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In this thesis Arabic script is transliterated into English as follows: 
 
English        Arabic        English  Arabic    Long vowels 
ʾ  أ          
t  ت            ḍ        ظ     ā ــا 
th  ث  ʿ        ع                  ī         ـــيــ   ــ  ــي  
j  ج  gh        غ                  ū         ــــو  
ḥ  ح  f       ف                  ā           ى 
kh  خ  q                  ق                   
d  د  k                  ك 
dh  ذ  l                   ل 
r  ر  m                   م 
z  ز  n                  ن  
s  س  h                   ه 
sh  ش  w                 و   
ṣ  ص  y                  ي         
ẓ  ض  a                   ة 
ṭ  ط  at                ة.. 
  
Dipthongs   Assimilation of the definite article 
aw  ـَـو          al-             .. الـ 
ay     ـَـيـ   al-sh              الشـ 
Wa-al           والـ .. 
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Background to the study 
This study is concerned with the legislation of Sharia (Arabic: 
Sharīʿa). Specifically, it is concerned with the provincial and 
kabupaten (regional)/municipal laws in Minangkabau, West 
Sumatra, which have been introduced since the implementation of 
decentralization and local autonomy in 2000. There have been 
numerous attempts to legislate Sharia by the local authorities, 
including members of parliament, governor and bupati (the head of 
kabupaten) and mayor. Sharia legislation at the provincial and 
kabupaten/municipal level is commonly labeled as Perda Sharia. The 
word Perda is an abbreviation of peraturan daerah, literally meaning 
the provincial or kabupaten/municipal law. Thus, Perda Sharia 
implies that the rules and regulations stipulated in 
provincial/municipal law are aimed to implement Islamic 
teachings regarding Sharia. Accordingly; this study will examine 
those themes of Sharia that have been legislated for. It will also 
examine the contents, practice and implementation of these laws 
in the province of West Sumatra.  
The position of Sharia in Minangkabau, West Sumatra, has 
been something of a mystery. The Minangkabau have a matrilineal 
society ruled by adat (custom). At the same time, it is one of the 
most thoroughly Islamized ethnic groups. This apparent 
contradiction and conflict between adat and Islam has induced a 
number of scholars to maintain that the matrilineal society has 
declined as the islamization of society has progressed (Kato 
1982:11). In 1803 (Dobbin 1982), the Padri zealots started a 
movement of Islamic modernist scholars known as the Kaum Muda. 
At the beginning of the 20th century (Abdullah 1971), the 
penetration of a monetary economy, educational progress and 
increasing population mobility have generally been perceived as 
the causes of this purported decline (Kato 1978; 1-2). In fact, 
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despite the perceived decline of Minangkabau adat, the current 
development of the society shows that the matrilineal system is far 
from disappearing and still manages to survive (Kato 1978:2; 
Hadler 2007:177). The relationship between adat and Islam rests on 
a maxim of adat – adat basandi Sharaʿ, Sharaʿ basandi kitabullah (adat 
is based on Sharia, Sharia is based on the Quran), that is commonly 
abbreviated as ABS-SBK. This maxim suggests that Minangkabau 
adat is subordinate to Sharia, however, practice demonstrates that 
the parts of society that are regulated by Sharia vary from time to 
time (Abdullah 1966; 1971; Dobbin 1983; Huda 2003). Accordingly, 
the matter of legislating Sharia for provincial and 
kabupaten/municipal laws is important to understand the position 
and development of Sharia in Minangkabau society today.  
The possibility of legislating Sharia for provincial as well as 
kabupaten/municipality laws is created by one main factor:  that is, 
the reformation of the state institutions that occurred after the 
collapse of the New Order Regime on 21 July 1998. The new era of 
the Indonesian government is commonly called the Era of 
Reformation — Era Reformasi. This term implies that the new 
government would conduct a ‘reform’, i.e. reform state 
institutions. In order prepare the grounds for these matters, the 
People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaran 
Rakyat/MPR) amended the 1945 constitution four times between 
1999 and 2002.1 The amendments resulted in a significant shift 
                                                        
1Debate and discussion on section 29 of the constitution took place inside and 
outside the parliament during 1999-2002, the constitutional amendment and 
reform period. Within parliament, the political parties PPP and PBB lodged their 
formal proposal to amend section 29 and reinsert Sharia into the constitution, 
even though together both parties only held 71 of the 462 seats. Outside of 
parliament, this proposal was supported by a number of Muslim groups, 
including the Islamic Defence Front (FPI), students at the Bogor Agricultural 
Institute (IPB) and the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). However, the 
proposal to reinsert Sharia into the constitution received no support from the 
two biggest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah (Hosen 2007:198-199). As a result, the attempt to amend section 
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concerning the establishment of new state institutions, also in 
terms of reshaping power relations between these institutions. The 
1945 constitution stipulates that the executive (the president), the 
legislature (the parliament, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR), and the 
judiciary (Supreme Court and Constitutional Court) possess the 
authority to deal with legal issues. The legitimacy of the president 
and parliament is derived from their election by the people. The 
president possesses the power of government in accordance with 
the constitution and the parliament holds legislative, financial and 
oversight functions. 
The president and parliament possess an equal right to 
table a bill in parliament. Article 20 of the constitution stipulates 
that both institutions must discuss each bill aiming to reach a joint 
approval. Subsequently, in order to make a jointly approval bill 
become law, it requires an approval from the parliament and 
president. If the president disapprove to the jointly approval bill 
that has been approved by the parliament, it will automatically 
become law within thirty days. However, article 5 of the 
constitution stipulates that whether or not a law is to come into 
effect relies on the president who authorizes to issue a government 
regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah/PP); otherwise, the law is legally 
nothing but window dressing in legal terms. 
 The amended 1945 constitution further stipulates the 
authority of judicial institutions. The Supreme Court (Mahkamah 
Agung/MA) has the authority to implement judicial power and 
exercise judicial review of any laws and regulations. Meanwhile, 
Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konsittusi/MK) possesses the 
authority to examine a case at the first and final level and has the 
final power of decision in matters of constitutional review. 
However, neither of these judicial institutions can exercise their 
authority without first receiving a plea from an individual or a 
                                                                                                                               
29 of the constitution failed. This failure proves once again that Indonesia is 
neither a secular, nor an Islamic state.    
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group who claim that their legal or constitutional rights have been 
harmed by an existing law or regulation. This development 
suggests that the legal relations among state institutions are 
considerably reformed.  
 In addition to the reform of legal relations among the state 
institutions, the reform has also dealt with political parties. The 
number of political parties has drastically increased, from only 
three political parties under the New Order to 141 parties 
registered at the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights in 1999. 
However, only 48 of these parties participated in the general 
election of 7 June 1999 and only 21 parties won one or more of the 
462 contested parliamentary seats (www.kpu.go.id). Among this 
number were several Islamic-oriented political parties who have 
attempted to introduce Sharia based state laws.  This situation 
arose out of the strengthened role of parliament. Laws 3 and 4 of 
1999 state that parliament has four mains functions:  a) to table 
bills and legislate; b) to act as a check on government; c) to 
approve the government’s budget; and d) to accommodate and 
channel the aspirations of the people.  
Prior to amending the constitution, on 13 November 1998, 
the People’s Consultative Assembly issued a decision authorizing 
the government to implement local autonomy and to devolve fiscal 
powers to the regions.2 Historically, regimes have perceived 
autonomy as a threat to national unity and centralized 
government (Eckardt and Anwar 2006:233). After only a few 
months of preparation, in May 1999, as part of a wider package of 
political reforms, the government passed law 22/1999 on regional 
governance and law 25/1999 on devolving fiscal powers between 
                                                        
2 See TAP MPR No.XV/MPR/1998 on the implementation of regional autonomy; 
administration, sharing and utilization of national sources under the justice 
principle; as well as the devolving of fiscal powers between the central and 




   
 
 
central, provincial and kabupaten/municipal government. Both 
laws stipulate a redistribution of political authority and financial 
resources among the three levels of government:  central, 
provincial and kabupaten/municipal.  
In connection to the implementation of regional autonomy, 
the central government decided to shift from centralized to 
decentralized government.3 This “decentralization” is commonly 
defined as:  
 
The transfer or delegation of the legal and political 
authority to plan, to make decisions and to implement and 
manage public functions and development programs from 
the central government and its agencies to field 
organizations of those agencies, sub-national spheres of 
(regional) government, local government authorities, semi-
autonomous public corporation, non-governmental 
organization, and community-based organizations; with 
corresponding resources, guided by the principles of 
subsidiarity and proximity (Ng’ndwe 2003:55-56). 
 
Shifting to a policy of decentralization implies that the central 
government is willing to share its authority with the provincial 
and kabupaten/municipal governments and other institutions.   
I would suggest that there are two grounds for this shift. First, it is 
the consolidation of state power through efforts to build state 
authority based on government consent.  Second, it is a break with 
the past, occasioned by both internal and external sources of 
pressure for change. In connection with these two grounds, factors 
within government may also have forced the change. These factors 
                                                        
3Through his political party PAN, Amien Rais actively campaigned for Indonesia 
to leave behind the unitary state and shift to federalism. His main argument was 
that Indonesia is too diverse to be a unitary state. He eventually withdrew this 
idea, however, because he received no significant support (Riyanto: 2000).  
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include: a) the fear for secession for certain regions; b) a 
determined approach towards deepening democracy; c) the 
economic crisis since 1998; d) structural change in the economy; 
and e) the demographic conditions of Indonesia. In addition, 
external factors may also have stimulated the government to shift 
to democratic decentralization; for instance, the expectations of or 
even pressure from international donors, including the World 
Bank (cf, Oluwu 2003:16-17; Pratiko 2003:33-34;  Huda 2010:273-
275). 
The government maintains this decentralization and 
regional autonomy with a number of laws, rules and regulations 
that are growing rapidly. Law 22/1999 stipulates that provincial 
and kabupaten/municipal government have the authority to govern 
all matters with the exception of foreign affairs, national security, 
the judiciary, monetary policies, religion, the national 
development plan, state administration, the national economic 
plan, the human and natural resources strategic plan, national 
conservation and national standardization. On 15 October 2004 the 
government passed law 32/2004 as a revision to law 22/1999. 
Section 13 to 14 of this new law stipulates the authority of the 
regional government and enhances with a number of details 
relating to tasks concerning administration and fiscal issues. 
However, article 10 (3) states that the matters of foreign affairs, 
national security, judiciary, monetary policies and religion still 
belong to the authority of the central government. 
The application of the principles of decentralization has 
also significantly reformed power relations within the provincial 
and kabupaten/municipal authorities. The provincial government 
mainly serves as the representative of central government at the 
region and has a limited authority concerning with the affairs of 
kabupaten/municipal government. The kabupaten/municipal 
government now possesses the authority to run the 
kabupaten/municipal government within the principles of 
decentralization. Although regional and central government share 
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power, the representatives of regional government also possess 
the same political legitimacy as those members of parliament who 
are directly elected by the people. Since 2005 this also applies to 
the governor, bupati (the head of kabupaten) and mayor. 
The regional governments immediately asserted their 
authority when decentralization and local autonomy were 
implemented in 2000. The first things they were concernd with 
were plans to issue rules and regulations, including attempts to 
legislate Sharia for provincial and kabupaten/municipal law. A 
number of regional authorities justified these attempts by saying 
that they obtained the authority to legislate Sharia in order to 
maintain local governance. In addition, the emergence of a number 
of Islamic political parties and public demands to legalize Sharia 
significantly contributed to this matter. This development 
occurred in a number of regions where Islam is an embedded and 
accepted part of local culture, including, among other provinces, 
West Sumatra, West Java, Banten, South Sulawesi, and South 
Kalimantan (Bush 2008; Hooker 2008; Crouch 2009; Muntoha 2010).  
This attempt to introduce Sharia legislation resulted in a public 
debate centered on whether local government has the authority to 
pass Sharia by-laws. Up to now, only the government of Aceh has 
the explicit authority to codify Sharia as a 
provincial/kabupaten/municipal law. This is called qanun and is 
stipulated in national laws 44/1999 and 11/2006. In other 
provinces it remains debatable whether regional government has 
the authority to legislate Sharia. There is a view that the district 
government has no authority to legislate Sharia in provincial/ 
kabupaten/municipal law as article 8 of law 22/1999 and article 10 
(3) of law 32/2004 stipulate that religious matters are the subject of 
the central government, not the district government.  The 
opposing view argues that local government does have the 
authority to legislate Sharia and that this is justified by articles 69 
of law 22/1999 and 136 (1) of law 32/2004, which stipulate that the 
governor, head of kabupaten/municipality and members of the 
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regional parliament are authorized to issue a local law in order to 
maintain local needs and identity (ciri khas daerah). However, 
article 70 of law 22/1999 and article 136 (3) of law 32/2004 limit 
this authority by making it conditional that the local law does not 
contravene the public good (kepentingan umum) or higher ranking 
laws. Despite these different views, Sharia laws have been 
introduced in a number of provinces. 
This study is devoted to the issue of legislating Sharia for 
provincial and kabupaten/municipal law (peraturan daerah) and its 
implementation after the government applied decentralization 
and local autonomy. This research uses the legislation of Sharia for 
the provincial/kabupaten/municipal law in West Sumatra. It is 
confined to those attempts to legislate Sharia that occurred 
between 2000 and 2011. It concerns the topics of legalized Sharia, 
the contents of the provincial as well as kabupaten/municipal laws, 
and the actual practice of these laws.  
 
Related studies  
To date, there have been a number of studies related to the issue of 
codification of Sharia for local law. However, not all of these 
studies applied an academic approach to this subject. Five 
academic studies that are worth mentioning briefly are those 
conducted by Deny Hamdani (2007), M.B. Hooker (2008), Robin 
Bush (2008), Melissa Crouch (2009) and Muntoha (2010). These 
studies can be summarized as follows:  
Deny Hamdani confines his study to the issue of the 
headscarf in the changing social and political constellation of post-
Suharto Indonesia. He devotes a chapter to the practices of Muslim 
dress code in the municipality of Padang and in a village, called 
Paninggahan in the region of Solok. He suggests that the 
formalization of Islamic attire has been unproductive in terms of 
promoting Islamic precepts, because this theme is an idea that is 
constantly contested within the complex Muslim social structure. 
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He also suggests that the imposition of Islamic attire on students in 
public schools has failed to encourage a personal awareness of 
religious and cultural identity (Hamdani 2007:128). Hamdani 
concludes that the imposition of the headscarf has resulted in a 
purely formal obligation; it has lost its profound inner meaning for 
those who wear it and the imposition of Islamic dress has 
transformed the headscarf into a tool of oppression – particularly 
for non-Muslim students who are forced to adopt this symbol of 
Islamic identity – rather than a liberating personal choice 
(Hamdani 2007:172-173). I would argue that these conclusions are 
premature. A study dealing with human action, the headscarf in 
this case, requires a long period to observe the practices in order 
to grasp whether a law has influenced human behavior.  
M.B. Hooker, a well-known scholar in the field of law, also 
focuses his scholarly work on this phenomenon. However, he 
places this issue in the framework of broader theme: Sharia for the 
Indonesian madhhab (school of Islamic law). Hooker’s research was 
concerned with whether the codification of Sharia for local law is 
in line with the efforts to define the Indonesian madhhab. Hooker 
examines the texts of Sharia by-laws issued in Aceh, South 
Sulawesi and West Sumatra as well as the draft criminal codes 
prepared by Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, a Muslim group that 
promotes Sharia at a state level. He analyses the position of these 
local laws in connection with Pancasila, the constitution and other 
state laws and regulations.  Hooker concluded that the legal status 
of a Sharia by-law is uncertain in terms of Pancasila, the 
constitution and regional autonomy laws. (Hooker 2008:243). After 
analyzing those Sharia by-laws issued in West Sumatra between 
2001 and 2006, he concludes that these local laws are a ‘work in 
progress’. Furthermore, he indicates that while these local laws are 
correct in form, they do not settle the question of validity. The 
intention of these local laws is to implement Sharia values; that is, 
to convert these values into public duty (Hooker 2008:268-269). 
Hooker further suggests that since conflicting assertions around 
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the legislation of Sharia occur, it requires a study on the 
effectiveness of the regulations in changing behavior (Hooker 
2008:268-269). This study attempts to provide what Hooker has 
suggested. 
 Robin Bush shows her enthusiasm in studying this issue. 
She examines 78 local laws from 470 regions throughout Indonesia. 
She classifies them into three categories: 35 local laws dealing with 
public order and social problems; 17 local laws regarding Islamic 
skills and obligation; and 14 local laws concerning religious 
symbols (Bush 2008:180). Bush concludes that there are four 
motives that trigger local authorities to codify Sharia for local 
laws: history and local culture, corruption and the necessity to 
disguise or deflect attention from it, local electoral politics and the 
lack of technical government opportunity at the local level. 
However, she emphasizes that it is mainly motivated by local 
politics and the local capacity for good government (Bush 
2008:182). Her conclusion is that the appeal of Islamist agendas 
seeking to formalize Sharia within the legal system is waning. 
Combined with the pressure on local government leaders to 
produce concrete results before the next direct elections, this 
appears to be shifting the emphasis of local politics towards good 
governance measures and away from symbolic regulations (Bush 
2008:191). Her findings reveal that this phenomenon closely relates 
to local politics. To some extent, my study attempts to revisit her 
conclusion that indicates that codification of Sharia is waning 
within the legal system.  
Melissa Crouch is also interested in this subject. She reports 
that the local government of West Sumatra has generated over 40 
local Sharia laws, more than any other province in Indonesia 
(South Sulawesi and West Java are next). Crouch examines 160 
local laws from 26 provinces in Indonesia and classifies these under 
nine themes: clothing, prostitution, social problems (maksiat), 
alcohol and drugs, religious rituals, zakāt management, Quranic 
education, local governance and non-Islamic regulations (Crouch 
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2009:58-60). She claims that these local laws have discriminated 
against vulnerable groups such as women, children, the poor and 
religious minorities. She concludes that the central government 
has failed to intervene because of the perceived need to maintain 
the support of the majority Muslim-voter base in a competitive 
political environment (Crouch 2009:80). However, current 
developments in the legal system mean that the review of what she 
claims to be discriminatory local laws is not only the task of the 
central government, but also that of the Supreme Court. Both have 
the power to review these laws and judge whether they contradict 
national laws and regulations. However, it should be noted that 
this review can only be instigated by a complaint from the 
discriminated people.  
Another scholar who devotes his study to this subject is 
Muntoha. He raises three main points regarding this issue:  the 
position of Sharia in the legal system, the implication of Sharia 
emerging in local law, and the categories of the local law regarding 
Sharia (Muntoha 2010:21). He concludes that the emergence of 
Sharia in local law is a reflection of the expectation of Muslims to 
obey Sharia, something which is guaranteed by article 29 of the 
constitution. He further argues that the national law provides a 
judicial and normative possibility (celah yuridis dan normatif) for the 
local authorities to codify Sharia in local law, in accordance with 
their local culture (Muntoha 2010:345-6). His study is based solely 
on normative discussions and lacks empirical research. 
Discrepancies between normative law and practice often occur. 
In short, further study of the codification of Sharia in local 
law is necessary in order to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of this phenomenon. For this purpose, it is 
important to pay close attention to the actors in this subject, to the 
drafts and final texts of the local laws, to how this issue is publicly 
discussed or debated, and also observe the implementation of 
those local laws over a longer period of time. This study is devoted 
to these comprehensive aspects of the phenomenon.  
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Focus of the study 
This study examines four aspects of provincial and 
kabupaten/municipal Sharia by-laws: the draft, public discussion 
and debate of a draft during the period in which it is scrutinized by 
members of parliament, and the texts and implementation of 
Sharia by-laws. Several Sharia by-laws have been selected for 
scrutiny. A provincial law is defined as a law that is passed by the 
provincial parliament and the governor. A kabupaten/municipal 
law is defined as a law that is approved by the parliament and the 
bupati or the mayor.4 In addition, this study also scrutinizes those 
regulations issued by the governor or bupati/mayor in connection 
with the legislation and implementation of Sharia.  
To categorize whether a provincial or regional law is a 
Sharia by-law (Perda Sharia), I follow Rudolph Peters who suggests 
that, ‘Whether the codification of the Sharia can still be regarded 
as Sharia and as Islamic, relies on the Muslims themselves; if they 
hold that it is Islamic and a legitimate interpretation of the Sharia 
there are no good arguments to view it differently’ (Peters 2002:92-
93). Thus, I categorize it as Perda Sharia if Muslims, politicians, 
government officers, journalists, or even non-Muslims name it 
Perda Sharia. Nevertheless, there is still another reason to 
rationalize a provincial or kabupaten/municipal law as Perda Sharia; 
that is, if the substantive law, the terms or vocabulary that are 
used in the texts of the law have been used in the Quran or Hadith 
or in other sources of Islamic teachings. In short, this study aims to 
                                                        
4Law 10/2004 mentions the term local law (Peraturan Daerah), which it defines as 
a law that is issued by the local parliament (DPRD) and approved by local 
leaders, i.e. governor or head of region or mayor. Article 7 (2) of this law further 
classifies the local law into provincial, regional and village law. In 2011 the 
government amended law 10/2004 with law 12/2011 and the term ‘local law’ is 
no longer used. It has been replaced with the terms provincial law and regional 
law. Article 7 (1) of law 12/2011 stipulates regional law to be at the bottom of the 




   
 
 
present a comprehensive position and the development of Sharia 
in the specific social context of Minangkabau society in West 
Sumatra. 
Research questions 
This thesis seeks to answer the following interconnected-
questions: Which parts of Sharia have been used in legislating 
provincial and kabupaten/municipal laws? Who are the actors 
behind this development? What is/are the motive(s) of the local 
authorities to legislate Sharia? Are the rules regulated in the Sharia 
by-laws fully implemented? These questions guide this research 
project to study a number of aspects of this issue: the draft of law, 
the legal process in the provincial, kabupaten/municipal 
parliament, the texts, and the actual practice of the law.  
 
Methods 
Data for this study is gathered using two research methods – 
bibliographical and empirical investigation. Bibliographical 
investigation aims to obtain information dealing with Sharia and 
other closely related subjects to this theme. It covers several 
studies on this subject conducted in a number of Muslim 
communities, in Indonesia and West Sumatra, and several subjects 
related to the general issue of law. I have conducted research in 
four libraries located in Leiden: the library of Leiden University 
(UB), the library of KITLV, the library of faculty of law and the 
library of social sciences. In West Sumatra, I also used the 
collections owned by the library of the Sharia Faculty of the IAIN 
and the faculty of law at Andalas University. In addition, the texts 
of laws and regulations issued by Indonesian institutions have 
mainly been gathered by accessing several internet links provided 
by government and non-government institutions that I consider 
credible.  
I conducted the empirical investigation in West Sumatra over 
three separate periods. My first fieldwork was carried out from 
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September 2008 to May 2009, the second was from 22 April to 28 
November 2010 and the last one was conducted from 2 December 
2011 to 23 January 2012. The purpose of this fieldwork varied. The 
first and second periods of fieldwork were primarily aimed at 
gaining data concerning: 1) the legal process relating to local laws 
in the parliament and at the provincial and kabupaten/municipality 
level. This process begins from the first idea of issuing the law, and 
moves through the drafting stage, public debates, and finally 
approval of the local law; 2) the implementation of the provincial 
and kabupaten/municipal laws; and 3) public opinion and 
responses, to these laws. My final period of fieldwork focused on 
gaining updates from the field. 
During the first and second periods, I gathered data 
through a variety of ways. First, I conducted several in-depth 
interviews, conversations, talks and chats with people whom I 
classified to be directly or indirectly involved with the attempts of 
Sharia legislation and its implementation. I also classified the 
respondents based on whether they were opponents or proponents 
to the issue. This included members of the provincial or 
kabupaten/municipal parliaments for the periods of 1999-2004, 
2004-2009 and 2009-2014; local authorities; ulama (Arabic ʿulamāʾ: 
religious scholars); teachers; students; administrators; academics; 
police officers; NGO activists; journalists and members of the 
general public. Secondly, I also conducted focus group discussions 
(FGD) in Padang, Solok and Bukittinggi. In addition, after 
withdrawing from the field, I have maintained contact with 
respondents via email, chatting, phone, SMS other forms of 
electronic communications. I have chosen not to mention their 
names in this thesis when I quote their ideas, thoughts and 
personal opinions. Rather, I only mention their position or job. 
Third, I collected the texts related to the legal process relating to 
provincial and regional laws; for example the drafts, minutes or 
text of speeches by the members of parliament and the governor 
or bupati/mayor. Finally, I collected news reports relating to this 
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issue published in the local newspaper between 2000 and 2010. I 
collected news from four daily local newspapers:  Daily Singgalang, 
Daily Haluan, Daily Padang Ekspres and Daily Pos Metro. In addition, 
news related to this study was also gathered via internet links 
provided by several newspapers, TV channels and other social 
networks including Facebook and YouTube. 
 
Organization of the book 
This book is arranged in five chapters, excluding the introduction 
and conclusion. The introduction provides the background to the 
study and positions this book in relation to several previous 
studies of a similar nature. It also includes the related studies to 
this topic, the focus of this study, the research questions that this 
study attempts to answer, and the methods used. 
Chapter one provides a general sketch of current 
developments in Sharia in the Muslim world. It includes a number 
of sections concerning the concept of Sharia, the role of Sharia in 
Muslim countries, the place of Sharia in the Indonesian legal 
system, a number of state legislated Sharia laws, the emergence of 
codification and legislation of Sharia in some provinces, and the 
position of Sharia in Minangkabau society in West Sumatra. 
The contents of chapters’ two to five are arranged on the 
basis of chronological themes relating to the legislation of Sharia. 
The first theme is the attempt of this legislation to deal with public 
morality matters. It is followed by three themes on Muslim dress 
code, the obligation to acquire the skills to recite the Quran and 
finally matters of zakāt. Thus, chapter two presents Sharia by-laws 
concerned with public morality and relating to criminal law. The 
chapter begins with a brief discussion of Islamic rules on public 
law, and it then presents an overview of the place of Islamic 
criminal law in Muslims countries. Subsequently, it discusses the 
presence of Islamic criminal law in the Indonesian legal system. 
The discussion continues in the context of West Sumatra, starting 
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from provincial law including its draft stage, public discussions in 
response to the draft and the content of the provincial law 
11/2001. Further, this chapter presents six selected regional laws 
on this topic, derived from Bukittinggi, Padangpanjang, 
Payakumbuh, Padangpariaman, Sawahlunto/Sijunjung and Pesisir 
Selatan. The last part of this chapter concerns the municipality of 
Padang and the (draft) law 11/2005, Satpol PP (civil service police 
unit) and the actual practice of the law. 
Chapter three presents the issue of Muslim dress code. This 
chapter begins with a discussion of the Islamic rules on this topic 
after which it presents a brief discussion on this matter in the 
Muslim world and the attitude of the Indonesian government 
towards this subject. Then, it provides a history of Muslim dress 
code in West Sumatran society and subsequently examines the 
provincial law concerning dress code. This chapter also examines a 
number of selected regional laws from Solok, 
Sawahlunto/Sijunjung, Pasaman, Limapuluhkota, Padangpanjang, 
Agam and Solok Selatan. The final section of this chapter presents 
the actual practice of Sharia law in the municipality of Padang. 
Chapter four presents an overview of Quranic education. 
This chapter begins with a brief outline of the rules on reciting the 
Quran. This is followed by a short description of reciting the Quran 
in the Muslim world and the Indonesian government’s policy on 
this issue. The next discussion is about Quranic education within 
Minangkabau traditions and this leads to an examination of the 
contents of the provincial law related to this subject. This is 
followed by a look at selected kabupaten/municipal laws of Solok, 
Sawahlunto/Sijunjung, Limapuluhkota, Pesisir Selatan and Agam. 
Then, this chapter presents the actual practices of Quranic 
education in the municipality of Padang, including SD Plus 
programs, implementation of regional law 6/2003 on Quranic 
education, Muslim responses to the policy and the impact of this 




   
 
 
The final chapter focuses on the institution of zakāt. It begins by 
presenting the Islamic rules on zakāt and also examines, briefly, 
developments in this area that have taken place in a number of 
Muslim countries. Subsequently, the government’s concerns about 
issues of zakāt are presented, relating to a period from the 1960s 
until 2011, when the government issued law 23/2011 as a revision 
to law 38/1999 on zakāt management. The discussion continues in 
relation to zakāt in West Sumatra, starting with how this topic is 
dealt with at the provincial level and continuing with a look at 
selected kabupaten/municipal laws on this topic. The laws selected 
originate from the kabupaten Pesisir Selatan, Solok, Agam and from 
the municipality of Bukittinggi, Padangpajang and Padang. The 
actual practices of managing zakāt in the municipality of Padang 
are also examined. This includes the establishment of a semi-
governmental zakāt institution (BAZDA), the collection and 
distribution of zakāt revenue, and resistance to zakāt. 
This study ends with a conclusion and a recommendation. 
The conclusion presents a number of findings and offers new 
understanding regarding the position and development of Sharia 
in Minangkabau society in West Sumatra in particular and in 
Indonesia in general. The recommendation addresses the need for 















Sharia has been central for Muslims since the time of the prophet 
to the present. Most Muslims believe that Sharia deals with all 
aspects of their life. However, the history of Sharia shows that 
categories of Sharia vary depending on time and place. Through 
the ages, Sharia has developed and it has also been confronted 
with various challenges. The most recent developments in Sharia 
show that it contests various values and laws, including issues 
surrounding its position within the legal system of a nation state.  
This chapter aims to present the position of Sharia in 
Muslim countries; starting from a global picture and ending at the 
latest developments in Minangkabau, West Sumatra. To this end, 
the chapter begins with a brief discussion regarding the concept of 
Sharia. Subsequently, it presents the position of Sharia in a number 
of Muslims countries, which, in turn, will illustrate its position 
within the Indonesian legal system. This will also outline elements 
of Sharia that have been legalized and incorporated into the 
national law. Crucially, this chapter also discusses the situation 
since the government implemented a policy of decentralization 
and regional autonomy in 2000 that has resulted in the legislation 
of Sharia for provincial and regional/municipal laws. It also 
discusses the validity of provincial or regional /municipal law and 
the extent to which central government still has the authority to 
control these laws if they are in contradiction with the 
constitution or other, higher ranking laws. In the final subsection I 
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will present a brief history of Sharia within West Sumatran society. 
The chapter ends with conclusions on the issues presented.  
 
1.2 The concept of Sharia 
Currently, the word Sharia is widely used to refer to the rules or 
regulations that determine how Muslims behave and conduct their 
lives. Principally, these rules and regulations are derived deform 
two main sources of Islamic teachings, the Quran and ḥadīth. The 
scope of these rules and regulations has been gradually extended 
by Muslim scholars (faqih/fuqahāʾ), legal advisers (mufti) and judges 
(qāḍī). The Quran and ḥadīth clearly indicate that the word Sharia 
applies to the rules and regulations that set out how to behave and 
to live.  
The word Sharia (Sharāʾiʿ, plural) originates from sh-r-ʿ, 
meaning, among other things, ‘water hole, drinking place; 
approach to a water hole' (Wehr 1979:544). If this is interpreted as 
a well-trodden path for man and beast to a source of water in an 
arid desert environment then one can appreciate why this term 
became a metaphor for Muslims and a whole way of life ordained 
by God (Weis 1998:17). The Quran mentions a word related to 
Sharia in five verses and the word Sharia itself occurs in the 
chapter of al-Jāthīya/the Kneeling down (45): 18, which designates 
a path. The cognate shirʿa occurs once in the chapter of al-
Māʾida/the Table spread (5): 48 and parallels minhāj, meaning the 
way or a path. The root sh-r-ʿa appears in verb form twice in the 
chapter of al-Shūrā/Consultation (42): 13 and 21. Lastly, the word 
shurraʿan appears in the chapter al-ʾAʿrāf/the Heights (7): 163 in 
relation to rebels (ʿAbd al-Bāqī 1988:378). In the ḥadīth the word 
Sharia occurs once in the ḥadīth of Ibn Ḥanbal. In the plural form it 
appears about a dozen times, including al-imān wa sharāʾiʿ, sharāʾiʿ 
al-islām, wa sharāʾiʿ wa ḥudūda and al-Islām wa sharāʾiʿahu (Wensinck 
1955:101). Thus, Sharia is the most frequently used term in both 
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the Quran and the ḥadīth for expressing the rules, regulations and 
system of rules relating to behavior and conduct.  
At the 2nd/8th century, the word Sharia was seldom 
applied by Muslim scholars. Indeed, the word dīn was used to 
describe Muslims’ activities. This term was not only used in 
reference to dogma but also with regard to the law (Rahman 
1979:102). For example, in Risāla, al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820) makes little use 
of the word Sharia or Sharʿ. The scholar al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) uses 
the word in al-Mustaṣfā in relation to sharʿunā (our law) and Sharʿu 
man qablanā (the law of those before us) (Celder 1997:322). In the 
8th/14th century, Muslim scholars use this word widely in 
reference to rules or regulations relating to conduct or behavior. 
For instance, al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388) uses the word Sharia as a central 
theme in al-Muwāfaqāt fī ʾuṣūl al-sharīʿa. He defines it as rules that 
regulate conduct (afʿāl), ways of speaking (aqwāl) and intention 
(iʿtiqād) (al-Shāṭibī 2003). A more contemporary scholar, ʿAbd al-
Wahhāb Khallāf (d. 1956) defines Sharia as a set of rules ordained 
by Shāriʿ (the Law Makers, God) dealing with the conduct (afʿʿāl) of 
mukallaf which are either imposed (ṭalaban), optional (takhyīran) or 
conditional (waḍʿan) (Khallāf 1992:100).  
Muslim scholars categorize Muslims’ conduct (khitāb al-
taklīf) into five classifications: neutral or indifferent (mubāḥ), 
recommended (mandūb), disapproved (makrūh), obligatory (wājib) 
and forbidden (ḥarām). These categories deal with a Muslim’s 
relationship with God, with other individual Muslims and with the 
community. Within these categories Sharia is not a uniform, fixed 
and unchangeable set of rules. Indeed, I found a variety of rules 
regarding behavior and conduct in various fiqh books, kitāb al-
fatāwā and Muslim laws in different countries. Furthermore, the 
above three categories have not remained fixed over time. The 
rules that were initially seen as only relating to the relationship 
between a Muslim and God later developed. For instance, the 
purpose of zakāt was to maintain the relationship between a 
Muslim and God and it also had social purposes. Later, however, 
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zakāt became viewed as a matter of ritual. The development of 
zakāt over the last three decades has demonstrated its double 
function – its socio-economic purposes and its purpose as a ritual. 
The rules relating to fasting provide us with another example. 
Current developments show that there are new regulations in 
some Muslim countries, for instance Morocco, that include 
punishment for those who disrespect the rules of fasting in a 
provocative manner during Ramadan (Buskens 2010:122). Similar 
developments can also be seen with regard to regional laws in 
areas such as West Sumatra (see chapter 2). 
Sharia, then, is part of a tradition of rules (which can be 
divided into five categories) that determine the correct forms and 
purpose of Muslim conduct. As a tradition of Muslim discourse, 
Sharia addresses the conception of the Islamic past and future and 
in particular to Islamic practice in the present (Asad 1984:14). 
Current developments in this tradition show that its scope has 
been widely extended. Sharia now also functions as a vocabulary 
for morality and justice. Indeed, it is a flexible vocabulary for a 
moral economy of claims and counter-claims between the masses 
and various factions, with regards to the obligations of ruler and 
ruled (Zubaida 2003:11). This development suggests that Sharia 
concerns all aspects of Muslim life, from birth to death; a total 
discourse that finds simultaneous expression within diverse 
institutions, be they religious, legal, moral, economic or political. 
However, attempts to legislate Sharia at a state level have forced to 
adjust it to the new circumstances of Muslim society today, so 
Sharia is primarily viewed in a narrow legal sense (Messick 1993:3).  
1.3. Role of Sharia in Muslim countries 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the majority of Muslim 
countries were subject to the political power of Western rulers. 
This domination led to the subordination of Sharia under the state 
legal systems imposed by these rulers. This position persisted after 
these Muslim countries gained their independence. The place of 
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Sharia in state legal systems can be classified into three categories: 
1) Sharia formally dominates the state legal system and Islam is 
officially the religion of state; 2) Sharia is a source of state 
legislation but a Western-style legal system prevails; and 3) Sharia 
has no role in the legal system at all (cf. Otto 2010:635; Peters 
2003:91).  
Saudi Arabia and Iran fall into the first category. In the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sharia is explicitly located in the state 
constitution and, formally, it is the sole source of political 
legitimacy and it is the source for the country’s laws (Vogel 
2011:55). This is evidenced by section 1 of the constitution, called 
al-Niẓām al-ʾasāsī, which states that the religion (of Saudi Arabia) is 
Islam. Article 7 states that ‘Rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
draws its authority from the Book of God Most High and Sunna of 
His Prophet’. These two texts have sovereignty (ḥākiman) over all 
regulations (niẓām) of the state (Vogel 2000:3). On 1 March 1992, 
King Fahd issued the first codified constitutional framework for his 
country, stating that the country will not adopt a Western-style 
system of democracy. He argued that the Islamic system, on which 
the constitution is based (Shūrā) is more suitable for the needs of 
the country (van Eijk 2010:151). In Iran, the role of Islam has been 
explicit since the country adopted a new constitution following the 
Revolution of 1979. The general principle of the constitution is 
illustrated by article 4, which states that ‘all civil, penal, financial, 
economic, administrative, cultural, military, political and other 
laws and regulation must be based on Islamic criteria’ (Mir-
Hosseini 2010:348).    
The majority of Muslim countries belong to the second 
category. However, there are nuances and variations from country 
to country, including Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Morocco. 
Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution, adopted in 1971, includes the 
clause: ‘Islam is the religion of the state, Arabic is the official 
language, the principle of the Islamic Sharia shall be a chief source 
of legislation’. In 1980, the government of Egypt amended article 2 
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of the constitution and changed the wording from mabādiʾ al- 
sharīʿa al-islāmīya maṣdar raʾīsī li al-tashrīʿ (the principles of Islamic 
Sharia are a principle source of Legislation) to the more forceful 
statement, mabādiʾ al- sharīʿa al-islāmīya al-maṣdar al-raʾīsī li al-tashrīʿ 
(the principles of Islamic Sharia are the principle source of 
legislation). Henceforth, Sharia would play a more important role 
in Egyptian society (Lombardi 2006:1-2). The new stress on 
Egyptian citizenship was designed not to combat, but rather to 
balance the role of religion in national identity and political 
discussions. Similarly, the ban on parties with a religious reference 
was based on a claim that religion should not be used to divide the 
country (Brown 2011:117). While the position of Sharia is similar in 
many Muslim countries, different countries have different schools 
of law (madhhab); for example, Morocco has adopted the Malikite 
School, while Malaysia and Indonesia adhere to the Shafi’ite 
School.  
Turkey belongs to the third category. In 1926, it adopted a 
totally different model in which the constitution establishes the 
Republic of Turkey as a democratic, secular and social state, 
governed by the rule of law and respecting fundamental human 
rights and freedom. Turkey implements the most rigorous secular 
project in the Muslim world and uses all available means to 
exclude Islamic norms from the public sphere. Codification of 
Turkish law is based on a number of European systems: civil and 
commercial law originally based on the Swiss system, 
administrative law founded on the French system, and criminal 
law based on the Italian system. Secularization of the law was 
largely completed in 1928 when Ataturk initiated secular reform 
and abolished Islam as the state’s religion. Calls for increased 
religiosity in recent decades have had no effect on the country’s 
law (Koçak 2010:231).  
As we have seen, the position of Sharia within these three 
categories varies from country to country. Otto suggests that the 
development of Sharia in twelve Muslim countries shows two main 
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streams – a sense of moderation and some signs of reverse trends. 
Otto suggests that the moderation can be seen in: the rolling back 
of earlier reforms (Iran), the move towards constitutionalism 
(Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Turkey), the continuing 
liberalization of marriage laws (Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan), 
restraint in the execution of cruel corporal punishment (Pakistan, 
Malaysia, Nigeria), significant progress in democracy and human 
rights (Indonesia) and the maintaining of the status quo (Mali). At 
the same time, Otto believes a second trend is emerging that is 
reflected in, among other things, the introduction of retribution 
punishment in Pakistan (1997), the rolling back of marriage law 
reform in Malaysia (1994) and the introduction of Sharia criminal 
law in Northern Nigeria (Otto 2010:620). 
  
1.4 Position of Sharia in the Indonesian legal system 
The position of Sharia in the Indonesian legal system finds its roots 
in the Dutch colonial administration. The colonial government 
attempted, not always successfully, to avoid being involved in 
religious matters. In 1882, it issued staatsblad 152/1882 which 
wrongly labeled Islamic courts in Java and Madura priesterraad or 
priests councils.. These courts were led by a group of judges called 
penghulu, which consisted of between three and eight non-salaried 
religious officials. Its jurisdiction covered family law, including 
marriage, divorce, inheritance and endowment (waqf). Crucially, 
however, decisions made by these courts could only be legally 
executed once the civil court had given its affirmation (executoire 
verklaring). For the government, elements of Sharia might be only 
valid if they had been absorbed by adat or customary law (Lev 
1972:11). This position illustrates that the position of Sharia in the 
colonial legal system was double dependent; it relied on the civil 
court (landraad) to execute decisions taken by the priest councils 
on the one hand, while on the other hand its validity depended on 
25 
 
   
 
 
adat (Hooker 2008). In other words, Sharia was located on the 
periphery of the colonial legal administration.  
There have been a number of attempts by individual 
Muslims or Islamic groups to make Sharia central to the 
Indonesian legal system. Their main objective is to gain 
constitutional acknowledgement of the legal standing of the 
implementation of Sharia for Muslims. This objective was 
advocated during sessions held by the BPUPK (Badan Penyelidik 
Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan/Investigating Committee for 
the Preparation of Independence) between June and August 1945. 
The result was a phrase added to the preamble of the constitution, 
commonly called Jakarta charter, stating that Muslims have an 
obligation to adhere to Sharia. In fact, this phrase was commonly 
seen as the legal basis for further steps to implement Sharia. 
Ultimately, however, this phrase was removed from the final draft 
of the constitution and the head of the BPUPK promised to revisit 
this matter after independence (Anshari 1981). This issue re-
emerged during the Konstituante debates held between 11 
November and 7 December 1957; during the parliamentary sessions 
at the beginning of the New Order (1966-8); and in the 
parliamentary sessions held between 1999 and 2002 aimed at 
amending the constitution. But, these attempts failed to achieve 
their purpose (Hosen 2006).  
Despite the fact that the constitution does not explicitly 
acknowledge Sharia, it has played a role in the development of the 
Indonesian legal system. There are two important factors that 
make it possible to apply Sharia. First, section 29 of the 
constitution regulates that: 1) the state shall be based upon a belief 
in the One and Only God; and 2) the state guarantees all citizens 
the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or 
belief.  This section indicates that Sharia is placed as a source for 
national law, not as national law itself. For that to occur, it must be 
transformed through the process of state legislation. This section 
requires that the implementation of Sharia must be based on an 
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individual consciousness or awareness, and not be imposed by 
state law. Furthermore, the state is obligated to facilitate and 
guarantee the implementation of Sharia; and the legislation to 
incorporate Sharia in national law must not be in an imperative 
form (Mahfud 2008:72). In fact, section 29 of the constitution is 
commonly used to justify Sharia legislation for state laws and 
regulations. Secondly, the government established the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs on 3 January 1946. This ministry primarily 
undertook tasks dealing with religious affairs that fell under the 
remit of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Home Affairs and 
the Ministry of Education and Culture. It established offices at the 
provincial, regional/municipal and sub-regional (kecamatan) level 
and these have played a significant role in intensifying Islam 
across the country. Historically, the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
has been a bridge between the interests of the state and the 
Muslim communities.  
Although section 29 of the constitution justifies legislation 
of Sharia for state law, evidence shows that the first Sharia 
legislation was not introduced until three decades after 
independence. This situation was mainly the result of three 
interconnected factors. Firstly, a number of Muslim groups, 
including the Darul Islam movement, utilized Sharia as an emblem 
that threatened the unity of Indonesia. They advocated replacing 
the unitary state with an Islamic state (Van Dijk 1981). Secondly, 
Sharia remained inapplicable for the state’s purposes as it was 
unsystematic, lacked procedural rules, was often contradictory and 
was disconnected from the modernization project introduced by 
the government. This situation was also linked to a learning 
culture in which Sharia was primarily taught to gain piousness 
rather than as a functioning law. Thirdly, there was a woeful lack 
of well-educated actors who could be proponents of Sharia for 
state law. The consequence of this third factor was that the power 
relations and political interests of the ruler had nothing to do with 
Sharia. Since the 1970s, these three problems have gradually 
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changed and the attitude of Indonesia’s rulers towards Sharia has 
begun to shift and we are seeing Sharia being introduced in certain 
contexts.  
 
1.5 Integrating Sharia with the state 
Although a number of scholars label the legislation of Sharia for 
state law as Islamization,5 this study takes a different position. It 
sees this legislation as an attempt by the state to integrate Sharia 
and bring it in line with the state’s interests (cf. Halim 2008). The 
word integrate implies that an act of adjustment is employed in 
three ways: to determine the means, the procedures and the 
methods of Sharia in order to bring it in line with Pancasila and the 
constitution. Integration also means acknowledging that there are 
other elements of Sharia that are not in line with these two 
standards. Further, the political interests of rulers, likely to gain 
the political support of Muslims if they permit the integration of 
Sharia, also play a role in this issue.  
The government aims to achieve at least two objectives in 
legislating Sharia for the national law: first, to accommodate a 
living law in the society, and second, to use it for social 
engineering purposes (Hooker 2008; Azra 2005). This fact reveals 
that the state prioritizes the accommodation of elements of Sharia 
practiced by the majority of Muslims while at the same time also 
attempting to shape Sharia so that is in line with the state’s 
interests. Consequently, the legislation of Sharia for state laws or 
regulations may be classified in two categories: real and symbolic. 
The first category contains ‘real’ legislation that is primarily 
designed to employ the law or regulation, while the latter is mostly 
aimed at maintaining the political interests of the rulers.  
                                                        
5Among these scholars are Mark Cammack (Cammack 1997) and Arskal Salim 
(Salim 2008a; 2008b). 
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Historically, the symbolic elements of the government’s policies 
first appeared in the 1950s, and have apparently continued to 
increase from the beginning of the New Order regime to the 
present. For example, the president holds an annual official state 
commemoration of the revelation of the Quran on the 17th day of 
Ramadan. The state also officially recognizes and remembers the 
birthday of the prophet Muḥammad, and the government 
regularly facilitates a national competition for reciting the Quran 
(MTQ). The president established a private charitable institution in 
1982, Yayasan Muslim Pancasila, which collects money from civil 
servants to finance the building of mosques throughout Indonesia. 
It was also symbolic that in 1985 President Suharto was willing to 
finance (with his own money) a project for the compilation of 
Islamic law (Kompilasi Hukum Islam) (Nurlaelawati 2010:82). To add 
to this list of symbolic events, since 2000 the government has 
legislated a number of laws concerning Sharia; however, it hardly 
ever issues the regulations required for the law to come into effect.  
That said, the government has also introduced Sharia legislation 
that can be characterized as having real purposes. In other words, 
the government has tried to facilitate Indonesian Muslims in 
implementing Sharia and to define a form of Sharia that is in line 
with the state interests and the Indonesian context. The Ministry 
of Religious Affairs, the state institution tasked with dealing with 
religious concerns, has been playing a central role in maintaining 
these two interconnected purposes. Consequently, Sharia has been 
incorporated into a number of laws, rules, regulations, and 
institutions concerned with Islamic education, Islamic courts, 
marriage law, zakāt, pilgrimage, and Islamic finance institutions. 
The following subsections briefly present those laws, rules, 
regulations, and institutions that have incorporated Sharia.  
1.5.1 Islamic education 
Since the early years of independence, educational institutions 
have been under the remit of several ministries, including the 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The 
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former primarily manages secular educational institutions known 
as pendidikan umum. The latter manages religious educational 
institutions, widely known as pendidikan agama (Azra 2007:261). 
Both ministries are responsible for organizing schools from 
elementary level through to higher education.6 The government 
provides teaching staff and facilities, as well as the curriculum for 
these institutions.  
One of the most important aspects for the government is 
managing religious education and the form of Islam – Sharia –— 
that is to be taught. The Ministry of Religious Affairs has designed 
a curriculum for all levels of education for this purpose. We need 
look no further than the curriculum of higher Islamic education, 
particularly the faculties of Sharia at STAIN, IAIN, and UIN, to see 
the shape and form of Indonesian Islam. Hooker concludes three 
points with regard to this curriculum: firstly, Sharia must be 
managed as part of the wider secular curriculum, but in fact, there 
has been successful implementation of a standard national Sharia 
curriculum; secondly, the innovations that are occurring in 
regional curricula should not be seen as a threat to fiqh; and lastly, 
the curriculum has shown that it can accommodate more than one 
form of legal reasoning. Indeed, two forms of legal reasoning are 
applied in these institutions – one drawn from classical Muslim 
sources and the other from the western tradition (Hooker 
2008:127-8). Students at Sharia faculties are trained to gain 
employment in positions related to their fiqh knowledge, including 
                                                        
6 The Ministry of Religious Affairs supervises Islamic education from elementary 
to higher education: it organizes Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI) for elementary 
schools, Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs) for junior high schools, Madrasah Aliyah 
(MA) for high schools and Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (STAIN), Institute 
Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN), Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) for higher Islamic 
education. According to data released by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 
2010, the total numbers are as follows: MI:1,675 (state/negeri) & 20,564 
(private/swasta); MTsN:1,415 (state/negeri) & 12,608 (private/swasta); MAN:748 
(state/negeri) & 5.149 (private/swasta); STAIN:32, IAIN:14, & UIN: 6, in total 52 
(state/negeri) & 522 (private/swasta), www.kemenag.go.id, accessed in 24/2/12.  
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as civil servants at the Ministry of Religious Affairs and judges in 
Islamic courts. It should be noted, however, that there are judges 
in Islamic courts who originate from other faculties at the IAIN or 
UIN, and who are also law graduates from secular universities.  
Current developments in the Indonesian education system 
reveal a gradual strengthening of Islamic education, particularly 
since central government issued law 22/2003 on national 
education that recognizes all levels of religious educational 
institutions to be part of national education. Presidential decree 
55/2007 gives the authority to the Ministry of Religious Affairs to 
set up curriculums for religious education at all levels, including 
for those educational institutions under the remit of the Ministry 
of Education. This situation confirms that the government persists 
in attempting to shape and guide Indonesian Islam and Indonesian 
Sharia.  
 
1.5.2 Islamic courts 
The Islamic court is an important Islamic institution and an arena 
where state-defined Sharia is imposed and put into practice. The 
colonial government first established this institution for Java and 
Madura in 1882 and the Indonesian government continued to 
maintain it after independence. Subsequently, in 1951, the 
government extended similar institutions, namely mahkamah 
syarʿiyah, to other regions in Indonesia. However, the government 
hardly provided sufficient facilities as it is a judicial institution and 
it also lacks authority to execute its decisions. Because of this 
situation, Hazairin (d.1975) who had expertise on Islamic and 
customary law, once suggested to abolish Islamic courts as he 
argued that they had no authority to execute their decision, they 
were poorly administrated and lacked facilities (Noer 1978:49-50).  
 The government finally acknowledged the authority of 
Islamic courts as a national judicial institution in section 7 (1) of 
the law 19/1964. When this amendment to the law was approved 
on 17 December 1970, the government decided to give Islamic 
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courts equal status with the other three courts regulated in law 
14/1970. Section 10 (1) elucidates that there are four judicial 
institutions in Indonesia: civil courts, Islamic courts, military 
courts, and state administrative courts. However, this is the only 
regulation that implements equal status and this means that it is 
still the case that decisions made by the Islamic court cannot be 
executed without receiving an affirmation from the civil court. In 
1980, the Ministry of Religious Affairs issued the ministry decision 
6/1980 to standardize the name of Islamic courts – at the first level, 
Pengadilan agama and Mahkamah Syarʾyah became Pengadilan Agama 
and the Islamic appeal court became the Pengadilan Tinggi Agama.   
The government also had the equal status of Islamic courts 
in mind in 1989 when it tabled a draft law on Islamic courts in 
parliament. A nationwide controversy ensued in response to the 
bill. The public debate showed that the bill was not only seen as a 
political shift by the government towards Islam, but it was partly 
an attempt by those Muslims advocating that Sharia should 
become a state matter (Mujiburrahman 2006:194). The debate 
ended after President Suharto guaranteed that the bill was 
disconnected with the ideological matters.  
Finally, members of parliament approved the draft and the 
president promulgated it as law 7/1989 on Islamic courts on 27 
December 1989. Section 7 regulates that the Islamic court’s 
jurisdiction is marriage, inheritance, grants (hiba), endowment 
(waqf) and almsgiving (ṣadaqa). Crucially, this law stipulates that 
the court was now an independent institution that can execute 
decisions without any affirmation from the civil court. In 2006, the 
jurisdiction of the Islamic court was extended when the 
government passed law 3/2006. Article 49 of this law states that 
the jurisdiction of this court is now: marriage, inheritance, waṣiya, 
ḥiba, waqf, zakāt, infāq, ṣadaqa, and Islamic economy.7 Article 52A 
                                                        
7 Article 49 further elaborates the scope of the Islamic courts to include 
economic disputes relating to: (a) Bank Syariah (Islamic banking), (b) Lembaga 
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also extends the jurisdiction of Islamic courts to include being a 
witness to the visibility of a crescent (ruʾyat al-hilāl), i.e. to 
determine the first day of each month of the lunar calendar. In 
addition, the government has bestowed special autonomy on the 
province of Aceh, which gives the province the authority to 
implement Sharia regulated under law 44/1999, 18/2001 and the 
presidential decree 11/2003. The jurisdiction of the Islamic court in 
Aceh province is underpinned by Qanun, a local law issued by 
provincial and regional/municipal authorities. In relation to the 
jurisdiction of Islamic courts, in 2011 the Supreme Court released 
data that reveals that the number of disputes settled in Islamic 
courts, including the Mahkamah Sharia of Aceh, had grown to 
363.041 cases (in 2010 the number was 320.788) (www.badilag.net). 
The majority of these cases concerned divorce.  
Before 2004, the Islamic court had not been a fully 
independent judicial institution and its structural, administrative 
and financial affairs were regulated by the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs. The widely held belief was that this situation meant that 
this judicial institution could be influenced by non-judicial 
interests. As previously stated, this came to an end when the 
government amended law 14/1970 on the judicial authority with 
law 35/1999 and, then, in 2004 the government issued law 4/2004. 
Article 42 (2) of law 4/2004 directs the transfer of the structural, 
administrative and financial affairs of Islamic courts from the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs to the Supreme Court by, at the latest, 
30 June 2004. In fact, the transfer occurred ten days before the 
deadline. On 29 October 2009, the government issued law 48/2009 
                                                                                                                               
Keuangan Mikro Syariah (Sharia micro finance institution), (c) Asuransi Syariah 
(Islamic Insurance), (d) Reasuransi Syariah (Islamic reinsurance), (e) Reksadana 
Syariah (Sharia fund), (f) Obligasi Syariah dan Surat Berharga Berjangka Menengah 
Syariah (Sharia bond and mid-term Sharia securities), (g) Sekuritas Syariah (Sharia 
securities), (h) Pembiayaan Syariah (Sharia financing), (i) Pegadaian Syariah (Sharia 
mortgage), (j) Dana Pensiun Lembaga Keuangan Syariah (retirement fund of the 
Sharia finance), and (k) Bisnis Syariah (Sharia businesses). 
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as a revision to laws 50/2006 and 7/1989 on Islamic courts. This 
new law aimed to harmonize a number of rules regarding Islamic 
courts with law 48/2009 on judicial authorities. For example, law 
50/2009 was amended with article 12A that regulates that judges in 
Islamic courts are also under the control of the Supreme Court and 
the Judicial Commission. 
 
1.5.3 Marriage   
The government had attempted to have a unified family law since 
the 1950s. In October 1950, the Minister of the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, Wachid Hasjim (d. 1953), established a committee, chaired 
by Teuku Muhamad Hasan and assisted by several members 
representing Muslims, Protestants, Catholics and women activists, 
to draft a marriage bill. In May 1953 the committee produced three 
bills: one for all citizens; one specifically for Muslims, Protestants 
and Catholics; and one for those falling outside these three 
religious groups. But, the Minister was dissatisfied with this 
legislation. In the subsequent three years, his successor Minister 
Mohammad Ilyas (1911-1970), also proposed a draft regarding 
Islamic marriage to parliament. But the members of parliament 
failed to reach a consensus regarding the content and form of the 
marriage law, because all factions in the parliament had different 
interests toward this issue although they realized that a unified 
marriage law was a priority (Martyn 2005:124-125). Despite these 
failed attempts, the Ministry of Religious Affairs issued the 
decision 1/1955 regarding the compulsory registration of 
marriage. Since then, there were no further developments 
concerning marriage law until 5 March 1958 when Soemari, 
member of the parliament belonging to the National Party (PNI) 
tabled a marriage bill aimed to apply to all citizens, regardless of 
religion. This bill was nicknamed ‘Mrs. Soemari’s bill’ that was 
viewed as an anti-polygamy bill. The parliament members 
belonged to religious parties opposed the Soemari’s bill and 
characterized the bill as secular. They mainly argued that a 
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marriage law should be based on religious law. Consequently, the 
parliament failed to reach a consensus to have a unified marriage 
law (Martyn 2005:138-144).   
 At the beginning of the New Order, there were three bills 
proposed by different government institutions. The Ministry of 
Religious Affairs proposed another draft bill on Islamic marriage 
(Rancangan undang-undang pernikahan ummat Islam) to parliament 
on 22 May 1967. In the following year, the Ministry of Justice also 
proposed a marriage bill, namely, Rancangan undang-undang pokok 
perkawinan (bill on marriage) to the parliament on 7 September 
1968 aimed at regulating marriage for all citizens without 
considering their religious devotions. These two bills were 
accepted by the parliament, but, both failed to become law as they 
were rejected by non-Muslim members, particularly those 
belonging to the Catholic party (Mujiburrahman 2006:160). In July 
1973, the government proposed another marriage bill. This time a 
majority of Muslims rejected the draft, providing three arguments: 
first, a number of articles of the bill were claimed to be in 
contradiction to Sharia; second, Muslims were anxious that Islamic 
interests should be defended in parliament; and third, the 
government did not consult with any Islamic organizations or with 
Muslim officials at the Ministry of Religious Affairs when preparing 
the bill.  
With the rejection of the proposed bill, a number of Muslim 
leaders approached the authorities – specifically the Armed Forces 
(ABRI) – because they believed that the bill would endanger socio-
political stability. In response to this approach, in October 1973, 
General Sumitro, commander of the Security and Order Operation 
(Kopkamtib) and Soetopo Joewono, head of the coordinating body of 
state intelligence (BAKIN), intensively lobbied with leaders of the 
Islamic Party (PPP) and Muslim Leaders outside parliament 
(Mujiburrahaman 2006:164-5). Finally, a compromise was reached 
and the bill was revised with number of articles that were mostly 
viewed in line with Islamic teachings. On 22 December 1973, 
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parliament approved the bill and less than a month later the 
president passed it on 2 January 1974 as law 1/1974. On 1 April 
1975, the president issued PP 9/1975 which legally implemented 
the law. 
This law consists of 24 chapters and 67 sections concerning 
marriage matters, including the requirements for marriage, the 
cancellation of a marriage, the right and obligations of husband, 
wife and children, and other related issues. A number of rules 
regulated under law 1/1974 were new for Muslims, including the 
administration of marriage and also the rule that a divorce is only 
legitimate if conducted in front of an Islamic court. Furthermore, 
its contents show that these codified rules are regulated under the 
Shafi’ite School of law, but it also extends into other schools of 
laws and even adopted elements of Dutch and adat laws.  
This unified marriage law was important for both the 
government and Muslims. For the government, this law was 
intended as a tool of social engineering, and to this end the law 
regulates the shape and form of the family. For example, a 
marriage must be administrated, rules on polygamy were 
tightened, and divorce must be conducted in court in order to 
guarantee the rights of both parties. Meanwhile, the majority of 
Muslims sees this law as a success in terms of achieving the 
codification of Sharia as state law.  
 
1.5.4 Compilation of Islamic law 
Kompilasi Hukum Islam – the Compilation of Islamic Law –commonly 
abbreviated as KHI, has marked a distinctive and real achievement 
in the Indonesian Islam project. The compilation of Islamic Law is 
redefinition; it is certainly not a purification of Sharia, but it is 
more than a selection or reworking because it imposes a new way 
of thinking about Sharia (Hooker 2008:18). From the process of 
drafting, the Compilation of Islamic Law is considered as an 
authoritative text, not least because many prominent Indonesian 
ulama were involved in the process of shaping it. That said, a 
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number of them acknowledged that they did not have much 
opportunity to articulate their views during discussions of the 
draft (Nurlaelawati 2010:88). This was the first (and perhaps the 
last) occasion that ulama were actively involved in the legal 
process of codifying elements of Sharia for national regulations. 
Thus, the authoritative position of the Compilation of Islamic Law 
is based on the fact that it is an ijmāʿ, i.e. the consensus of 
Indonesian ulama.  
The idea of the Compilation of Islamic Law was originally 
derived from a situation where judges of the Islamic court had no 
standard legal references for examining disputes. Consequently, 
the same kinds of disputes could result in different judgments. To 
overcome this problem, in 1985, Bustanul Arifin (d. 2011), a 
member of the Supreme Court, advocated the idea of a set of 
standard legal references. In short, Muslim scholars, judges, and 
the Minister of Religious Affairs agreed. President Suharto also 
approved the plan and even offered a sum of his own money to 
fund the committee that would take the project forward. Bustanul 
Arifin was appointed as head of the committee that would prepare 
the draft. This process, which lasted six years, involved a number 
of activities, including examining 160 fiqh texts; holding seminars 
and discussions; consulting with 181 prominent ulama; examining 
Islamic court decisions; conducting comparative analysis with 
other Muslim laws from different countries. After more than six 
years, the committee finally succeeded in producing a Compilation 
of Islamic Law, Kompilasi Hukum Islam. (Nurlaelawati 2010:79-81) 
For the legal bases of KHI, on 10 June 1991 the president signed the 
presidential instruction no.1 of 1991 aiming to give the Ministry of 
Religion the right to disseminate the KHI. It consists of three 
simple divisions: book I on marriage and divorce (19 chapters and 
170 sections); book II on inheritance (7 chapters and 43 sections); 
and book III on endowment (5 chapters and 13 sections). These 
books contain explanations and clarifications for a number of 
sections. In addition, section 229 states that the judge must pay 
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serious attention to the values of the community, in order for the 
decision to be just.  
The Compilation of Islamic law is not an uncontested 
document. In October 2004, a working group from within the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs produced a counter legal draft to the 
Compilation of Islamic Law. This caused controversy and was 
withdrawn by Minister of Religious Affairs within weeks. The 
controversy derived from a number of issues in the draft: 1) a 
guardian, wāli, is not required in a marriage; 2) a ban on polygamy; 
3) a compulsory marriage contract; 4) the mutual marriage gift, 
maḥr; 5) registration would be an essential element of marriage 
rather than an evidentiary requirement as it is at present; 6) ʿidda 
for men and women;  7) permission for an interreligious marriage; 
8) nushuz (disobedience) could be the fault of both husband and 
wife; and 9) males and females would inherit equal shares of an 
estate and non-Muslim claimants would also be allowed to inherit 
(Hooker 2008; Nurlaelawati 2010). Given these issues, the counter 
draft was widely considered to be secular. Despite the fact that the 
KHI was challenged, after 15 years it has passed the efficacy test 
(Hooker 2008:26). It is an original attempts to legislate elements of 
Sharia, although, judges at the lowest level of the Islamic court 
have not yet fully incorporated the Compilation of Islamic Law in 
their decisions (Nurlaelawati 2010).  
1.5.5 Endowment 
The first regulation by the Indonesian government on endowment 
(waqf) occurred in 1977 when it issued the government regulation 
28/1977.8 This regulation is directly connected to law 5/1960 on 
                                                        
8Under the administration of the colonial government, waqf matters were 
regulated under Staatsblad no. 6196 issued in 31 January 1905, Staatsblad no. 
12573 issued in 4 June 1931, Staatsblad no. 13390 issued in 24 December 1934 and 
Staatsblad no. 1935 issued in 27 may 1935. These regulations ruled that waqaf was 
administered under the authority of bupati and should be focused on the public 
interest (Djatnika 1983; Halim 2005). 
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agrarian law, which could affect the legal status of endowment 
property. In response to the issuance of this regulation, the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs established a section at its offices 
tasked with managing issues concerning endowment.  
Although rules on endowment have been regulated in the 
Compilation of Islamic Law, on 27 October 2004 the government 
upgraded the regulation to a law by introducing law 41/2004. This 
law consists of 11 chapters and 81 sections. This not only 
strengthens the legal basis of endowment, locating it in the 
hierarchy of the Indonesian legal system, but it also provides more 
standardized and comprehensive rules concerning this subject.  
There are five aspects that can be characterized as new 
rules on endowment: First, endowment property is classified as 
relative ownership or public ownership and both required 
registration with the relevant official institutions. Second, 
endowment property not only covers immovable property such as 
land or buildings, but also extends to moveable property including 
money, vehicles, and intellectual property. Third, endowment is 
seen as not just having ritual and social purposes, but also it also 
meets wider public needs and has a business purpose in 
accordance with Sharia. Fourth; the law suggests establishing an 
independence organization, namely, the Indonesian Endowment 
Institute (Badan Wakaf Indonesia). Lastly, an administrator (nāẓir) of 
endowment must be professionally trained.   
The government passed government regulation 42/2006 to 
implement the endowment law. However, there has not been any 
significant public attention with regards to the implementation of 
law 41/2004, although theoretically endowment was a potential 
economic source. According to data released in 2010 by the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, the extent of waqf land in Indonesia 
has reached more than three billion m² and it is situated in more 
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than 400,000 different locations. 67.6 per cent of this land has been 
certified and 32.5 per cent remains uncertified.9 
 
1.5.6 Pilgrimage  
The government plays a central role in managing the pilgrimage 
(hajj) in Indonesian history. In this respect, it deals with the 
matters of politics, economy, growth of population, progress of 
Islam in Indonesia, the government’s relationship with Saudi 
Arabia and health as well as security (Agenda n.d:149-158; 
Vredenbregt 1962:94-121). Accordingly, the government plays a 
central role in organizing the hajj and demonstrates regulated and 
systematized control of this religious duty. Three important points 
should be made in this regard: First, performance of pilgrimage 
must be religiously correct and administratively valid. Second, it is 
conducted overseas, in Mecca, thus its objectives must be limited 
and its purpose specific. Thirdly, it involves an amount of money. 
The Ministry of Religious Affairs determines the regulations and 
procedures relating to the hajj. Thus, one interpretation is that the 
pilgrim must not only surrender to God, but also to the state 
(Hooker 2008:205-6).  
The government began to manage the pilgrimage in 1950. 
For this purpose, it issued rules and regulations including the 
decree of the Ministry of Religious Affairs no. A/III/I/648 (issued 
on 27 March 1950). This decree regulates several issues including 
the costs of the pilgrimage, transportation to and from Mecca, 
health, and passports, and it established a committee to manage 
the pilgrimage, its requirements, etc. (Konperensi 1950:354-460). 
These rules have been adjusted over the years. For example, in 
1999 the pilgrimage was regulated under law when the 
                                                        
9 Endowment property has reached 3,181,586,921 m², is situated in 417,265 
locations and 67.6 per cent of it has been certified by the government, 
www.kemenag.go.id accessed in 24/2/12.  
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government issued law 17/1999. This law is purely for 
administrative purposes, In addition, law 13/2008, in response to a 
decision by the government of Saudi Arabia, permits pilgrims to 
use a regular passport for the journey rather than a special 
passport (paspor haji).  
There are two current and distinctive issues concerning the 
pilgrimage: the government’s monopoly of the process, and how to 
manage the annual quota of pilgrims and whether people who 
have performed the pilgrimage have different rights to people who 
never do it. The way the Indonesian government manages the hajj 
has become a target of criticism and the state’s monopoly of the 
process is seen as a source of corruption and inefficiency. Both 
political overtones and the fact that the hajj is a source of income 
for the government are factors for the government’s involvement 
in the process (Noer 1978:58-64). Several NGOs expressed similar 
criticism to the parliament on 27 January 2004; they were critical 
of the lack of standard services and also stated that the monopoly 
actually weakens the organization of the pilgrimage. It should be 
noted, however, the majority of critics are involved in privates 
companies keen to play a role in this business. 
The Saudi authorities have fixed an annual quota for 
pilgrims at 1% of the Muslim population of a country. 
Consequently, the Indonesian government operates a queue 
system.10 Participation in the hajj requires payment of a deposit. 
Previously this was a minimum of 20 million rupiah; since 2010 this 
figure has increased to 25 million rupiah. The money is paid into a 
special bank account called a tabungan haji. This money cannot be 
withdrawn by the investor and no interest or shares are paid. This 
money provides the investor with a queue number generated by an 
online system. This number indicates the investor’s place on the 
waiting list and it can take anything from three to ten years to 
                                                        
10The quota for Indonesia is as follows:188,900 (2006), 189,000 (2007), 193,723 
(2008), 191,000 (2009), 185,669 (2010) www.kemenag.go.id accessed 23/2/12.   
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reach the top and have the opportunity to perform the pilgrimage. 
The government has a right to use this sum of money before the 
investor receives permission to do the pilgrimage.   
Clearly, the government gains financial advantage from this 
system. Assuming that at any one time there are 2 million 
investors, this generates a huge amount of money. According to a 
staff member at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, when the system 
was first established, the government only gained 2.5% of the 
monthly interest, but since 2006 the money was invested in a 
different way, giving the government approximately 10% of the 
monthly interest. Besides this financial gain, the government also 
obtains financial advantage from the journey cost of the 
pilgrimage.11 Thus, it is understandable that public demands for the 
accountability of the management of the pilgrimage gradually 
increases. 
Besides this financial advantage, the government also 
shapes Sharia in relation to the hajj. The Ministry of Religious 
Affairs has produced a number of manuals for the pilgrimage: 
Panduan perjalanan haji (Manual for the pilgrimage journey), 
Bimbingan menasik haji (Instruction and manual for the pilgrimage), 
Hikmah ibadah haji (wisdom behind the pilgrimage), and lastly doʿa 
dan dhikir (prayers and invocations). These four books are a 
                                                        
11Costs for the journey to the ḥajj vary from year to year and depend on places of 
embarkation. There are now eleven points of embarkation for the ḥajj. The costs 
(in US dollars) are as follows: Aceh 2,753 (2007), 3,258 (2008), 3.243 (2009), 3,147 
(2010); Medan 2,753 (2007), 3,292 (2008), 3,333 (2009), 3,237 (2010); Padang 2,753 
(2007), 3,258 (2008), 3,329 (2009), 3,233 (2010);  Palembang 2,850 (2007), 3,379 
(2008), 3,377 (2009), 3,280 (2010); Batam 2,753 (2007), 3,292 (2008), 3,376 (2009), 
3,325 (2010); Jakarta 2,850 (2007), 3,430 (2008), 3,444 (2009), 3,364 (2010); Solo 
2,850 (2007), 3,379 (2008), 3,407 (2009), 3,327 (2010); Surabaya 2,850 (2007), 3,430 
(2008), 3,512 (2009), 3,432 (2010); Banjarmasin 2,950 (2007), 3,517 (2008), 3,518 
(2009), 3,440 (2010); Balikpapan 2,950 (2007), 3,517 (2008), 3,544 (2009), 3,474 
(2010); Makasar 2,950 (2007), 3,575 (2008), 3,575 (2009), 3,505 (2010) 
www.kemenag.go.id accessed 23/2/12.  
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package and are meant to be read together.12 The fourth book 
reflects the government’s construction of Sharia. This construction 
clearly shows that the current pilgrimage is the orthopraxy but 
also demonstrates what the Ministry of Religious Affairs believes to 
be the true significance of the pilgrimage (Hooker 2008:233). 
Compared to the colonial time, aspects of the pilgrimage vary 
significantly and it is undeniable that the pilgrimage is an aspect of 
Islam that is intertwined with politics (Eisenberger 1928; Noer 
1978:64; Van Dijk 1991). Current developments show that the 
government’s definition of the hajj is limited to a ritual journey 
and that participation results in increased social status (van 
Bruinessen 1995).  
 
1.5.7 Islamic finance 
The first Islamic finance institution was established in Indonesia in 
1992. The Indonesian ulama Council (MUI) endorsed the idea of 
establishing an Islamic bank13 that applied a non-interest system. 
                                                        
12 The first book consists of nine chapters: (1) introduction, (2) preparation, (3) 
departure, (4) activities in Saudi Arabia, (5) Returning (to Indonesia), (6) Medical 
Counseling and Care, (7), Devotional Visit (ziarah), (8) Travel Prayers and Funeral 
Prayers, and (9), epilogue (Panduan 2009). The second book consists of six 
chapters: (1) introduction, (2) Definitions and General (3) Hajj Tamattu’, Hajj Ifrad 
and Hajj Qiran, (4) Previsions and the Umrah and Pilgrimage, (5) Question and 
answers on the pilgrimage matters, (6) epilogue (Bimbingan 2009). The third book 
only comprises three chapters: (1) Introduction, (2) Concept and General 
Significance of Hikmah, and (3) Insights into the pilgrimage (Hikmah 2009). The 
last book consists of nine parts: (1) Doʿa of departure, (2) Doʿa when performing 
Tawaf, (3), Doʿa when Performing Sa’i, (4) Intention, Doʿa when leaving for Arafah 
and Doʿa when Performing wukuf, (5) Doʿa   when waiting (mabit) in Muzdalifa and 
Mina, (6) Doʿa when Performing the Farewell Circumambulation (tawaf wada’) 
and doʿa after Performing Tawaf Wada’, (7), Doʿa when Visiting Madina, (8) Doʿa 
when Arriving at Home, and (9), Simple Doʿa (Doʿa 2009). 
13 In Indonesia, banks that apply an Islamic financial system are Bank Syariah or 
Sharia Bank rather than Islamic Bank or Bank Islam, as in Malaysia. According to 
Ash-Shiddigy the name is derived from a conversation between the MUI team, 
the Ministry of Finance and B.J. Sumarlin, an Indonesian Christian. A member of 
MUI said that the aim of establishing the bank was to provide a financial 
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This approval emanated from a national meeting of the Indonesian 
ulama Council in August 1990. The idea was fully supported by the 
up and coming Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals 
(Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia/ICMI) and the approval also 
came from President Suharto. The first Islamic bank, Bank 
Muamalat, was established on 15 May 1992 and in the first few 
years this financial institution received public support, as 
evidenced by an 84 billion rupiah pledge to purchase a share in the 
bank (Hefner 2003:155-156). 
The justification for establishing an Islamic bank came from 
law 7/1992 on banking systems, which provides the possibility to 
establish a new dual banking system. Furthermore, the 
government issued law 10/1998 as an amendment to law 7/1992. 
This new law explicitly refers to an Islamic banking system and 
provides further legal grounds for the secular banking system to 
create an Islamic branch. Besides these two laws, the Islamic 
banking system is also justified through law 23/1999, which was 
later amended by law 3/2004, stating rules on the authority of the 
Central Bank to regulate banking system, including an Islamic 
system. Furthermore, the government issued law 21/2008 on 
Islamic banking on 16 June 2008. Hence, the position of Islamic 
banking system has been fully acknowledged within the legal 
system.  
In support of the growth of an Islamic banking system, the 
Indonesian ulama Council issued a legal opinion (fatwa) concerning 
the interest on loans on 24 January 2004. The fatwa classifies 
interest, which has been widely practiced by several financial 
institutions, including banks, insurance and mortgage institutions, 
as prohibited. Nevertheless, this fatwa is only valid in areas where 
                                                                                                                               
institution for Muslims who believe that ribā or interest is not allowed. 
Consequently, the minister hastily named the bank Bank Syariah. Ash-shiddiqy 
mentioned this story when he was presenting a paper at the conference 
organized by the IAIN Padang in July 2010.  
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an Islamic banking system is operating. It is clear that the fatwa 
aims to stimulate Muslims to engage with the Islamic banking or 
other institutions. The increase in Islamic financial institutions 
proves that this intention has been partly achieved.  
The growth of the Islamic economic system continued with 
the establishment of Islamic insurance and Islamic mortgage and 
other financial institutions. This development has also been 
reflected in educational institutions, which now have faculties of 
Islamic economy and teach other related subjects on this theme. 
This development has not only occurred at Islamic higher 
education institutions such as STAIN, IAIN or UIN, but also within 
secular higher educational institutions like the University of 
Indonesia (Azra 2007:263).  
It is important to note that the emergence of the Islamic 
banking system and other Islamic financial institutions has 
occurred within less than twenty years. This can be accounted for 
by the fact that the aim of Islamic financial institutions is to 
stimulate economic growth. In addition, article 49 of law 3/2006 
extended the jurisdiction of Islamic courts to include disputes 
related to Islamic finance. In this regard, the Supreme Court issued 
decree no. 20 of 2008 on 10 September 2008 providing a legal basis 
for Islamic courts to implement the Compilation of Law on Islamic 
Economy (Kompilasi Hukum Ekonomi Syariah/KHES). This compilation 
consists of four books: the first book regulates the subject of law 
and the scope of properties; the second book deals with contracts; 
the third books deals with regulations on zakāt and grant (hiba); 
and the fourth book regulates Sharia accountancy.   
 
1.5.8 Penal code  
The government has issued a number of laws, rules and regulations 
concerning penal codes, none of which give an explicit indication 
that they are derived from religious texts. That said, several 
substantive laws are derived from religious teachings, including 
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Sharia. This subsection is confined to the matters of blasphemy 
and pornography. 
The criminal offences of hatred, heresy and blasphemy are 
dealt with in the Penal Code (KUHP), article 156a.  This article, 
which is derived from article 4 of the presidential decree 
1/PNPS/1965, was issued on 27 January 1965. The decree 
determines that hatred, heresy and blasphemy are offences and it 
obligates the government to record this in article 156a of the Penal 
Code. This article has been often used to justify a number of 
events. For example, in 1990 judges sentenced a famous journalist, 
Arswendo Atmowiloto, to five years in jail for committing 
blasphemy. This followed Atmowiloto publishing a list of figures 
most admired by readers in his weekly tabloid ‘Monitor’ on 15 
October 1990. The Prophet Muḥammad was placed at number 
eleven in the list and this was seen as humiliation of the prophet. 
A case currently going through the courts involves a 
number of Muslim groups who are demanding that the 
government abolishes the Ahmadiyah Organization which they 
accuse of breaching the rules of article 156a of the Penal Code 
rules. On 23 February 2009, six NGOs, together with four leading 
Indonesian scholars14 proposed that the Constitutional Court 
cancel the presidential decree No.1/PNPS/1965 because it is in 
contradiction with the 1945 constitution. They argued that this law 
was issued in an emergency situation and thus it has become 
irrelevant in the current social realities and that it contravenes the 
constitution and its regulations. After hearing the case, the 
Constitutional Court rejected the proposal on 19 April 2010, 
declaring the decree still valid.  
The law on pornography can also be included in the 
category of laws that have been adapted to include elements of 
                                                        
14 The NGOs are Imparsial, ELSAM, PBHI, DEMOS, Yayasan Desantra and YLBHI, 
and the scholars are KH.Abdurrahman Wahid, Prof. DR. Musdah Mulia, Prof. M. 
Dawam rahardjo and KH. Maman Imanul Haq.  
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Sharia. The government issued law 44/2008 on pornography on 26 
November 2008. It consists of eight chapters and 45 sections. All 
the regulations on this are concerned with immorality. When the 
draft was still being discussed in parliament, this issue provoked 
wide public debate and discussion because cultural diversity meant 
that immorality varied from region to region. Despite several 
public rejections of this draft, immorality can now be punished.  
 
1.6 Bringing Sharia to the regions 
The provincial and regional/municipal governments possess the 
authority to issue laws. This is regulated in the constitution and 
laws 22/199 and 32/2004. Article 18 (6) of the constitution 
elucidates: ‘regional authorities shall possess the authority to issue 
local laws and other regulations to implement the local autonomy 
and the duty of assistance’. The provincial and regional/municipal 
laws, and other regulations, must fit into legal frameworks with 
regard to substance, procedure and structure. Firstly, the 
substance of local laws must fulfill certain requirements: not 
contradict with public interests (kepentingan umum) or higher 
ranking laws; it may impose punishment; it should consider the 
principles of guardianship, humanity, nationality, justice and 
equality before the law.  
Second, local laws should follow procedures set out by the 
legal authority belonging to the governor, bupati/mayor and the 
parliament. The governor and the provincial parliament possess 
the authority to table a draft law and these institutions are 
required to approve any bill. Subsequently, the jointly approved 
draft will be discussed by members of the provincial parliament. 
After the provincial parliament approves the bill, it requires 
approval from the governor in order to become provincial law. If 
the governor does not approve the bill within thirty days, it 
automatically becomes a provincial law; however, for it to become 
legally applicable, the governor must issue a governor’s regulation 
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(Peraturan gubernur). If this is not forthcoming, the provincial law 
remains window dressing. This legal mechanism is also applied to 
region/municipal laws. 
Third, local laws are the lowest ranking laws in the 
hierarchy of the national legal system. Law 10/2004 regulates that 
the law may be issued at the province, regional and village levels.15 
But, law 12/2011 revises this, removing village law from the 
hierarchy16, reclassifying it as a regulation.17  
Provincial and regional law have an equal validity 
compared to those laws issued by higher ranking state institutions 
such as the People’s Consultative Assembly, the national 
parliament or the president. However, these laws are only valid in 
the province or region/municipality where they are issued. The 
validity of the law is justified by two factors: firstly, section 18A of 
the constitution authorizes these institutions to issue the law; and 
secondly, the provincial or regional/municipal authorities are 
representatives of the people and members of the provincial or 
regional/municipal parliament or the bupati or the mayor are 
elected through general election. Thus, the authority of these 
                                                        
15 The hierarchy of national law according to article 7 of the law 10/2004 is:1) the 
constitution of 1945 (UUD 1945); 2) the national law/perpu (Undang-
Undang/Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti undang-undang); 3) the government 
regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah); 4) President Regulation (Peraturan President); 5) 
local law (Peraturan Daerah).  
16 The hierarchy of national law according to article 7 of law 12/2011 is:1) 
Constitution of 1945 (UUD 1945); 2) decisions of the People’s Consultative 
Assembly (TAP MPR); 3) National law/perpu (Undang-Undang/Peraturan Pemerintah 
Pengganti undang-undang); 4) Government regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah); 5) 
Presidential regulations (Peraturan President); 6) Provincial law (Peraturan daerah 
provinsi); 7) Regional law (Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten/kota) 
17Regulations that are issued by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR),  
Council of Representative of the region (DPD), Parliament, Supreme Court, 
Constitutional Court, Supreme Audit Board, Judicial Commission, Indonesian 
Bank, Ministers, states institutions that are established according to the law, 
provincial parliament, governor, regional/municipal parliament, bupati/major, 
head of village or equivalent.  
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institutions is equal to the authority possessed by the president, 
members of the People’s Consultative Assembly and the national 
parliament that are authorized to issue laws.    
However, as the unitary state (eenheidstaat) the central 
government has the power to control provincial and regional 
authorities, because decentralization and local autonomy means 
transfer or delegation of the legal and political authority. This 
control is commonly known as the general norm control 
mechanism (Asshiddieqy 2006:107). Two types of control 
mechanism are regulated under the constitution that stipulates 
the possibility to conduct judicial or constitutional review. Judicial 
review is mentioned in section 24A (1), which rules that the 
Supreme Court is authorized to review the ordinance and 
regulations made, while constitutional review is mentioned in 
section 24C (1), which rules that the Constitutional Court is 
authorized to review the law against the constitution.   
Laws 22/1999 and 32/2004 introduce the norm control 
mechanism – executive preview and review. Executive preview is 
conducted by central government and provides for the review of a 
draft of any provincial law before the draft is discussed by 
provincial authorities. As the representative of central 
government, the governor may also review the drafts of regional 
laws before they are discussed in the provincial or 
regional/municipal parliament. The second type of review is also 
conducted by central government and involves the review of 
provincial laws or decisions made by the governor. As the 
representative of central government, the governor has the 
authority to review regional/municipal laws or regulations issued 
by a bupati or mayor.18 In addition, the judicial review conducted 
by the Supreme Court is also applied to provincial, 
regional/municipal law.   
                                                        
18 The review mechanism regarding provincial and regional law may be seen in 
the appendices 1, 2 and 3. 
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In relation to this issue, the question of whether provincial or 
regional/municipal government has the authority to legalize 
Sharia legislation remains a matter of dispute. Laws 44/1999 and 
18/2006 explicitly regulate that this authority only belongs to the 
province of Aceh. There are no explicit regulations regarding other 
provinces. This dispute is rooted in the fact that the laws relating 
to regional government mention that religious matters are outside 
the authority of regional government. In fact, the same laws also 
suggest that local government shall have the authority to issue 
regulations to maintain regional governance. Despite this dispute, 
Sharia legislation has been introduced in a number of provinces 
and regions/municipalities. The following subsections briefly 
present the Sharia legislation introduced in the province of Aceh 
and in other provinces. 
 
1.6.1 Sharia in Aceh 
The government of Aceh possesses a special autonomy to 
implement Sharia. This privilege is regulated under laws 44/1999, 
18/2001 and 11/2006. The first two laws concern the special 
autonomy for the province of Aceh and the third law deals with 
detailed regulations issued after the Helsinki Memorandum of 
Understanding, signed between representatives of the Indonesian 
government and the Aceh Freedom movement (Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka, GAM) on 15 August 2005. Law 44/1999 elucidates that 
Sharia has been an important element of Aceh society. Section 1 (1) 
specifies that Sharia is Islamic teaching regarding all aspects of life, 
and article 4 (1) authorizes the province to implement Sharia 
through local legislation at the provincial and regional/municipal 
levels. This legislation is called Qanun.   
Although section 7 (1) of law 11/2006 determines that 
foreign affairs, national military and security, judicial, monetary 
and fiscal as well as religious affairs are excluded from the 
authority of the province of Aceh, section 125 (1) authorizes this 
province to codify Sharia regarding to: 1) theology (ʿaqīda), 2) 
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Sharia, and 3) moral (akhlāq).19 Subsequently, the Qanun have been 
added to the jurisdiction of the Maḥkāma Sharʿīya, the special name 
for the Islamic court in Aceh, where the substantive law of the 
Qanun deals with the jurisdiction of the Islamic court. Qanun have 
also been added to the jurisdiction of the secular court, pengadilan 
negeri, if the substantive law of the Qanun concerns the jurisdiction 
of this court.  
The government of Aceh has issued a number of Qanun 
concerning, among other things, the establishment of the 
Consultative Council of Ulama (Majelis Permusyawaran Ulama, 
MPU), implementation of Sharia relating to theology, ritual, public 
expression of Sharia, religious education, prohibition of drinking 
alcohol, gambling and khalwat, management of zakāt institutions, 
and Islamic education.20 There is current public debate in Aceh 
regarding the extent to which Qanun will be codified in Islamic 
criminal law.  
  
1.6.2 Sharia in other provinces  
Although the authority of governments in other provinces to 
legalize Sharia is not explicitly regulated, a number of authorities 
                                                        
19 Furthermore, article 125 (2) mentions that the fields of Sharia regarding ritual 
(ʿibāda), family law (āḥwal al-shakhṣīya), private matters (muʿāmala), public law 
(jināya), court (qaḍā), education (tarbīya), (daʿwa), preaching (Syiar Islam) and 
defending Islam (pembelaan Islam). 
20 The Qanun issued included:1) Qanun 3/2000 on the establishment of MPU, 2) 
Qanun 5/2000 on the implementation of Sharia in Aceh, 3) Qanun 7/2000 on 
customary law and Sharia, 4) Qanun 43/2001 on the administration of MPU and 
the establishment of the plenary council, 5) Qanun 10/2002 on the establishment 
of a Sharia court, 6) Qanun 11/2002 on the implementation of Sharia in the area 
of theology (aqīda), ritual (ibāda) and public expression of Sharia (syi’ar), 7) Qanun 
32/2002 on the religious educational system based on the Quran and Ḥadīth, 8) 
Qanun 11/2003 on the prohibition of drinking alcohol and similar types of 
beverages, 9) Qanun 13/2002 on the prohibition of gambling, 10) Qanun 14/2003 
on the prohibition of the khalwat, 11) Qanun 7/2004 on the management of zakat, 
and 12) Qanun 11/2004 on the tasks and duties of the Sharia police. 
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have exercised their power to legislate Sharia for provincial, 
regional/municipal laws known as Perda Sharia, i.e. Sharia by-laws. 
They have sought to revitalize and enshrine Sharia in relation to 
beliefs and practices and other social problems such as 
prostitution, gambling, alcohol and drugs. This legislation occurred 
in a number of provinces, including South Sulawesi, South 
Kalimantan, East Java, South Sumatra and West Sumatra. 
There is no precise information about how many 
provincial, regional/municipal governments across Indonesia have 
issued Perda Sharia. However, a study conducted by Crouch on this 
subject shows 160 Perda Sharia issued between 1999 and 2000 in 26 
provinces. Crouch suggests that local governments in the province 
of West Sumatra have generated the most Perda Sharia, with over 
forty. This is followed by local governments in South Sulawesi and 
West Java, both of which have produced over 20 Perda Sharia 
(Crouch 2009:54-58). This number has gradually increased because 
the dynamics of local politics have intensified this issue. The 
majority of Perda Sharia concern issues relating to Muslim dress 
code, prohibition of prostitution, alcohol consumption, drugs and 
other addictive substances, several offences on immorality, rituals, 
zakāt institutions, Quranic education and other governance issues.  
In May 2006, Sharia legislation in several provinces and 
regions/municipalities evoked public and parliamentary debate. 
The debate was initially provoked by two major news magazines, 
Gatra and Tempo, printing articles concerning this issue. Gatra 
wrote the headline ‘Negeri Syariah tinggal selangkah lagi’ (Islamic 
State: only one step away) on 6 May 2006.21 This was followed on 14 
                                                        
21 Gatra carried a series of eight reports and four interviews. The reports were 
entitled: Gelora Syariah Mengepung Kota, Peta Terapan Syariat Islam, Jalan Panjang 
Syariat Islam dan Negara, Belajar Damai dari Bulukumba, Menguji Niat Perda, Syariat 
Islam di Berbagai Daerah, and Sengketa Pandangan Porno. The interviews were with: 
Hasyim Muzadi (chair of the NU), Tifatul Sembiring (the President of PKS), 
Muhammad Ismail Yusanto (Public speaker of the Hisbuttahrir Indonesia), Dewi 
Djakse (politician of PDI-P), and Adnan Buyung Nasution (Lawyer). 
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May 2006, by the Tempo headline ‘Syariat Islam di daerah’ (Sharia in 
the regional areas).22 These magazines triggered public fears about 
the emergence of Sharia in a number of regions. On 16 May 2006, 
this issue reached the heart of government when Konstang 
Panggawa (member of a Christian political party, PDS) interrupted 
a session of the parliament. He quoted the reports of Gatra and 
Tempo and suggested that members of parliament should carry out 
political steps to prevent the growth of Sharia in the regions. He 
said that Perda Sharia were in contradiction with higher laws and 
also contravened the constitution of 1945. Panggawa’s interruption 
inflamed the debate on this issue among members of parliament 
and was widely covered by the media. The first reaction to 
Panggawa’s views came from the Zulkifliemansyah (members of 
PKS political party) who said that Panggawa’s views were totally 
wrong and it was a mistake to interpret Perda Sharia as 
contradicting higher laws and being against the constitution. They 
argued that Perda Sharia is justified (Republika, 17/5/2006).  
Arguments for and against the issue increased among 
members of parliament. Those against the issuance of Perda Sharia 
were members of the Protestant and Catholic and nationalist 
parties, such as PDS and PDI; meanwhile, those pro Sharia were 
from the Islamic parties, such as, PKS, PAN, PBB. On 17 May 2006, 
56 members of DPR signed a petition asking their leaders to write a 
letter to the president asking for the withdrawal of Perda Sharia. 
The petition was delivered to the vice chair of the parliament, 
Soetarjo Soerjogoernitro. A counter-petition was signed by 134 
members of parliament, mainly from Islamic parties.23 This 
                                                        
22Tempo carried seven reports in the 14 May 2006 edition; namely, Syariat Islam di 
Jalur Lambat, Dari Aceh Sampai Mataram, Jika Malam selalu Mencemaskan, Membawa 
Kontroversti ke MA, Akibat Menyontek Tetangga, Pecut Banbu dari Bulukumba, and 
Goyangan Tak Kunjung Reda.   
23
 A breakdown of these 134 members of parliament shows that: 22 are from the 
PPP, 30 from the PKS, 30 from the PAN, 20 from the BPD, 6 from the Golkar, 8 
from the PBR, 5 from the Demokrasi and 3 from the PKB.  
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petition was delivered to the chair of parliament, Agung Laksono, 
on 27 June 2006. Finally, the two sides reached an agreement to 
reconcile the debate by suggesting that Perda Sharia should be 
examined according to the legal mechanisms of executive review, 
judicial review or constitutional review.  
The central government, under the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, has conducted the executive review of provincial, 
regional/municipal laws, including Perda Sharia. This examination 
aimed to scrutinize whether the laws are in contravention of state 
laws and regulations. The examination revealed that between 2002 
and 2006, 554 provincial and regional/municipal laws have been 
withdrawn. These laws dealt mostly with the issues of local tax and 
retribution (Huda 2010:156-7). None of the legislation withdrawn 
was Perda Sharia. However, the Supreme Court had only examined 
one Perda Sharia – 5/2006 – on the prohibition of prostitution, 
issued by the authorities of Tangerang. The case was put to the 
Supreme Court by a number of individuals and NGOs who 
characterized the provincial law as being in contravention with 
national laws. In March 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that law 
5/2005 from Tangerang does not contravene any national law. 24  
 
1.7 Sharia in West Sumatra 
The province of West Sumatra is mostly associated with being 
Minangkabau land. Minangkabau land covers an area that is larger 
than the provincial area. Indeed, the Bangkinang region in the 
                                                        
24
The individuals who proposed judicial review by the Supreme Court were Lilis 
Mahmuda, Tuti Rachmawati and Hesti Prabowo who were from Tangerang,  and 
they were supported by several NGOs, including the Jakarta Law Aid Institute 
(LBH Jakarta) the Apik Law Aid Institute, the Indonesian Lawyer Association 
(PBHI), and the Wahid Institute. They argued it contradicted with higher laws 
such as the Penal Law, Regulation no.7/1984 on the rectification of the CEDAW, 
NO.39/1999 on human rights and No.10/2004 on the legal procedure of 
promulgating the law.  
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province of Riau and the Kerinci area in the province of Jambi are 
also part of the Minangkabau culture. However, West Sumatra is 
also home to the Mentawai, who do not belong to Minangkabau 
culture. The following discussion deals with the Minangkabau 
culture, the majority of which comes under the administration of 
West Sumatra province. 
West Sumatra now has twelve regions and seven 
municipalities, consisting of 176 sub-districts and 627 villages, 
called nagari. The population projection in 2009 was 4.83 million, 
comprising 2.37 million men and 2.46 million women. The 
population includes: 97.57% Muslims, 1.21% Protestant, 0.96% 
catholic, 0.04% Hindu, 0.19% Buddhist and 0.02% others. In 2009, 
there were 4,532 mosques, 11,868 mushalla/surau (prayer sites), 72 
protestant churches, 49 catholic churches, and 6 viharas (West 
Sumatra 2010). 
Minangkabau culture is defined by a handful of customs 
and rough linguistic commonalities, spreading out from a 
heartland of highland villages called the darek and into the 
expanding rantau (Hadler 2008:4). Before the arrival of Islam, the 
people of Minangkabau had obeyed the adat rules of this 
matrilineal society founded by Datuk Katumanggungan and 
Perpatih Nan Sabatang. It is widely believed that ulama who 
belonged to a Sufi order introduced Islam to the Minangkabau 
people in the 13th century, and in the next three centuries they 
succeeded in converting the Minangkabau people to Islam. They 
successfully shifted the role of surau to be the center of Islamic 
teachings for the Minangkabau people.  
At the end of 18th century and at the beginning of the 19th 
century, some ulama who returned from Mecca, where they had 
gone to study Islam as well as to perform pilgrimage, applied a 
more legalistic approach to the Islamization of the society, and 
they began to devote attention to examining what was Islamic and 
what was un-Islamic. Haji Miskin, for example, preached against 
certain external abuses in Minangkabau society, in particular 
55 
 
   
 
 
gambling, opium-smoking, cock-fighting, the drinking of tuak 
(alcohol) and the chewing of betel (sirih). Another Padri leader, 
Tuanku Nan Renceh, introduced a new order that was based on 
four tenets: faith, circumcision, fasting and prayer five times a day. 
As symbol of the new order, tobacco, opium, betel, cock-fighting, 
gambling and strong drinks would be banned, men were to wear 
beards and dress completely in white, women had to cover their 
faces and the two sexes were not to bathe together (Dobbin 
1974:336). The adat leaders were opposed to the new approach and 
this led to fierce tensions that resulted in a civil war. After a couple 
of years of war, a number of adat leaders requested help from the 
Dutch authorities to fight the ulama groups, namely the Padri. The 
involvement of the Dutch resulted in what is commonly called the 
Padri War. The conflict ended in 1937 when Tuanku Imam Bonjol 
was arrested and passed away in exile in Manado in 1864.  
It is important to briefly mention the relationship between 
Sharia and Minangkabau adat. Initially, Padri leaders expected 
people to fully convert to Islam and disobey the adat that was 
claimed to be in contradiction with Sharia. In the memoirs he 
wrote in exile, Tuanku Imam Bonjol revealed an interesting notion 
concerning the relationship of Sharia and adat rules. In 1832, he 
was told by pilgrims who had returned from Mecca that the 
Wahhabi had fallen in Mecca and the version of Sharia 
promulgated by Haji Miskin (the first leader of the Padri in 1803) 
were no longer valid. This story influenced Tuanku Imam Bonjol’s 
thought. In his memoirs, he recalls saying to one of his advisors, 
‘there are many laws in the Quran that we have overlooked. What 
do you think about this?’ His advisor replied: ‘We have overlooked 
many of the laws in the Quran’. (Naskah 2004:39). The memoir also 
reveals that in a meeting held among Islamic as well as adat 
authorities, they agreed that: 
 
This was the request of all the adat leaders to the Tuanku Imam. 
They applied the law according to the teaching of the Quran. And 
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so they applied the law according to the teaching of the Quran. 
And the adat leaders used Sharia as the basis for adat (adat 
basandi syarak). If there was a problem with adat it would be 
brought to the adat leaders. If there was a problem with Sharia. If 
there was a problem with adat it would be brought to the Islamic 
authorities. (Naskah 2004:40-1).  
 
This is the first text that mentions that Minangkabau people 
agreed to a maxim of adat based on Sharia (adat basandi Syarak). 
However, in the second half of the 19th century, Verkerk Pistorius 
pointed to a different maxim that is adat based on Sharia and 
Sharia based on adat (adat basandi syarak, sharak basandi adat) 
(Pistorius 1871).  
      At the end of the 19th century, Minangkabau adat was again 
under attack. This time from Aḥmad Khatib al-Minangkabawi 
(1860-1916) who left for Mecca as a teenager to study Islam. In 
Mecca, he married a daughter of Ṣalih al-Kurdi, from a rich Arab 
family, and he did not return to his homeland until his death in 
1916. He wrote three books regarding the adat rules of inheritance 
and claimed that the adat practices of inheritance contradicted 
Sharia and, thus, he characterized it as jāhilīya tradition. He further 
suggested that adat rules should be replaced with Sharia. If they 
were not able to do this, he suggested that people should perform 
hijra and move to another place where Sharia was applied. His 
views were followed by ulama who had studied Islam with him in 
Mecca, including Khatib Muhammad Ali (1861-1836), a leading 
figure of Kaum Tua, and Abdul Karim Amrullah (1879-1945), well 
known as Haji Rasul, a leading figure of Kaum Muda. However, after 
observing actual practices of how property was treated according 
to adat rules, they concluded that Sharia could not be applied. They 
argued that property ruled under adat law did not fulfill the 
requirements necessary for the application of Sharia (Huda 2003).  
At the beginning of the 20th century, Minangkabau ulama 
polarized into two groups: traditionalists, called the Old Group 
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(Kaum Tua) and modernists, called the New Group (Kaum Muda) 
(Abdullah 1971). They were involved in public debates on trivial 
doctrinal (khilāfīya) matters, comprising eighteen problems, such 
as: berdiri mawlid (standing while reciting the history of Prophet), 
permissibility of Ṭarīqa Naqshbandiyya and Saṭṭarīya, vocalizing the 
vow at the beginning of prayers and visiting graves (Abdulmutalib 
1981). The impact of this polarization still continues today and 
ulama associated with the modernist group are mostly attached to 
organizations such as Muhammadiyah; while the traditionalist 
group tends to be part of organizations such as Tarbiyah Islamiyah 
or other Sufi orders. 
Since independence, the relationship between Sharia and 
Minangkabau adat has, on the whole, been harmonious. 
Concerning inheritance, for example, in 1952 Minangkabau ulama 
and adat functionaries reached an agreement that Sharia can be 
applied to self-earned property and adat rules are applied to adat 
property. However, it was suggested that people should write a 
waṣīya that gives one third of the self-earned property to a nephew 
or niece (kemanakan). This agreement was re-emphasized by the 
ulama at a meeting in Padangpanjang between 21-25 July 1969 
(Huda 2003:113).  
However, the actual practices show that most Minangkabau 
people are reluctant to apply Sharia to self-earned property. This 
property tends to be collectively owned by family members. As 
long as all family members agree to this practice, according to 
Syarifuddin, it does not contradict Sharia (Syarifuddin 1984:333). 
Subsequently, this collective ownership tends to be regulated 
under adat rules (von Benda-Beckmann 1979). This practice 
suggests that the foundation of Minangkabau society is still ruled 
under adat law, although the maxim adat basandi syarak, syarak 
basandi kitabullah, has been widely accepted by the people. 
According to Hadler, ‘the Minangkabau matriarchate is hard to kill’ 
and the Minangkabau adat is still a strong basis of Minangkabau 
society (Hadler 2008:177). 
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Adat and Sharia have become two important themes of public 
discourse in West Sumatra since the implementation of 
decentralization and regional autonomy in 2000. There are strong 
views that local government should be based on public policies in 
accordance with local identity. This local identity refers 
specifically to the maxim of adat. Besides the possibility to issue 
laws created by the national decision to devolve power, provincial 
law 9/2000 also created more obvious chances to issue local 
legislation relating to village administration. This provincial law 
states that decentralization and local autonomy allow for the 
adjustment of government structure in accordance with 
Minangkabau culture, in which the lowest government structure is 
nagari. It also provides for the governance of society in accordance 
with the philosophy of adat: adat is based on Sharia, Sharia is based 
on the Quran; Sharia commands, adat implements; the nature is 
being a teacher (adat basandi syarak, syarak basandi kitabullah. Syarak 
mangato, adat mamakai. Alam takambang jadi guru). This philosophy 
authorizes the position of Sharia and adat as two central entities 
for the society.  
 
1.8 Conclusions 
The use of the term Sharia has grown in line with the development 
of Muslim history. Currently, it is primarily understood in a legal 
sense, particularly in the sense of positive law. Although early 
Muslim scholars did not use this term in discussing rules for 
Muslims, the Quran and ḥadīth clearly designate that this word 
means life rules for Muslims; a discursive tradition or a total 
discourse on Muslim life. As a set of rules, Sharia deals with 
different situations at different times and from place to place. 
The position of Sharia in the era of nation states among the 
Muslim countries varies from country to country. Most of the legal 
systems of these countries employ European models, maintaining 
the systems applied by colonial governments. Current 
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developments, however, suggest that Sharia has been gradually 
adopted into the legal system of these countries. Thus, Sharia faces 
new challenges to adjust, particularly in relation to the nation 
state that also possesses its own meanings, structures and rules. 
The dynamic relation between the two varies from country to 
country. 
In Indonesia, the government has legalized a number of 
aspects of Sharia for national law. The legislation is strongly 
intended to define an Indonesian Islam or an Indonesian madhhab. 
This term is commonly defined as Sharia in accordance with the 
state’s purposes. The political parties and state institutions play an 
important role in determining to what extent the elements of 
Sharia should be legalized. Thus, the state is actively involved in 
shaping Sharia through education, family, endowment, pilgrimage, 
Islamic charity forms, economic activities and judicial institutions. 
In addition, with regard to public law, Sharia is mostly placed on 
the periphery, outside the legal sphere.  
In Minangkabau, West Sumatra, the position of Sharia, 
juxtaposed with the adat, has been playing an important role in  
society. Most people obey Sharia in relation to rituals such as 
performing prayers, fasting during Ramadan, paying Islamic forms 
of charities, and performing pilgrimage. Besides ritual activities, 
several institutions relating to Sharia have been established 
including mosques, Islamic education centers (both state and 
private institutions), and a number of Sufi orders. In addition, the 
role of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which established a sub-
regional office (kecamatan) in the area, has played a key role in 
implementing Sharia legislation relating to state laws, rules and 
regulations. There have also been attempts to legislate other 
aspects of Sharia, which are not currently of the state’s concern, in 
the provincial or regional/municipal law. This legislation will be 











Maintaining ‘public morality’: 




In the early stages of decentralization it was a widely held view 
that the government had been less than successful in maintaining 
public morality despite its monopoly over policing the efficient 
administration of positive law (Hooker 2008:281). This lack of 
success was demonstrated by the widespread occurrence of 
prostitution, gambling, and drug and alcohol abuse. Here, I will 
suggest that public morality problems occur not only as a 
consequence of a discrepancy between the state penal law and the 
Islamic penal code, but also because of a lack of effective 
implementation of the penal code due to a culture of corruption 
among government officers.25  
There is a significant distinction between the state’s penal 
law and Islamic criminal law located within the issue of morality, 
which has been defined as the need to ‘suppress practices 
condemned as immoral though they involve nothing that would 
ordinarily be thought of as harmful to other persons’ (Hart 
1963:25). However, this issue is not unknown in the Islamic 
criminal code, which deals with offences relating to committing 
prohibited acts or disobeying obligations set out in the Quran or 
                                                        




   
 
 
ḥadīth. The discrepancy between the rules within the Indonesian 
penal codes and Islamic criminal law has become a challenge for 
many Indonesian Muslims who adhere to Islamic teachings, as well 
as obey the national penal codes enforced by the government.  
 The issue of maintaining public morality became a priority 
for local authorities with affiliations to Islamic political parties 
such as PAN, PPP, PK, and PBB. They orchestrated attempts to table 
a draft law on this subject aimed at preventing and eliminating 
public immorality. This chapter focuses on public morality and 
addresses three main questions: 1) To what extent are there 
attempts to introduce Sharia legislation relating to public 
immorality? 2) How has this issue been debated in public? 3) To 
what extent were the laws on this matter implemented in terms of 
actual practice? This chapter presents a number of discussions and 
practices on the following topics: 1) Islamic rules on public law; 2) 
Islamic public law in the Muslim world; 3) immorality within 
Indonesian public law; 4) public morality in West Sumatra; 5) local 
legislation on public morality that covers provincial and regional 
laws; 6) actual practice implemented by the municipality of Padang 
in terms of maintaining public morality; and 7) conclusions.  
 
2.2. Islamic rules on public law 
According to Islamic rules on public law, unlawful acts are mostly 
related to disobeying obligations or committing prohibited acts. 
Muslim jurists have classified unlawful acts into three groups: 
firstly, ḥadd or ḥudūd. These are offences that are mentioned in the 
Quran and consist of violations of the claims of God (ḥuqūq Allāh). 
They have a mandatory fixed punishment (ḥadd or ḥudūd). 
According to a majority of Muslim jurists in the Sunnī school, these 
offences fall into six categories: 1) theft (sariqa); 2) banditry (qaṭʿ al-
ṭarīq, ḥirāba); 3) unlawful sexual intercourse (zina, Arabic: zināʾ); 4) 
unfounded accusations of unlawful sexual intercourse (qadhf); 5) 
drinking alcohol (shurb al-khamr); and 6) apostasy (ridda). The 
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second group of unlawful acts is qiṣāṣ and diya. These are offences 
against the personal integrity, including homicide and wounding. 
These offences are widely regarded in terms of retaliation (qiṣāṣ) 
and financial compensation (diya). The third group of unlawful acts 
is taʿzīr and siyāsa. This relates to the discretionary punishment of 
sinful or forbidden behavior or acts endangering public order or 
state security (Bahnasiy 1965; al-Jazīrī 1990; al-Zuhaily 1997). The 
above classification is solely based on whether criminal offences 
and punishment have been elucidated in the Quran and ḥadīth. It 
is not based on whether the aim of the act is to inflict harm or evil 
on others. 
The following paragraphs briefly discuss a number of 
offences that may be categorized as acts of public immorality. They 
relate to unlawful sexual intercourse; drinking alcoholic beverages 
and taking psychotropic substances, gambling, distributing 
pornographic prints and committing prohibited acts during the 
fasting month (Ramadan).  
According to Sharia, sexual intercourse is only permitted 
within a marriage or between a slave woman and her master. 
Sexual intercourse that does not fall within bounds of these 
categories is considered to be unlawful sexual intercourse (zina). It 
is committed by a man and woman who are not married to each 
other, whether or not it takes place voluntarily, and whether or 
not payment is made. A man who engages in unlawful sexual 
intercourse commits a tortious act, regardless of whether or not 
the woman consented. The essential element that determines 
whether there should be punishment for unlawful sexual 
intercourse or not is actual penetration by the man into the vagina 
(Bahnasiy 1965:11-12; al-Jazīrī 1990:49; Ibn Rushd 1994:362-3). 
However, a strict standard of evidence is required to prove this 
offence; instead of the usual testimony of two witnesses, testimony 
by four witnesses in four different court sessions is required. 
The Quran states that the punishment for those who 
commit unlawful sexual intercourse is flogging and the ḥadīth 
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states that the penalty is stoning. If the woman is not married, the 
man is liable for a proper bride price (maḥr al-mithl)26 in return for 
having enjoyed her sexual service. If she is a slave, the man has to 
pay damages to her owner. Furthermore, the person who commits 
unlawful sexual intercourse can be punished with the fixed 
penalties of either 100 lashes or death by stones, depending on 
their own legal status (Bahnasiy 1965:17-18; al-Jazīrī 1990:45-64).  
This rule extends to other sexually immoral acts, including 
prostitution and homosexuality, although there are different 
opinions about the punishment for these offences. In addition to 
this type of sexual immorality, the Quran also prohibits khalwa 
(close proximity between unmarried persons of the opposite sex) 
and any acts that facilitate others to commit these acts are also 
prohibited.27  
The Quran prohibits the drinking of alcoholic beverages (al-
khamr) and gambling (al-maysr).28 Muslim jurists have extended 
this to prohibiting the consumption of any food and drink that can 
affect or damage the human psyche. These new extensions are 
derived from the texts of the Quran and ḥadiths. However, there 
are different opinions on the punishment for drinking alcohol. 
Shafi’ite follow the practice of the prophet, which says that the 
punishment is forty lashes. Other jurists follow ʿUmar who 
increases the punishment to eighty lashes. However, there is some 
controversy among the Islamic Jurists concerning drinking 
                                                        
26Maḥr mithl is the average bride price that a woman of the same age and social 
status would receive upon marriage in that region.   
27The Quran states the prohibition of committing unlawful sexual intercourse 
and its consequences in various verses: al-Furqān/the Criterion (25):68; al-
Mumtaḥana/the Examined One (60):12; al-Isrāʾ/the Night Journey (17):32; and 
al-Nūr/the Light (24):2, 3. Several ḥadīth add more detailed rules relating to 
punishment and practice in the time of the prophet. In Fiqh books, the offences 
come under the heading of Islamic public law (bāb al-jināya).  
28The Quran mentions the prohibition of alcoholic beverage and gambling in 
various: al-Baqara/the Heifer (2):219; al-Māʾida/the Table Spread (5):90 & 91. 
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beverages other than khamr. Most jurists put the consumption of 
such beverages on a par with khamr and therefore believe the 
punishment should be the same, regardless of the quantities 
involved. In contrast, the Hanafites hold that someone will only be 
punished if he actually becomes intoxicated (Bahnasiy 1965:18-22; 
al-Jazīrī 1990:10-15; Ibn Rushd 1994:370-2).  
Other public moralities are regulated by discretionary rules 
(taʿzīr).  Taʿzīr deals with any unlawful and sinful acts that are not 
constituted as ḥudud offences, homicide, or bodily harm. Executive 
officials and judges may impose corrective punishment on those 
who have committed such unlawful and sinful acts (Bahnasiy 
1965:192-193). The function of these discretionary rules is not only 
to determine punishment of those who commit ḥudd and crimes 
against the person, but also those who cannot be sentenced to the 
appropriate punishment for procedural reasons, or are pardoned 
by the victim’s next of kin, or because there is a lack of legally 
required evidence. It also determines punishment for those who 
have committed acts that resemble crime but do not fall under its 
legal definition; this includes illegal sexual acts that are not 
intercourse. 
Current evidence suggests that the category of 
discretionary acts is increasing in different Muslim countries. For 
example, it is now seen as an immoral act in some Muslim 
countries not to fast during the Ramadan, or for a person to 
publish or distribute nude photographs. Islamic discretionary rules 
accommodate attempts to maintain public morality.  
 
2.3 Islamic public law in Muslim countries 
Current developments in the Muslim world show that Islamic 
public law varies from country to country. The application of 
public law can be classified into three categories: a country that 
officially disconnects with Islamic criminal law; a country that uses 
Islamic public law as the primary basis for its public code; and a 
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country that uses another source, and not Islamic public law, as 
the primary basis of its public codes. Turkey is the only Muslim 
country that belongs to the category of countries that is 
disconnected from the Islamic penal code. This disconnection 
began when the government adopted German public law in 1929 
(Koçak 2010:264).  
The second category of countries that have a public code 
based primarily on Islamic principles – albeit obeying different 
Islamic schools of law – includes Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, 
Sudan, Libya and Nigeria. The position of Islamic penal codes in 
these countries can be described as follows: Saudi Arabia applies 
substantive public law concerning ḥudūd, qiṣāṣ and taʿzīr, largely 
according to the Hanbalite doctrine though it has remained 
uncodified. This includes offences of unlawful sexual intercourse 
and abuse of alcohol. In 2001, the Saudi government enacted a code 
of criminal procedure that elucidates that punishment can only be 
inflicted on those who commit crimes prohibited by Sharia (Vogel 
2000; Peters 2005:152; Van Eijk 2010:166).  
Iran applies Islamic public law according to Shiite 
doctrines. In early 1981, the government applied a public code in 
accordance with Islamic criminal law, which included of unlawful 
sexual intercourse, homosexuality and abuse of alcohol. In the 
following two years the government enacted state laws relating to 
ḥudūd and qiṣāṣ and determined that the penalty for committing 
such offences would be flogging. In 1991, the Iranian parliament 
approved a new criminal law containing five books that cover a 
range of offences including ḥudūd, homicide, blood money and 
discretionary punishment (Mir-Husseini 2010:358-60).  
Pakistan also applies Islamic public law. Under the Zia ul-
Haq regime, in 1979, the government turned away from the legal 
code introduced by the British and adopted Islamic public law. A 
number of offences concerning hudūd, qiṣāṣ, and taʿzīr, largely 
determined by Hanafite doctrine, are now punishable (Lau 
2010:218; Wasti 2009:7-8). Rules regarding unlawful sexual 
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intercourse, such as homosexuality, adultery and fornication, are 
identical to those set out in classical fiqh, which states that the 
penalty for the offender is not only flogging but also 
imprisonment. Punishment for a fornicator is flogging, not 
lapidation (stoning), and for the abuse of alcohol it is forty lashes 
(Peters 2005:156-7).  
Sudan is another country that applies an Islamic public 
code. This is regulated under section 9 of the 1973 constitution that 
stipulates that Sharia is the principle source of Sudanese 
legislation. In subsequent years a number of offences were 
incorporated under Islamic criminal law. For example, in 1977 
abuse of an alcoholic substance became an offence, and in 1984 it 
was decided that unlawful sexual intercourse is punishable with 
eighty lashes and one year of imprisonment.  
In Libya, the implementation of an Islamic criminal code 
began when Qaddafi came to power. In 1973 and 1974, the 
government enacted state laws concerning offences regulated 
under Islamic public law, largely according to the Malikite 
doctrine. Unlawful sexual intercourse and abuse of alcohol are 
punishable offences. Similar developments occurred in Nigeria 
where Islamic criminal law is applied. The offence of zina is 
punishable by death by stoning if the offender is currently married 
or has been married; otherwise, the punishment is one hundred 
lashes. Qadhf or false accusation of zina is punishable with eighty 
lashes and abuse of alcohol is punished with eighty lashes. Since 
2000, twelve northern Nigeria states have introduced new 
punishments for violation of Islamic criminal law. This 
development includes a number of offences of unlawful sexual 
intercourse, sodomy, and alcohol abuse (Weimann 2010:22-29).   
There has also been development of Islamic criminal law in 
other Muslim countries that had experienced different colonial 
powers. Although most of these countries continue to apply public 
law implemented by their colonial administrations, they have 
attempted to adopt traces of Islamic criminal law. A number of 
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countries belong to this category, including Morocco, Egypt, Mali, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. In Morocco, the most recent 
developments show that in 2003 a number offences derived from 
Sharia were absorbed into Moroccan public law, including 
punishing Muslims who provocatively disrespect the rules of 
fasting during Ramadan, obstruction of religious practices, and 
other offences that corrupt Islamic values concerning family life 
and honor (Buskens 2010:122-4). Indonesia’s experience regarding 
this issue is presented in the following sections. 
 
2.4 Immorality within Indonesian public law 
The Indonesian government still applies a penal code that was first 
implemented by the colonial government, although a number of 
sections have been abolished or added. The colonial government 
issued Koninklijk staatsblad no. 732 on Wetboek van strafrecht voor 
Nederlandsch Indië (WvSN) in 15 October 1915 and this penal code 
was came into force on June 1918. In 1946, the government issued 
law 1/1946 on this subject and changed its name into Kitab Undang-
Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP). Since the initial penal code was 
introduced and enforced by colonial power, the Indonesian 
government has drafted a number of versions of this law, including 
a bill put before parliament in 2005. However, a new penal code 
has never been passed. This failure may be because the 
government and parliament failed to reach a consensus 
concerning the variety of norm and code of conducts concerning 
public law.  
 KUHP and other state laws include a number of public 
immoralities as crimes. KUHP elucidates this matter in the chapter 
on public decency and public order. Sections 281 to 283 of KUHP 
highlight the prohibition of providing, performing, showing, 
distributing, and publication of any obscene material, such as nude 
photographs, in public; and the prohibition of earning a living 
from such material. Sections 284 to 288 prohibit adultery between 
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two parties, one of whom, or both of whom, is or are married. 
Section 284 specifies that this offence may only be punished if his 
or her spouse objects to the act; otherwise, it is not a crime.  
However, fornication is not included as a crime in KUHP. Sections 
289 to 296 prohibit other illicit sexual acts, such as homosexuality, 
and providing facilities for and earning a living from these illicit 
sexual acts.  It also classifies sexual intercourse with an underage 
person as a crime.  Section 300 prohibits the selling or giving of 
alcoholic drinks to an underage person (below sixteen years old). 
In addition, section 484 elucidates that being drunk is only a crime 
if it disturbs public order. Section 303 elucidates the prohibition of 
gambling, including offering and providing facilities for gambling 
and living on the earnings from gambling. But, this offence is not 
considered a crime if the government permits it. At section 303, 
gambling is defined as any game in which there is a possibility to 
gain profit or that requires a player to rely on fortune rather than 
tactics or skillfulness. In 1974, the government decided to 
completely prohibit any form of gambling when it issued law 
7/1974. This law came into effect when the government issued 
regulation 9/1981 aimed at qualifying any form of gambling as a 
crime.  
The government has also issued a number of other laws 
that qualify immoral acts as crimes. This includes law 5/1997 on 
psychotropic and other substances, law 22/1997 on narcotics, 
24/1997 on broadcasting, and 44/2008 on pornography. The first 
two laws rule that psychotropic substances and narcotics are 
strictly restricted to health and knowledge purposes. Any form of 
abuse of these substances is strictly prohibited and the offender 
may be punished with a minimum of four and a maximum of 
fifteen years in jail, or with a fine of a minimum of 150 and a 
maximum of 750 million rupiah. Various forms of indecent 
materials, including pornography and material related to gambling 
are also prohibited from publication or broadcast in any form of 
media. Law 24/1997 rules that offenders will be punished with 
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seven years in jail or a fine of 700 million rupiah. Law 44/2008 
threatens the offender of a pornographic offence with punishment 
of a minimum of six months and a maximum of one year in jail or a 
fine of 250 million rupiah.  
 
2.4.1 In the province of Aceh  
Aside from the current developments in terms of issuing state laws 
concerning public immorality, a number of provinces and regions 
have codified public immorality in local law since 2000. The 
authorities in Aceh have issued qanun aimed at regulating public 
morality offences concerning the prohibition of drinking alcohol, 
gambling and khalwat. Qanun 12 of 2003 makes it an offence to 
consume khamr and psychotropic substance. Khamr is broadly 
defined as an alcoholic drink that may cause health and 
consciousness problems including brain damage. Qanun 12 
elucidates that consuming alcohol and other psychotropic 
substances is prohibited (ḥarām). Thus, any parties – individual, 
organization or business, government and community – are 
prohibited from becoming involved with these substances. Every 
person is forbidden from consuming alcoholic and other 
psychotropic substances. Offenders will be punished with forty 
lashes. The punishment for habitual consumers adds a third more 
lashes to the basic punishment. This qanun prohibits an 
organization or business from producing, providing and selling 
alcoholic and psychotropic substances. Punishment for doing so is 
a minimum of three months and a maximum of one year prison or 
be fined with a minimum 25 billion and a maximum 75 billion 
rupiah.  A government officer who issues such a permit will be 
punished with a minimum of three months and a maximum of one 
year in jail or be fined with a minimum 25 billion and a maximum 
75 billion rupiah. 
The offence of gambling is regulated under qanun 13 of 2003 
and it defines gambling as an activity that involves a bet between 
two or more parties in which the winner makes a profit. This qanun 
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elucidates that gambling is prohibited (ḥarām). Consequently, 
every person is prohibited from committing any form of gambling. 
Offenders will be punished with a minimum of six and a maximum 
of twelve lashes in public. Habitual gamblers will be punished with 
one third extra lashes. Qanun 13 goes on to prohibit any 
organization or business from organizing, facilitating and 
protecting any form of gambling. Punishment for doing so is a fine 
of a minimum 5 million and a maximum 15 million rupiah. This 
qanun rules that no government institution has the authority to 
issue a license to legalize gambling. Any officer doing so will be 
fined with minimum 5 million and maximum 15 million rupiah. 
People should actively prevent any forms of gambling, for example 
by reporting it to the local authorities. 
Qanun 14/2003 concerns khalwat. This is defined as close 
proximity between unmarried people of the opposite sex. The 
above qanun prohibits khalwat, facilitating khalwat and the 
protection of an offender. Punishment for committing khalwat is a 
minimum of three and a maximum of nine lashes or a fine of 
minimum 2.5 million rupiah and maximum 10 million rupiah. 
Qanun 14 also prohibits any private or government institution from 
providing facilities or protection for offenders. Anyone caught 
doing so will be punished with a minimum of two months and a 
maximum of six months in jail or be fine with minimum 5 million 
and maximum 15 million rupiah.   
The three Aceh qanun outlined above reveal that the nature 
of these offences is decided by rules that are regulated under the 
Islamic penal code. They also reveal that those offences have 
shifted away from what KUHP has already ruled. This shift 
occurred as a result of legal and social factors: legally, the 
government of Aceh has the authority to codify Sharia and socially, 
most people of Aceh adhere to the rules of public morality in 




   
 
 
2.4.2 In other provinces 
In other provinces and regions a number of local public morality 
laws have been issued mainly relating to the prohibition of 
prostitution, gambling, and alcoholic beverages. Here, I will 
provide an example by outlining two regional laws, one from 
Bulukumba in South Sulawesi and one from Sambas in West 
Kalimantan. The authorities in Bulukumba issued regional law 
03/2002 prohibiting the abuse of alcoholic beverages. The law 
defines alcoholic beverages as any drinks containing elements of 
ethanol substances mixed with other substances. This definition 
emphasizes the technical methods required to produce alcohol, 
rather than focusing on the health problems caused by this 
substance. It does not, however, totally prohibit the consumption, 
sale or distribution of alcoholic beverages in this region. Sections 2 
to 6 rule that the head of the region may issue a license to legalize 
the consumption or sale of alcohol; however, section 7 limits the 
places where alcoholic beverages may be sold to tourist 
destinations, hotels, restaurants and bars. Section 8 also restricts 
students and public officers from buying and consuming alcoholic 
beverages. Offenders will be punished with a maximum of six 
months in jail or fined a maximum of 5 million rupiah. Thus, this 
regional law follows the rules set out in KUHP rather than Sharia.  
The authorities in Sambas issued regional law 3/2004 on the 
prohibition of prostitution and pornography. The prohibition of 
zina is also included in this local law, which defines prostitution 
and zina as two separate acts, despite them both involving sexual 
intercourse (whether consensual or by force) between a man and a 
women who are not married to each other. Pornography is defined 
as any act that stimulates sexual desire or lust, whether it be as a 
result of a way of dressing or of behavior. Offenders may be 
punished with a minimum of four months and a maximum of six 
months in jail or with a fine of minimum 3 million and maximum 5 
million rupiah.  
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Similar local regulations can be found in other regions throughout 
the archipelago, such as in West Java, South Sulawesi, South 
Sumatra and other provinces. This development suggests that local 
authorities are challenged with problems of public morality and 
are attempting to solve these problems by issuing local laws. A 
number of regions still issue local laws aimed at prohibiting 
gambling, even though it has already been prohibited under 
national law.29 Perhaps, the purpose of this is to put the matter 
firmly under the authority of the regional government, rather than 
national law who enforce it using the police.  
 
2.5 Public morality in West Sumatra  
In West Sumatra public immorality is formed by several sets of 
rules, including adat law and Sharia. These two rules are located at 
the periphery of state law; however, both are very much ‘living’ 
laws within society. Actual practice varies and requires an 
awareness of whether an immoral act is governed by adat or 
Sharia. It should be noted that adat rules regarding public 
immorality are more varied and more specific than Sharia. The 
history of this society reveals that the first conflict between groups 
of Muslims and adat functionaries occurred in the 19th century and 
was triggered in part as a result of public immorality issues, 
including gambling and smoking opium (Dobbin 1974:328). Current 
questions of public immorality largely deal with unlawful sexual 
intercourse, abuse of alcohol and other psychotropic substances, 
gambling, the spread of pornographic materials and other immoral 
conduct between men and women.  
In recent decades, the provincial authorities have 
attempted to tackle the problems of prostitution. In 1978, the 
government took the political decision to establish a rehabilitation 
center located in Sukarami at Solok, aimed at offering prostitutes 
                                                        
29The regional law of Sambas 4/2004 on the prohibition of gambling.   
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an alternative and to provide them with the skills to support 
themselves without resorting to prostitution. However, it has little 
impact in terms of reducing the number of prostitutes. On the 
contrary, current evidence shows that number of prostitutes is 
gradually increasing. According to a government report, there 
were approximately 200 prostitutes in West Sumatra in 2000 
(Singgalang, 22/7/2001). This actual figure is likely to be higher as 
not all prostitutes are willing to be recorded in this official data. 
Though prostitution is condemned, it is widely available in a 
number of cities in West Sumatra. For example, in Padang 
prostitutes can be easily observed on several main streets during 
nights, or they stay at cheap hostels or hotels located in the city. It 
has been widely rumored that corrupt government officers are 
involved in the prostitution, securing places for prostitutes to 
work or protecting the places where they reside. A number of 
other people also benefit from the earnings of prostitution, 
including taxi drivers and landlords.  
The spread of other public immoralities such as gambling 
and the abuse of alcohol and other psychotropic substances, as 
well as the distribution of pornographic materials has been 
widespread. In the early 2000s, it was common to observe people 
freely selling and offering lottery cards, alcoholic drinks, and 
pornographic pictures in several public places in Padang, even 
next door to the police headquarters or the mayor’s office in the 
city.  These public immoralities have resulted in the increase of 
both crime and social problems, including a rise in the number of 
people who have contracted HIV/AIDS (Profile 2011:39).30 Most 
people have become skeptical that the government is able to deal 
with such social problems effectively (interview with ulama, 
27/7/2010).  
                                                        
30 According to the statistical data of West Sumatra the total crimes and offences 
registered at the court between 2005 and 2009 as follow. Crimes; 2005:2,184,  
2006:2,447,   2007:2,875,  2008:2,872 and 2009:3.119 Offences; 2005:198,082, 
2006:91,426, 2007:89,991, 2008:87,435 and 2009:82,569 (West Sumatra 2010:195).  
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For most people, the issue of public immorality is rooted in two 
main factors. First, there is a discrepancy between the rules 
regarding immoral acts and the state’s law and the norms of adat 
and Sharia which the majority of people adhere to. Law 
enforcement is only possible according to the state’s rules. 
Secondly, though state law has clearly classified a number of public 
immoralities as crimes, there is a lack of implementation. Police 
officers often justify this failure by saying that public immorality is 
hard to defeat because it has long been a part of human culture. 
Another argument used by the police to justify the failure to 
enforce state laws on public immorality is the lack of police 
numbers. This is may be justified by the fact that the ratio of police 
and population in Indonesia is still far from ideal, that is 1:400. The 
data shows that between 1995 and 2000 the ratio is 1:1.000 and this 
rate increased to 1:750 between 2000 and 2004. This number 
increased to 1:500 in 2009 (News.detik.com, 01/07/2010). In West 
Sumatra, the ratio rate reaches 1:504 in 2009 there were 9,568 
police personnel for a population of approximately 4.83 million 
(West Sumatra 2010:53:57). The general population tends to take 
the opposite view to the police and it is frequently argued that the 
lack of enforcement is a result of corrupt police officers who are 
deeply involved in immoral acts such as gambling, prostitution, 
abuse of alcohol and drugs.  
The issue of public immorality has become a prime concern 
among politicians, specifically those belonging to Islamic political 
parties such as PPP, PAN, PKS and PBB. These politicians advocate 
Sharia legislation as well as adat rules to regulate public 
immorality at the provincial and regional/municipal levels.  
 
2.5.1 Provincial Law 
Members of the provincial parliament marked a new achievement 
when they advocated a draft provincial law concerning public 
immorality. The parliament has the authority to table a draft 
provincial law according to the regional autonomy law of 1999 and 
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the amended constitution. Prior to this legislation, this institution 
lacked the authority to draft bills. This development attracted wide 
public attention. In addition, legislation concerning immorality is a 
relatively sensitive issue for the public, because many see it as an 
attempt to legalize Sharia rather than adat rules. Consequently, 
there has been a varied response to this development. As 
Indonesian legal history shows, public discussion and debate has 
been the usual response to any attempts to legalize Sharia. These 
responses tend to become emotional and polarized. The 
proponents of Sharia are accused of going against Pancasila and the 
constitution; meanwhile opponents of Sharia are accused of 
islamophobia.  
The following section presents two subsections of the draft 
and provincial law 11/2001. This aims to examine the contents of 
both, and the extent to which the provincial law differed from the 
draft and why such a difference occurred.  
  
2.5.1.1 The draft 
The E commission of the provincial parliament is tasked to deal 
with social welfare (kesejahteraan rakyat) and this means it is also 
concerned with the issue of public immorality. Though some 
people have voiced the opinion that public immorality problems 
cannot be solved by a legal approach, this commission believed 
that these matters required legal solutions. Thus, members of the 
commission took the initiative to prepare a draft for provincial 
law. According to the chair of this ad hoc commission, the 
members of the parliament had conducted several public 
assessments before taking a decision to draft a bill on the matter. 
As he mentioned to me: 
  
We had been talking to people during several official visits to 
villages and other official public gatherings. People were mostly 
complaining about a gradual diminishing of public morality. 
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According to them, the adat maxim adat basandi Sharia, Sharia 
basandi kitabullah, was nothing more than lip service and 
disconnected from people’s attitudes and behaviors. However, I 
acknowledge that not all people felt the same about this, but 
most of them do. They suggested we should issue a provincial law 
to maintain public morality. This suggestion motivated members 
of the E commission of DPRD to draft and subsequently table a 
bill in parliament (Interview, the former chair of the 
commission, 07/06/2009). 
  
In early of 2001 the E commission began the process of drafting a 
provincial law concerning the prohibition and elimination of 
public immorality (Pelarangan dan pemberantasan maksiat). The draft 
consisted of seven chapters and seventeen sections.31 Below three 
parts of the draft are examined: the motives behind its issuance, 
the rules included in the draft and the penalties.  
The draft mentions three main reasons for introducing the 
law. First, the province of West Sumatra is a region that has a 
distinctive character, not least that the society is ruled by both 
adat and Sharia. This is justified by the maxim: adat is based on 
Sharia; Sharia is based on the Quran; Sharia commands; adat 
implements; the messages are taken from nature (adat basandi 
syara’, syara’ basandi kitabullah, syara’ mangato, adat mamakai, alam 
takambang jadi guru). Second, several immoral acts, including 
prostitution, unlawful sexual intercourse, homosexuality, 
gambling, pornographic acts, and the abuse of alcohol have 
affected, disturbed and disharmonized the foundation of society. 
These immoralities clearly contravene not only a number of state 
laws and regulations, but also religious and adat rules. Third, the 
purpose of issuing the provincial law is generally to maintain social 
harmony and specifically to protect new generations from the 
negative impact of immoral acts.   
                                                        
31 The draft can be seen in appendix 5.  
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Furthermore, this draft defines a number of key terms related to 
this issue. Public immorality (maksiat) is defined as conduct by any 
person that disturbs the foundations of social life and that is 
considered contrary to state regulations, and religious and 
traditional rules. This immorality includes male and female 
prostitution, unlawful sexual intercourse (zina), abortion, 
homosexuality, pornographic acts, gambling, and abuse of 
narcotics and alcoholic beverages. These immoralities may be 
classified into four main categories: 1) unlawful sexual intercourse; 
2) gambling; 3) abuse of alcohol and other psychotropic 
substances; and 4) pornographic acts. 
The drafter appears to be attempting to change the 
meaning of immoralities as defined in the national public laws. 
Though definitions of alcohol and other psychotropic substances 
are, on the whole, simply restated from what is written in the 
national public laws, unlawful sexual intercourse (zina) is defined 
as unlawful sexual intercourse committed by a man and women 
who are not married to each other, including consensual 
intercourse. Prostitution is defined as unlawful intercourse with 
financial benefits committed by a man and woman who are not 
married to each other. Homosexuality is defined as unlawful sexual 
intercourse by two people of the same sex. Nevertheless, the draft 
remains vague and imprecise about a number of immoral acts; for 
example, pornographic acts are defined as any acts and/or conduct 
that may stimulate sexual desire.  
The draft rules that any person who is involved in, facilitates, 
provides, or permits public immorality shall be guilty of an 
offence. Section 10, entitled prohibition, states the following: 
 
(1) Any person who commits public immorality (maksiat) shall 
be guilty of an offence; 
(2) Any person  whose conduct can stimulate or trigger another 
person to commit immoralities shall be guilty of an offence; 
(3) Any female person who leaves their house between 10pm and 
4am, without being accompanied by family members (muḥrim), 
78 
 
   
 
 
and/or she is not on duty obligated by law, and/or she is not 
doing any work justified by other legal norms, shall be guilty of 
an offence; 
(4) Any owner of hotel/motel/inn/guest house who allows any 
guest to visit outside of visiting time or outside of the visiting 
room (guest room/lobby), or allows anyone to commit 
immoralities, or provides massage services, or allows males and 
females who are not married to each other to stay in the same 
room, shall be guilty of an offence. 
  
The draft specifies a code of conduct for owners of hotels, 
entertainment venues, tourist destinations, educational 
institutions, state and privates institutions, business groups, and 
mass media. For example, the owner of a hotel should record the 
identity of guests who are staying and send this data to an 
appointed local authority. The hotel owner must provide 
transportation to take their female staff home if their shift ends 
after 10pm; the owner is also obligated to prevent any form of 
public morality offence. This draft implies that public immoralities 
commonly occur in these public places.    
The penalties for offenders are regulated in section 14. 
Subsection 1 elucidates that offenders who commit the offences 
that have been regulated under national public laws will be 
punished according to the penalties set out in the national 
legislation and that details of the offence will be published in three 
local media sources. Subsection 2 rules that the penalty for 
offenders who commit offences stipulated under the draft will be 
imprisoned for a maximum of six months or fined a maximum of 5 
million rupiah. Details of the offences will be published in three 
local media. Subsection 3 further rules that offenders who own 
hotels, entertainment venues, tourist destinations, educational 
institutions, state and private institutions, business groups, and 
mass media will be punished with a maximum of six months in jail 
or fined a maximum of 5 million rupiah. There will also be 
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administrative sanctions such as the withdrawing of a business 
licence. Subsections 4 to 6 elucidate that if an offender is a public 
officer the penalty will be doubled. The draft mentions legal 
institutions that should enforce this provincial law, including the 
police, the civil servants investigation bureau and the civil service 
police unit.  The implementation of provincial law is approved by 
the governor of West Sumatra.  
This draft shows that codes of conduct concerning public 
immorality are derived from state regulations, Minangkabau adat 
and Sharia. The standard rules regarding immorality are derived 
from Sharia and, to some extent, also from adat, while the penalties 
for these offences are adopted from state law. This evidence 
reveals that Sharia does play a central role in this issue. Hooker 
suggests that this development can be characterized by the 
attempts to adopt elements of Sharia into state values (Hooker 
2008:291-2). 
The provincial parliament established an ad hoc 
commission to produce and get joint approval of the draft with the 
provincial government. The commission subsequently planned a 
number of hearings with broader audiences, including academics, 
NGO activists, ulama, adat functionaries and public figures from 
civil society groups as well as other elements of society. These 
meetings were scheduled between 26 and 29 June 2001. The ad hoc 
commission intentionally decided not to circulate the draft to 
wider public audiences; nevertheless, it fell into the hands of 
journalists who published it. A local daily newspaper, Haluan, 
printed the draft between 24 and 26 June 2001. There was a swift 
reaction from the public to the draft that was keen to share its 
views with members of parliament.   
The public response to the draft was varied. Some people 
were happy and fully supported the bill; others were shocked and 
rejected it completely; there were a number of skeptics who 
proposed a different idea, and there were those who were critical 
and asked for a revision. Opponents and proponents alike not only 
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came from West Sumatra, but also outside of the province. The 
draft triggered nationwide public debate and discussions centered 
on two main issues. First, whether or not a provincial law on public 
immorality was necessary; and second, the rules stipulated in the 
draft were seen to be in contradiction to national law and human 
rights. Opponents and proponents to the draft reacted emotionally 
rather than rationally to the proposed legislation.  
Many of the proponents were local ulama, adat 
functionaries and activists from Muslim organizations, including 
Muhammadiyah, Aisiyah Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. 
Their support was publicly articulated whenever possible. In 
addition, proponents attempted to counter criticism of the draft. 
However, they tended to do this in an emotional way, attacking 
opponents with value judgments, rather than with rational 
arguments. For example, during a meeting of the ad hoc DPRD 
commission on 25 June 2001, the Chair of Muhammadiyah 
expressed his support by saying ‘I acknowledge that this draft is 
still in the form of a draft, therefore it still requires enriching and 
revising. However, we should not be hasty and say that this draft 
contravenes [national laws] and thus must be fully rejected. This 
denial is a reflection of narrow-mindedness and inaccuracy’ 
(Singgalang, 27/06/2001). This statement reveals that the Chair did 
not focus on countering the arguments of opponents; rather he 
judged them accusing them of being narrow-minded and 
inaccurate.  
A similar approach was adopted by the leader of Aisiyah 
Muhammadiyah who delivered the following views on this issue: 
‘According to Aisiyah the draft is more respected than the 
[declaration of human rights], because it is based on adat and syara’ 
[Islamic Law]’. She went on to accuse opponents of the draft of 
having been contaminated by Western values that are not in 
accordance with Islamic teachings (Singgalang, 27/06/2001). 
Classifying the draft as more respected than international human 
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rights legislation and judging opponents for their ‘Western values’ 
is an emotional reaction.   
The Vice Director of the legal aid organization (PHBI) said: 
‘it is strange that some of us are promoting western values that are 
obviously not in line with our tradition and culture. It is time to 
implement the richness of Islamic values’ (Singgalang, 27/06/2001). 
An outstanding local ʿālim (Islamic religious scholar), rather 
suspiciously supported the draft by saying, ‘this draft aims to 
protect akhlāq of ummat [muslim communities] from disorder. 
Thus, all of us must support [the draft] and we should not be 
provoked by others whose agenda is to cancel the draft’. An adat 
functionary also supported the draft. He said, ‘Muslims are the 
dominant population in Minangkabau; thus, it is logical that 
Islamic law influenced our tradition. Consequently Islamic law that 
is adopted in the draft must be obeyed in this region’ (Singgalang, 
27/06/2001). Similar voices were also heard from other individuals 
or Muslim and adat organizations, including the West Sumatra 
Ulama Council, a number of Muslim academics and adat 
functionaries. In addition, there were equally emotional responses 
among opponents of the draft. For example, an accusation was 
made that the members of parliament lacked intellectual 
capacities (Haluan, 03/06/2001).  
Despite the emotion on both sides, there were some 
constructive arguments put forward, mostly by opponents who 
disagreed with the draft or certain sections of it. The governor of 
West Sumatra, NGO activists, and scholars belonged to this 
category. Their arguments can be summarized into three main 
points:  First, substantive laws in the draft have already been 
regulated under national public laws. Thus, there was no point in 
issuing the same substantive laws, particularly ones that 
contravene the national laws. The suggestion was put forward to 
maintain public morality by reinforcing the national laws, rather 
than issuing local regulations on the matter.  Second, it was argued 
that a legalistic approach, such as issuing a provincial law 
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concerning public immorality (maksiat), was not the best solution. 
‘To prohibit a woman from leaving her home between 10pm and 
4am is not the best solution for prostitution practices, it will create 
more difficulties for good women’, wrote AA Navis in the daily 
newspaper Singgalang (Singgalang, 21/07/2001). The next day, he 
wrote again and saying that the provincial government had 
already tried a similar approach to this issue but the result was 
unsuccessful and, in fact, the number of prostitutes in West 
Sumatra was on the increase. According to Navis, public 
immorality was rooted in a number of factors, such as economic, 
social, religios and adat problems. These factors must be taken into 
consideration when formulating solutions, rather than merely 
relying on a legal approach (Singgalang, 22/07/2001). 
Third, the parliament should not issue any provincial law 
that is largely based on adat and Islamic teachings and with the 
purpose of implementing Islamic law in West Sumatra. West 
Sumatra is not only home to Muslims and the Minangkabau 
people, but also to the Mentawai region. It could be seen as a 
matter of discrimination to issue a provincial law that only applies 
to Muslims and Minangkabau people. Thus, Navis suggested 
issuing a similar regulation at the regional rather than at the 
provincial level (Singgalang, 24/07/2001).  
The most controversial point in the draft is section 10 (3) that 
states that ‘any female person who leaves their house between 
10pm and 4am, without being accompanied by family members 
(muḥrim), and/or she is not on duty obligated by law, and/or she 
is not doing any work justified by other legal norms, shall be 
guilty of an offence’. Several NGO activists argued that this 
section not only violated national public law, but also human 
rights as well. Further, it would create problems for women who, 
for example, must work during the night, such as in the 
traditional market, hospitals, hotels and other places. Thus, it 
was proposed to withdraw this section from the draft. However, 
there were a number of ulama and adat functionaries who 
supported the restrictions on women leaving their home during 
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the night. They argued that not only was the restriction inspired 
by Sharia, but also that such actions were ruled as cando – 
indecency – under adat.  
Although there were a number of calls to withdraw the draft, 
during a speech by the governor to members of parliament on 10 
September 2001, he suggested that parliament adjust the draft to 
fit in with the requirements of the national laws. To this end, the 
parliament might revise the draft by focusing merely on 
prevention (pencegahan) matters and excluding those sections of 
the draft dealing with the issue of elimination (pemberantasan).  
In response to criticism of the draft, most members of parliament 
were reluctant to involve the wider public in a debate and tended 
to agree to revise major parts of the draft. Of the 55 members of 
parliament, only five had experience as members of provincial 
parliaments, and four had been regional parliament members.32 
The remainder had no such experience. It is commonly said that 
being a member of the parliament happens ‘by accident’. This is as 
a result of a growth in political parties and the fact that there are 
few qualified figures for the role. In fact, many members of 
parliament began their careers as civil servants. However, a new 
law provided opportunities for them to join political parties. 
Consequently, this created the possibility for anyone who was 
interested to take on a political position (Asnan 2006:245-6). 
However, many of these new members underestimated the work 
involved. There were other factors that contributed to this 
situation. Political institutions like the parliament are not yet well 
equipped with comprehensive rules and regulations to facilitate 
the performance of their tasks. For example, the rules regarding 
the issuance of a provincial law were still, in general, regulated 
                                                        
32 Figures for members of parliament in 1999 were as follows: KAMMI 1 person, 
PUI 1 person, PPP 10 people, PDI 5 people, PAN 11 people, PBB 3 people, PK 2 
people, Golkar 12 people, PP 1 person, PKB 1 person, PPIM 1 person, and 
representatives of Military and Police 6 people (Asnan 2006:243-5).    
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under the presidential decision 44/1999 and a comprehensive rule 
on this issue is regulated under law 10/2004.    
 
2.5.1.2 Provincial law 11/2001 
After six revisions of the first draft, the parliament finally 
approved a final draft and the governor subsequently approved 
provincial law 11/2001 on the prevention and elimination of public 
immoralities (pencegahan dan pemberantasan maksiat) on 14 
November 2001. It consists of seven chapters and 24 sections. It is 
not surprising that its contents are considerably different from the 
first draft.  
A brief summary of its contents follows. The provincial law 
aims to adopt the notion of adat as well as Sharia in maintaining 
public morality. It specifies that a number of immoral acts violate 
the norms of religion, adat and national public laws. Specific public 
offences are defined in section 2 (2): unlawful sexual intercourse 
and other conduct that may result in unlawful sexual intercourse, 
gambling, abuse of alcohol, narcotics and psychotropic substances, 
and offences relating to pornographic materials.   
Though the national public laws regulate public 
immorality, the provincial law is concerned with four main issues: 
unlawful sexual intercourse; gambling; abuse of alcohol, narcotics 
and other psychotropic substances; and pornographic material 
issues. Of these four classifications, only the definition of zina is 
different from what has been defined in national public laws. The 
definitions for other immoral acts, including gambling, abuse of 
alcohol, narcotics and other psychotropic substances and 
pornographic materials are largely copied from the national pubic 
laws. For instance, section 1 (e) defines zina as  intercourse 
between a man and woman who are not married to each other, or 
between to people of the same sex, whether it takes place 
voluntarily or by force, and whether or not payment is made.  
These four offences are regulated in sections 5 to 15 which 
are summarized as follows: Sections 5 and 6 elucidate that any 
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person who commits and facilitates unlawful sexual intercourse, or 
may trigger sexual desire through physical movement and/or not 
covering part(s) of the body that they are obligated to cover by 
religious and adat rules, produces any kind of writings, pictures, 
and entertainment that triggers sexual desire shall be guilty of an 
offence. Sections 7 to 10 rule that any person who commits 
gambling, facilitates gambling or provides a place or protection for 
such activities, earns a living from gambling, or licenses gambling 
shall be guilty of an offence. Sections 11 to 14 rule on the abuse of 
alcohol, narcotics and psychotropic substances. Section 12 
specifies that any person who blends, produces, stores, sells, 
distributes, presents, protects and consumes alcohol, narcotics or 
psychotropic substances shall be guilty of an offence. These 
substances are strictly restricted to medical purposes. With 
regards to publishing and producing materials that may trigger 
immoral acts, section 14 elucidates that any person who is in 
charge of a state or private institution, or any person who has 
business relating to publishing, producing, and distributing mass 
media, including printing, electronics stores, and pictures and 
posters, that contravenes religious and adat values shall be guilty 
of an offence. This provincial law stipulates the importance of 
public participation. People are encouraged to report (suspected) 
offences and immoral acts to the local authorities. Furthermore, 
the general public is also obligated to warn people against 
committing public immoralities.  
However, there are two significant weaknesses of 
provincial law 11/2001 – the lack of penalty and the lack of legal 
enforcement. Section 22 (1) only indicates that the offender will be 
punished according national public law. It only regulates an 
administrative penalty for any local officer who does not take any 
legal action following the report of a suspected offence. In 
addition, it does not explicitly indicate specific legal enforcement, 
although it mentions that the police have a role in enforcing this 
law. That said, the police are excluded from the subject of regional 
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autonomy. Enforcement is prescribed in the form of the civil 
service police unit (Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja/Satpol PP); however, 
as yet there are no legal enforcement institutions for regional 
governance.  
According to law 22/1999, the governor is required to issue 
a decree in order to implement the provincial law. Without this, 
the legislation remains legally inapplicable. There is no specific 
regulation stating when the governor should issue this degree. 
Implicit in this rule is that implementation of the provincial law 
relies on the political will of the governor. The governor 
established a committee to prepare the draft for the governor 
decree; however, it failed to fulfill its task. To date, the governor 
has yet to issue a decree to implement provincial law 11/2001.  
Although the provincial law legally cannot come into force, 
the evidence has shown that it has been widely used to justify 
certain acts as public immorality offences. Despite this 
disadvantageous situation, the presence of provincial law 11/2001 
has resulted in the issue of public immorality becoming the 
concern of the regional authorities. However, it also causes a 
complex relationship between two legal enforcement bodies: the 
police department and the regional authorities, including Satpol 
PP. This issue is discussed further in the last section of this 
chapter.   
2.5.2 Regional/municipal law  
There are four municipalities and three regions that have issued a 
law concerning public immorality. They are the municipalities of 
Bukittinggi, Padangpanjang, Payakumbuh and Padang, and the 
regions of Padangpariman, Sawahlunto/Sijunjung and Pesisir 
Selatan. This raises the question, why is this issue only of concern 
in these areas? One explanation may be that these issues had 
become a priority for most politicians belonging to Islamic political 
parties, including PK(S), PAN, and PBB They mostly considered 
public immorality to have become widespread in these places and 
has caused social problems, for instance the abuse of alcohol and 
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other psychotropic substance and criminality (Interview with a 
member of the provincial parliement, 07/06/2009). 
The following paragraphs briefly present the contents of 
each regional and municipal law. Attention is mainly focused on 
two issues: the category of public immoralities and the penalty for 
the offences.    
 
2.5.2.1 The municipality of Bukittinggi  
The municipality of Bukittinggi was the first region to issue a 
municipal law on public morality in West Sumatra. The parliament 
and the mayor issued municipal law 9/2000 on the prevention and 
elimination of public immorality on 28 September 2000. It consists 
of six chapters and eight sections. This law was revised in 2003 
with the municipal law 20/2003.  
Section two classifies public immoralities in three 
categories. Firstly, personal offences, including: 1) prostitution; 2) 
abuse of alcohol in public; 3) disrespecting the rules of fasting in a 
provocative manner during Ramadan; and 4) distributing 
pornographic material in public. The second category relates to 
the misuse of business premises for public immorality offences; 
and the third category refers to offences of protecting or 
facilitating immoral acts. The rules relating to unlawful sexual 
intercourse (zina) are excluded from this law and section 4 (2 & 3) 
specifies that drinking alcohol is only prohibited in public. This 
allows the authorities to grant licenses to businesses dealing with 
alcohol. However, this law adopts new elements of Sharia, i.e. 
disrespecting the rules of the fasting month. The penalty for 
offenders is a maximum of four months in jail or a fine of 4 million 
rupiah. The municipal law 20/2003 revised this penalty with a 




   
 
 
2.5.2.2 The municipality of Padangpanjang  
The authorities of this municipality issued the municipal law 
3/2004 on the prevention and elimination of public immorality on 
3 February 2004. It consists of ten chapters and 23 sections. This 
law classifies public immoralities into eight categories: 1) Unlawful 
sexual intercourse (zina). Section 5 specifies that any person who 
commits sexual intercourse, conducts homosexual or lesbian 
relations, provides facilities or protects places for these offences, 
and lives on the earnings from unlawful sexual intercourse shall be 
guilty of these offences. 2) Indecent behavior. Sections 6 and 7 rule 
that any person who wears clothes that are not in accordance with 
Muslim dress code, behaves in a way that provokes sexual desire, 
lives on the earnings from harming people and protects any 
activities relating to harming people shall be guilty of an offence. 
3) Publishing and distributing pornographic materials. Section 7 
rules that any person who produces, distributes, stores, supplies or 
sells any pornographic materials shall be guilty of an offence. 4) 
Prohibits the abuse of alcohol. Section 10 elucidates that any 
person who sells alcohol without authorization, consumes it in 
public place, or facilitates and protects the abuse of alcohol shall 
be guilty an offence. 5) Disrespecting the rules of Ramadan. Article 
8 rules that any person who shows disrespect for the rules of 
fasting during Ramadan, including smoking, drinking or eating in 
public shall be guilty an offence. 6) Playing games. Article 13 rules 
that students are prohibited from playing games, such as 
Playstation and billiards while wearing school uniform. 7) Abuse of 
narcotics and other psychotropic substances. Section 11 rules that 
any person who facilitates other people in the abuse of narcotics 
and other psychotropic substance shall be guilty an offence. 8) The 
prohibition of gambling. Section 12 elucidates that any person who 
facilitates gambling shall be guilty an offence.  
Section 18 rules on the penalties for the above offences. 
Offenders involved in unlawful sexual intercourse, prostitutes and 
homosexuality will be punished with a maximum of six months in 
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jail or a fine of 5 million rupiah. The offence of indecent behavior is 
punished with a maximum one month in jail or a fine of 1 million 
rupiah. The offence of publishing or distributing pornographic 
pictures is punished with a maximum six months in jail or a fine of 
a maximum of 5 million rupiah. Offenders who disrespect the rules 
of fasting will be punished with a maximum three months in jail or 
a fine of 2.5 million rupiah. The offence of gambling, abuse of drugs 
and other psychotropic substance is punishable with a maximum 
six months in jail or a fine of 5 million rupiah.  
The enforcement of this municipal law is conducted by the 
police department and also by the civil service investigator. 
However, these offences are not included in the tasks of Satpol PP.  
 
2.5.2.3 Kabupaten of Pesisir Selatan, Padangpariman, Sawahlunto 
and Payakumbuh 
The regional laws in these four areas are mainly duplications of 
provincial law 11/2001. The classifications regarding public 
immorality and its punishment repeat what is laid down in the 
provincial legislation. That is to say, there are four categories: 1) 
unlawful sexual intercourse and other acts that include intention 
to commit unlawful sexual intercourse; 2) gambling; 3) abuse of 
alcohol, narcotics and other psychotropic substance; and 4) 
publishing or distributing any form of pornographic materials. The 
evidence suggests that the regional law on this issue is largely 
motivated by a need to provide the legal grounds for the regional 
government to maintain public morality.  
2.5.2.4 The municipality of Padang 
The municipal parliament and the mayor issued municipal law 
11/2005 on public order and peaceful society (Ketertiban umum dan 
ketentraman masyarakat) on 12 September 2005. Compared to 
similar laws from other regions, this law uses a different title – 
public order and peaceful society – to other regions that generally 
use the phrase ‘public immorality’. This difference implies that this 
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municipal law has a specific aim. Before the municipal government 
proposed the draft of the law to the parliament in 2005, the 
parliament had received a different draft on this issue, entitled the 
control, prohibition and prevention of public immorality 
(Penertiban, pelarangan, dan penindakan penyakit masyarakat). This bill 
had been tabled by members of parliament belonging to Islamic 
political parties in October 2000.  
  In 2000, the municipal parliament established a commission 
to prepare a new draft. The commission comprised of 23 members, 
14 of whom were from Islamic political parties and the remainder 
were from nationalist parties.33 Interestingly, it was led by a 
member from Golkar, who opposed to the draft. However, on 22 
March 2001, the committee successfully prepared the draft entitled 
the control, prohibition and prevention of public immorality. It 
was subsequently tabled for further plenary sessions in the 
parliament. The draft consisted of six chapters and nine sections. 
The draft elucidates a number of public immoralities that 
are not in line with religious rules and adat, but it does not include 
offences regulated under the national laws. Thus, the municipal 
law is required to control, prohibit and prevent these immoral 
acts. The draft defines public immoralities in a broad sense; that is, 
any acts that contravene Islamic teachings, adat, and other rules. 
Sections 2 and 4 specify the categories of public immoralities: 1) 
prostitution and related conduct such as khalwa (close proximity 
between unmarried persons of the opposite sex); 2) abuse of 
alcohol, drugs and other psychotropic substances; 3) disrespect for 
the rules of fasting during Ramadan; 4) distributing or displaying 
pornographic material; 5) abuse of public places, including hotels, 
                                                        
33 Total members of the parliament were 43 persons: there were 26 persons from 
Islamic political parties, they were 14 persons from PAN, 2 persons from PK, 6 
persons from PPP, 2 persons from PBB, 1 persons from PUI and 1 persons from 
KAMMI; there were 13 persons from nationalist parties, 6 persons from PDIP, 6 
persons from Golkar 6, and 1 persons from PKP; the rests were 5 persons 
representation of police and military (www.kpu.go.id).  
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cafés, tourist destinations and public transportation such as taxis34 
to facilitate public immorality offences; 6) living on the earnings 
from public immoralities. Section 6 rules on the penalties for these 
offences.  
Offenders will be punished with a maximum of five months 
in jail or fined to a maximum of 5 million rupiah. To implement his 
law, section 3 gives authority to the mayor to issue any political 
decisions aimed at control, prohibition and prevention of public 
immorality offences, including determining which places or 
locations are permitted to run food businesses during Ramadan. 
The above classifications show that this draft is identical to the 
municipal law of Bukittinggi.  
The draft was discussed in several public meetings. During 
August and September 2001 the parliament held a series of public 
meetings with several government institutions, academics, public 
figures, NGOs and Muslim organizations. These meetings reached 
agreement that such a municipal law on this issue was required. 
Subsequently, the parliament held several plenary sessions. On 2 
December 2001, members of parliament agreed to send the draft to 
the mayor of Padang. This happened on 2 January 2002. 
Subsequently, the mayor delivered the position of the municipal 
government with regards to the draft in a letter, dated 20 April 
2002, to the parliament. In the letter the mayor explicitly disagreed 
with the draft. He argued that the substantive laws in the draft 
were already regulated under national public laws. He further 
suggested that if there was an offence that was excluded in the 
national public law, but that contravened with adat or social 
values, then law 1/1955 regulated that a judge could authorize the 
punishment of offenders with a maximum of three months in jail. 
Thus, there was no need to issue a municipal law on these matters 
                                                        
34 Most people believe that taxi drivers have been playing a role in prostitution 
business in the city in which they often provide prostitutes for the hotel guests 
(conversation, with a young businessman, 28/8/2010).  
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(Chaironi 2004:59; the letter of the mayor no.50/Huk/IV-2001). In 
addition, disapproval of the draft was also voiced by members of 
parliament, including the chair of the commission, (Haluan 
19/12/2003). In short: as a result of insufficient support for the 
draft, the parliament finally withdrew the draft from the 
parliamentary agenda on 18 December 2003. This cancellation 
meant that the attempt by Islamic members of parliament, aimed 
at legalizing Sharia for at the municipal level, failed.  
The wish for a municipal law concerning public immorality 
re-emerged soon after a new mayor was elected in Padang in 2004. 
The newly elected mayor held a different position on this issue. 
There are two factors contributing to this different stance: firstly, 
the mayor was maintaining his political power by collaborating 
with Muslims figures and organizations as well as Islamic political 
parties; secondly, he was responding to public demands to 
prioritize religious matters, including maintaining public morality.  
The municipality prepared a draft on this subject. In 2005, the 
mayor tabled the bill in parliament. In order to avoid public debate 
and controversy the mayor used a different approach to the issue 
and avoided any reference to or association with Sharia. The 
purpose of the draft appeared simple: to gain legal grounds for 
maintaining public morality. It took six months for the parliament 
to pass the draft and in 12 September 2005 the parliament and the 
mayor approved to the draft of municipality law 11/2005 on the 
public order and peaceful society (Ketertiban umum dan ketentraman 
masyarakat). A member of parliament expressed his views 
concerning the successful issuance of the municipal law saying 
that ‘this municipal law marks an important achievement of the 
parliament. No single word related to Sharia or adat is used, but the 
purpose is clearly the same’ (Interview, former member of the 
parliament, 07/07/2010).  
The municipal law 11/2005 consists of twelve chapters and 
sixteen sections. Its purpose is to maintain public order, a peaceful 
society and, as the title of the law implies, to maximize the use of 
93 
 
   
 
 
public facilities to protect people’s needs. Sections 2 and 3 prohibit 
the misuse of public roads; section 4 regulates the use of green 
spaces and public places; section 5 deals with cleanliness of the 
environment, including an obligation to keep public order in 
neighborhoods; section 9 mentions that business premises must 
only be used for the intended purposes. Section 10 explicitly 
outlines the prohibition of gambling and prostitution. Section 14 
elucidates that these offences will be punished with a maximum of 
six months in jail or a fine with a maximum of 5 million rupiahs.  
Although this legislation does not explicitly refer to the 
issue of public immoralities, any acts that contravene public order 
can be charged under the municipal law. In addition, issues 
relating to public immorality are implicitly regulated in a number 
of sections. For example, section 9 regulates that the owners of 
business premises such as hotels, tourist destinations and cafés, are 
only permitted to operate under license. In addition, municipal law 
11/2005 results in two interconnected points: the municipal 
authority now has a legal basis for maintaining public morality, a 
domain previously belonging to the police and in which local 
authorities played a limited role. It also gives the authority to the 
mayor of Padang to take any political decision necessary for the 
maintenance of ‘public order and peaceful society’. 
On 26 March 2007, law 11/2005 was revised by municipal 
law 04/2007. This new law was only aimed at revising sections 13 
and 14 concerning court procedures and the penalties for offences. 
It regulates that the offences may be punished with a maximum of 
three months in jail or a fine of a maximum of 5 million rupiah.   
 
2.6 Actual practices for maintaining public morality in 
Padang 
This section presents actual practices for maintaining public 
morality imposed by the municipal government of Padang. Before 
presenting the implementation of the municipal law, it presents an 
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overview of the civil service police unit (Satuan polisi pamong praja, 
abbreviated to Satpol PP), an institution authorized to implement 
the law.  
 
2.6.1 Satpol PP 
Satpol PP is a law enforcement institution that has significantly 
exceeded its power since the implementation of regional 
autonomy. It was established at the provincial and 
regional/municipal level. At the provincial level, Satpol PP is 
accountable to the governor and at the regional/municipal level it 
is directly accountable to the bupati/mayor. Its main tasks are 
dealing with the enforcement of the provincial or 
region/municipal laws and other rules and regulations issued by 
the governor or bupati/mayor (Pembinaan n.d:19). 
Historically, this institution has existed since colonial 
times. It was part of the police institution that was called de 
bestuurspolitie, established in 1892, aimed at maintaining public 
order and security (Bloembergen 2009:110). During the Japanese 
occupation this institution was abolished, because the Japanese 
authority mainly relied on military forces. After the establishment 
of the police department on 18 august 1945, Polisi pamong paraja 
became a part of the police institution. However, the government 
paid specific attention to this institution on 30 October 1948 when 
it established an institution called datasemen polisi penjaga keamanan 
kapanewon whose task was to maintain public security primarily in 
the Yogjakarta area. On 10 November 1948 its name changed to 
datasemen polisi pamong praja. On 3 March 1950, the Minister of 
Home Affairs issued a decree to establish this institution in Java 
and Madura and named it Kesatuan polisi pamong praja. In these 
provinces it was to support local government activities. In 1960, 
the institution was established in other islands (Dajoh & Suwirjo 
1997:6-7). In 1962, law 13/1961 on the police changed the name of 
the institution once again, this time to Kesatuan pagar baya, and in 
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the following year the Minister of Home Affairs revised its title to 
Kesatuan pagar praja.  
The final name change resulted in the title Satuan polisi 
pamong praja, commonly abbreviated to Satpol PP when the 
government issued local government law 5/1974. Section 86 (1) of 
law 5/1974 elucidates that Satpol PP is tasked to maintain public 
order at the province and regional/municipal levels. However, the 
government strengthened the legal position of Satpol PP more than 
two decades later when it issued the government regulation 
6/1998 on 7 January 1998. This rule authorizes Satpol PP for two 
main tasks: to support local rulers in maintaining public security 
and to enforce regulations issued by the local authorities.   
After the implementation of law 22/1999 and 32/2004, the 
role of Satpol PP gradually increased. The president issued the 
government regulation 32/2004 on Satpol PP. Section 3 elucidates 
two tasks for this body: to maintain security and public order and 
to enforce provincial or regional/municipal laws. In order to 
implement these tasks, it may coordinate other law enforcement 
institutions, including the police, civil service investigator and 
other authorities. Satpol PP has the authority to investigate 
offences regulated under provincial or regional/municipal law and 
to take ‘repressive non-judicial’ actions in respect of those who 
contravene provincial or regional/municipal laws.  
Current developments show that the authority of Satpol PP 
grew significantly when the president revised government 
regulation 32/2004 with 10/2010 on Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja. 
Section 6 elucidates that it has the authority to: 1) conduct non-
judicial (i.e. the case does not need to be decreed by a court of 
justice) action regarding offences regulated under local law or 
other local regulations; 2) take any actions to prevent offences 
regulated by local law and other local regulations; 3) facilitate and 
empower security; 4) investigate offences regulated under local 
law or other local regulations; 5) issue any administrative penalty 
for offences committed. Further, Satpol PP has the authority to ask 
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the police to follow up cases if the criminal law is broken. In 
addition, section 24 of government regulation 10/2010 regulates 
that the staff of Satpol PP may be armed with gas-powered 
revolvers, blanks and electric shock sticks.  
In order to maintain the organization of Satpol PP in the 
Municipality of Padang, municipal law 14/2004 on the civil service 
police unit was issued. Currently, this law enforcement agency 
employs 200 staff, most of who work in administrative functions; 
less than half are actively working as law enforcers.  
 
2.6.2 Actual practices relating to municipal law 
As a law enforcement institution, Satpol PP is tasked with enforcing 
municipal law and other regulations issued by the mayor. In order 
to maintain public morality, it encompasses municipal law 11/2005 
which forms the rules of public immorality in general terms. In 
terms of actual practices, Satpol PP mostly deals with cases 
concerning 1) gambling; 2) prostitution; 3) khalwa; 4) abuse of 
alcohol, drugs and other psychotropic substances; 5) disrespect for 
the rules of fasting during Ramadan; 6) pornographic conduct or 
matters relating to pornographic materials; and 7) abuse of public 
facilities. Satpol PP operates in two ways. First: by carrying out 
regular or incidental inspections of places where public immorality 
offences are common. Second, by pursuing reports or complaints 
from people concerning suspected public immorality offences.  
Satpol PP inspects public places and facilities, including 
hotels, motels, tourist destinations, cafés, bars, billiard rooms and 
markets. These inspections are scheduled at both regular and 
irregular times. The purpose is to assess whether the place is being 
used in accordance with its intended purpose. Thus, at hotels for 
example, Satpol PP examines the identity of guests of the opposite 
sex who are staying in the same room to find if they are married. 
From the assessment, Satpol PP can reach two conclusions: either 
that the hotel is being used according to its permit and the guests 
are married couples; or, that the guests staying in the same room 
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are unmarried. If this is the case, Satpol PP will take the couple to 
its headquarters and the owner of the hotel will be warned that the 
hotel is being abused and that he is liable for public immorality 
offences.  
In 2005, the owners of hotels became upset about the 
regular sweeping of their premises conducted by Satpol PP. The 
association of hotels and restaurants (Perhimpunan Hotel dan 
Restoran Indonesia, PHRI) protested to the mayor of Padang. They 
argued that their income had significantly diminished because of a 
decreasing number of quests staying at hotels as direct result of 
Satpol PP carrying out frequent inspections. They suggested that 
Satpol PP reduce its checks. In response to the protest, the mayor 
reacted by saying that the inspections would not be stopped and 
there should be no problems if the hotel was being used according 
to its permits (Singgalang, 29/11/2005).  
Satpol PP also inspected tourist destinations, in particular a 
number of places that are popular with local youths spending time 
with their partners. These places are mainly located in coastal 
areas, close to the beach, situated in southwest and northern 
Padang. There, many native people run small-scale businesses, 
such as kiosks, restaurants and cafés. The owners often provide a 
small temporary building35 where a couple can spend their 
afternoons or evenings. According to Satpol PP, this is a public 
immorality offence, namely, khalwa, i.e.  close proximity between 
unmarried persons of the opposite sex. Posing a metaphorical 
question, the chief officer of Satpol PP said ‘if they are not 
committing public immorality why are they sitting and spending 
time in hidden places?’ There were 21 couples arrested during an 
inspection of a tourist destination conducted on 18 March 2011 
(Interview, the chief officer of Satpol PP, 19/05/2010).  
 
                                                        
35In colloquial language this temporary building is named pondok baremoh, 
literally meaning a place for gaining pleasure.   
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Figure 2.1. The two couples sitting on the bench have been accused of 
committing khalwa (Photo is printed in Daily Haluan¸ 08/06/2011). 
 
During the inspection, Satpol PP firstly examines the identity of the 
suspected couple. If they are not married, they will be taken to the 
headquarters of Satpol PP.  
Besides conducting inspections, Satpol PP also receives 
reports or complaints from people who suspect the occurrence of 
public immorality. These kinds of cases mostly occur in rented 
houses (rumah kost) and people from the neighborhood report the 
cases to the Satpol PP. Satpol PP follows up such reports by 
inspecting the house and the marital status of the tenants. If Satpol 
PP is suspicious that these people have committed public 
immorality, they are taken to the headquarters. The following 
image shows three pairs of the opposite sex being interrogated at 
the Satpol PP headquarters. They are accused of violating municipal 
law 11/2005 because they had been living in the same house. The 
case emerged as a result of reports from the neighborhood.  
Satpol PP records show that most of the cases dealing with 
public immorality offences are prostitution, unlawful sexual 
intercourse, khalwa, gambling, abuse of alcohol and psychotropic 




   
 
 
10/07/2010). On the whole, these cases are dealt with by the local 
law enforcement authority and only a few cases are forwarded to 













   
 
Figure 2.2. Six females and two males are being interrogated at the headquarters 
of Satpol PP (Photo is printed Daily Haluan, 04/06/2011 
 
Cases of khalwa are usually dealt with using three solutions: firstly, 
if the offenders live in Padang, Satpol PP calls their parents or their 
relatives into the headquarters in order to discuss the situation. 
Most cases are solved by signing an agreement that their parents 
or relatives promise to tighten their control over the offenders. 
One parent told me that he felt so embarrassed when his child was 
arrested by Satpol PP. He acknowledged that it is a punishment 
(conversation, with a parent, 30/06/2010). Secondly, if the offenders 
do not have parents or relatives in Padang because they are 
studying at the university, Satpol PP asks for a member of the 
administrative or teaching staff to come to the headquarters. A 
university teacher told me that he once had dealings with Satpol PP 
when two of his students of the opposite sex were arrested 
(Conversation, with a teaching staff, 20/11/2009). Thirdly, if none of 




   
 
 
offenders to sign a letter agreeing that they will not commit the 
offence in the future.  
The case of prostitution is more complicated. This is 
because prostitution is generally well organized and in most cases 
there are government officers involved in protecting the practices, 
places and people involved (interview, with the staff of Satpol PP, 
10/01/2009). On the whole, there are two solutions. One is to call 
the parent or relative of the prostitutes to the headquarters, and 
the other is to send them to a rehabilitation center located in the 
region of Solok. However, a number of cases have been closed 
when police or military officers have come to the headquarters 
and told to Satpol PP that the prostitute is his wife. In these cases, in 
order to avoid a conflict with officers of other law enforcement 
institutions, Satpol PP usually releases the prostitutes. The 
involvement of government officers in prostitution means that 
often people know when Satpol PP plan to inspect public places 
where there are occurrences of prostitution. This plan is leaked to 
the owner and, consequently, when Satpol PP arrives to inspect the 
premises there is no trace of public immorality.  
Because the local government has no authority concerning 
national law – this is a matter for the judicial institutions of central 
government – those offences that are regulated under municipal 
law can only be prosecuted if they are also stipulated under the 
national public code. As previously mentioned, even when cases do 
breach national public law, Satpol PP tends to resolve these matters 
using its authority and it is reluctant to forward cases to the police. 
One particular example illustrates this. Two young women, SS and 
NA, were arrested by Satpol PP in Fallas café, located in the city 
center, while they were performing a striptease at 21.45 on 26 
September 2011. After both of them signed a document in which 
they promised not to commit the same offence, Satpol PP released 
them. However, this case became the concern of the police 
following attention from the local media. On 15 October, the police 
arrested SS while she was in front of Busako Hotel in Bukittinggi 
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and NA was arrested the next day. Within a short time, the police 
had forwarded the case to the courts. They were charged under 
section 43 of the national law 44/2004 on pornography. After a 
number of court sessions, the judges of the criminal court 
punished them with one year in jail. The punishment was justified 
by the fact that they had breached section 34 of national law 
44/2008 by performing a striptease. In this case, the judges did not 
use any sections of the municipal law to charge the women; rather 
they said that what they had done contravened the values of 
Minangkabau adat and contradicted attempts by the local 
government to maintain public morality. The verdict reveals that 
the judges executed the case using national public law, not 
municipal law (Haluan and Singgalang, 09/02/2012).  
During the fasting month, Ramadan, the tasks of Satpol PP 
increase. Their attention turns not only to regular tasks such as 
inspecting public places, but also to incidents where the rules of 
fasting are disrespected. In this regard, since 2010, municipal 
authorities have paid an increasing amount of attention to when 
and where food businesses are permitted to operate during 
Ramadan. Restaurants, cafés and other food centers locate where, 
in areas where the majority of inhabitants are non-Muslim, are 
permitted. However, this requires Satpol PP to work harder in 
terms of inspecting whether the rules of fasting are being obeyed.  
The issue of disrespecting the rules of Ramadan is increasingly 
becoming a public concern. In 2005, Satpol PP dealt with many 
incidents relating to permits for owners of restaurants, cafés, and 
other food businesses. One case arose when several young people 
decided to play games in an internet café and Playstation center 























Figure 2.3. A cartoon of two young boys playing billiards in the evening during 
Ramadan. In the distance adhān, a call to prayer, has begun (Published in Padang 
Ekspres 14/08/2011) 
 
Satpol PP also deals with issues concerning gambling and the abuse 
of alcohol, narcotics and psychotropic substances. However, 
according to the chief of Satpol PP these cases are mainly dealt with 
by the police because these matters are fully regulated under state 
laws. Where Satpol PP is involved in these matters, it is as part of  a 
taskforce, called SK4, established by the municipal government 
and consisting of Satpol PP, police and military personnel.  
Summarized, the actual practices relating to municipal law 
11/2005 conducted by Satpol PP show that they are mostly in line 
with the rules mentioned in the draft of 2000 that was withdrawn 
by the parliament in 2003, rather than following the rules 
regulated under municipal law 11/2005. However, these practices 
are frequently justified using municipal law 11/2005, i.e. to 
maintain public order and peaceful society. The practices also 
reveal that the role of Satpol PP in maintaining public morality is 
dominant. Thus, it requires qualified and credible staff; otherwise, 









The New Order government was commonly seen as unsuccessful in 
maintaining public morality, although there have been several 
state laws that prohibit immoral acts, such as the law on the 
prohibition of gambling, abuse of drugs, alcoholic beverages and 
other psychotropic substances. In order to solve public immorality 
problems, people generally see that it is necessary to authorize the 
provincial, regional and municipal governments (using a legal 
basis) to maintain public morality by issuing legislation. A number 
of the proponents of this plan advocate the legalization of Sharia. 
This is evidenced by several drafts of the law in which the 
categories of offences have been regulated under Islamic criminal 
law. This includes the prohibition of unlawful sexual intercourse, 
homosexuality, close proximity between unmarried people of the 
opposite sex (khalwa), prostitution, living from the earnings of 
prostitution, provocatively disrespecting the rules of fasting 
during Ramadan, wearing clothes that are not in accordance with 
Muslim dress codes, gambling, spreading pornographic materials, 
drinking alcohol, and abusing narcotics and other psychotropic 
substances. This list reveals that a number of offences included in 
the regional/municipal legislation have already been regulated 
under the national law.  
The drafts have evoked public debate and controversy. The 
resistance to the drafts was rooted in: 1) the fact that the 
substantive laws of the drafts have already been regulated under 
the national law; 2) the substantive laws were seen as not in line 
with legal principles; and 3) the legalization of Sharia is excluded 
from the authority of the provincial or regional/municipal 
government.  
The proponents of the drafts, who mostly belonged to 
Islamic political parties, failed to ensure the legalization of Sharia 
as a solution for maintaining public morality. The effects of this 
failure are: firstly, the drafts were withdrawn from parliament, as 
was the case of the draft of 2000 in the municipality of Padang. 
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Secondly, the parliament made major revisions to the drafts and 
consequently elements of Sharia were excluded from, for example, 
the provincial law 11/2001 and other regional laws of Pesisir 
Selatan, Padang pariaman, Sawahlunto and Payakumbuh. Thirdly, 
the parliament made minor revisions which actually included 
several elements of Sharia in these local laws. The evidence for this 
can be seen in the laws issued in Bukittinggi and Padangpanjang.  
Actual practices of maintaining public morality are 
enforced by the civil service police unit (Satpol PP) in the 
municipality of Padang. However, my research suggests that they 
did not enforce the rules that are explicitly regulated in the texts 
of the municipal law 11/2005. That said, they did deal with any acts 
that disturbed ‘public order and peaceful society’. The offences 
included in this category include the prohibition of unlawful 
sexual intercourse, homosexuality, close proximity between 
unmarried people of the opposite sex (khalwa), prostitution, living 
from the earnings of prostitution, disrespecting the rules of fasting 
in a provocative manner during Ramadan, gambling, spreading 
pornographic materials, drinking alcohol, and abusing narcotics 
and other psychotropic substances. These offences refer to those 
regulated in the draft of 2000 that the parliament withdrew in 2003 











Dress codes: Islam, custom and uniform 
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
During my fieldwork in Padang (West Sumatra) in public places 
such as markets and wedding parties, I found that eight out of ten 
females had a dress style commonly called busana muslim or pakaian 
muslim. This Muslim dress comes in a floor length version, 
sometimes with long sleeves, and is worn with a loose or fitted 
headscarf. In rural areas, the number of women wearing this style 
of dress could be as many as nine out of ten. The current trend is 
for this type of dress, in its various styles, to be worn widely by 
Muslim females in public places, at both religious events and on 
non-religious occasions. Dress code has emerged as an important 
issue in West Sumatra since the implementation of 
decentralization and local autonomy. The local authorities decided 
to adopt this new uniform for civil servants and students in order 
to achieve a collective identity for West Sumatran society. The 
issue of Islamic dress codes relates not only to Muslim female 
dress, but also to Muslim male dress. 
This chapter focuses on the issue of Islamic dress code in 
West Sumatra. It attempts to answer the question, what does 
wearing Muslim dress mean for West Sumatran people? This 
question leads us to seek explanations about what Muslim dress 
means for West Sumatran society, for local authorities and also for 
the wearer and the viewers of Muslim garments. This chapter 
presents a number of discussions and practices on the following 
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topics: 1) Islamic rules on dress; 2) current debates in the Muslim 
world about dress; 3) changes and regulations in Indonesia; 4) 
Muslim dress within West Sumatran culture; 5) the emergence of a 
dress code in local (provincial and regional) law; 6) Islamic dress 
practices in Padang; 7) public debate on this subject; and 8) 
conclusions.  
 
3.2 Islamic rules on dress 
Dress provides guidance on the issues of ʿawra, such as adornment, 
protection of the wearer from extreme weather and violence 
during, among other things, battle. It also distinguishes the wearer, 
so that they are easily identified and cannot be either ignored or 
molested. Certainly, the ulama paid more attention to the issue of 
ʿawra than to other issues, because uncovering ʿawra may be 
harmful for both the wearer and the viewer. The word ʿawra 
(singular) ʿawrāt (plural), is derived from ʿawara which means, 
among other things, defectiveness, faultiness, deficiency and 
imperfection (Wehr 1979:768-9). This meaning implies that these 
parts of the body need to be protected and even that they may be 
the source of embarrassment or temptation for either the wearer 
or the viewer. This notion is indicated by the use of the word ʿawrāt 
in the Quran in the chapter on al-Aḥzāb/the Allies (33):13, ʾinna 
buyūtanā ʿawratun wa mā hiya bi ʿawratin (truly our houses are bare 
and exposed, though they were not exposed). Further, the chapter 
of al-Nūr (the light) 24: 58 elucidates that there are three times 
where a state of undress is permitted: before the morning prayer, 
clothes may be discarded during the noonday heat, and after the 
late night prayer.  
The ulama define ʿawra simply as parts of the body that, in 
principle, are not allowed to be seen by non-family members, 
except in an emergency situation. The issue of dress has been 
connected with notions of purity and impurity (ṭahāra and najas), 
ritual behavior (sunnah), and the differentiation of the believer 
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from the unbeliever (ghiyār), as well as the separation of the 
genders (ḥijāb). The ulama have different views on determining 
which parts of the body are ʿawra; this difference occurs because 
neither the Quran, nor the ḥadīth are explicit on this issue.  
In order to prescribe rules on this matter, the ulama mostly 
refer to five groups of verses of the Quran. First is (1) al-Aḥzāb/the 
Allies (33): 53. This verse is concerned with the issue of visiting 
etiquette and ḥijāb. The word ḥijāb is understood as ‘to cover’. 
Thus, this verse elucidates that ḥijāb means to cover the entire 
female body. This not only applied to the Prophet’s wife, but to all 
Muslim females (Ibn ʿAraby 1958:1567). Second is al-Aḥzab/the 
Allies (33): 59. This contains the words yudnīna ʿalayhinna min 
jalabībihinna (they should cast their outer garments over their 
person (when out of doors). The word jalabībihinna is derived from 
jilbāb and it means that the whole body is ʿawra and, as such, should 
be covered. Third is al-Nūr/the light (24): 30-31. These two verses 
are often used as the basis for obligating Muslim females to wear 
jilbāb and to argue that not all of the female body is ʿawra. Fourth is 
al-Aḥzāb/the Allies (33): 32-33. These verses relate to certain rules 
of conduct, including the rule that Muslim females should not 
behave like non-Muslim females and should behave properly and 
stay at home if there is no pressing matter forcing her to leave the 
house (Ibn ʿArabi 1958:1523; al-Qurṭūbi 1998:127; Ibn Kathīr 
1986:483). The fifth verse is al-Nūr/the light (24):60, which provides 
an exception for elderly women in terms of being less strict about 
covering their ʿawra. Besides these verses, there are a number of 
ḥadīth that have been used for the basis of Islamic dress codes. 
Nevertheless, no ḥadīth precisely determines which part of the 
body is ʿawra (Shihab 2005:83). Consequently, the ulama must have 
been influenced by other factors in attempting to understand this 
issue. These factors include diversity in applying logic, custom, 
sensitivity towards sexual issues and referring to different 
religious texts.  
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The views of the ulama concerning this issue may be summarized 
into three classifications. Firstly is the ʿawra of the Muslim male. 
They agree that this is the area from the navel to the knee. 
Secondly is the ʿawra of Muslim female. In terms of what is ʿawra 
for Muslim females when she is in the company of non-family 
members (maḥram), there are two differing opinions among the 
ulama. The first and dominant view is that the entire female body 
must not be seen, with the exception of the face and the hands. 
The second view is that the whole of the female body, including 
the face and hands, but with the exception of the eyes, is ʿawra. 
This second view is held by a much smaller group of ulama. The 
ulama also have different views regarding what is ʿawra when 
Muslim females are accompanied by family members and other 
Muslim females. According to the Shafi’ite and Hanafite the area 
that is ʿawra is between the navel and the knee; according to the 
Malikite it is the entire body, with the exception of the face, head, 
neck, hands and feet, And, according to Hanbalite rules, it is all of 
the body, with the exception of the neck, face, head, hands, feet 
and calves. The third view relates to the ʿawra of a child. According 
to Hanafite rules, a child who is under four years old has no ʿawra. 
The genitals and anus of a child who is between four and ten years 
old is considered ʿawra. When a girl child is older than ten, her 
ʿawra is the same as an adult female’s. The Shafi’ite hold a more 
restrictive view; that is to say, that the ʿawra of a child and an adult 
are the same (al-Zuhaily 1997).  
Historically, terms that were used to identify Muslim dress 
varied widely within each country. Stillman identifies over one 
hundred terms for elements of Muslim dress, many of which are 
used for the hijāb (Stillman 1986:745-746). Furthermore, current 
discussions on Muslim dress are largely concerned with modest 
dress by women. The word ḥijāb is used widely in this context, 
along with the related word ‘veil’. While the word ‘veil’ has no 
Arabic linguistic referent, ḥijāb is strongly rooted in Arabic 
language and culture (El Guindi 1999: xi). Discussions about female 
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Islamic dress commonly focus on three main terms: the headscarf 
(khimār), a gown or cloak (jilbāb) and a cloth covering for the face 
(niqāb).  
 
3.3 Current debate in the Muslim world 
Scholarly works on dress have provided us with rich and various 
theories from the perspective of appearance. In the words of 
Alison Lurie, the richness of dress is associated with language and 
includes vocabularies that are taboo, modern, ancient, as well as 
borrowed words, dialect, colloquialisms, slang and vulgarities 
(Lurie 1981:6).  This leads us to the fact that this concept has 
several dimensions. First, it reveals personal identity, one that is 
defined geographically and historically and is linked to a specific 
community and to certain groups. At the same time, it also 
differentiates an individual from others. Second, dress is an 
indication of a person’s social position in a society. This social 
position, given at birth, may be affected by class, caste, or lineage. 
Ultimately, dress may also be a symbol of economic position 
(Bernes & Eicher 1992:1). In other words, dress is a manifestation of 
culture and is imbued with a meaning understood by both the 
wearer and the viewer. From a socio-cultural perspective, dress 
can be defined simply as ‘an assemblage of body modification 
and/or supplements displayed by a person in communicating with 
other human beings’ (Eicher & Mary 1992:15).  
Historically, discussions on Islamic dress have shown that 
this issue has raised important concerns throughout the Muslim 
world over the last two centuries. Such discussions have derived 
from a view that dress is not only seen as a devotional act, but that 
it has been heavily loaded with several purposes aimed at 
stigmatizing the wearers. This includes opinions that characterize 
Islamic dress as oppressive for women (Ahmed 1992; Scott 2007). 
This notion can be seen in the 1899 publication by Qāsim Amīn, 
Taḥrīr al-marʾa (the liberation of women) long regarded as a major 
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step in the history of Egyptian feminism. Amīn authored this book 
to raise four issues concerning Muslim females: 1) Muslim female 
dress code; 2) participation of Muslim females in public; 3) 
polygamy; and 4) divorce (ṭalāq). With regard to Muslim female 
dress, he argued that there was no religious teaching, either naṣṣ or 
Sharia, that obligates Muslim women to adhere to a particular 
dress code, i.e. ḥijāb or jilbāb, as had been practiced in most of the 
Muslim world. Any dress code had, in fact, emerged from actual 
practices, adhered to out of a sense of righteousness, rather than, 
as widely assumed, as a result of Islamic teachings. According to 
Amin, the Quran elucidates that Muslim females are allowed to 
uncover certain parts of her body even when in the presence of 
non-family members. However, it does not determine exactly 
which parts of the body are allowed to be bared (Amīn 1911:54-58). 
Amin’s view was a clear attack on Islamic dress codes and aimed at 
eradicating what he saw as ‘bad habits’ among the natives (Asad 
2003: 233). It could also be interpreted as an attempt to transform 
Muslim society along the lines of the Western model and to 
substitute the dominant Islamic-style male dress with Western 
garb (Ahmed 1992:161). 
As Western culture became more prevalent in the Muslim 
world the issue of hijāb became an emblem for political differences 
and a resistance to the homogenizing and egalitarian force of 
Western civilization. Göle argued that ‘it cross-cuts power 
relations between Islam and the West, modernity and tradition, 
secularism and religions, as well as between men and women 
themselves’ (Göle 1996: 1). Currently, discussions dealing with 
Muslim dress focus largely on female attire and the notion that 
dress is seen not as a manifestation of religious devotion to God, 
but rather as a symbol of political resistance. This phenomenon 
has emerged in discussions in a number of European countries, 
including Belgium, the United Kingdom, France and the 
Netherlands. However, the discussions in these countries differ 
according to constitutional and educational traditions. Moors 
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points out that this issue has transformed from a non-issue into a 
hyperbolic threat to the nation state and ‘it shifted from ‘objective’ 
problems to subjectively experienced feelings of fear, anxiety and 
discomfort’ (Moors 2009:406-7).  
Discussions dealing with Muslim dress have also occurred 
in countries where Muslims form the majority of the population. 
The importance placed on this issue is largely determined by the 
position held by Islam or Islamic teachings within the 
constitutional, legislative, as well as the cultural spheres of a 
particular country. Although the role of dress plays an important 
part in Islamic culture, on the whole Western fashion still 
dominates the Muslim world, with the notable exception of Saudi 
Arabia and a number of Gulf States where people generally adopt 
traditional attire. Even what it is commonly called azyāʾ al-sharʿya 
(literally, Islamic dress) usually includes modest forms of Western 
clothes (Stillmann 2003:161).  
 
3.4 Changes and regulations in Indonesia 
The Indonesian government’s policies towards religious matters 
are founded on the country’s colonial past and a history of the 
state distancing itself from any ideas of adapting religious 
teachings. In fact, since independence, the government has added 
a few elements of Islamic teachings to the educational process. 
This relates specifically to the weekly teaching of religion in 
schools. In January 1946, the establishment of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs (MORA) made it possible for the Muslim 
community to maintain Islamic tradition through daʿwa and 
educational activities at all levels, from central government to 
village hierarchies. However, despite this move, the government 
stigmatized any symbols associated with Islam and viewed them as 
backward or as part of an attempt to threaten the Indonesian state. 
Consequently, Muslims in post-independence Indonesia who 
wanted to be seen as embracing or as a part of the modernization 
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process that was introduced by the state frequently avoided using 
any emblem related to Islam.  
Although the Indonesian constitution guarantees the 
freedom of any citizen to perform their religious convictions, the 
position of the government towards Muslim dress has, at times, 
varied. Before the 1980s, the government only granted permission 
to those Muslims working and studying under the institutions 
managed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs to wear clothes in 
accordance with Muslim dress codes. At all other institutions such 
clothes were forbidden.  
At the end of the 1980s, there was a new development 
concerning dress codes, in particular the headscarf. A number of 
female Muslim students studying at educational institutions 
managed by the Ministry of Education were not allowed to follow 
classes and were expelled from schools. This decision was based on 
a ruling issued by the Directorate General of Primary and 
Secondary schools of the Ministry of Education and Culture on 17 
March 1982. This stated that wearing the headscarf was against 
school dress code. The headscarf issue rapidly became a dispute 
between students, their parents and schools across the country. 
Indeed, in some cities, including Jakarta, Bandung, Bogor, and 
Bengkulu, the disagreements about the headscarf ended up in 
court. However, the verdicts were disappointing for the parents 
and students (Panji Masyarakat 1989). In response to this situation, a 
number of female Muslim students decided to adjust their dress 
according to the schools’ dress codes; however, there were also 
students who decided to transfer to private schools that allowed 
them to wear the headscarf (Tempo 1985; Alatas & Fifrida 2001; 
Hamdani 2007). This did not mean that the dispute on the 
headscarf had ended.  
This issue raised the concerns of Muslim organizations 
including the Islamic Ulama Council (MUI). This organization 
proposed a revision of the school dress code to the government 
and eventually the matter reached and was discussed by members 
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of the cabinet. Subsequently, the government accommodated the 
demand and a decision to amend the dress code was taken. On 16 
February 1991, the Ministry of Education and Culture via the 
Directorate General of Primary and Secondary schools issued a 
decree permitting female Muslim students to wear the headscarf 
during school sessions (Hamdani 2007). Responses to the decree 
were varied. There were schools that allowed the students to wear 
the headscarf at all times; there were also schools that set dress 
codes that only allowed Muslim dress on Fridays. Since the 1980s, 
there has been a clear shift and, with the exception of those in the 
military and the police, Muslim women working in government 
institutions are now allowed to wear Islamic dress during working 
hours. 
A number of important factors were responsible for this 
shift in government policy towards Muslim dress. First, the 
government no longer saw the headscarf as an emblem that 
threatened the Indonesian state; rather, it accepted that it is a 
symbol of religious devotion. Wearers were, on the whole, 
motivated by religious convictions. The shift in government 
thinking, which came about in the 1980s, was a direct result of 
increasing numbers of students wearing Islamic attire both in and 
outside of school. Their demands for a change in the regulations 
could no longer be ignored by those in power (Alatas & Fifrida 
2001). Second, there has been a gradual but definite move towards 
increased religious devotion in Indonesia in recent decades. This 
has been reflected in many ways, including a trend for Muslim 
women to wear more modest dress. This shift has been partly 
influenced by the emergence of a number of Muslim fashion 
designers since the 1980s, whose work has been promoted 
regularly in the specialized Muslim women’s media (Bagdja 2007; 
Elmir 2009). The strong message from this is that Muslim dress can 
be fashionable and modern, as well as preserving Muslim women’s 
modesty and conforming to Islamic conventions.  
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Since the implementation of decentralization and local autonomy, 
the issue of Muslim dress has emerged in several provinces and 
regions, including Aceh, South Sulawesi and West Sumatra. Public 
discussions on this subject vary according to the socio-political 
context of the provinces and regions. In Aceh, for example, the 
issue of Muslim dress emerges in section 13 (1) of qanun 11/2002, 
which elucidates Setiap orang islam wajib berbusana islami (every 
Muslim is obligated to wear Muslim dress). In the following 
paragraphs, we will see that this issue has a different nuance in 
West Sumatra.  
 
3.5 Muslim dress within West Sumatran culture 
Dress has always been an important symbol of identity for the 
Minangkabau people of West Sumatra. Islamic dress not only 
indicates piousness of the wearers, but also shows their adherence 
to Minangkabau adat. Current traditional Minangkabau male and 
female dress is in accordance with Islamic teaching because it 
covers the wearer’s ʿawra. Historically, there has been a lack of 
historical evidence relating to whether Minangkabau adat dress 
has been in accordance with the Islamic norm or whether it was 
adjusted to fit the Islamic norm. However, what is certain is that 
the headscarf was added as a new element of Minangkabau female 
dress. The headscarf gradually shifted from being a shawl worn 
over the shoulder or diagonally across the female body to covering 
only a certain part of a woman’s head. Ultimately it became used to 
cover women’s heads entirely.  
Due to the intensifying penetration of Western culture, 
beginning with the Dutch colonial government in the 19th century, 
dress emerged as an issue. As is commonly known, the colonial 
administration administered the population into European, native 
and foreign/oriental (Arab and Chinese) groups and subjected each 
of them to their own legal system. Included in this was the notion 
that European dress was worn by Europeans and natives and that 
115 
 
   
 
 
people of foreign/oriental origin wore dress according to their 
traditional dress code (Van Dijk 1997). Stillmann has suggested 
that Muslim men adjusted their traditional attire more rapidly 
than Muslim women (Stillmann 2003:166) and that this also 
occurred in Minangkabau society. At the beginning of the 20th 
century, the discussion about Islamic dress centered on male dress, 
and in particular male attempts to adopt a European style of dress 
for a particular reason. It was only in subsequent decades that the 
issue of female dress became part of the discussions.  
Because Muslim men interacted with colonial government 
services before Muslim women, the initial discussions about dress 
in the second decade of the 20th century dealt with Islamic male 
dress. In the beginning, the issue of male dress derived from the 
daily activities of Muslim men; for instance, the use of trains, 
which due to the segregation policy, had different fares for natives 
and Europeans. (The fares were cheaper for Europeans than for 
natives). The consequence was that Muslim men adjusted their 
traditional dress to a European style in order to get the lower 
price. This triggered discussions about whether Muslim men 
should be allowed to wear Western dress (Kaptein 2009:183). Even 
though the colonial administration had provided a mechanism for 
the natives to be subject to European law, this issue became a 
concern of the ulama. Indeed, two opposing sides of ulama groups 
– Kaum Tua and Kaum Muda – were involved the discussions. The 
Kaum Muda tended towards allowing the adoption of Western 
dress, while the Kaum Tua ulama rejected this idea, arguing that 
wearing European dress meant being part of the European people 
who were commonly viewed as anti-Muslim. In contrast, the Kaum 
Muda argued that Islam did not obligate Muslim men to wear a 
certain style or color of clothes. Thus, Muslim men were permitted 
to wear European dress. Kaptein suggests that this subject was not 
the only concern of the ulama who resided in the Minangkabau 
region, but also reached the ulama in Islamic institutions in the 
Middle East (Kaptein 2009).  
116 
 
   
 
 
Discussions dealing with the issue of Muslim female dress first 
emerged publicly in 1928. Haji Rasul condemned some Muslim 
women for wearing a short dress that, he claimed, contradicted 
Islamic teachings. A number of Muslim women adopted this 
Western dress style that was short and sometimes also revealed a 
woman’s décolletage. Haji Rasul authored Tjermin Terus attacking 
this new trend. According to Hamka, Haji Rasul’s son, his father 
condemned this development by characterizing Muslim females 
who wore this dress style as prostitutes. This dysphemism was 
rejected by Muslim scholars who lived in the region as well as 
those at a distance, including Nur Sutan Iskandar who lived in 
Jakarta. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this issue became the subject of 
wide public debate and Haji Rasul went on to author two more 
books on the matter: Pelita I and Pelita II (Hamka 1982:193-4). 
Although the public rejected his views, Haji Rasul did not change 
his position and refused to revise his opinions. Despite attacks by 
the ulama, several Muslim women were attracted to the kemajuan 
program, which also manifested itself in the adopting of a new 
dress code that was in line with European dress.  
Since independence, the culture of dress has remained a 
continuing discussion. On the whole, the Islamic dress code is 
obeyed when Muslims were attending religious or adat activities 
and it has also become an important collective identity for the 
society. In contrast, the government also maintained its own dress 
identity, which differed from the dress code of Muslim and adat 
adherents. Muslim women in governmental institutions were not 
permitted to wear the headscarf during their working hours. The 
government also imposed a rule that Muslim women had to adopt 
the governmental dress code if they were dealing with other 
government administrations. For example, Muslim women had to 
take off their headscarf when taking a photo to be used on an 
identity card, certificate or even for their pilgrimage documents. 
The government certainly applied restrictive rules in connection 
with this religious symbol in its institutions.   
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The ulama council of West Sumatra, MUI, was concerned about two 
situations in particular: firstly, the fact that wearing Islamic dress 
at government institutions was almost impossible for Muslim 
women; and secondly, that most Muslim women only wear the 
Muslim dress for religious activities. On 23 March 1983, MUI issued 
a fatwa concerning Islamic dress, and female dress in particular. 
The fatwa acknowledged that a Muslim dress code has been part of 
Minangkabau culture and it emphasized that the purpose of 
wearing Islamic dress was to cover ʿawra and to maintain the 
modesty of the wearer. The fatwa defined Islamic female dress as a 
dress that covers the female body, with the exception of her face, 
the palms of her hands up to her wrist and the soles of her feet up 
to her ankle. The text of the fatwa shows that MUI calls on Muslim 
females to wear dress that is in accordance with the Islamic dress 
code, and it also calls on the government to permit Muslim women 
to wear Islamic dress during work or study at governmental 
institutions. However, this fatwa had no impact on the government 
and there were no political decisions on this issue taken.  
The expectations of MUI gradually changed, beginning in 
the 1990s. This decade is marked by a significant transformation in 
terms of Muslim women increasingly wearing dress according to 
the Islamic dress code not just for religious activities, but also for 
unrelated activities such as going to the market, wedding 
ceremonies and appearances in other public places. This shift was 
caused by a number of factors. First, the central government’s 
attitude towards the aspirations of Muslim groups was gradually 
shifting and, as a reaction to this, it allowed female Muslim 
students to wear Islamic dress from 16 February 1991. In response 
to this decision, students –from primary level to senior high 
schools – began wearing variations of the school uniform that were 
in line with the Muslim dress code during school sessions on 
Fridays. Secondly, the image of Islamic dress was also changing 
significantly. It was no longer seen as a symbol of backwardness, 
but rather wearers are now seen as also being part of modernity. 
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This shift resulted in the growth of businesses related to female 
Islamic dress and the promotion of modest designs in specialist 
media. In addition, the growing devotion of Muslim women was 
also attributed to this shift. However, it was not just a question of 
women being motivated purely by Islamic teachings, but also by 
the growing popularity of modest dress (Alatas & Fifrida 2001; 
Bagdja 1997; Elmir 2009). At the end of the 1990s, and with the 
exception of the military and the police service, the wearing of 
Islamic dress was widespread among Indonesia’s Muslim women.  
 
3.6 Provincial, regional/municipal law on Islamic dress  
Until the introduction of decentralization and local autonomy, the 
uniform for female civil servants and both male and female 
students in primary and secondary schools was commonly viewed 
as not being in accordance with the Islamic dress code. Female civil 
servants wore a uniform without a headscarf, with a blouse with 
short or long sleeves and a skirt that came below the knee. The 
uniform for girls in primary schools was a white blouse with short 
sleeves and a dark-red skirt which fell five centimeters above the 
knee. For boys it was a white shirt with short sleeves and dark-red 
shorts that-fell ten centimeters above the knee. At junior high 
schools female student wore a white short-sleeved blouse and a 
dark-blue skirt that fell approximately five centimeters below the 
knee, while male students wore a white shirt with short sleeves 
and dark-blue shorts that were no less than ten centimeters above 
the knee. At senior high school, female students wore a white 
short-sleeved blouse and a grey skirt that came five centimeters 
below the knee; and male students had a white short-sleeved shirt 
with long grey trousers (Hamdani 2007: 230-2).  
When the local government gained the authority to 
maintain local identity, the idea to introduce a new uniform for 
schools and other government institutions that is in line with 
Islamic dress gained ground. In response to this idea, a number of 
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provincial and regional authorities came up with a plan to issue a 
provincial law or other form of regulation specifically aimed at 
applying a Muslim dress code. This plan was justified with the 
argument that, in fact, Muslim dress had been widely adopted as 
the identity of the society. The following subsections present how 
this issue is regulated and to what extent the new dress code is 
enforced.  
3.6.1 Provincial law 
The provincial DPRD had previously never issued provincial 
legislation relating to Islamic dress. However, members of the 
DRPD belonging to the Islamic parties of 1999-2004 had been 
concerned with the idea of issuing a provincial law on this subject. 
This initiative was based on the judicial right to table a bill to the 
parliament, as is stipulated in the Constitution. For example, the E 
commission, which is tasked with dealing with social welfare 
affairs (kesejahteraan rakyat), had prepared a draft on this subject in 
Islamic dress was required to maintain Minangkabau society, 
which had already embraced an Islamic dress code based on adat 
rules. He further argued that such a law was an attempt to 
minimize the negative impact of modern dress that was flooding 
the society (Haluan, 27/7/2004). The draft had been discussed 
limitedly within the E commission. Plans to draft a bill and table it 
in the DPRD emerged during the period towards the end of the 
current DRPD that would be replaced by a new intake of members 
of parliament following the general election of 2004. To date, no 
provincial law dealing with an Islamic dress code has been passed 
by DRPD, largely because there seems to be no interest from 
members of the DRPD of 2004-2009 or 2009-2014 in this issue.  
Despite the fact that there is no provincial law there is still 
attention for this issue. On 6 October 2005, the governor issued a 
letter calling on civil servants to dress in accordance with a Muslim 
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dress code.36 This letter did not specify exactly what this dress code 
was; however, it is commonly understood that Muslim dress means 
the covering of ʿawra. In fact, this letter has become one of the 
legal bases for government institutions applying a Muslim dress 
code for civil servants.  
  
3.6.2 Regional/municipal law 
Regulations concerning Muslim dress code throughout the regions 
in West Sumatra may be classified into two categories. The first 
category comprises those regulations issued by a bupati or mayor. 
The region of Tanah Datar and the Municipality of Padang are 
included in this category. In Tanah Datar, the former bupati issued 
a letter on Islamic dress on 27 June 2001, while in Padang it took 
until 7 March 2005 for the mayor to issue an instruction for Muslim 
students to switch their uniform to one in line an Islamic dress 
code during school sessions.  
A number of local authorities came up with arguments 
against issuing a regional law on this subject. They believed that a 
decision by a bupati was sufficiently effective to rule on the dress 
code of civil servants and students. The head of the Law and 
Government Bureau of the Region of Tanah Datar said: 
 
The local authorities [the executive, Bupati¸ and the legislature, 
the DPRD] of this region reached an agreement that a Muslim 
dress code can only be issued in the form of a decision by the 
Bupati. This agreement is based on a practical reason; that is, to 
take such a matter through the DPRD legislation process would 
not only e time consuming, but also costly. Evidence shows that a 
decision issued by a bupati regarding an Islamic dress code is fully 
                                                        
36 The number of the letter is 260/421/X/PPr-05, dated 6 October 2005, signed by 
the governor, and addressed to all the government institutions in West Sumatra. 




   
 
 
respected by both Muslim civil servants and students. In 
addition, people have become accustomed to Muslim dress and it 
is regularly worn by most Muslims in the region on a daily basis. 
It seems a bit strange to legislate that people who are regularly 
wearing Muslim garb to wear Islamic dress. Thus, it is argued, 
there is no need to issue a regional law on this matter (Interview, 
1/12/2008).  
 
In addition, the text of these letters shows that the bupati decided 
to issue an instruction not only based on his own decision but also 
following suggestions from members of the DPRD and the MUI in 
the region. Thus, the bupati was not only exercising his own 
authority in deciding to issue the letter, but also taking into 
consideration proposals from related institutions.  
The same situation arose in the municipality of Padang, but 
for different reasons. Here, the mayor issued an ‘instruction’ aimed 
at changing the uniform of students so that it was in line with 
Muslim dress code.37 The mayor argued that he had the authority 
to make decisions on this subject without the consent of the DPRD. 
He argued that there was ‘no need to issue a municipal law on this 
subject, as long as Muslims support this policy and the purposes of 
the decision are fully understood’ (Haluan, 20/2/2005). Predictably, 
this decision subsequently received support from the members of 
the DPRD, including politicians from PPP, PAN and Demokrat 
Party. 
The second category of regulations relating to dress falls 
under the remit of regional or municipal law. The regions of Solok, 
Sawahlunto/Sijunjung, Pasaman, Limapuluh Kota, Padangpanjang, 
Agam and Solok Selatan are included in this second category. The 
local authorities, the executive and the legislature agreed that any 
                                                        
37The mayor issued the ‘Instruction’ no.451.422/Binsos-III/2005, dated 7 March 
2005, which was subsequently followed up by letters no.1556/420.DP/TU.2/2005, 
issued by the Head of Educational Affairs, dated 30 March 2005.  
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change in the dress code of civil servants and students must be 
regulated under regional law. It is widely argued that regional law 
would provide a strong legal basis for the continuity of the shift; if 
the local politics changed significantly it would not be an easy 
process to abolish the regional law. In addition to these arguments, 
members of the DPRD expected to enhance their public reputation 
by issuing a regional law on this subject. The implementation of 
this law mainly relied on whether the bupati/mayor had any 
political interest in implementing the law. In addition, the 
presence of a regional law on this subject could be taken as an 
indication that there were no serious political tensions in the 
power relations between the bupati/mayor and the DPRD.  
The regional laws on Muslim dress code are confined to 
seven regions: Solok, Sawahlunto/Sijunjung, Pasaman, 
Limapuluhkota, the Municipality of Padangpanjang, the region of 
Agam, and Solok Selatan. These regional laws are aimed at 
regulating the dress of all Muslims who inhabit the region, but in 
particular civil servants and students. Although the rules state that 
they relate to a Muslim dress code, in fact, the rules are largely 
directed at Muslim women.   
The texts of the regional laws reveal that there are four 
aspects that motivated the local authorities to issue the legislation. 
First is article 29 of the constitution, which guarantees that every 
citizen may perform their religious teachings and beliefs. Second is 
the desire to implement the Islamic teaching that obligates 
Muslims to wear Islamic dress. Third is the desire to implement the 
adat rule that has fully adopted the Islamic teachings on this issue. 
Fourth is to maintain a social life that reflects the piousness of 
every Muslim.  
The authorities of Solok, Agam and Solok Selatan, for 
example, were not motivated to implement adat, but the other 
three aspects were seen as important. The authorities in 
Sawahlunto and Limapuluh Kota were purely motivated by the 
desire to implement Islamic teachings and to maintain piousness 
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in public life. The authorities of Pasaman were motivated by the 
constitution, and a desire to implement both Islamic teachings and 
adat. And the authorities in Padangpanjang were motivated by 
Islamic teaching, adat and the desire to maintain piousness, rather 
than by the constitution. This suggests that in all regions the 
passing of a law on Islamic dress was mostly motivated by a desire 
to implement the Islamic teachings. Consequently, the obligation 
to wear Muslim dress has become an imperative.  
Although these local authorities have various motives, they 
all have the same purpose and objective in terms of issuing a law 
on this subject. Their purpose is to implement and maintain 
Islamic teachings regarding public life and to preserve the dress 
code according to adat rules. In addition, there are four objectives: 
first, to maintain pious attitudes among Muslims; second, to make 
Muslims accustomed with wearing Islamic dress during working 
hours and when they are in other public places; third, to ensure 
that society remains accustomed with Islamic and adat culture; and 
finally, to preserve the adat maxim: ‘Sharia commands, adat 
applies’ (Shara’ mangato, adat mamakai). These purposes and 
objectives make it clear that the regional law on this issue is aimed 
at maintaining a collective identity for society, i.e. Muslim dress.  
Muslim dress is defined in three different ways. These 
definitions range from the general and imprecise to the detailed 
and precise. It is defined as ‘the dress of Muslim males and females 
that has an Islamic characteristic’.38 This definition is obviously 
very general and imprecise and it does not mention what the 
Islamic characteristic is. It is also defined as ‘Muslim dress is the 
                                                        
38This definition belongs to the law of Kabupaten Solok, Pasaman, Limapuluh kota 
and Solok Selatan. The original text says: Pakaian Muslim dan Muslimah adalah 
pakaian yang bercirikan Islami (Solok, Pasaman and Solok Selatan): Berpakaian 
muslim dan muslimah adalah cara berpakaian seseorang laki-laki atau wanita menurut 
tuntunan agama Islam. 
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dress that covers the ʿawra.39  This definition is straightforward and 
precise and apparently refers to the terms of Sharia. The last more 
detailed definition is ‘the dress of Muslim men and women that 
covers ʿawra, is not transparent, and not tight’. 40 This definition 
adds two new elements to the standard dress code to cover ʿawra; 
that is, that the dress should not be transparent and tight. This 
definition implies an attempt to correct a dress mode that has been 
widely practiced by Muslim women, which is to cover ʿawra, 
however, using textiles that are transparent and tight in style. 
Many believe that this new does not succeed in covering ʿawra.  
The Islamic dress code can be outlined as follows: The dress 
for Muslim men is a shirt with long or short sleeves and trousers; 
for Muslim women it is a headscarf that covers the hair, ears, neck, 
nape of neck and chest, and a long-sleeved blouse that covers the 
hips, plus trousers or an ankle-length skirt. Other important 
elements are that it must not be transparent or tight or show the 
body shape. In addition, dress can be adjusted for sporting 
activities, but it must still conform to the dress code.  
The Islamic dress code applies to Muslims working in both 
government and private institutions, and students studying at 
both government and private educational institutions, ranging 
from primary to senior high schools. In the regions where there 
are higher educational institutions, such as universities, this dress 
code is also applied. Indeed, for this group of Muslims wearing 
Islamic dress is imperative. However, there are different rules 
regarding the rest of the Muslim population. For example, in the 
regions of Agam and Sawahlunto/Sijunjung the Muslim dress code 
is also imposed on all Muslims living in the area, whereas in other 
regions it remains optional. In addition, all regional laws 
                                                        
39This definition belongs to the law of Kabupaten Agam: Pakaian muslim adalah 
pakaian yang menutup aurat.  
40 This definition belongs to the law of Kabupaten Sawahlunto/Sijunjung.  
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emphasize that the dress code is only applicable for Muslims 
working and living in the regions. Non-Muslims are permitted to 
dress according to their own religion or custom, or they are 
allowed to adopt Islamic dress.  
These regional laws also regulate penalties for disobeying 
the dress code. Civil servants who disobey the code will be 
sanctioned according to rules specific to government workers.41 
For students who refuse to conform there are five sequential steps 
of sanctions: first, they receive a verbal warning; second if they 
continue to flout the code they will receive an official written 
warning in the form of a letter; the third step is to warn the 
parents of the student; if this does not have any effect, the student 
will be suspended from lessons; and finally, if all of the previous 
attempts have failed, then the student will be expelled from the 
school. It is worth noting that while the ‘common’ Muslim is not 
forced to obey the dress code, they are expected to wear Islamic 
dress when interacting with government institutions. Indeed, 
there is often a notice in public service offices stating ‘no service 
for those not wearing Muslim dress’.42 If they insist on being 
served, the officer will do so reluctantly and say: ‘please put on 
Muslim dress next time you come here’.  
To sum up, regional laws on Muslim dress code have 
provided a chance for Muslims to wear Islamic dress during their 
work or study at government institutions, where previously it had 
been strictly forbidden. However, the government’s decision on 
this issue seems to have shifted from one extreme –that Muslims 
are not permitted to wear the Muslim dress –to another –that 
Muslims are being coerced into following an Islamic dress code. 
                                                        
41 This issue is regulated under article 30 of Act no. 43 of 1999 on Civil Servants. 
This article is subsequently regulated by Government Regulation (Peraturan 
Pemerintah) No. 53 of 2010 on Discipline for Civil Servants and the sanctions are 
regulated under article 10 of the Government Regulation.  
42 The notice says Bagi yang tidak memakai pakaian muslim tidak dilayani. 
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This shifting policy has a further implication. Under the previous 
regime, many devoted Muslims felt unhappy that the government 
would not allow them to wear dress according to their beliefs.  
However, the current rules mean that many non-Muslims and non-
devout Muslims feel unhappy about pressure from the government 
to conform to an Islamic dress code. These implications are 
examined further in the following sections.  
 
3.7 The practice of wearing Muslim dress  
The previous mayor of Padang had been relatively late in taking a 
political decision on this issue compared to other regions that had 
widely implemented an Islamic dress code.43 This delay may have 
been as a result of the mayor’s lack of concern with religious 
issues. When a new figure was appointed to the post by the DRPD 
in 2004, the issue found its way onto the mayoral agenda. Indeed, 
on 7 March 2005, the new mayor issued an instruction obligating 
pupils, from primary school through to senior high school level, to 
replace their un-Islamic school uniforms with new Islamic 
versions. This instruction was also aimed at increasing the number 
of religious activities for students. In addition, in the same year, 
the mayor also instructed Muslims working at municipal 
institutions to wear Muslim dress during working hours and also 
for other activities relating to their work. This section presents the 
practices of Muslim dress in the Municipality of Padang. 
Subsequently, it will examine the meanings of Muslim dress for 
three different actors: 1) the mayor, as a policymaker; 2) the 
wearer; and 3) the viewer.  
There were a number of considerations for the mayor in 
making a political decision to enforce a Muslim dress code for 
                                                        
43 Muslim dress was applied in the Region of Tanah Datar in 2001, Solok in 2002, 
Sawahlunto/Sijunung  in 2003, Pasaman in 2003, Limapuluh Kota in 2003, and 
Padangpanjang in 2004.  
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students and civil servants. These considerations are laid out in the 
text of the instruction and also in a public statement issued by the 
mayor and published in the media. The text of the instruction 
shows that this policy is a follow up of the Pesantren Ramaḍan 
program44 conducted in 2004, which taught various subjects on 
Islamic teachings in a bid to improve religiosity among students. In 
addition, the mayor’s personal aims also contributed to his 
decision to introduce this policy. Indeed, he said:     
That [to obligate the students to wear Islamic dress] is one of my 
personal intentions, and it has long been in my mind, even 
before gaining the post of mayor. I have been obsessed that 
Muslims who are living in this municipality should obey Sharia, 
as has been obligated to them by Islam. In addition to this, I also 
expect this decision will be in line with the adat maxim adat 
basandi Syarak, Syarak basandi kitabullah [adat is based on Sharia, 
Sharia is based on the Quran]. For me, Islamic teachings and adat 
must be applied in harmonious ways (Haluan, 17/04/2005).  
The mayor also argued that imposing a Muslim dress code on 
students would provide a possibility for them to perform their 
zuhur and asyar prayers at the schools. Previously, these rituals 
could not be performed in schools because male students were 
wearing short trousers or female students did not cover their 
ʿawra. Obligating Muslim students to wear a uniform in accordance 
with an Islamic dress code not only motivates the implementation 
of Sharia on this matter, but also maintains Minangkabau adat and 
other ritual practices.  
The obligation to wear Muslim dress was point ten in the 
mayor’s instruction. It says that Muslim students from primary 
                                                        
44Pesantren Ramadan, introduced in 2004, provides religious activities for Muslims 
students during the fasting month of Ramadan. The students are released from 
their school sessions for these activities and they have to follow religious 




   
 
 
school onwards are obligated to wear Islamic dress and that  non-
Muslim students should also adjust their dress by wearing baju 
kurung (long skirt) for female students or long trousers for male 
students.45 In practice, however, female students regularly wear a 
headscarf, a shirt with long sleeves, and an ankle-length skirt; male 
students wear a shirt with short sleeves and long trousers. Thus, 
the dress of the female students from primary through to senior 
high schools has totally changed; while uniforms for male students 
in senior high school remains the same and slightly changed for 
pupils in primary and junior highs schools. This new uniform was 
first applied in July 2005, for the academic year of 2005/2006. 
This new dress code was aimed at all schools, whether 
state-run or privately owned. The municipal government granted 
one exception and that was for private educational institutions 
owned by non-Muslims.46 These schools continue to apply the 
national school uniform according to the decree of the Directorate-
General of Primary and Secondary schools issued by the Ministry 
of Education and Culture in 1991. Thus, Muslim students who are 
studying at non-Muslim schools can choose to wear dress either 
according to the instruction issued by the mayor or according to 
the decree of the Directorate General of Primary and Secondary 
Schools. However, this can gives rise to a dilemma for these pupils.  
                                                        
45 The text says bagi Murid/Siswa SD/MI,SLTP/MTS dan SLTA/SMK/MA se-Kota 
Padang diwajibkan berpakaian Muslim/Muslimah yang beragama Islam dan bagi 
non-Muslim dianjurkan menyesuaikan pakaian (memakai baju kurang bagi 
perempuan dan memakai celana panjang bagi laki-laki).  
46 There are a number of non-Muslim schools in Padang, including schools under 
the Prayoga Foundation (Yayasan Prayoga): elementary Schools; SD Agnes, SD 
Terisia, SD Yos Sudarso, SD Tirtonadi, and SD Fransiscus: Junior High School; 
SMP Frater, SMP Maria, and SMP Yos Sudarso: Senior High School; SMA Don 
Bosko, and SMA Xavarious (Haluan,17/04/2005). 
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3.7.1 The meaning of Islamic dress according to the mayor 
The mayor asserted his authority by issuing his instruction 
enforcing a Muslim dress code in schools. This evidence is relevant 
to what James Scott has suggested; that is, that the ruling class 
dominates the means of physical and symbolic productions and 
control culture, religion, education and media to disseminate those 
values that reinforce its position (Scott 1985:315). In the case of an 
Islamic dress code, the mayor has a particular interpretation of the 
meaning of this subject. However, it does not automatically mean 
that the wearers or viewers preserve the same meanings. Indeed, 
they probably produce their own interpretations that can be 
different from or even contradict that of the mayor. In other 
words, although the mayor has the authority to force the wearer to 
apply this code, he cannot impose the meaning of it on other 
parties, because this is an issue of individual belief and value.  
Although the mayor does not specifically refer to the 
meaning of wearing Muslim dress, his position can be surmised 
from several of his public statements. First, it identifies piousness. 
Wearing Muslim dress relates to an internalized set of meanings 
attached to a role played in a network of social relationships. The 
government has an obligation to provide possibilities for Muslims 
to practice and express their identity when working in 
government institutions or attending educational institutions. The 
wearing of Islamic dress is one way of doing this. It also creates a 
possibility for Muslims to perform their religious obligations, such 
as prayers, during school sessions.  
Second, Muslim dress maintains an important sense of 
identity for Minangkabau society. The mayor argued that imposing 
Islamic dress on students is aimed at preserving the continuity of 
dress as an expression of the identity of their society, also for the 
future. However, he did not explain the above two points in great 
detail. This may be because he wanted to avoid accusations from 
his political opponents, non-Muslim or outsiders that he provides 
more privileges to Islam or adat. Or, it is also probable that he does 
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not have sufficient knowledge of the complex aspects of dress 
within Islamic teachings and adat. Instead, he regularly approaches 
this issue by using more rational arguments. 
Third, Muslim dress can also be viewed as a form of sex 
education. Although the subject of sex education is not a part of 
the curriculum in schools, the introduction of an Islamic dress 
code has affected, in particular female, students’ knowledge of sex. 
By covering their bodies not only to prevent sexual harassment by 
viewers, Islamic dress also restricts the wearer’s mobility and 
ability to socialize, and therefore limits any associated sexual 
activity, such as walking hand in hand with their boyfriend in 
public places. This issue also connects to a fear of spreading AIDS 
that is widely seen as the effect of free sex (Parker 2009:65-9).  
Four, in the context of sex education, Muslim dress also 
prevents the exposure of the wearer’s reproductive organs and 
hides biological changes, such as puberty, which is occurring at an 
increasingly young age. Indeed, some female students can show 
signs of adolescence as soon as the fifth or sixth class of primary 
school. Accordingly, adopting Islamic dress may result in the 
wearer feeling more secure and induce a more polite attitude.  
Five, Muslim dress is a symbol of health. Enforcing Muslim 
dress is also an attempt to protect the wearers from contracting 
dengue fever, a disease transmitted by aedes aegyty mosquitoes. 
This virus most commonly infects people under fifteen years old, 
although there are cases of adults with dengue fever. Although the 
aedes aegypty is not endemic in Padang, dengue fever remains a 
serious disease and a problem to be solved. The mayor claims that 
since the implementation of Muslim dress, the number of students 
suffering from dengue fever has significantly decreased. This goes 
against the general trend in Indonesia where incidents of this 
disease are increasing annually due to the effects of an unhealthy 
environment. The annual report from the Padang health center 
reveals that 1,586 people were recorded with the disease in 2009 
and this number decreased to 1045 in 2010 (The health 2011:16). 
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However, there is no study that proves the effects of wearing 
Islamic dress on the decreasing number of sufferers; it seems the 
claim is based purely on the reasoning of the mayor.  
Six, Muslim dress is also intended to create equality among 
the students. The body can also be an economic symbol and dress 
can reveal whether the student belongs to a rich or poor family. By 
wearing Islamic dress it is not easy to identify whether a female 
student is wearing, for example, luxurious or fake accessories, such 
as earrings and other jewelry. Students belonging to rich families 
have little possibility to show off their wealth, and female students 
from poor families do not feel inferior as any accessories are 
covered by their headscarf.   
Seven, Muslim dress is a uniform. It now indicates whether 
the wearers are students of a certain level of education or civil 
servants working at an educational or other municipal department 
and it can even locate someone in the hierarchy (Lurie 1981:18-19). 
The type and color of Muslim uniform can reveal something of the 
status of the wearer. However, there is still a lack of study 
regarding the extent to which Muslim dress has influenced the 
dignity and confidence of the wearers: whether Islamic dress has 
significantly increased the dignity and confidence of the wearer or 
vice versa. 
These meanings of Muslim dress put forward by the mayor 
are not only adopted from the existing values or belief in the 
society, but are also new interpretations of Muslim dress produced 
by the mayor closely related to his other tasks as the local ruler. 
For example, the role of Islamic dress as an identifier of Muslims 
and Minangkabau adat have long existed within the society, but 
the interpretation of the influence of Islamic dress on sex 
education, health and equality are aimed at sustaining other 
programs of the mayor as the local ruler (Parker 2009:67). In short, 
these meanings reveal that the mayor’s intentions to apply a 
Muslim dress code also directly connect with his other tasks as the 
local ruler.  
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3.7.2 The meaning of Islamic dress for wearers 
Although the Islamic dress code only applies to civil servants and 
students, there are a few non-Muslims who also adopt this style of 
dress. The meaning that wearers attach to Islamic dress can be 
distinguished into three categories: wearers who support the 
wearing of Islamic dress; those who are neutral to the issue; and 
those who are not comfortable wearing Islamic dress.  
Those wearers who are proponents of Muslim dress are 
generally accustomed to wearing clothes that are in line with a 
Muslim dress code. On the whole, they wear Islamic dress not only 
during working hours or while attending school, but also when 
they leave their house for religious activities and even non-
religious occasions such as shopping, visiting their colleagues and 
attending weddings. A few of this group acknowledged that they 
do not regularly wear Islamic dress when they are in their own 
neighborhood or for errands within walking distance, such as 
shopping at the kiosk close to their home or for short visits to their 
neighbor. For this group, the meaning of Muslim dress is not only 
the implementation of Sharia, it has also become synonymous with 
their identity. These people mostly belong to pious families who 
have always adhered to Islamic dress.  
However, according to one wearer, adopting Muslim dress 
is not always easy. A school teacher said: 
     
Presently, dressing according to the Muslim dress code is not so 
easy. We are flooded with different dress values by the media, 
such as newspapers, TV programs, the internet, all of which are 
challenging our Islamic values. As a teacher, as well as parent, I 
am facing an uneasy situation about this [wearing Muslim dress] 
because students also tend to be more independent now and 
make their own decisions. Alhamdulillah, the government [mayor] 
obligates civil servants and students to wear Muslim dress. And 
the designs of Muslim dress are currently more varied and 
affordable (Interview, with the teacher, 15/07/2010). 
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The second category of wearers sees this issue as disconnected 
with Islamic teachings. They perceive Muslim dress solely as a 
uniform, or even that it is only a trend, or that the current 
government prefers modest dress. This group only wears the 
uniform for work or school and in their own time they feel free to 
wear any dress style they like. They also said that they often wear 
Muslim dress if they go to religious occasions, such as to a mosque 
or to visit their ancestors’ graves before the fasting month. This 
group also felt that the number of people wearing Muslim dress in 
public places appeared to be growing. One middle-aged woman 
said that she felt uncomfortable attending gatherings where the 
majority of females were wearing Muslim dress. But, she 
acknowledged that she is not yet ready to wear Muslim dress, not 
only because she feels mentally unprepared to do so, but also 
because she lacks the money to purchase new dresses for different 
purposes (Interview, with a civil servant, 10/06/2010). 
Muslim females belonging to this category tend to 
differentiate between religious and non-religious places. A 
religious place is simply defined as a place where religious 
activities occur, for instance a mosque, visiting a death (taʿziya) or a 
graveyard. A non-religious place is defined as a place where non-
religious activities take places, such as schools, offices, and 
shopping centers. During my fieldwork, I observed that Muslim 
females in this group only wear Islamic dress when visiting 
religious places; they do not wear Muslim attire if they are going to 
non-religious places. This suggests that for a number of Muslims, 
not all aspects of their life are seen as areas that must be governed 
















Figure 3.1 Female students wearing school uniform,   
author, 22/01/2011 
 
In addition, there are also non-Muslims students who opt to wear 
Muslim dress during their school sessions without feeling 
uncomfortable, even though they have the right to wear the 
national uniform. These students acknowledge that for the 
majority of Muslims, Islamic dress is an important part of their 
identity in terms of being Muslim. However, for this group, 
wearing Islamic dress does not mean they are Muslim. They see it 
merely as a school uniform. This opinion is expressed by a 
Christian student in a vocational school, who spoke frankly: ‘I have 
been wearing this dress [pointing her headscarf] since the first 
year of my study and I enjoy it [smiles]. I have friends [non-
Muslims] who are also wearing this, but other friends are wearing 
other dress [national uniform]. As a student, this is my school 
uniform’ (Interview, with a Christian student, 25/05/2010). 
The third category of wearers is those who feel 
uncomfortable with the obligation to adopt Islamic dress. There 
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are a number of Muslims and non-Muslims belonging to this group. 
They claim that they do not feel comfortable wearing Muslim dress 
to school. They argue that they do not like covering their body 
completely because it hides their beauty. But they acknowledge 
that they have no choice and cannot wear the national uniform 
because they are Muslims. Also in this group are a number of non-
Muslim wearers who have to wear Muslim dress because the school 
authorities have imposed it on them. For example, a Christian 
student acknowledged that she was forced to wear Muslim dress 
when she was studying at the high schools in Padang but felt very 
uncomfortable wearing it (Fransiska Silalahi, interviewed by a 
reporter from Journal Perempuan, 60:116-119). Consequently, 
wearing the unwanted dress provoked a feeling of resistance and 
this is expressed in various ways. 
One form of resistance includes students only wearing 
Muslim dress during school sessions and immediately taking it off 
when she leaves the school yard. According to Lurie, taking off the 
dress is a sign of defiance (Lurie 1981:19). Another form of 
resistance comes through the gossip and chat of those students 
who disagree with the dress code. One Christian student revealed: 
 
Because I am the only Christian student at the school, it [wearing 
Muslim dress] does not become a topic of discussion during the 
school sessions. But I chat with my friends about this subject 
when we are attending religious ceremonies in the church. We 
are fed up with wearing jilbab [Muslim dress]. Why should we, 
non-Muslims, wear jilbab? But we keep it [the protest] only in our 
heart (Silalahi 2008:118). 
 
The only option for those who disagree with the dress code is this 
kind of daily resistance. We can see from the student above that 
she avoided confrontation with the school authorities by 
continuing to wear Islamic dress. Consequently, there was no 
impact from the daily resistance. However, these actions can 
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certainly reduce the feelings of resentment and discomfort as it 
helps the wearer see the dress as nothing more than a school 
uniform and disconnected from the idea of implementing Sharia or 
the communal identity of Minangkabau society.  
 
3.7.3 The meaning for the viewer  
Most viewers of Muslim dress also have their own interpretations 
of the attire worn by colleagues, children, family members and 
neighbors. They may perceive it in the same way as the ruling elite 
or the wearers or they may have different views. The 
interpretations of viewers can be classified into two categories: 
those viewers who interact with wearers during their working 
hours or school sessions, and those viewers who are involved with 
wearers in informal activities. The first category covers non-
Muslim civil servants and students who do not wear Islamic dress, 
and the second category relates to parents or family members of 
civil servants or students, and the inhabitants of the municipality.  
 
3.7.3.1 Non-Muslims  
As previously stated, non-Muslim civil servants and students are 
not obligated to wear Muslim dress. Despite the fact that a few 
non-Muslims decide to adopt the dress, the majority opt to wear 
another uniform that is not in line with an Islamic dress code. This 
subsection deals only with non-Muslims who do not wear Muslim 
dress and who have been actively interacting with wearers during 
their working hours or school sessions. These viewers can be 
categorized as happy and unhappy viewers and these categories 
reflect their different perceptions of an Islamic dress code.  
For the happy group, not adopting the Islamic dress code 
does not evoke any uncomfortable feelings.  They argue that if 
wearing Muslim dress is meant to signify being Muslim and to 
identify adherents of Minangkabau adat then it follows that not 
wearing Muslim dress also identifies non-Muslims. The people 
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belonging to this category are proud to display their non-
Muslimness publicly. They can express that ‘I am not a Muslim’ or 
‘I am a Christian’ or ‘I am a Buddhist’ through their dress. This 
current development can be seen, for example, in public places 
where people are wearing T-shirts with slogans such as ‘I love 
Christ’. This is something that almost never occurred prior to the 
implementation of the Muslim dress code. Indeed, the identity of 
non-Muslims was blurred in public. 
Furthermore, those people who do not wear Islamic dress 
often feel a degree of pressure or competitive spirit in terms of 
achieving more than their peers who wear Islamic dress at work or 
in their places of study. A female Christian student at senior high 
school (Sekolah Menangah Atas, SMA) said that not wearing Islamic 
has triggered her motivation to study harder and to become 
actively involved in extracurricular activities (Interview, with a 
non-Muslim SMA student, 25/05/2010). Similarly, a Christian civil 
servant who dresses differently than the majority of her colleagues 
said that her non-Islamic dress influenced her to behave in 
accordance with Christian values. 
In contrast with the first group of the viewers, the unhappy 
group feels uncomfortable not wearing Islamic dress during their 
working or school hours. They worry that by not wearing Islamic 
attire they will receive different treatment or may be 
discriminated against by their colleagues or teachers. They do not 
understand the government’s motivation for implementing a dress 
code based on the beliefs of one religion, rather than on values 
that can be accepted by all inhabitants. However, they also 
acknowledge acts of non-compliance have little impact and that 
their objections go unheard.  
Thus, the difference between the first and second group of 
viewers is located in perception. The first group demonstrates a 
degree of tolerance to Muslim attire; in contrast, the second group 




   
 
 
3.7.3.2 Parents, family members and neighbors  
This subsection deals with those viewers of Muslim dress who are 
parents, other family members or neighbors and who interact with 
wearers in settings such as at home, in the neighborhood and 
other places of informal activity. Specific attention is paid to 
whether the viewers are Muslim and non-Muslim, and the 
interpretations and impact of Muslim dress on this group are 
presented below.  
Most of the Muslim viewers in this group are of the opinion 
that the Muslim dress code introduced by the mayor for civil 
servants and students is directly connected with an aim to 
implement Sharia as well as Minangkabau adat. They claim that 
Muslim dress has played an important role in the collective 
identity of Muslims and the Minangkabau adat community. 
Furthermore, they commonly argue that the government has an 
obligation to concern itself with social identity. A retired man said, 
‘I am delighted with the current government obligating them [civil 
servants and students] to wear Muslim dress; it is the 
government’s task to maintain this important identity’ 
(Conversation, with a retired civil servant, 10/08/2010). According 
to another viewer, implementing Muslim dress in educational 
institutions not only maintains the values of the dress, but also 
guarantees the continuity of the identity for the next generation. 
‘It is not easy to be a good Muslim in this modern era where 
modernity emphasizes the value of self-determination. The 
implementation of Muslim dress codes by the government may 
help to maintain the values of wearing the dress’ (Interview, with a 
local ulama, 25/07/2010). 
A number of parents who have children studying at schools 
where Muslim dress is imposed perceive Islamic dress as a 
response to modernity. The fear of the negative impact of 
modernity has become such a concern for parents that it has 
become an unofficial and informal discourse that amounts to a 
‘moral panic’ about teenage girls. In this context, wearing Muslim 
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dress also means maintaining moral values and managing the 
wearer’s mobility and socializing (Parker 2009:65). Thus, wearing 
Muslim dress is not only seen as a current need, but also important 
for the future.  
Imposing an Islamic dress code in state schools may also 
create a new opportunity for traditional Muslim families to obtain 
better education at schools managed by the Ministry of 
Education.47 Previously, traditional Muslim families opted to send 
their children to schools where Muslim dress is worn. On the 
whole, these schools are managed by the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs or are owned by private or Muslim institutions. Since 
Muslim dress has been implemented at all schools under the remit 
of the Ministry of Education, traditional Muslim families now have 
the possibility to study at schools with good academic reputations.  
Another interpretation of Muslim dress is that it has gradually 
influenced other family members to switch their dress in 
accordance with an Islamic dress code. However, this gradual 
change is not wholly motivated by a desire to implement Sharia; 
rather, it originates from a need to fit in and adjust their way of 
dressing when attending occasions where the majority of females 
are wearing Islamic dress. A middle-aged woman said that 
currently most of the women attending all-female gatherings such 
as arisan48 wear Muslim dress. Initially, she had not adopted Islamic 
dress, but had felt uncomfortable at being the odd one out. She 
                                                        
47In the Indonesian educational system schools are managed by two different 
ministries: the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The 
schools under the Ministry of Education have a better quality of education, thus 
become favored schools for study, rather than those under the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs. This fact is the result of, among other things, financial factors. 
Schools managed by the Ministry of Education are funded specifically for 
educational purposes, whereas schools under the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
are funded for religious purposes. 
48Arisan is a regular social gathering whose members contribute to and take 
turns at winning an aggregate sum of money.   
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finally decided to purchase Muslim clothing and regularly wears it 
when attending these gatherings.  
 
Finally, I decided to continue wearing Muslim dress when I leave 
the house. In the beginning, I started to wear this [Muslim dress] 
because I felt odd attending female gatherings, but now I am 
more motivated by the religious teachings [ajaran agama]. I find 
that wearing Muslim dress is simple, but it is expensive [laugh], 
although various qualities of Muslim dress are now available in 
the dress shops or supermarket. They are affordable enough 
(Conversation, with a middle-aged female, 01/08/2010). 
 
Another Muslim woman shared a similar story. She finally decided 
to adopt Islamic dress after finding herself being the odd one out 
when taking her children to kindergarten. She acknowledged that 
her child also often complained about her appearance and the fact 
that she did not wear Muslim dress (Conversation, with a young 
female, 20/07/2010). These two cases reveal that wearing Muslim 
dress is not solely motivated by the desire to implement Sharia, 
but that social aspects may also motivate Muslim women to wear 
it.  
Non-religious aspects, such as appropriateness or 
properness, may also motivate Muslim women to wear (or not 
wear) Muslim dress. However, this is largely determined by 
whether wearing Muslim dress is located as a habit or a rule in the 
society (Hart 1994). If it is only a habit it will not generally result in 
women wearing it, whereas if there is a rule, women are forced to 
adopt the dress code or face criticism from society for 
inappropriate behavior. This situation can be seen in social 
gatherings among Muslim females in neighborhoods where not all 
of them wear Muslim dress. In this case, the dress is not aimed at 
covering ʿawra, but rather it is considered a value of 
appropriateness. We also see this reasoning at play when Muslim 
women leave their homes for short journeys or when they are 
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receiving familiar guests at home. However, this is not a factor 
within traditional Muslim families or families who have performed 
pilgrimage. These families regularly wear Muslim dress with the 
purpose of covering their ʿawra whenever they deal with other 
people who do not belong to their family (muḥrim). 
Non-Muslim viewers in this group have a different 
interpretation of the Muslim dress code imposed by the 
government. For them, it evokes feelings of fear and discomfort. 
They are concerned that not wearing Islamic dress may result in 
different treatment. They suspect that inequality may occur in 
terms of accessing public services from government institutions or 
in public schools, or in terms of gaining equal opportunities as civil 
servants. However, there is no evidence to suggest that they or 
their family members have experienced discrimination relating to 
government services. In addition, viewers also experience what is 
commonly called ‘political fear’. This political fear can be defined 
as a fear arising from a political discourse and several public 
discussions that locate this issue as an attempt to implement 
Sharia, and the desire to replace the state with an Islamic state. For 
this group, the government imposing an Islamic dress code is a 
sign that a number of Muslim groups are determined to shift 
Indonesia towards an Islamic state. 
To sum up, the meanings of Muslim dress for the ruler, the 
wearers and the viewers outlined above demonstrate how closely 
linked this issue is with their lives and daily activities. The 
meanings attached to Islamic dress indicate the depth of 
involvement within the social-cultural-religious structure of their 
society. Religious individuals and families tend to attach religious 
significance to Muslim dress; non-religious people and families 
tend to attach non-religious meanings to the issues; a political-
minded person will interpret it from a political standpoint; a local 
ruler will view the issue from the perspective of all his tasks as the 
ruler. In other words, these meanings also reflect their position in 
the socio-religious-economic structure.  
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3.8 Public debate: Contestation of values  
Although local authorities have argued that issuing a Muslim dress 
code had a number of purposes, it is difficult to deny that the 
attempt was primarily to implement a dress code according to 
Sharia. This Muslim dress code has emerged in the form of an 
imperative stated in a number of regional laws or other forms of 
decisions issued by the local rulers. When the government began 
to implement these regulations, this issue became a topic of public 
discussion and debate. This discussion and debate is directly 
related to the codification of Sharia in regional law. The public 
discussion and debates dealt with the legal issue of whether the 
codification of Sharia in regional law is justified. This subject has 
also become an important political issue that has evoked 
considerable feelings of discomfort and fear among both 
opponents as well as proponents. The arguments of both sides are 
briefly presented below. 
Proponents, including members of DRPD and local rulers, 
have argued that the adoption of Islamic values concerning dress is 
the government’s concern and that the authority in this matter 
not only belongs to the local government, but is also guaranteed 
under the 1945 constitution and the philosophy of the state, 
Pancasila. They also argue that this issue is not related to Islamic 
teaching per se, but that it has been adopted as an important form 
of cultural identity. These arguments have received support from 
many Muslims and Muslim organizations, including 
Muhammadiyah and MUI, as well as adat organizations such as 
LKAAM (an umbrella adat organization). In addition, public 
discussions often became emotional when supporters accuse 
opponents of this issue of ‘Islamophobia’, which has its roots in 
colonial times.  
By contrast, opponents argued that adopting the Islamic 
teachings concerning dress and issuing a regional law to this effect 
contradicts the constitution and other regulations. They further 
argued that only the province of Aceh has a special privilege 
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allowing it to implement Sharia. In other provinces, including West 
Sumatra, religious matters are governed by central government. 
Moreover, opponents accuse proponents of having a long term 
agenda to reintroduce an Islamic state and that imposing an 
Islamic dress code may threaten integration in Indonesia. They 
accused such a policy of provoking feelings of fear among 
vulnerable people.  
Another argument put forward by a number of NGO 
activists is that imposing a Muslim dress code is in contradiction 
with human rights. They advocate two reasons to support this 
claim. First, imposing Muslim dress has resulted in discrimination 
for non-Muslims civil servants and students who dress differently 
from the majority. This situation also conflicts with the principle 
of equality before the law. They also predicted that this 
discrimination may lead to other discrimination in work or 
schools. Second, imposing Muslim dress meant that civil servants 
and students no longer had the right to decide their own dress.49 
However, this second reason looked misleading, as the government 
had always had a uniform policy – in whatever form – for civil 
servants and students. According to Lurie, wearing a uniform ‘is to 
give up one’s right to act as individual – in terms of speech is to be 
partly or wholly censored’ (Lurie 1981:18).  
The arguments used by the opponents and proponents of 
Muslim dress are emotional: the opponents accuse supporters of 
the code of threatening the foundations of the state. Proponents 
accuse the other side of Islamophobia and of being anti-Sharia, As a 
result of such emotive exchanges, it was almost impossible for 
both sides to discuss the issue in a proper way. For instance, there 
were few public discussions or forums where both sides of the 
issue were presented. As a result, the issue was confined to the 
realm of gossip, chat, rumor and scandal.  
                                                        
49These arguments by proponents were also expressed during two programs on 
the Metro TV Channel, entitled Genta Demokrasi, that aired in September 2010. 
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The local authorities have attempted to clarify the issue of Muslim 
dress by disconnecting it with any attempt to disintegrate the 
state. For example, the governor of West Sumatra, in an interview 
with Perter Gontha, a television host, argued that the local 
government had intended to create harmony between the society 
and the government, but that it has become a challenge as the 
policy had created feelings of discomfort and worries about 
discrimination. He acknowledged that the inappropriate reactions 
to this subject also constituted a challenge for the local authorities. 
He also argued that without the dress code Muslims were being 
denied their right to implement the values derived from their 
religious teachings. The governor said: 
 
Truly, we are very respectful when the Balinese celebrate the 
Nyepi [last day of Balinese calendar when no work is done] and, 
for example, there are no flights back and forth to Bali. Not a 
single one of us raises a protest. This is because of all of us 
respect the religion of the Balinese. How come [some people 
protest] when the majority of Muslims issued a regulation only 
for them? This must be also respected. That is simple! However, 
the issue is seen as forcing others [non-Muslims] to obey the 
[Islamic] regulations. In fact it does not…. 50  
 
This issue is intermingled with other related issues dealing with 
attempts to implement Sharia in an Indonesian legal and historical 
context. Only time and experience will tell which direction this 
issue will ultimately take.  
                                                        









This chapter reveals that regional laws oblige Muslims who are 
employed as civil servants and students to dress according to an 
Islamic dress code. A number of local authorities are motivated to 
implement Sharia in relation to the dress code. This shift is 
justified by a view that Islamic dress provides a communal identity 
for the society. Consequently, the local government has the 
authority to issue a regional law on this subject. The dress code is 
regulated by a number of regional laws, which provide guidance 
not only concerning things such as covering ʿawra, but also other 
functions, such as adornment and distinguishing the wearer. These 
two new elements of the dress code have departed from the 
emphasis given by most ulama on the issue of ʿawra.  
This matter of dress has become the subject of wide public 
debate and discussion. A number of non-Muslims and NGOs 
activists as well as politicians perceive this development to be in 
contravention with the constitution and the philosophy of the 
state, as well as the principle of equality before the law. The 
proponents of Muslim dress see this opposition as a form of 
discrimination of those Muslims who intend to implement Sharia. 
They argue that the constitution and the philosophy of the state 
guarantee their right to adhere to their religious teachings. These 
arguments are frequently repeated and have been used by both 
sides in the debate since the beginning of independence and the 
first attempts to codify Sharia in the state law.   
For the local authority, the intention behind obligating 
Muslims to wear Islamic dress is not only to implement Sharia but 
it also links to other related governmental tasks. However, the 
wearers and viewers of Muslim dress may perceive these 
intentions differently.  
After more than a half decade of the implementation of 
Muslim dress the result has been a shift in Muslim daily life. For 
example, the dress code appears to have enhanced the religiosity 
and cultural awareness not only of the wearers, but also among 
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Muslims in general. It has also created a new possibility for 
traditional Muslim families to continue their education in schools 
that have better academic reputations and that are managed by 
the Ministry of Education. However, the fact cannot be avoided 
that obligating Muslim students to wear Muslim dress has also 
raised feelings of discomfort and discrimination among non-
Muslims or undevout Muslims. Thus, a further empirical study is 
required to examine whether this policy has had an impact in 
terms of the local government maintaining and managing public 
services. For example, whether or not local government officers 
have a particular preference for the wearers of Islamic dress 
during recruitment processes. 
The continuity of this practice in the future may be 
determined by two factors. First, it relies on local politics. This 
practice will continue if the following mayor/local ruler has the 
same stance on this issue. If this is not the case, then there is a 
possibility that the dress code will be revised or replaced with 
another policy. For instance, a new rule could revise the current 
imperative form of the rule with an alternative more optional 
version. Second, it also relies on whether the current practice is 
seen as having affected any advancement in the society. As 



















Two important identifiers of the Minangkabau people are that they 
are adherents to a matrilineal society and that they are pious 
Muslims. Maintaining this identity was a central theme when the 
provincial government issued provincial law 9/2000 on village 
administration (Pemerintahan nagari). This law was aimed at 
returning to a nationwide unified village structure, based on the 
Javanese desa to nagari, the lowest government structure based on 
Minangkabau tradition (Von Benda-Beckmann 2007). A return to 
the nagari system would signal a return to their identity. To be a 
pious Muslim is important to the identity of the Minangkabau 
people and as a Muslim one should adhere to Islamic teachings. For 
this purpose, an ability to recite the Quran is necessary. This ability 
provides an individual with the ability to perform Islamic rituals.  
A village prayer house, called surau, or a mosque is an 
important Islamic institution located in the village. According to 
the adat rules, there cannot be nagari without the surau. 
Historically, the surau has functioned as more than a place for 
performing rituals and as a center for Islamic learning, it also had a 
social function; under adat rules it was a place where male youths 
might spend the night if there was no place available for them at 
their matrilineal/parental house (Dobbin 1983:118-119). However, 
this function has gradually deteriorated since the government and 
Muslim reformers introduced a program of modernization early in 
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the twentieth century (Azra 1990). The current situation shows 
that this institution plays a very limited role, largely limited to 
ritual purposes, i.e. praying and other various Islamic celebrations. 
Its function as the educational center has been transformed and it 
is now part of a modern schooling system. However, the schooling 
system has not fully accommodated all the functions of the surau. 
Thus, the idea behind returning to surau is to restore Minangkabau 
identity and also to revitalize the function of surau. 
One important aspect of the identity of the Minangkabau 
people, related to the function of surau, is being a pious Muslim. 
Surau plays a significant role in this regard as a place of Islamic 
teaching, including the teaching of recitation of the Quran. 
Culturally, the essential characteristic of a pious Muslim is having 
the ability to recite the Quran. This is an important requirement 
not only for performing the obligatory prayers five times a day, 
but also for other rituals during, for example, the fasting month. In 
recent decades, the increasing number of people without the skills 
to recite the Quran has been a cause for public concern. Indeed, 
this situation is commonly seen as an indication that the identity 
of the Minangkabau people has significantly deteriorated and 
might even threaten the continuity of Islam. Thus, a number of 
local authorities and other public figures advocated a plan to 
restore this identity using a legal approach, i.e. issuing provincial 
and regional/municipal laws aimed at introducing new subjects 
into schools, including recitation of the Quran.    
This chapter presents those provincial and 
regional/municipal laws concerning Quranic recitation. It attempts 
to answer three questions: How is recitation of the Quran 
regulated? To what extent is the provincial, regional/municipal 
law applied? What is the implication of the law for other Islamic 
institutions? In order to answer these questions, this chapter is 
divided into seven sections: 1) rules on recitation of the Quran; 2) 
recitation of  the Quran in the Muslim world; 3) the Indonesian 
government’s policy on this theme; 4) Quranic recitation within 
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Minangkabau society; 5) the contents of provincial, 
regional/municipal law on this issue; 6) actual practice of Quranic 
recitation in Padang, including SD plus, recitation of the Quran in 
elementary schools, public response, and its impact on Quranic 
education institutions; and finally, 7) conclusions relating to the 
topic of this chapter are presented.  
      
4.2 Rules on recitation of the Quran  
Reciting the Quran in a correct way is an important subject for 
Muslims. This can be explained by the importance of the Quran for 
Islamic society; it is the word of God as revealed to the Prophet 
Muḥammad and, thus, the Prophet was concerned that it should be 
recited correctly for the purposes of proclaiming, pondering and 
remembering the message of God in worship and in devotional life. 
It also deals with the desire to obey the Quran through 
understanding and applying its contents in practical ways in the 
life of Islamic society. These concerns lead to dominant modes of 
Quranic piety: recitation (qirāʾāt) and exegesis (tafsīr) (cf. Denny 
1980:91; Nielson 2001:xvi). This section is confined to the rules 
regarding the recitation of the Quran  
The Quran was revealed to the prophet in the Arabic 
language,51 which consists of several dialects. Traditions (ḥadīth) 
say that the revelation was given to the prophet in seven dialects 
(aḥruf) (Wensinck 1927:130). Muslim scholars have different 
opinions on the meaning of seven dialects. One view is that they 
are the dialects of all the Arabic tribes. Others say that it deals with 
seven issues: noun gender and number, verbal tense and mood, 
inflection, adding or dropping of words, difference in word order, 
                                                        
51The Quran mentions this matter in eleven verses: al-Naḥl/Bees (16):103; al-
Shuʿarāʾ/The poets (26):195; Fuṣṣilat/Expounded (41):44; Yūsuf/Joseph (12):2; al-
Raʿd/The thunder (13):37; Ṭāhā (20):113; al-Zumar/The crowd (39):27; 
Fuṣṣilat/Expounded (41):3; al-Shūrā/Consultation  (42):7; al-Zukhruf/The gold 
adornment (43):3; al-ʾaḥqāf/Winding sand-tracts (46):12 (ʿAbd al-Bāqī 1992:579). 
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substitutions, and dialect references (Nielson 2001: 200). The rules 
for reciting the Quran (tajwīd) aim to guarantee the correct method 
of recitation. Modern copies of the Arabic text of the Quran 
contain symbols of the tajwīd and complete rules for recitation are 
also attached to copies of the Quran.52   
The methods for reciting the Quran must conform to the 
rules that are now commonly called tajwīd. This notion is 
elucidated in the chapter al-Qiyāma/the resurrection (75): 16-18. 
The word tajwīd is derived from jawada, literally meaning ‘to be or 
become good, to become better, to improve’ (Wehr 1979:172). This 
meaning has come to be understood generally as the art of reciting 
the Quran, ʿilm al-tajwīd. Although, this term does not occur in the 
Quran itself, it was used in the early period. According to a ḥadīth, 
ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭalib, a son-in-law of the prophet, was asked about the 
meaning of the Quranic phrase wa-rattil al-Qurʾāna tartīlā53 (to recite 
the Quran in slow, measured rhythmic tones). He replied by saying 
it was tajwīd al-ḥurūf wa maʿrīfat al-wuqūf, an excellent rendering of 
the consonant sounds and knowledge of the pause. The al-wuqūf 
has come to be known as the pause (al-waqf) and this, in turn, 
developed into al-wuqūf wa al-ʾibtidāʾ, the location of pauses and 
commencement that are important for ʿilm al-tajwīd (Denny 
2000:72-3). While it is never incorrect to use the word ‘recitation’ 
in relation to the Quran, this term is so general that it fails to 
indicate precisely what is meant in a given instance. For example, 
the term tartīl expresses the precise, deliberate, rhythmic 
recitation of the words and phrases of the Quran, measuring them 
out properly in relation to each other in correct sequence and 
without haste (Denny 1980:97).  
                                                        
52 I possess two copies of the Quran, both of which contain the rules for reciting 
the Quran. They were printed in Semarang, Indonesia, in 2006 and 1993.  
53This phrase is mentioned in the chapter al-Muzammil/the enfolded one (73):4.   
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There are two other related terms: ʿilm al-qirāʾa and ʿilm al-tilāwa. 
The word qirāʾa derives from the Arabic word q-r-ʾ, meaning ‘to 
recite, to read’ (Wehr 1979:882). A person who recites the Quran is 
called qurrāʾ54 and the meaning of the Quran itself is the recitation. 
The word tilāwa literally means ‘to read, read out loud, to recite’ 
(Wehr 1979:117). However, tilāwa does not relate specifically to 
performance; that is the domain of tajwīd and, to a lesser extent, 
qirāʾa (Denny 2000:73).  
The rules for reciting the Quran cover several topics. This 
includes: the point of articulation (makhrāj al-ḥurūf), manner of 
articulation (ṣifāt al-ḥurūf), allophones (ḥurūf al-farʿīya), assimilation 
(idghām) and dissimilation (iẓhār), extended duration of syllables 
(madd), and pause and beginning (wuqūf wa-al-ibtidāʾ) (al-Ḥuṣri 
1999:17; Denny 2000:73-4; Nielson 2001:18-19). The etiquette of 
recitation and compensation for the reciter are also included in 
these rules.  
On the whole, there are three styles of reciting the Quran: 
taḥqīq, ḥadr and tadwīr. The taḥqiq style is a very slow recitation 
that the reciter takes time for and focuses on complete 
articulation. In contrast, ḥadr is a rapid style of recitation in which 
the reciter adapts to a faster pace by eliding or assimilating 
phonemes. This method of recitation is purely for the reciter and is 
conducted in a monotone. The tadwīr style of recitation places 
finds a middle course between taḥqīq and ḥadr and adopts a 
medium tempo (Nielson 2001:20).  
The following paragraph presents selected technical 
aspects of the rules for reciting the Quran.55 The rules deal with, 
first, the letters of the Arabic alphabet and how they are 
                                                        
54 In the early period of Islamic history the qurrāʾ also meant villagers (Juynboll 
1973).  
55 The rules are summarized from the manual of tajwid (kitāb al-tajwīd) that is 
attached to the author’s two copies of the text of the Quran printed in 
Semarang, Indonesia, in 2006 and 1993. 
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articulated in the human vocal anatomy (makhrāj al-ḥurūf). They 
also provide an illustration of the mouth, throat, teeth and lips 
with indicators showing where the utterances originate. These 
kinds of diagrams are generally only included in modern tajwīd 
manuals. Second, the rules outline the manners of articulation 
(ṣifāt al-ḥurūf).  
What follows is a brief presentation of the etiquette of 
articulation of the Arabic alphabet. First is the conjunction of 
syllable-final n/ن, which has no following vowel (sukūn) or marks 
of short vowels or when doubled at the end (tanwīn). This category 
is classified as iẓhār (clear) and idghām (assimilation). The iẓhār 
governs that the n/ن sukūn or tanwīn is clearly uttered according to 
its place of origin if it is followed by one of the letters of iẓhār:  آ إ) ء 
 For example, nārun ḥāmīya is pronounced .,غ and ع ,خ ,ح , ه ,(ًا
nārunḥāmīya. The idghām (assimilation) governs that the n/ن sukūn 
or tanwīn is assimilated into the following letters.  
The idghām consists of idghām bi-ghunna, idghām bi-lā-
ghunna, iqlāb and ikhfāʾ. Idghām bi-ghunna governs that the n/ن 
sukun or tawīn is fully assimilated with nasality (ghunna) into the 
subsequent consonants: ن  ,م ,و and ي. For example, surūrun marfūʿa 
is pronounced surūrummarfūʿa. In contrast, idghām bi-lā-ghunna 
governs that the n/ن sukūn or tanwīn is assimilated without 
nasality to the consonants r/ر or l/ل. For example, khayran yarah is 
pronounced khairayyarah. Iqlāb, literally meaning to change, 
governs that the conjunction of syllable-final n/ن sukūn or tanwīn 
is transformed into m (م) with nasality (ghunna) if it is followed by 
b/ب. For example, min baʿd is pronounced mimmbaʿd. Ikhfāʾ, literally 
meaning hiding, governs that the conjunction of syllable-final n/ن 
sukūn or tanwīn is pronounced with nasality (ghunna) if it is 
followed by a number of consonants, huruf al-ikhfāʾ. These are: t/ت, 
th/ث, j/ج, d/د, dh/ذ, z/ز, s/س, sh/ش, ṣ/ص, ḍ/ض, ṭ/ط, ẓ/ظ, f/ف, q/ق, 
k/ك. For example, min ṭīn is uttered minnṭīn. The effect of n/ن and 
ghunnah in the cases of ikhfāʾ, iqlāb and idghām and the doubling in 
153 
 
   
 
 
idghām and the double n/ن into m (م), is to prolong the duration 
and to change the timbre. 
Second is the conjunction of syllable-final m/م, which has 
no following vowel (sukūn). This category consists of ikhfāʾ shafawī, 
idghām mutamāthilayn and iẓhār shafawī. Ikhfāʾ shafawī governs 
whether the conjunction of the syllable-final m/م sukūn is uttered 
with nasality if it is followed by the consonant b/ب . For instance, 
tarmīhim bi-ḥijāratin is pronounced tarmīhimmbiḥijāratin. Idghām 
mutamāthilayn governs whether the conjunction of syllable-final 
m/م sukūn is assimilated to the following consonant m/م with 
nasality. For example, innahā ʿalayhim muʾṣada is pronounced innahā 
ʿalayhimmuʾṣada. Iẓhār shafawī governs that the conjunction of 
syllable-final m/م sukūn is clearly voiced in its original place 
without nasality if it is followed by any Arabic letter with the 
exception of the consonants m/ م   and n/ن. For instance, alam 
nashraḥ is voiced alamnashraḥ.  
The third rule of etiquette concerns the consonants m/ م   
and n/ن with tashdīd (  ّنّ  م ), which is marked over a double 
consonant and the letter’s repletion saved. It governs that the 
consonants m/ م   and n/ن with tashdīd (  ّنّ  م ) are voiced with 
nasality and prolonged with two madd.56 For example, ʿamma 
yatasāʾalūn is pronounced ʿammmmayatasāʾalūn. The fourth rule 
relates to qalqala. This is defined as vibrating the place of 
articulation so that a strong form is heard. This is the insertion of ә 
(schwa) for the consonants ط ,د ,ج ,ب and ق, and is commonly called 
hurūf al-qalqala.   
Another important rule concerns the pause and the 
beginning and the etiquette of recitation. The location of pauses 
and commencement are symbolized by seven marks:  م  is the sign 
for an obligated pause (al-waqaf lāzim); ال is the sign for a prohibited 
                                                        
56 Madd is the length of a voiced consonant. The length of madd varies between 
one and six madd. 
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pause (ʿadam al-waqaf);  قلى  is the sign that suggests it is better to 
pause than to continue (al-waqaf ʾawlā);  صلى is the sign that 
suggests it is better to continue than to pause (al-waṣlu ʾawlā);  ج  is 
the sign that indicates that to continue or to pause is optional 
(waqaf jaiz);  .·.   .·. are two separated signs that indicate that it is 
permissible to pause in one of the signs, but it is not allowed to 
pause between the two (waqaf muʿanaqa); and  finally,  ع is the sign 
for the end of a chapter (ṣūra) or a particular verse (āyat) (rukūʿ). 
The etiquette of recitation of the Quran consists of six points. They 
are: an ablution should be performed before the recitation; the 
recitation should be conducted in a clean place and that a mosque 
is the best place for the recitation; the reciter should be wearing 
clean and tidy clothes, facing qibla (kaʿba); reciting the prayer that 
is called basmala; that is: Allāhumma aftaḥ-lanā ḥikmata-ka wa-nshur 
ʿalaynā raḥmati-ka min khazāʾini raḥmati-ka yā ʾarḥam al-raḥīmīn; 
starting with reciting aʿūdhu bi-llāhi min al-shayṭān al-rajīm (I seek 
refuge in God from the accused satan) that is called taʿawwudh 
(seeking protection) and bi-smi llāh al-raḥmān al-rahīm (in the name 
of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful). The ritual should end with 
reciting ṣadaqa llāhu l-ʿaẓīm (God the Mighty has spoken truly) (al-
Ghazāli n.d; al-Suyūṭī 1967). 
It is important to make a final remark regarding the above 
rules, and that is that in actual practice the rules are a 
supplementary text in the process of learning to recite the Quran. 
The most important method for applying the rules is through 
direct transmission from a teacher to student. Thus, without a 
teacher it is almost impossible to learn the art of reciting the 
Quran.  
 
4.3 Recitation of the Quran in the Muslim world 
As we have established, having the skill to recite the Quran in a 
correct way is essential for every Muslim, whether or not they are 
native Arabic speakers. This is not only because recitation of the 
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Quran is a ritual itself, but also because this skill is required in 
order to successfully perform other rituals; for example, for 
performing prayer five times  a day. Thus, this skill has become the 
foremost concern of pious Muslim individuals, families and society. 
Indeed, religious study usually begins with learning to recite and 
read the Quran.  
Across the Muslim world, the recitation of the Quran has 
remained the model for elementary religious education. In Arabic 
speaking countries, like Egypt (Starrett 1998; Nielson 2001) and 
Morocco (Eickelman 1985), the recitation of the Quran often takes 
place in a small school known as a kuttāb or maktab. In Egypt, the 
kuttab is small local institution for the memorization of the Quran 
in which students are taught basic reading and writing skills 
(Starrett 1998:27). As a country where Islam is the state religion 
and Arabic its official language, the government of Egypt is 
obligated by the Constitution and by Law no.139 of 1981 to teach 
the recitation of the Quran in educational institutions, and to 
encourage the home environment and society to promote such 
skills. Consequently, the government has introduced the recitation 
and memorization of the Quran in schools and it regularly 
organizes competitions for the recital of the Quran (Starrett 
1998:118; Nielson 2001:136-7). There is a similar story in Morocco 
where memorization and the ability to recite the Quran correctly 
and accurately have become important themes in schools where 
this subject is taught from the first year of primary education 
(Eickelman 1978:492).  
Recitation of the Quran has also become an important part 
of Islamic education in non-Arabic countries, including in 
Southeast Asia. Teaching takes place in mosques, prayer houses, 
teacher’s houses and in educational institutions managed by the 
government or private Muslim benefactors (Hefner 2009:7). In 
Malaysia, for example, recitation of the Quran was first introduced 
in an Islamic educational institution in the early 1800s. At this 
time, students were expected to master recitation of the Quran, 
156 
 
   
 
 
even without possessing skills in the Arabic language (Hefner 
2009:112).   
 
4.4 The Indonesian government’s policy on Quranic 
recitation. 
In the 1960s, the Indonesian government began to consider the 
idea that Muslim traditions regarding Quranic matters were part of 
the government’s concern. Initially, the government was mainly 
concerned with holding symbolic events related to these matters, 
but gradually it extended its remit and introduced more 
substantial activities.  
The government manages at least two symbolic events in 
connection with the Quran: the annual commemoration of the first 
revelation of the Quran and MTQ (Musabaqah Tilawatil Quran) the 
national competition for reciting the Quran. The event of 
commemorating the first revelation of the Quran was first held 
during Sukarno’s presidency and has grown into an annual 
appointment in the Presidential agenda. Although the ulama have 
different opinions concerning the date of the first revelation, there 
is consensus that it occurred during Ramadan, as indicated in the 
Quran. The government decided to conduct the commemoration 
on the seventeenth day of Ramadan, bearing in mind that this was 
also the day that Indonesia declared independence in 1945. This 
event is held alternately in the State Palace or at the Istiqlal 
mosque and it usually consists of three programs: the recitation of 
a few verses of the Quran by a qāriʾ (reciter), followed by a 
translation, a speech from a Muslim scholar concerning the 
revitalization of Quranic values, a short speech from the President 
and, lastly, doʿa (prayers, Arabic: duʿāʾ) often conducted by someone 
from the Ministry of Religious Affairs.  
In 1968, the government introduced the national 
competition for reciting the Quran, namely MTQ (Musabaqah 
Tilawtil Quran). This event was held for the first time in Makasar in 
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that year (Muchtar 1998:260). Since then, the competition has been 
held every two or three years and in 2012 the competition 
celebrated its 25th anniversary. Before the government began 
sponsoring MTQ, similar events had been organized on a voluntary 
basis by the Muslim community in a number of cities, including in 
Asahan, North Sumatra in 1946, in Makasar in 1949, and in Jakarta 
in 1952. Prior to the 1950s, the organization of Quranic reciters 
(qurrāʾ) existed in number of regions; for example, in Jombang, 
Makasar, Banjarmasin, Palembang, Kudus, and Medan. On 15 
January 1951 Wahid Hasyim, the Minister of Religious Affairs, 
established the organization of Quranic reciters, Jamiʿīyatu al-qurrāʾ 
wa al-ḥuffāḍ, based in Jakarta. In subsequent years, sister 
organizations were established in other regions. In 1953, this 
organization held its first national summit in Jakarta (Halim 
2006:168-172).  
Today, MTQ is a regular feature of the governmental 
agenda from national to village level. The first MTQ was aimed 
only at adult reciters, but subsequent events introduced various 
levels of competitions. For instance, the 24th MTQ in 2009 was 
open to adults, teenagers and children. The types of competition 
were also extended into understanding the meaning of the Quran, 
memorizing entire texts, and writing Quranic texts, i.e. 
calligraphy. In addition, MTQ events have also been held by 
different government departments and private institutions, 
including special MTQ events for university students, journalists, 
and disabled people. In short, MTQ has emerged as the public face 
of Quranic tradition. However, this competition has not been 
without criticism. Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly called Gus Dur, 
the fourth President of Indonesia, once criticized the national 
event for being ‘useless’. However, he was not expecting this event 
to be withdrawn from the government’s agenda; he was merely 
expressing his own opinion.  
Besides the symbolic purpose of holding regular 
competitions for reciting the Quran, the government relates these 
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events to its concern for Quranic education and how the Quran is 
taught to Muslims. In 1971, Mohammad Dachlan, the Minister for 
Religious Affairs, together with Ibrahim Hossen, the head of the 
Bureau of Public and Foreign relations of Religious Affairs, 
established a higher Quranic education institution, namely PTIQ 
(Pendidikan Tinggi Ilmu al-Quran). This institution primarily 
provided training in the art of Quranic recitation and the study of 
related knowledge (Muchtar 1998:260). Similar institutions were 
subsequently established in a number of provinces throughout 
Indonesia, including in West Sumatra in 1993. 
A more fundamental policy towards Quranic education was 
introduced on 13 May 1982 when two ministries, the Ministry of 
Home Affairs and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, issued the joint 
decree No.128 and 44A concerning this issue. The decree was 
aimed at improving Muslims’ (mainly students) ability to recite 
and write Quranic texts. This development demonstrated the 
government’s desire to enhance the ability of Muslim students in 
this area and make compulsory the subject of religion (agama), 
which had long been implemented from primary school to 
university. The Minister for Religious Affairs followed up the 
decree by issuing the Ministerial Instruction No.3 in 1990, aimed at 
providing a manual for reciting and writing Quranic texts.  
The current trend shows that the government’s interest in 
this subject has gradually increased. The government amended the 
1945 constitution and the National Education System law No. 20 of 
2003 in relation to this subject. Sections 12 (4), 30 (5) and 37 (3) of 
the constitution require the government to provide more space for 
religious education. Subsequently, the government issued the 
government regulation No. 55 of 2009 to implement these three 
articles. Section 3 of the government regulation gives the authority 
to the Ministry of Religious Affairs – the government institution 
whose main tasks concern religious matters – to manage religious 
education at all levels. This government regulation also elucidates 
the task of the Ministry of Religious Affairs to design religious 
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education (pelajaran agama) and to include Quranic education 
(pendidikan al-Quran) for all levels of education. Section 24 of the 
regulation defines Quranic education as educating Muslim students 
to have the ability to recite, write, understand and implement the 
Quran. Subsection 5 elucidates that the curriculum for Quranic 
education consists of reading and writing Quranic texts, 
memorizing certain verses of the Quran, understanding the way to 
pronounce the letters (tajwid) and memorizing some prayers (doʿa) 
that are stated in the Quran.  
On 6 December 2010, the Ministry of religious Affairs issued 
the Ministerial Decree No. 16 of 2010 on the management of 
religious education in schools. This decree states that it aims to 
standardize religious education from kindergartens to senior high 
schools. Section 6 of the decree elucidates the contents of this 
subject, focusing on building the personality of students with the 
following topics: first, deepening and extending religious 
knowledge; second, motivating students to obey their religious 
teachings in daily life; third, obeying religious teachings as the 
foundation of life as an individual, family member, community, 
and nation; fourth, maintaining a good personality with a focus on 
honesty, self-discipline, hard work, independence, self-esteem, 
competitiveness, cooperation, sincerity and responsibility; and 
fifth, maintaining inter-religious understanding among students. 
These objectives indicate that the direction of religious 
education will be shaped by the government. Current 
developments in government policy regarding religious education 
demonstrate the role of the Indonesian government in shaping 
religious understanding and this is set to become more significant 
in the coming decades.  
Prior to the central government’s involvement with the 
issue of Quranic education, decentralization and local autonomy 
meant that a number of local governments had been concerned 
with these issues. For example, in the province of Aceh Qanun no. 5 
of 2008 obligates students to have the ability to recite the Quran. 
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Furthermore, this ability is also obligatory for anyone running for 
the post of governor, bupati/the mayor and members of the 
parliament regulated under section 13 (1) c of the Qanun no. 3 of 
2008 (http://dishubkomintel.acehprov. go.id). The government of 
Bulukumba issued the regional law no. 6 of 2003 on the obligation 
for students and bridegrooms to have the ability to recite the 
Quran. A number of regions in West Sumatra have also issued 
similar laws.  
 
4.5 Quranic education within West Sumatran tradition 
The history of the learning tradition in West Sumatra shows that it 
is not necessary to learn the Arabic language in order to learn the 
Arabic alphabet with the aim of gaining the ability to recite the 
Quran for ritual purposes. This situation continues in present 
times. Historically, a surau located in the surrounding area of a 
village played the role of an Islamic as well as an adat institution. 
As an Islamic institution it was the center for basic Islamic 
training, including for prayers, learning the Quran, fiqh and other 
religious subjects. As an adat institution, it was a place where adat 
rules were taught to a new generation, a sleeping place for male 
teenagers, and for short stays for journeying traders (Dobbin 
1983:120; Radjab 1974:23; Azra 1990:66).  
However, this tradition is no longer compatible with the 
development of society, which has been responsive to the social 
changes and modernization introduced by the colonial 
government and Muslim reformers. On the one hand, at the end of 
the nineteenth century, most people adjusted swiftly to the 
modernization programs introduced by the colonial government, 
including the system of education. On the other hand, in the early 
twentieth century, Muslim reformers also targeted the surau 
tradition in order to modernize society. These two factors 
gradually reduced the role of surau as centers for Islamic 
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education. After independence the deteriorating role of surau 
continued.  
Despite this deterioration of the function of surau, they 
have contributed significantly to forming the identities of 
Minangkabau people, their adherence to Islamic teachings as well 
as adat. Practicing rituals and being able to recite the Quran are 
two important communal identities of the Minangkabau people. A 
conversation with Minangkabau people revealed that someone 
lacking the skills to perform these two things will be stigmatized 
and no longer seen as a Minangkabau person, and only as an 
animal, specifically a buffalo (kabau).57 For most people, 
particularly those in traditional Muslim families, the ability to 
recite the Quran is required for a number of events. For example, 
the Quran is read when a family member is approaching death, or 
during a gathering commemorating the death of relatives. Extracts 
of the Quran are also recited at the graveyard during visits before 
or after the fasting month. Because the ability to recite the Quran 
is seen as a marker of identity, attaining this goal is celebrated in 
the villages and a celebration, namely, Khatam Quran, will be held. 
This event is also seen as being a symbol of mukallaf (obligated to 
follow the law). Further, the skill of reciting the Quran is also 
required for those wanting to get married and raise a family 
according to the Islamic teachings.  
The current situation shows that only a small number of 
people are still learning the skills to recite the Quran in surau. In 
most villages, as well as in urban areas, this form of teaching has 
transferred to other places or institutions under the initiative of 
family members, community based organizations or even the local 
                                                        
57To stigmatize one who does not practice Islamic rituals or has no ability to 
recite the Quran is common among the Minangkabau people. It is spoken of in a 
metaphoric way, i.e. using the Minangkabau words, minang meaning Islam and 
kabau meaning buffalo. Thus, one who does not practice Islamic teachings is no 
longer part of the Minangkabau people, and is seen only as a kabau (buffalo).  
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government. Families who have someone who can teach the Quran 
often establish centers of learning, not only for their family 
members, but also for other children in the neighborhood. Since 
the 1960s, mosques have gradually transformed into the primary 
centers for Quranic learning, such as TPA (Taman Pendidikan 
Alquran/Education center for the Quran) and TPSA (Taman 
Pendidikan Seni Alquran/Education center for the Quranic arts). 
Subsequently, similar institutions were established in most of the 
mosques in West Sumatra. In the last two decades, reciting the 
Quran has also been taught in formal education institutions owned 
by private Muslim benefactors. This new subject has mainly been 
introduced in these private schools in order to attract new 
students. It should be noted, however, that this subject is an 
additional subject, to be taught alongside the religious education 
enforced by the government. This subject is set up for those 

















Figure 4.2.  Children learning how to recite and write the Arabic alphabet at the 





   
 
 
Besides reciting the Quran, theology, history of the prophet, the 
performance and meaning of ritual, ethics, memorizing a number 
of verses of the Quran and doʿa (prayers) are also taught in these 
institutions. Generally, these subjects are not systematically 
arranged in a curriculum, but rather are taught dependent on the 
ability of the students. Various teaching methods are used in these 
centers, including metode juz amma, metode iqraʾ and metode tartil.58 
In short, this section has shown that both continuity and 
change have been present in relation to the function of surau in 
maintaining the identity of the Minangkabau people. The ability to 
recite the Quran is still an important identifier for the society and 
thus is continued in the changing institutions. In the beginning, 
surau was the only institution that maintained this identity, but 
this function has been gradually deteriorating and it has been 
transferred into other institutions that are no longer fully under 
the control of the society. This change has been followed by 
changes in the methods of teaching. When the government shifted 
from desa to nagari as the lowest level of government structure, the 
spirit of returning to nagari was followed by the desire to revitalize 
the function of the surau as the nagari institution that plays a role 
in maintaining the identity of society. 
                                                        
58 A handbook, namely juz amma, is commonly used for teaching metode juz 
amma. This handbook consists of two main parts: the first part consists of how to 
read the Arabic alphabet, starting from single letters and moving on to 
combined letters; the second part consists of 36 verses, starting from al-Fatiḥa 
(the Opening) and subsequently moving on to al-Nās (Mankind) and ending with 
the verse al-Nabāʾ (the Great event). Metode iqraʾ was initially designed by As’ad 
Humam in Kota Gede, Jogjakarta and this method soon spread throughout the 
archipelago. This method is particularly effective for students who have the 
ability to read Roman letters. The tartīl method was introduced by Gazali, a 
teacher at STIQ (The Higher Education for the Quranic Arts) in Padang. 
According to him, an integrated approach is applied in teaching the students to 
recite the Quran. This method consists of seven sub-subjects, including reciting 
the Quran, writing words of the Quran, dictating words of the Quran, applying 
rhythm in reciting the Quran (murattal), ʿilmu tajwid, and adopting a proper 
attitude towards the Quran (akhlāq al-karīma) (Interview with Gazali, 16/10/2009). 
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4.6 Local law on Quranic recitation 
It is widely believed that the identity of Muslim and adat adherents 
has, at best, been changing gradually and at worst is in crisis. This 
situation has occurred on the one hand as a consequence of social 
changes, including the decreasing function of social actors and 
institutions, including ulama, adat functionaries and surau, and the 
increasing dominance of central government in terms of defining 
almost all aspects of the society on the other hand. When the local 
government was given the authority to define what is best for the 
society, it voiced the opinion that attempts must be made to 
maintain a society in which Muslims in West Sumatra should have 
the ability to recite the source of Islamic teachings, the Quran. This 
could be achieved by introducing a new subject to the school’s 
curriculum, i.e. recitation of the Quran. This skill was excluded 
from the aims of those religious subjects (pelajaran agama) that 
were regulated under law 2/1989 on the national education 
system. Thus, introducing the new subject to schools was meant to 
fill the gap between social need and the educational system applied 
by the government. Besides obligating students to learn this skill, 
brides and bridegrooms are also expected to be able to recite the 
Quran. Such a step was seen as a way of achieving the collective 
identity of the society. In order to provide legal grounds for this 
purpose, a number of local authorities attempted to issue 
provincial and regional laws on this matter.  
 
4.6.1 Provincial law 
The provincial parliament of West Sumatra was rather late in 
taking action on the issue of Quranic education. It passed a 
provincial law on this subject in 2006, while a number of other 
regional governments had already passed legislation as early as 
2001. However, members of the 1999-2004 parliament had 
prepared a draft bill on this subject in 2004, but they decided to 
suspend it given the imminent general election of that year and 
165 
 
   
 
 
the influx of newly elected members. The draft was primarily 
prepared by members of parliament belonging to Islamic parties,59 
but subsequently this draft received support from almost all 
parliament members.  
On 11 September 2006, parliament tabled the draft of the 
provincial law. According to the explanation in parliament, there 
were three main purposes for issuing a provincial law on this 
subject. First, they sought to maintain the social identity of 
Minangkabau people, which placed great store in the ability to 
recite the Quran. Indeed, as previously mentioned, culturally, it 
was unacceptable not to possess these skills and other members of 
the community would be critical of those without the ability to 
recite the Quran. Members of parliament expressed concern that 
the number of people without this ability has been significantly 
increasing. Second, they were attempting to improve the quality of 
people’s lives.  The Quran states that religious teachings must be 
the foundations of life. Consequently, every Muslim should have 
the ability to understand the rules in the Quran and the 
government has an obligation to introduce this subject in schools. 
Third, the provincial law is meant to guarantee continuity and 
reflect the way this issue has been regulated under regional or 
municipal laws.  
The draft was named Pendidikan Alquran (Quranic 
Education) and consisted of 12 chapters and 21 sections. The 
drafters acknowledged that, initially, the draft was named 
‘Pemberantasan buta huruf al-Quran’ (the elimination of illiteracy of 
the Quran), and subsequently this title was changed into ‘Pandai 
baca tulis al-Quran’ (the ability to recite and write Quranic text). 
                                                        
59 There are fourteen members of DRPD who are from different political parties: 
Mahjeldi Anharullah, Muslim M. Yatim, and Mochklasin from PKS; Rizal Moenir, 
and Syafril A. Hadi from Demokrat;  Salmiati from PBB: Irdinansyah Tarmizi, 
Saidal Masfiyuddin, and Usman Husen from Golkar; M.Asli Chaidir and Hayatul 
Fikri from PAN; Guspardi Gasand Abdul Kadir from PPP: Erwina Sikumbang from 
PDIP (Adnan 2006:244). 
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Finally, the title of the draft that was proposed on 11 September 
2006 was ‘Pendidikan al-Quran’ (Quranic education). No more than 
half a year later, on 15 February 2007, the parliament and the 
governor agreed to approve the draft as Provincial law No. 3 of 
2007 on Quranic education. This title differs from that of the 
regional law on this issue, which uses the words ‘obligation to have 
the ability to recite the Quran’.   
This provincial law is fuelled by the spirit of returning to 
nagari and surau and also refers to national law No. 20 of 2003 on 
the national education system. The main purpose of this provincial 
law is to introduce Quranic education as a new subject in both 
private and state schools. Its objectives further aim to improve the 
personal development of students and to encourage them to 
become pious, skilled in the recitation of the Quran, and to help 
them understand and implement Quranic values. To achieve this, 
Quranic education is defined as a systematic attempt to improve 
the ability of students in terms of reading, writing and 
understanding the Quran. Section 4 elucidates that this provincial 
law only applies to Muslims, but to Muslims at all stages of 
education. In addition, this law also states that Quranic education 
must be applied at both formal and informal educational 
institutions.60 With regard to formal education, recitation must be 
taught for two hours every week. Further, section 14 elucidates 
that this skill should also be learned by a prospective bride and 
groom.   
This law also determines a standard competency that is to 
be achieved. These competencies are regulated under section 13:  
 
a.  Competency for primary school students, meaning to 
have the ability to recite the Quran, to write Quranic words, to 
understand certain verses of the Quran, to understand basic tajwid 
                                                        
60The classification of educational institutions is referred to in Law No. 20/2003 
on the educational system.    
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[rules of pronunciation, duration and dividing Quranic texts] and 
to memorize ten verses of juzʾ ʿamma [the last thirty chapters of the 
Quran].  
b. Competency for the junior high school students means to 
have the ability to recite the Quran, to write Quranic words, to 
understand certain verses of the Quran, to understand tajwid and 
Quranic arts, to memorizing fifteen verses of the juzʾ ʿamma and 
other verses of the Quran.  
c. Competency for senior high school students means to 
have the ability to recite the Quran, to write Quranic words, to 
understand certain verses of the Quran, to understand tajwid and 
Quranic arts, to memorize twenty verses of juzʾ ʿamma and other 
verses of the Quran.61 
In addition, students should have a certificate to prove that 
he/she has accomplished the desired level of competency and has 
the ability to recite the Quran. The certificate may be officially 
issued by one of the above mentioned three education systems. In 
order to implement the provincial law, the provincial as well as 
regional government has the obligation to provide teachers, 
financial support and other facilities for this education. 
Other important elements of this law deals with 
punishment and this is regulated in section 18. This sections also 
states that any student who does not meet the requirements of 
standard competency regulated under section 13, cannot be 
allowed to continue on to the next level of education. However, 
there is an exception to this rule and that is if the parent provides 
a written guarantee to the school that their child will meet the 
necessary standards within a short period of time. If this is 
                                                        
61 Students in primary school should memorize the following chapters: of al-Nās, 
al-Falaq, al-Ikhlāṣ, al-Massad, al-Naṣr, al-Kāfirūn, al-Kawthar, al-Māʿūn, Quraysh, 
and al-Fīl. Students in junior high school should memorize five more chapters: 
al-Humaza, al-ʿAṣr, al-Takāthur, al-Qāriʿa, and al-ʿĀdiyāt. Students in senior high 
school are required to memorize five other chapters: al-Zalzala, al-Bayyina, al-
Qadr, al-ʿAlaq, and al-Tīn.  
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forthcoming, the school is permitted to accept an unqualified 
student to continue in his/her studies. At the same time, a 
prospective bride and groom who do not fulfill the requirements 
for reciting the Quran must delay their marriage for a certain 
period of time. Further, section 18 also states that the punishment 
for an official who issues a fake certificate for Quranic education is 
a maximum of three months in jail and/or a fine of a maximum of 
30 million rupiah. Lastly, this provincial law obliged the 
government to begin implementing Quranic education in the 
academic year of 2008.  
On 20 August 2009, the parliament and governor issued 
provincial law No. 2 of 2009 on the implementation of education. 
This provincial law mentions that the education system in West 
Sumatra must adopt the values held by the Minangkabau 
community, i.e. adat is based on Sharia and Sharia is based on the 
Quran. To implement this notion, section 14 (3) determines that 
Quranic education and BAM (Budaya Alam 
Minangkabau/Minangkabau culture) will be taught in primary 
schools through to senior high schools. In the following year, the 
governor issued the governor decree No. 71 of 2010 with the 
requirement to implement provincial law No. 2 of 2009. The 
provincial government has prepared a handbook for students in 
the first six classes of primary schools. However, the 
implementation of Quranic education in schools in some regions in 
West Sumatra is not based on this provincial law, rather it is based 
on the regional law that has been issued by the regional 
government before the provincial authorities became involved in 
this issue.  
 
4.6.2 Regional law 
As soon as the government returned to nagari as the lowest 
structure in 2001, the regional government became involved in a 
number of social issues related to the identity of local people. Most 
people recognized that one of the social problems to be dealt with 
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was the lack of ability in the community to recite the Quran, 
something which is widely perceived as important to the 
communal identity of the Minangkabau people. There were two 
solutions for this problem, firstly, to introduce Quranic recitation 
into the curriculum in schools and secondly, to require prospective 
brides and grooms to have the ability to recite the Quran. A legal 
basis was necessary for such steps and consequently, almost all 
regional governments planned to issue a regional law in this 
regard. This section of the chapter presents five of these regional 
laws, selected because they were the first regions to issue such 
legislation. They are the regions of Solok in 2001, 
Sawahlunto/Sijunjung, Limapuluh Kota and the Municipality of 
Padang in 2003, the region of Pesisir Selatan in 2004 and the region 
of Agam in 2005.  
The title of these regional laws indicates the obligation for 
various groups of people to have the ability to recite the Quran. 
Students and prospective brides and grooms are included in the 
regional laws of Solok, Limapuluhkota, Pesisir Selatan and 
Sawahlunto/Sijunjung. Meanwhile, the regional law of 
Sawahlunto/Sijunjung extends the obligation to civil servants as 
well. The regional law of Agam elucidates that all people are 
required to obtain this skill, not just students and prospective 
brides and grooms. The municipal law of Padang only requires 
students in primary schools to be taught recitation of the Quran. 
The regional laws of Solok, Sawahlunto/Sijunjung, Limapuluh 
Kota, Padang, and Agam focus on rules regarding the obligation to 
learn to recite and write the Quran, while the regional law of 
Pesisir Selatan adds the obligation to perform prayers. Despite 
these differences, these regional governments have three 
interconnected reasons for legislating on this issue: the central 
position that the Quran holds for Muslims in performing ritual, the 
position of Islam and adat in the community, and the important 
role of educational institutions.   
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The main purpose of these regional laws is to maintain the identity 
of Muslims and Minangkabau people. This can be achieved by 
ensuring that people have the ability to recite and write texts from 
the Quran. This skill will enhance knowledge that can subsequently 
be applied to their lives. For this purpose, Quranic education must 
be added to the curriculum of all schools, from primary to senior 
high school. The regional law further determines that the 
standards of competency required for this subject vary depending 
on the level of education: For primary school, students are 
expected to have the ability to recite and write Quranic texts and 
to know the basics of tajwid (the rules for pronunciation, duration 
and dividing Quranic texts). Students of junior high schools are 
expected to reach an intermediate level of ability in reciting and 
writing Quranic texts and to know tajwid. Finally, senior high 
school pupils must attain an advanced level in terms of reciting 
and writing Quranic texts and knowing tajwid, but in addition they 
are also expected to have a basic ability in performing Quranic 
arts. Besides these competencies, they must also have the skills to 
perform prayers and memorize some verses of the Quran. In 
addition, the regional law of Agam elucidates that Quranic 
education also applies to kindergartens and to higher education 
institutions. The regional law of Pesisir Selatan obligates students 
to perform regular prayers. And the regional law of 
Sawahlunto/Sijunjung obligates civil servants to have the ability to 
recite the Quran.    
Any student who has fulfilled the standard competencies 
will be awarded a certificate. Obtaining this certificate is a 
requirement for applying to the next level of education and they 
will also have to undergo an oral examination to test their skills. 
All the regional laws determine that applicants who meet the 
necessary requirements will be accepted for the level of study it 
applied to. However, if their parents can provide a guarantee that 
the applicant will reach the standard of ability within a short 
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period of time, the school may also accept an unqualified 
applicant.  
In respect of the issue of prospective brides and grooms 
having the ability to recite the Quran, the regional laws vary in 
terms of punishment. The regional laws of Solok, Limapuluh Kota, 
and Pesisir Selatan regulate that a marriage can only be 
undertaken if the couple can prove that they have the necessary 
skill. However, the regional law of Sawahlunto/Sijunjung regulates 
that the marriage may go ahead if both of them give a guarantee 
that they will learn to recite the Quran. They will not be given a 
marriage certificate, validating their union, until they have proved 
themselves in this matter. The regional law of Agam is more 
sympathetic and regulates that a marriage may be undertaken in 
all cases and it only recommends that recitation of the Quran be 
learned after the marriage has taken place. It should be noted here 
that this requirement violates what has been regulated in the 
Marriage Law of 1/1974 and the KHI. 
There are also penalties for anyone issuing a fake certificate 
for the accomplishment of Quranic education. In this regard, the 
regional laws of Solok, Limapuluh Kota, and Padang regulate that 
the offender will be punished with a maximum six months in jail 
and/or fined with a maximum of 5 million rupiah. The regional law 
of Pesisir Selatan regulates a slightly different punishment, i.e. if 
the offender is a civil servant the punishment will be determined 
under the government regulation 30/1980 on the discipline of civil 
servants. By contrast, the regional law of Sawahlunto/Sijunjung 
makes no mention of any penalty for this issue. In addition, the 
regional law of Agam does not prescribe a penalty for people who 
do not have the ability to recite the Quran. Instead, section 4 only 
suggests that people gain the ability to recite the Quran.   
In sum, a number of local governments now obligate people 
to gain the skills to recite the Quran, although not all regional laws 
prescribe penalties for those who do not fulfill this requirement. 
The different approaches to this issue depend on the significance 
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of this issue in each region. However, an important consequence of 
this development is that regional governments have to provide 
facilities for the implementation of this regional law. These 
facilities include teachers, allocated time for the subject, and 
textbooks and manuals for this subject. This is, of course, a very 
costly policy for local governments. Besides the financial 
implications, this situation has also resulted in the government 
reducing the role of surau or mosques or other private places as the 
centers of Quranic learning. This contradicts with the idea of 
returning to nagari and surau. This matter will be discussed further 
in the following section. 
 
4.7 Practices of Quranic recitation  
The municipal law of Padang No. 06 of 2003, issued in December 
2003, is the legal basis for the government to obligate students to 
meet a required level of competency in terms of reciting the 
Quran. To implement this municipal law the mayor issued the 
instruction No. 451.422/Binsos-iii/2005 on 5 March 2005. The 
municipal government has introduced recitation of the Quran into 
selected primary schools since 1998. However, the municipal 
government has been involved with this issue since 1998 when it 
implemented the SD Plus program in a handful of primary schools. 
Before examining the implementation of the municipal law, this 
section will discuss the SD plus program, followed by a discussion 
about people’s response to the implementation of Quranic 
education, and then it will discuss the impact of this program on 
the learning centers voluntarily managed by the Muslim 
community.  
      
4.7.1 SD Plus 
The municipal government initially introduced Quranic recitation, 
namely the SD Plus program, in a select number of primary schools 
in 1998. This program was specifically designed for students in the 
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fifth and sixth years of primary school who have not yet achieved 
the ability to recite the Quran in a proper way. The students are 
required to attend three sessions of one and a half hours every 
week. This program was put in place for one academic year, thus, 
there are a total of 84 sessions a year. Although the program is 
taught in schools, the sessions have no impact on the existing 
resources available for formal education. Rather, the municipality 
provides financial support and facilities for this special program. It 
is the responsibility of Gazali, a member of the teaching staff at 
STIQ (High Education for Quranic Arts and knowledge), the 
originator of the program. He was given a number of tasks 
following his initial proposal to the municipal government in 1998, 
including designing the curriculum, recruiting and training the 
teachers and evaluating the program. This program was first 
implemented in the academic year of 1998 and ended in 2005.  
Gazali once commented on the historical background of the 
program:  
 
Quranic education is non-formal education that is commonly 
held in Quranic learning centers such as MPA/MDA [Madrasah 
Pendidikan Alquran/Madrasah Diniyah Awaliyah] located in mosques 
elsewhere in this city. Its curriculum has been standardized and 
is very good. However, most of the teachers do not have the 
necessary ability to implement the curriculum. Consequently, 
the students who have finished the Quranic education in those 
institutions do not meet a standard competency in reciting the 
Quran according to the curriculum. This situation is shown in the 
results of a survey conducted in 1998, which indicates that 70 per 
cent of the students do not have the ability to recite the Quran in 
a proper way. Then, I discussed this finding with Zaitul Ikhlas, a 
member of E commission of DRPD from Golkar, and I proposed an 
SD Plus program to overcome the problem among students 




   
 
 
Gazali’s personal relationship with the members of parliament is 
an entry point for developing the idea of a SD plus program. This 
subject immediately became the concern of parliament and Gazali 
was asked to design the SD Plus program. In short, the municipality 
agreed to implement it in selected primary schools. For this 
purpose, Gazali prepared a method of learning the Quran that he 
named the tartīl method. This method applies an integrated 
approach to seven aspects of learning the Quran: reciting, writing, 
dictating, reciting the Quran in murattal (a proper way), reciting 
with a rhythm of murattal, applying ʿilmu tajwid, and proper 
manners for reciting the Quran.  
The number of primary schools where this program is 
applied increased every year. Between July 1998 and June 1999 this 
program was only applied in two primary schools, primary school 
No. 25 in Kuranji and No. 33 in Rawang. In the following years the 
number of SD programs gradually increased to reach four primary 
schools in 1999/2000, eleven in 2000/2001, 75 in 2001/2002, 
eventually reaching 250 primary schools in 2002/2003. Since 
2003/2004 the number of primary schools teaching the SD program 
has been decreasing, first to 150, then to 75 in 2004/2005 and the 
program ended in the 2005/2006 academic year with only 50 
primary schools teaching SD. The peak of the program occurred in 
2003/2004 when the municipality provided 2 billion rupiah to 
support the program. The SD program gained public attention and 
a number of private primary schools also adopted the system. For 
instance, the primary school in Pratiwi has been teaching the SD 
program since 1999 (Haluan, 29/8/2003). 
This issue finally became the concern of the municipal 
government. Besides funding the SD Plus program in primary 
schools belonging to the government, the municipality also 
became involved in how this subject could be taught at the Quranic 
learning centers organized by the Muslim community. In 1999 the 
municipality provided two million rupiah for each learning center 
in this regard, and in subsequent years the municipality provided a 
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financial incentive for 483 teachers teaching at 90 Quranic learning 
centers. In 2003, the municipal government tabled a draft 
municipal law regarding Quranic education in primary schools in 
parliament. Within a short time the draft was approved as 
municipal law No.6 of 2003 in December 2003. Local politics 
changed in 2004 when a new figure was elected by the parliament 
to the post of mayor of Padang. The new mayor subsequently 
implemented municipal law No.6 of 2006 in the academic year of 
2005. This saw the end of the SD Plus program in this year.  
 
4.7.2 Quranic recitation  
When the newly elected the mayor took up his post in 2004, he 
became involved in the issue of religious education in schools. 
According to him, the religious education that has been introduced 
at all levels of education was not sufficient for the students. Thus, 
he decided it should be enriched by adding other religious subjects 
and activities (Interview, with the mayor, 20/07/2010). In 2004, the 
mayor decided to hold religious activities for Muslim students 
during the fasting month and to introduce a new subject, namely 
BTA (Baca-tulis al-Quran/reciting and writing the Quran) in primary 
schools starting in 2008.  
On 7 March 2005, the mayor issued an instruction 
obligating Muslim students to attend religious activities held in 
mosques in their neighborhood. This includes religious gatherings 
for adolescents (wirid remaja) and early morning education (didikan 
subuh). The former is designed for students of junior and senior 
high schools and is held at the mosque every first and third 
Thursday of the month at 7.30pm. School teachers are encouraged 
not to give students homework on the nights of these Thursday 
classes. The early morning sessions are designed for students of 
primary schools and involve attending the mosque in their 
neighborhood starting at 5.30am every Sunday. These two 
activities are supervised by school teachers living in the 
neighborhood. The curriculum for these activities is provided by 
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educational institutions belonging to the municipality and the 
religious Ministry. Besides these extracurricular activities, the 
students are also obliged to attend other annual activities, namely, 
Pesantren Ramadan (Ramadan School) where the municipality 
decides to switch teaching sessions from the school to the mosque. 
At the Pesantren Ramadan the students will receive a number of 
courses including theology, Islamic jurisprudence, reciting the 
Quran, and other subjects indirectly connected to religious 
teachings, including learning about drug abuse and other 
psychotropic substances. In addition, since 2008 the municipal 
government has also obligated non-Muslim students to attend 
religious activities organized by their church or temple. The 
municipality provides equal financial support for religious 
activities organized for both Muslim and non-Muslim students.62 
According to the mayor, the objective of these religious 
activities is the implementation of a return to the surau as the 
center of religious activities. For Muslims, surau is the mosque and 
for non-Muslims it is the church or temple. Furthermore, this idea 
is also linked to the mayor’s own personal experiences and 
opinions. He once said: 
 
First, I was inspired by the religious tradition among Buddhist 
people when I was visiting Cambodia. Most of the youth there 
spend a number of months in religious places learning religious 
teachings, aimed at maintaining a religious foundation for their 
life. We had a similar experience when the younger generation 
spent their childhood in surau. So, when I was appointed as the 
mayor of Padang in 2004, I introduced some religious activities 
based in mosques as well as in schools. For instance, I introduced 
Pesantren Ramadan in 2004 and this was followed by other 
                                                        
62The municipality provides financial support of 15,000 rupiah per student and 




   
 
 
religious activities. I expect these activities will establish 
religious foundations for the younger generation and that we 
will see the results in the next 20 years. Second, referring to my 
personal education in sport, regularly performing ṣalat (prayers) 
in proper ways will be good in terms of shaping students’ posture 
and to prevent them from developing hunched backs (Interview 
with the mayor, 20/07/2010). 
 
Aside from these two reasons, the mayor also justifies this policy 
by saying that teaching the students pelajaran agama (religious 
subject) for only two hours per week is inadequate.63 Thus, the 
students are obligated to attend a number of religious activities 
and the BTA (Baca Tulis al-Quran) was introduced for students in 
primary school. He further argued that the participation of the 
community is required to support these mosque-based programs. 
Thus, these mosque-based programs are seen as the responsibility 
of the government and Muslim communities.   
BTA is applied in primary schools as the implementation of 
the municipal law 6/2003.64 For this purpose, the municipality 
                                                        
63The total hours for studying religion at school amounts to only 80 hours per 
year. This number is accumulated from 2 hours per week for the 40 weeks of 
study in a year. Meanwhile, the total hours of studying Islam within wirid remaja, 
and Pesantren Ramadhan for the students of SMP and SMA is approximately 250 
hours per year. For BTA, Didikan Subuh, and Pesantren Ramadan students of SD the 
number amounts to 370 hours per year.  
64 In order to examine the practices of BTA in primary schools, data is gathered 
from two schools: the primary schools located in Kampung Baru nan XX and 
primary school No.30 located in Cengkeh Nan XX of sub-district of Lubuk 
Begalung. The total number of primary schools in this sub-district are 38, 
located in 15 kelurahan, with the total number of students reaching 9,616 in 2006; 
8,989 in 2007 and 9,720 in 2008. The total number of students in the primary 
school of Kampung Baru nan XX reached 506 in 2008, and for SD 30 in Cengkeh 
nan XX it was 825. www.padang.go.id/v2/content/view/291/226/ , accessed on 
10 August 2011. The main reason for selecting these two primary schools is that 
primary school No.30 is one of the best schools in the municipality, while SD is 
considered of average quality.   
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provides the teachers and curriculum as well other facilities. BTA 
is taught to students in each year for two hours per week. The 
handbook for the students has only been available since the 
2009/2010 academic year. As can be seen in the handbook, the 
standard competency for this subject is described as: 1) the first 
year students must have the ability to pronounce and write single 
Arabic letters from alif to ya, and understand a few basic manners 
in terms of reciting the Quran; 2) second year students must have 
the ability to pronounce and write combined Arabic letters; 3) the 
third year students must have the ability to pronounce and write 
Quranic words. The students are required to have the ability to 
recite the Quran and memorize one chapter of the Quran, i.e. al-
Nās; 4) In the fourth year, students should have the ability to recite 
in a proper way, to write, memorize, and translate chapters of the 
Quran: al-Nās (114), al-Fīl (105), al-Baqara (2):155-158, and al-Humaza 
(104); 5) Fifth year students should have the ability to pronounce 
long vowels and to recite, write, memorize and  translate chapters 
of the Quran: al-Takāthur (102), al-Qāriʿa (101), al-ʿĀdiyāt (100), al-
Zalzala (99); 6) Students in the sixth year are expected to be able to 
recite, write, memorize and translate the chapters of the Quran: al-
Tīn (95), al-Sharḥ (94), al-Ḍuḥā (93), Āli ʿImrān (3):133-135 and 159 
(concerning akhlāq), al-Nisāʾ (4):142-145 (concerning akhlāq al-
mazmūma). This competency is extended from the standard 









Figure 4.2: The cover of a handbook for students in the sixth year of primary 
school. It shows a five-year old child reciting the Quran.  
 
The attitude of students toward this subject may be classified in 
two main categories. The first group of students perceives this 
subject as easy to follow and have little difficulty with it. They 
mention that they have learned each topic at the mosque or 
Quranic learning center in their neighborhood or in their home 
with a private tutor. A sixth-year student at primary school No. 30 
said, ‘I always gain more than 9 every semester in this subject, 
because it is very easy. I learned it when I was five years old. This 
subject is boring and useless. I think there is no need to learn this 
subject at schools, this is mubazir (useless)’ (Conversation with a 
student of primary school No.30, 10/06/2010). A similar impression 
was expressed by another student: ‘I have been able to recite the 
Quran since I was five years old and able to memorize some verses 
from juz amma. When I was studying BTA at school, it was very 
easy’ (Conversation with a student at primary school No. 30, 
05/06/2010). Most of the students at the primary schools belonged 
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to this category. The second category relates to a small number of 
students who do not have any difficulty in following the subject, 
but they have problems memorizing selected verses of the Quran 
and the words for performing prayers. The students in this 
category have not yet learned to recite the Quran, or, if they did, 
they lacked the serious attention necessary. One student said: ‘I 
like this subject and it’s useful for me because I never learned to 
recite the Quran in the mosque’ (Conversation with a student at 
primary school No.25, 05/05/2010). In addition, many of the 
students belonging to this category receive little input from their 
parents regarding religious activities at home.  
Thus, most of the students lacked enthusiasm for this 
subject. According to a number of teachers of this subject, BTA can 
only benefit students who have never learned to recite the Quran 
at Quranic learning centers. ‘For the students who have been 
learning to recite the Quran at MDA or TPA, this subject is mubazir. 
But, I am only doing my job’ (Interview, with a teacher at primary 
school No.30, 15/05/2010). 
It seems that the municipal authorities realized that the 
atmosphere in which BTA was being taught needed stimulation. 
For this purpose, the municipality held an annual competition for 
memorizing verses of the juz amma for primary school students.65 
The competition consists of two rounds. The first round is held at 
the sub-district (kecamatan) level and each primary school sets up a 
group consisting of fifteen to twenty students. This round is aimed 
to determine who the best five groups are. The second round is 
held at the municipal level and the best five groups from eleven 
sub-districts compete to find the best five once again. However, 
the students selected for the competition are not those students 
who gained the skills to memorize the Quran at primary school; 
                                                        
65For the best five groups in the first round, the students must be able memorize 
12 verses of juz amma, i.e al-nās (114) to al-ḍuhā (93) and in addition the verse al-
ṭāriq (86).   
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rather, they learned at the Quranic learning centers in their 
neighborhood.  
Clearly, the implementation of BTA in primary schools has 
been a costly policy. Not only because the municipality has to 
provide teaching staffs for 354 primary schools in Padang, but also 
in terms of providing facilities and other supporting material for 
these classes.  The facts show that this subject is largely a 
repetition of what the majority of students have already been 
learning at the Quranic learning centers. Moreover, most of the 
students have met the standard of competency before they begin 
BTA at school, because the standard of competency applied at the 
Quranic learning centers are much higher than those of the 
primary schools.  
Since 2000, the municipality has attempted to standardize 
the competency of students who have been undertaking Quranic 
education at the Quranic learning centers by conducting a test. 
This test is held every May and is conducted in the Quranic 
learning centers. The test consists of two parts: a written and a 
spoken test. The written test aims to evaluate six subjects 
regarding theology, Islamic jurisprudence, ilm tajwid, history of the 
Prophet Muḥammad, doʿā, and memorizing some verses. The 
spoken test aims to evaluate the students’ ability to recite the 
Quran, words of prayer, doʿā and to write Quranic texts. Students 
who have passed the test obtain a certificate issued by the 
municipal authority. This certificate will be used as a requirement 
for the students applying for the next level of their education.  
Applying BTA in primary education has been a costly 
policy, because the government provides funds, teachers, and 
other facilities. Meanwhile, most students continue to study at the 
Quranic learning centers. This situation could be explained by local 








Since the municipal government has become involved with the 
issue of the obligation for students to have the ability to recite the 
Quran, people have raised their response to this subject. These 
responses can be classified into two categories: supportive 
responses and opposing responses. Those people who opposed the 
idea voiced two main arguments. Firstly, the government should 
not issue any regulation that only applied to Muslims. Doing so was 
viewed as contravening the principle that everybody is equal 
before the law (Ali Fauzi & Saiful 2009:35). This opinion was 
commonly raised by NGO activists.  
Secondly, some argued that issuing and implementing a 
municipal law concerning this matter was not the best solution for 
the problem of the degradation of Minangkabau identity and the 
role of surau or mosques as Quranic learning centers:  
 
The deterioration of Minangkabau identity cannot be solved by a 
legal approach such as issuing a municipal law to obligate 
students to have the ability to recite the Quran. This problem 
must be solved by a cultural approach, such as facilitating society 
to solve its own problems, improving the facilities of Quranic 
learning centers managed by the community, or improving the 
capacity of the teachers by offering them capacity building 
training (Conversation, with a lecture of IAIN, 05/05/2010).  
 
In addition, they suggested that rather than adding Quranic 
education to the primary school curriculum, it was best for the 
government to play a part in improving the quality of the learning 
process in the Quranic learning centers managed by the 




   
 
 
In contrast, those supporters of the government’s plan were many. 
This support was revealed in a survey conducted by the Freedom 
Institute66, centered in Jakarta, in 2007 and 2008. It shows that 
92.3% (2007) and 76.9% (2008) of the respondents agreed with a 
regional law that obligates Muslims to have the ability to recite the 
Quran, and a further 92.3% of the respondents in 2007 and 2008 
said that this regulation was not discriminatory to non-Muslims 
(Ali-Fauzi & Saiful 2009:47). Further, this support lies in an 
argument that the government has the obligation to provide 
Quranic education in primary schools as part of its attempts to 
implement Islamic teachings, as guaranteed by the constitution of 
1945 (Conversation, with a civil servant, 05/04/2010). Another 
supporter argued that ‘It is good that the government is now 
concerned with this issue, but I do not agree that Quranic 
education, a new subject, should be introduced in the schools. It is 
better for the government to support the Quranic learning centers 
as places to continue learning the Quran’ (Conversation, with a local 
ulama, 25/08/2010). 
         These responses show that the majority of people supported 
the involvement of the government in this issue. In contrast, it also 
suggests that only a small number of people believed that the 
government should not become dominant in connection with 
social problems and that solutions should be found without the 
involvement of the authorities.  
 
4.7.4 Impact  
The introduction of Quranic education in primary schools 
demonstrates that the ability to recite the Quran has become an 
obligation. Previously, it has been a voluntarily initiative of the 
people. There is little doubt that this decision is a political matter 
and one initially aimed at progressing the political interests of the 
                                                        
66This survey was also conducted in the municipality of Padang.   
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decision maker, in this case the mayor. He has certainly gained a 
good political reputation and won the election for a second term as 
mayor of the municipality in 2008. It has also been successful in 
terms of increasing the ability of students to recite the Quran. The 
evidence can be seen, for example, in the fact that all applicants to 
junior high school No.11 during the selection process for the 
academic year 2010/2011 possessed the ability to recite the Quran. 
This situation is different from previous years when there were a 
number of applicants who lacked the necessary recitation skills. 
The principal of primary school No. 30 also claimed that all his 
students from the third to the sixth class now have the ability to 
recite the Quran. She acknowledged that there were a few students 
who were not able to recite the Quran when BTA and other 
religious activities were first introduced in 2005 (Conversation with 
the principal of the primary school no. 30 30/07/2010). 
A similar impact may also be seen in those students 
attending ritual activities at the mosque in their neighborhood. For 
example, it is common for an imām of prayer to be criticized by his 
makmum (follower) students if he does not pronounce the words of 
the Quran correctly, or if he repeatedly recites the same short 
verse of the Quran as the imām of prayer. Indeed, students are now 
very outspoken and often gossip about a preacher conducting the 
Friday sermon if he mispronounces or mistranslates verses of the 
Quran. One preacher expressed his appreciation for the 
improvement the students have made in terms of both reciting and 
memorizing verses of the Quran. He said: ‘The program of the 
government to improve the ability of students to recite the Quran 
has shown its results. For example, the students may openly 
criticize the imām if he mispronounces a verse of the Quran. I now 
have to recheck the Quran to see whether or not my recitation is 
still accurate’ (Conversation with a daʿī, 10/09/2010). A similar 
notion was also expressed by an adult Muslim who regularly 
performs his prayers at the mosque in his neighborhood. He said 
that an imām of prayer must now be aware of his own ability in 
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relation to pronouncing the words of the Quran; otherwise he will 
be a target of criticism from the students (conversation with an 
adult Muslim, 06/10/2009).  
The obligation to have the ability to recite the Quran has 
also raised concern among Muslim activists regarding the fact that 
it has gradually reduced the interest of students to learn the Quran 
in the Quranic learning centers managed by the Muslim 
community. This waning interest is influencing the function of 
these institutions. This concern was voiced by the head of the 
Quranic learning centers forum in 2003. According to him, since 
the involvement of the government in this area, and particularly 
since the implementation of SD plus, the number of students who 
are studying at Quranic learning centers (TPA/MDA) has decreased 
(Haluan, 22/10/2003). Similar concerns have been voiced by other 
local ulama and scholars. This development indicates that the 
government‘s dominance and power in issues of public life is 
gradually increasing. Nevertheless, there is no significant form of 
resistance from the public to this dominance. Perhaps this lack of 
resistance is the result of the public’s lack of power to resist the 
increasing authority of, for instance, local ulama, adat leaders, and 
other public leaders.   
However, introducing Quranic education in primary 
schools is not the only factor that has caused a decrease in the 
interest of students to learn the Quran in Quranic learning centers. 
Other factors include a lack of teaching facilities and the teaching 
method applied. A mother who works as a teacher at a university 
said: ‘I do not want to send my two children to the TPA/MDA to 
learn the Quran. My children would be sitting on the floor during 
their studies. This is not good for their health’ (Conversation, with a 
female civil servant, 20/07/2010). Similar reasons were voiced by 
another mother that decided to invite a teacher to come to their 
house to teach her children to recite the Quran. She argued that 
‘the learning method that is used by the teachers at the TPA/MDA 
at the mosques here is very old fashioned and the teachers use a 
186 
 
   
 
 
stick during their learning processes’ (Conversation, with a mother 
of two children, 05/08/2010).  
These complaints appear to confirm the situation at the 
majority of the learning centers. Most of them are located in 
mosque buildings and surau or muṣalla (private mosque). In Padang, 
the total number of mosques reaches almost six hundred and with 
the surau or muṣalla this reaches almost seven hundred and fifty 
(BPS 2010:157). Only a few of these buildings provide special rooms 
for teaching the Quran and, thus, pupils generally sit on the floor 
during the learning process. Furthermore, only a few of the 
teachers in these learning centers are professionals and most of 
them are working there to supplement their income. For example, 
a number of students from IAIN are working as teachers in these 
learning centers.  
 
4.8 Conclusions 
This chapter shows that the contents of a number of local laws 
concerning the obligation to have the ability to recite the Quran 
differ from region to region. Most of them obligate students to be 
able to recite the Quran, but they differ in terms of whether it is 
also obligatory for civil servants or prospective brides and grooms. 
The municipal law of Padang only obliges students of primary 
schools in this regard. To achieve this, the authority applies BTA in 
primary schools and obligates students of primary and senior high 
schools to attend religious activities held in mosques in their 
neighborhood. Despite the fact that the practices have been 
showing signs of success and most of the students are now able to 
recite the Quran, this policy has created  competition between the 
schools managed by the government and the Quranic learning 
centers managed by the Muslim community.  
         Current developments indicate that introducing Quranic 
recitation in primary schools has gradually weakened the function 
of Quranic learning centers managed by the Muslim community. 
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This situation became more intense once the central government 
implemented Quranic education regulated under the government 
regulation 55/2007 and the ministerial decree of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs 16/2010, which elucidate that religious subjects, 
including Quranic education, were exclusively the authority of the 
government. Implementation of this scheme appears to be 
successful in terms of maintaining the identity of the Minangkabau 
people, as both Muslims and adat adherents, who have the ability 
to recite the Quran and to perform Islamic rituals. However, the 
role of the Quranic learning centers managed by the Muslim 
community is gradually being diminished. Consequently, since the 
start of the twentieth century, the function of the mosque, surau 
and muṣalla has transformed into places solely for ritual activities. 
However, further development will depend on the Muslim 
response to the growing domination of the government in public 
life. Thus, further empirical study on the issue of how Muslims 
respond to the increasing dominance of the government in public 











ZAKĀT IN TRANSITION:  




The involvement of the government of Indonesia in zakāt matters 
has gradually increased over the last decade. This shift occurred 
after central government passed law 38/1999 on zakāt 
management on 23 September 1999. The government revised this 
legislation with law 23/2011 on 25 November 2011. These laws 
have contributed to the growth of a number of zakāt institutions 
managed by regional governments, generally known as semi-
government zakāt institutions (Badan Amil Zakāt Daerah/BAZDA). 
These institutions have appeared since the implementation of 
decentralization and local autonomy in 2000. Regional 
governments have attempted to justify their involvement by 
legislating on zakāt in provincial or regional/municipal law. 
Consequently, central government has not passed any rules to 
implement law 38/1999. A number of Muslim scholars see this 
development as a sign of the increasing achievements of 
Indonesian Muslims in terms of legislating Sharia in state law. 
Others, by contrast, see it as state interference in the practice of 
religious beliefs.  
In a broader account, the contemporary development of 
Muslim society shows that charitable practices, including matters 
of zakāt, have shaped various institutions and structures in Muslim 
society. This developing situation cannot be removed from the 
political, social, and economic context as all of these elements are 
189 
 
   
 
 
involved in the growth of zakāt institutions. There are a number of 
motives at play behind this practice, including a desire to relieve 
suffering or to end need, a desire for personal salvation, the 
struggle for political power or social standing, the wish to honor, a 
hope for beneficial gain and advantages, as well as a desire to 
assert social control (Bonner 2003:2).  
This chapter presents the issues concerning government 
involvement in zakāt matters. I attempt to answer two main 
questions in this chapter: to what extent has the government 
codified rules on zakāt in national and local law? And, what are the 
actual practices of local government in terms of managing BAZDA. 
This chapter presents the following topics: 1) zakāt rules and a new 
interpretation of zakāt; 2) roles of zakāt institutions in the Muslim 
world; 3) changes and regulations relating to zakāt made by the 
government of Indonesia; 4) provincial and regional/municipal 
laws on zakāt; 5) actual practices of local government for managing 
BAZDA conducted by the municipal government of Padang; 6) 
resistance; and 7) conclusions.   
   
5.2 Rules on zakāt and a new interpretation 
This section presents the rules on zakāt, which consist of two 
interconnected subtopics. The first deals with the rules on zakāt as 
mentioned in the Quran, ḥadīth and by Muslim scholars. The 
second concerns new interpretations by a number of Indonesian 
scholars who have attempted to offer a set of new rules aimed at 
contextualizing zakāt matters in accordance with the current 
Indonesian situation. The distinction between these two 
approaches is that the first set of rules emphasizes zakāt as a 
religious obligation, while the second entwines this subject with 




   
 
 
5.2.1 Rules on zakāt 
The payment of zakāt is at the very heart of Islamic teachings. 
Indeed, it is one of the five pillars of Islam. It widely defines one’s 
status as a Muslim, along with the confession of faith, obligatory 
prayers, fasting during Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mecca for 
those who can afford the trip. The word zakāt is derived from the 
verb zakā, which means, among other things, ‘to thrive; to grow, 
increase; to be pure at heart, be just, righteous, good; to be fit, 
suitable’ (Wehr 1979:441). Based on these meanings, zakāt is 
commonly seen as function of increasing, i.e. blessing, the 
property from which it is taken and purifying from sin those who 
give it or their property. The word is also linked to another word, 
ṣadāqa, which is commonly used for voluntarily giving alms. Both 
words are used interchangeably in the Quran. Although zakāt and 
ṣadāqa are not distinguished from each other in the Quran, certain 
verses clearly imply two kinds of donations, as is mentioned in al-
Baqara/the Cow (2):177. The word zakāt appears 32 times in the 
Quran, always in the singular, and the command to give zakāt is 
frequently joined with the command to offer prayer (ṣalāt).  
According to Muslim tradition, failure to pay zakāt is a sign 
of hypocrisy and the prayers of those who do not pay zakāt will not 
be accepted. The purpose of zakāt is, as its meaning in the Quran 
suggests, to cleanse both the payer’s wealth and himself. By 
relinquishing some of his wealth, the payer purifies what remains; 
he also limits his greed, thus soothing his conscience. This 
interpretation draws support from two sayings attributed to the 
Prophet: ‘Goods on which one has paid zakāt cease being part of 
one’s treasure’, and ‘Allah instituted zakāt so that you can enjoy the 
rest of your wealth with a clear conscience’. Even more important 
is that the payers give without expecting anything in return; they 
are solely an expression of pious generosity. This means that the 
act of paying zakāt forms its own reward. Further, modern 
proponents of zakāt have emphasized different dimensions, 
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including the reduction of inequality and its fairness to payers and 
recipients (Kuran 2003:283).   
According to Muslim tradition, zakāt matters consist of 
zakāt for property (zakāt al-māl) and zakāt for individuals (zakāt al-
fiṭr). The following paragraphs deal briefly with the rules of these 
two types of zakāt. It should be noted, however, that it is confined 
to the rules that the majority of Muslim scholars concur with. 
 
5.2.1.1 Zakāt on property 
The discourse dealing with zakāt on property covers five issues: 
They are the person for whom it is obligatory (muzakkī), the kinds 
of property on which it is imposed, the rates and amount at which 
it is levied (niṣāb), the periods during which it is levied (ḥawl) and 
the recipients (mustaḥiqq).   
Muslim scholars agree that the person for whom zakāt is 
obligatory means any Muslim who is free, sane (balīgh) and who 
has complete ownership of property equal to the minimum 
prescribed scale (niṣāb). However, there is disagreement about its 
obligation upon orphans, the insane, slaves, the ahl-al-dhimma 
(non-Muslims), and people without sufficient ownership, i.e. 
someone who is in debt or when the capital of the property is held 
in a trust (al-Jazīriy 1990:590; Ibn Rushd 1994:225).  
So there is agreement about some of the categories for 
which zakāt is obligatory and disagreement about others. They 
refer to the Quran reference to zakāt al-māl relating to two types of 
minerals – gold and silver – that are not molded into jewelry; three 
kinds of animals – camels, cows and sheep; two categories of grains 
– wheat or barley; and two categories of fruit – dates and raisins. 
There is some dispute about whether olives are also included (Ibn 
Rushd 1994:226).67 In addition, zakāt applies almost exclusively to 
                                                        
67 The Quran mentions these categories in a number of verses; al-Baqara:267, al-
Nisāʾ:14, al-Tawba:34, al-Dhāriyāt:19, al-Maʿārij:24).  
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the property of private individuals. The property of a government, 
as well as property owned by the public treasury is not subject to 
zakāt.   
Subsequently, the rules deal with the rate of zakāt (niṣāb) 
for each category of property in which zakāt is levied and the 
quantities for which zakāt is charged on those items reaching the 
nisāb. For example, the niṣāb of silver is five awqiya (ounces). This 
amount of silver is based on an authentic saying by the Prophet, 
‘there is no ṣadāqa in what is less than five awqiya (ounces) of 
silver’. According to Muslim scholars, an awqiya is equal to five 
dirhams by weight and they agree that the amount due on this is 
one quarter of a tenth. The rule for gold is that its zakāt is one-
fortieth, as long as it remains in its mineral state. The rule for zakāt 
on animals is that a person who owns up to 24 camels must pay one 
goat for every five camels; for cows, the zakāt is a one-year old cow 
for every thirty cows; for goats the zakāt is one sheep for every 
forty goats. The rate for farm output depends on whether or not 
the land is irrigated. The obligation of zakāt for crops on rain-fed 
land is one-tenth (ʿushr) and the zakāt for a crop on irrigated land is 
a half of one-tenth, as established by the Prophet. In addition, the 
niṣāb for goods (ʿurūd) is derived from goods acquired for sale, and 
in particular it is based on goods held prior to the payment of 
zakāt. The niṣāb of these goods is based on commodities, as it are 
these that present the value of consumable things and capital as 
well as the ḥawl for goods according to those who impose zakāt on 
goods (al-Jazīriy 1990:593-5; Ibn Rushd 1994:234-45).  
The beneficiaries of zakāt enumerated in al-Tawba/the 
Repentance (9):60 fall into eight broad and flexible categories: 1) 
the poor (fuqarāʾ); 2) indigent (masākīn), 3) collecting agents 
(ʿāmilūn ʿalayhā); 4) those whose hearts are won over (al-muʾallafa 
qulūbuhum); 5) slaves (riqāb); 6) debtors (ghārimūn) who lack the 
means to repay their debts; 7) those in the ‘path of God” (fī sabīl 
Allāh). The most common interpretation of this is that these are 
volunteers engaged in jihad; and 8) travelers (ibn al-sabīl) who in 
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the course of their journey find themselves without immediate 
available assets to meet their expenses. However, the Quran is 
silent on the enforcement of the zakāt obligation and the 
disbursement of zakāt revenue.  
 
5.2.1.2 Zakāt for individuals (zakāt al-fiṭr) 
The discussion on zakāt for individuals deals with five issues. They 
concern the identification of whether or not it is obligatory, the 
person for whom it is obligatory, the amount that is due and for 
what kinds of commodities, the time when it is due and the people 
entitled to receive it.   
The majority of Muslim scholars maintain that paying zakāt 
al fiṭr is an obligation for all Muslims whether they are male or 
female, infant, child or adult, slave or freeman. The parent pays 
this obligation for their infant or child and the master pays for his 
slave. This obligation does not require the niṣāb of property. 
However, Muslim scholars stipulate that zakāt al fiṭr is obligated for 
those who have a surplus of food for himself and for his family 
members. Further, one group of scholars agree that the category of 
food includes wheat, dates, barley or aqiṭ (cheese made from sour 
milk). Another group believes that this obligation is levied on 
staple foods from the land or the food of Muslims. The quantity of 
food is not to be less than one ṣāʿ (a specified measure of contents) 
of wheat shared by two people or a ṣāʿ of barley or one of dates for 
each person (al-Jazīriy 1990:627-30; Ibn Rushd 1994:254-5).  
Zakāt al-fiṭr becomes obligatory at the end of Ramadan and 
Muslims are permitted to pay it from the beginning of the fasting 
month. Muslim scholars agree that the revenue should go purely to 
the poor. However, they disagree on whether the poor non-
Muslims should be included as recipients. The disagreement is 
about whether the basis for zakāt al-fiṭr is poverty alone or whether 
it is about poverty and about being a Muslim. Those who maintain 
that it is about poverty as well as being Muslim do not believe non-
Muslims should receive payments, while those who maintain that 
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it is purely about poverty alone believe it is permissible for non-
Muslims to be recipients.  
Lastly, most Muslims believe that it is the obligation of 
Muslim rulers to send out officials (ʿāmil) to collect zakāt and to 
assist property owners in fulfilling their zakāt duties. This belief is 
justified by the practices of the Prophet and the early caliphate. 
According to Islamic sources, the collection of zakāt revenue was 
already in full force during the lifetime of the Prophet and his 
companions. While the Muslim community was based in Mecca, 
the Prophet’s fledgling government was not yet regulating 
assistance to the poor. Only with the relocation of the rapidly 
growing community to Medina did zakāt become a formal and 
compulsory transfer system. Muslims were required to make 
periodic payments to the public treasury (bayt al-māl) that financed 
the new state’s activities. After the Prophet passed away, there was 
a challenge to zakāt.  Some of the tribes that had joined Islam 
under the Prophet challenged Abu Bakr, the first caliph. One sign 
of this challenge was their refusal to pay zakāt, which they claimed 
was a purely personal obligation to the Prophet. Subsequently, the 
Prophet’s companions, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān and ʿĀlī, conducted the 
collection of zakāt. During the Umayyad period, zeal for the 
collection of zakāt grew. The Ummayads, the first dynasty of 
Muslim caliphs invested further energy in organizing zakāt 
collection and toward the end of the Umayyad period a 
government office for zakāt (diwān al-ṣadāqa) was established. A 
similar institution existed under the successor dynasty of the 
Abbasid caliphs, which set up an office of good works and zakāt 
(diwān al-birr wa al-ṣadāqa) (Zysow 2002:409).  
 
5.2.2 New interpretation of the rules on zakāt 
A number of Indonesian Muslim scholars challenge the above 
mentioned classical rules on zakāt. Among this group are Jusuf 
Wibisono (1950), Hazairin (1950) T.M. Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy (1969), 
Amien Rais (1987), Dawam Rahardjo (1988), Masdar F.Masudi 
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(1991), Permono (1992) and Hafidhuddin (2002). These scholars 
primarily argue that the basis for the rules on zakāt is a particular 
social and economic structure of the society that existed when the 
rules were formulated. In addition, this obligation mainly centers 
on the religious obligation of the payers (muzakkī) and gives less 
attention to whether zakāt revenue has actually improved the lives 
of recipients. Thus, they advocate comprehending zakāt in terms of 
modern realities. Their challenge to the classical interpretation of 
zakāt deals with six themes: 1) who is obliged to pay zakāt; 2) the 
kinds of wealth on which it is imposed; 3) the rates and the amount 
at which it is levied (nisāb); 4) the role of Indonesian government in 
zakāt, i.e. whether its role is ʿāmil (collector), whether it should be a 
regulator, or whether its role should be both regulator and ʿamil 
(collector); 5) who is entitled to receive zakāt revenue; and 6) 
whether zakāt is similar to tax. The following paragraphs present a 
brief summary of these themes. 
The obligation to pay zakāt is no longer just for an 
individual; it is also levied on institutions that own property 
valued at an amount that reaches a minimum rate of nisāb. It is 
confined to Islamic institutions. Under the new interpretation, the 
kinds of wealth on which zakāt is due is extended to any property 
that results from business in the fields of mining, fisheries, 
plantations, export-import, housing, farming and salaried 
employment (Ash-Shiddieqy 1969:21-41; Hazairin 1971:107-8; 
Mas’udi 1991:137-42). The recipients of zakāt revenue are still 
limited to the eight groups of recipients regulated by the verse of 
al-Tawba/the Repentance (9):60; however, their meanings have 
been extended to meet modern realities. Accordingly, zakāt 
revenue may be utilized for fulfilling the needs of the community, 
including for financing public facilities such as hospitals, schools, 
paying the health costs of the poor, constructing orphanage 
facilities, paying the debts of the needy, to finance the 
government’s program to eliminate poverty, to fund rehabilitation 
centers, empowering society, and to provide facilities for the state 
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army (cf. Ash-Shiddieqy 1969:13; Rahardjo 1988:43; Mas’ud 
1991:147-162). 
The standard nisāb of property must be based on rates that 
are fixed in accordance with the sense of justice of the society (Rais 
1987:60-1: Mas’udi 1991:142). For example, Amien Rais, who has 
written on the issue of zakāt on income among professionals, 
including bankers, consultants, auditors, brokers, exporters and 
importers and accountants, suggests that zakāt should be paid at a 
rate ranging from five to 25 per cent of their monthly income (Rais 
1987:61).  
Muslims scholars dispute the role of the Indonesian 
government as the collector (ʿāmil) of zakāt. Some scholars believe 
the government’s role as ʿamil is legally justified because it is an 
important task of the government to provide services for people 
who are the recipients of zakāt. For this purpose, the government 
may establish a zakāt institution such as a public treasury (bayt al-
māl) (cf. Ali 1988:35; Ash-Shiddieqy 1969; Mas’udi 1991; Permono 
1992). For others, zakāt is a matter of religion and zakāt revenue 
flows from the zakāt payers (muzakkī) directly to the recipients 
(mustaḥiqq) and there should be no interference between the two 
parties (Rais 1987:64). According to this opinion, the government 
may only be involved in zakāt matters as a regulator.  
Another dispute has arisen over the matter of whether or 
not zakāt is the same thing as tax. In this regard, Mas’udi advocates 
that tax is the same as zakāt. According to him, those who have 
paid tax have no need to pay zakāt as well. As was the case during 
the Prophet’s time, tax is zakāt for Muslims. However, it is still 
necessary to make a vow regarding the intention to pay zakāt 
(Mas’udi 1991:34). According to other scholars, there is a 
significant distinction between zakāt and tax, with the former 
being a religious obligation and the latter an obligation to the 
government (Rahardjo 1988:41).  
Despite the fact that there are disputes between Muslim 
scholars about certain aspects of zakāt, these new rules for zakāt 
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have created the possibility for the government and NGOs to 
become involved in managing zakāt institutions. This development 
began in the 1980s when a number of NGOs activists and local 
governments established zakāt institutions aimed at collecting and 
distributing zakāt and other forms of Islamic charity. This 
development also links to the growth of Islamic finance, such as 
Islamic banking, insurances, mortgages, and other micro finance 
institutions.  
 
5.3 Roles of zakāt in the Muslim world 
The involvement of the government in collecting zakāt ceased with 
the advent of colonialism and the introduction of systems of 
government that excluded religious doctrine. Indeed, authorities 
in most Muslim countries largely renounced Islamic codes of law, 
including zakāt (Kuran 2008:285). However, since the second half of 
the twentieth century there has been renewed interest by 
government to become involved in this religious matter. The 
discussions surrounding this theme are not only religious, but have 
also extended into economics, a field that advocates developing a 
zakāt law appropriate for modern conditions.  
Besides attempts to revive zakāt institutions, the 
government has also convened numerous conferences, and 
published several manuals and pamphlets instructing Muslims on 
how to fulfill their obligations regarding zakāt. In addition, various 
private zakāt organizations have been formed. This 
reinterpretation of the rules of zakāt has been challenged by the 
ulama, such as Rashīd Riḍā in his interpretation of the Quran and 
Yūsuf Qaraḍāwi in his prominent work, fiqh al-zakāt. Contemporary 
development of zakāt shows that zakāt is enforceable by law in 
Saudi Arabia (1951), Libya (1971), Yemen (1975), Malaysia (1980s), 
Pakistan (1980), and Sudan (1984).68 However, there has also been a 
                                                        
68Collection of zakāt in Saudi Arabia is based on Royal Decree No. 17/2/28/8634, 
dated 29 Djumādā thāny 1370/7 April 1951. In Libya it is Law no. 89 of 1971. In 
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movement across the Muslim world to create new intermediaries 
to receive voluntary payments of zakāt. Among these are quasi-
governmental agencies (set up by the government) in places such 
as Jordan (1979), Bahrain (1979), Kuwait (1982), Egypt (1977), as 
well as Indonesia (1999) (Zysow:418-420).  
 
5.4 Changes and regulations in Indonesia  
This section briefly provides details of the shifting attitude of the 
government and the regulations it has passed concerning zakāt, 
from the beginning of independence to the most current situation 
and law 32/2011 on zakāt management.  
 
5.4.1 Changing attitude of the government 
Zakāt matters have been the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs and are regulated under the government 
regulation no.5/SD/1946, issued on 25 March 1946, concerning the 
tasks of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. This regulation elucidated 
that religious matters previously dealt with by the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Education 
and Culture, would now be dealt with by the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs. For example, the tasks of zakāt, waqf (endowment) and 
ibadah sosial (social donation), commonly abbreviated as zawaibsos, 
came under the Ministry of Home Affairs but were now transferred 
to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. On 8 December 1951, the 
Minister of Religious Affairs issued the circular letter (Surat Edaran) 
no. A/VVII/17367 aimed at encouraging Muslims to pay zakāt. This 
circular was followed up with a manual stating that zakāt and social 
donation were tasks of the Office of Religious Affairs (Jawatan 
                                                                                                                               
Malaysia the collection of zakāt is separately administered in each state by the 
Religious Affairs Council. Pakistan has enacted the Zakāt and Ushr Ordinance of 
1980. Meanwhile, Sudan introduced Qanūn al-zakāt wa-al-ḍarāʾib of 1984.   
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Urusan Agama) (Ikhwan 2006:188-9). However, the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs finally decided not to issue any further policy to 
develop zakāt institutions, giving the reason that it wanted to avoid 
being accused of restoring the spirit of the Djakarta Charter, which 
stated that Muslims are obligated to follow Sharia. During the 
1950s, any attempts to advocate Sharia being part of the 
government’s concern could be politically perceived as a move 
towards an Islamic state (Zarkasyi 2010:1). Accordingly, matters of 
zakāt escaped the attention of the Old Order government. 
The New Order regime did not believe that matters of zakāt 
should be the concern of the government; rather, it believed it was 
the individual concern of Muslims. However, Muslim leaders and 
bureaucrats have advocated that it be the state’s concern since the 
beginning of the New Order government. In 1967, the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs prepared a draft zakāt law and proposed it to the 
parliament, also sending copies to the Ministry for Social Affairs 
and the Ministry of Finance in Letter No.MA/099/67, dated 14 July 
1967. In response to the draft, the Minister of Finance suggested 
that it would be better if zakāt was subject to ministerial regulation 
rather than state law. The Ministry of Religious Affairs agreed to 
the suggestion. On 15 July 1968, K.H. Moh. Dahlan, as the Minister 
of Religious Affairs, passed the ministerial decrees No.4/1968 and 
5/1968. The first decree concerns the establishment of a Muslim 
treasury (bayt al-māl) in villages and the latter deals with the 
establishment of a national zakāt committee. In addition, the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs also considered suggestions on this 
subject made at a conference in Sukabumi in 1952 (Ichwan 
2006:190). In contrast, the president did not accept that this subject 
was the concern of the government and instructed the Minister of 
Religious Affairs to cancel the two ministerial decrees. In response 
to this rebuttal, the minister immediately passed instruction 
No.1/1969 to cancel the implementation of the decrees (Zarkasyi 
2010:2).   
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Despite the failure of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, a number of 
ulama approached the president directly about zakāt matters. 
Before meeting with the president on 24 September 1968, eleven 
ulama69 held a meeting to prepare a draft recommendation. They 
agreed to propose that Indonesian Muslims, particularly those 
living in Jakarta, establish an institution of zakāt to intensify the 
collection and distribution of zakāt revenue. They also suggested 
that the president, as a Muslim, should be a pioneer in paying zakāt 
(Fadlullah 1993:100-103).  
The president took the suggestions on board and on 26 
October, during the commemoration of the isrāʾ wa-al-miʿrāj of the 
Prophet, he said: 
 
As we know, zakāt is a religious obligation for those who are rich. 
Ninety per cent of the Indonesian population is Muslim. If ten 
million of them are willing to pay zakāt, and each of them pay Rp. 
10,000, the revenue collected annually will be Rp. 2.5 billion. This 
amount of money could be used to construct mosques, hospitals 
and orphanages, to help elderly people, to provide work for the 
needy, social and religious facilities […]. As the first step, I 
announce to all Indonesian Muslims that as a private citizen I 
agree to manage and collect zakāt revenue. Let us together as 
Indonesian Muslims be united and become Muslim who dedicate 
our activities to improve the welfare of Indonesian Muslims in 
particular and the entire Indonesian population in general. As a 
private citizen, I will devote myself to receiving zakāt revenue in 
cash or in other forms from all Muslims in this homeland. God 
willing, I will regularly publicize to all citizens how much money 
I receive and I will be responsible its usage. I really expect that 
this appeal will receive public attention and will receive support 
                                                        
69These ulama are Prof. Dr. Hamka, K.H Ahmad Azhari, K.H.M. Sjukri Ghazali, 
K.H. Muhammad Sodry, K.H. Taufigurrahman, K.H. M.Saleh su’aidi, Ustadh. M.Ali 
Alhamidy, Ustadh Muchtar Luthfy, K.H. A.Malik Ahmad, Abdul Kadir, R.H, and 
M.A. Zawawy (Fadlullah 1993:102).  
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and feedback from the leaders and all Muslims (Effendi, et al. 
1981:259-260).  
 
This speech reveals that the president intended to emphasize zakāt 
matters as a private concern rather than the state’s. However, four 
days after delivering the speech, the president passed a letter 
no.07/Pres/1968 instructing three officers – Major-General 
Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara, Colonel Inf. Drs. M. Azwar Hamid 
and Colonel Inf. Ali Afandi – to make all necessary preparations for 
a nationwide zakāt collection. Subsequently, on 28 November 1968, 
the president also passed another letter no.B.133/Press/11/1968 
instructing institutions of the government to be involved in zakāt 
matters. 
On 29 May 1969, the president announced the amount of 
collected revenue when he was delivering a speech at the 
commemoration of the birth of the Prophet (maulud Nabi). The 
collected revenue had reached more than 20 million rupiah and 
almost 1500 dollars, collected from more than 1100 Muslims70 
(Department 1969a:11-12). On 9 October 1969, at the 
commemoration of the israʾ miʿrāj of the Prophet, the president 
again announced the collected revenue, which had now reached 
almost 21 million in rupiah and a further 1400 dollars. More than 
16 million had been distributed to the recipients in several regions, 
including West Irian71 (Departement 1969b:9). Nevertheless, the 
president only included issue of zakāt in his official speeches on 
these two occasions. That said, the president was still concerned 
with this subject and tried to establish a zakāt institution under the 
Ministry of Public Welfare, not under the Ministry of Religious 
                                                        
70Amount of revenue collected was Rp.20,448,196.30 and US$1,378.01 collected 
from 1,170 payers (Departement 1969a:12).  
71Amount of revenue collected revenue was Rp.20,817,885.07 and US$1.374,01. 
Rp.16.200.000.00 of this revenue was distributed (Departement 1969b:9). 
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Affairs. For this purpose, he passed decree No.44/1969, dated 21 
May 1969 on the establishment of a committee for the utilization of 
zakāt, but with the possibility of the collected revenue being 
transferred to the president’s own account No. A.10.000 (Ichwan 
2006). Furthermore, in 1970 the president established a body, the 
President’s Socio-Religious Fund (Dana Sosial Kerohanian Presiden), 
to collect revenue for social donation and religious affairs. But, the 
government failed to announce the development of this fund 
adequately. Similar concerns emerged in 1982 when the president, 
together with Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara (the Minister of 
Religious Affairs from 1978-1983, d. 1998), Widjojo Nitisastro (the 
coordinating Minister for economy, finance and industry from 
1973-1983, d. 9 March 2012) and Sudharmono (the vice president 
from 1988-1993, d.2006) established Yayasan Amal bahakti Muslim 
Pancasila. This foundation collected charity from Muslim civil 
servants and military staff. The collected revenue was mainly used 
to fund the establishment of new mosques throughout the 
archipelago.72 By 2009, the money from this fund had built almost 
one thousand mosques (www.yamp.co.id, accessed in 6/04/2012).   
Despite the personal involvement of the president in 
matters of zakāt, the provincial governments also felt the need to 
take political steps towards this issue. The governor of Jakarta, Ali 
Sadikin, established a semi-autonomous zakāt agency, Badan Amil 
Zakāt (BAZ), in December 1968. Ali Sadikin passed several 
provincial regulations dealing with the issue of collecting and 
distributing zakāt revenue. Since then, this institution has become 
a model for other provincial governments who have set up their 
own zakāt institutions: East Kalimantan (1972), West Sumatra 
(1973), West Java (1974), South Kalimantan (1974), South Sumatra 
                                                        
72Revenue is deducted from the monthly wage of the civil servants and military 
officers. Civil servants who belong to the first four categories pay Rp.50.00, 
Rp.100,00, Rp.500.00, and Rp.1.000,00, respectively; and for  military officers, it is 
Rp.50.00, Rp.100,00, Rp.500.00, and Rp.2.000,00, respectively (www.yamp.co.id).  
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(1975), Lampung (1975), Irian Jaya (1978), North  Sulawesi and 
South Sulawesi (1985) (Abdullah 1991:60). These provincial 
governments established their quasi-governmental zakāt agencies 
with difference names.  
In 1991, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs passed a joint decree, No.29 and 47 of 1991, 
concerning the establishment of institutions of zakāt, infāq and 
ṣadāqa. Again, the president denied the notion that an institution 
of zakāt was the concern of the government. The government 
treats the institution of zakāt as a purely public organization. For 
this purpose, its role is as a counselor and it does not get involved 
in managing the institution. The government maintained this 
position until the fall of the New Order Regime in 1998. However, 
the new government took a different stance on this issue. The shift 
was revealed on 23 September 1999 when the president passed the 
codification of rules on zakāt: law 38/1999.  
 
5.4.2 Regulations on zakāt 
Although the government passed a law on zakāt in 1999, it does not 
directly mean that the institution of zakāt becomes a state concern. 
Despite having implemented law 38/1999, the parliament and 
government decided to revise it. The president passed the revision 
as law 32/2011, promulgated on 25 November 2011. The following 
paragraphs briefly present these two laws.  
 
5.4.2.1 Law 38/1999 
The Ministry of Religious Affairs has advocated that zakāt matters 
have been a state concern since the beginning of the New Order 
regime, but it received no support from the president. When the 
new government came to power, the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
prepared a draft proposal on this subject. On 4 February 1999, the 
Minister of Religious Affairs presented this draft to the president. 
On 30 April 1999, the State Secretary signaled the agreement of the 
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president on this issue and suggested the establishment of a 
committee to improve the draft. On 20 May 1999, the committee 
finished preparing the draft entitled Collecting, Zakāt, Infaq and 
Sadaqa. On 25 May 1999, the Minister of Religious Affairs proposed 
the draft to the president. Subsequently, the president approved a 
letter, No. R.31/PU/VI/1999, on 24 June 1999 to table the draft to 
parliament. Within three months, the parliament and president 
agreed to approve the draft as law. On 23 September 1999, the 
government promulgated the draft as law 38/1999 on zakāt 
management.  
Law 38/1999 consists of ten chapters and 25 sections. The 
basis of this law is the 1945 constitution that guarantees the 
citizens the right to adhere to their religious teachings. This law 
further specifies that zakāt revenue is a latent financial source for 
the improvement of social welfare. This law elucidates a number of 
themes concerning zakāt matters: For example, it states that zakāt 
is obligatory for any Muslim and institution belonging to Islam 
that possesses property on which zakāt is due (Section 2). The 
obligation of Muslim institutions to pay zakāt is a new discourse in 
Muslim tradition. The shift of the government’s position is 
regulated in Section 3, which states that the government has the 
obligation to protect, supervise and provide services to zakāt 
payers (muzakkī), the recipients (mustaḥiqq) and ʿāmil (collectors) of 
zakāt. This section clearly justifies the role of the government in 
managing the institution of zakāt. For this purpose, the 
government may establish an institution of zakāt, in this case the 
Badan ʿĀmil Zakāt (BAZ), in line with the governmental structure, 
i.e. at national, provincial, regional and sub-regional levels (Section 
6). Muslim organizations are also permitted to establish a similar 
institution, namely Lembaga ʿĀmil Zakāt (LAZ), but this institution 
must be under the authorization of the government (Section 7). 
These regulations show an important shift in the government’s 
position concerning zakāt matters and illustrate the government’s 
intention to control the institutions of zakāt. 
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The kind of wealth on which zakāt is imposed deals with zakāt on 
property as well as zakāt al-fiṭr. The kinds of property include: 1) 
gold, silver and money; 2) businesses and companies; 3) income 
from crops, gardening and fisheries; 4) income from mining; 5) 
livestock; 6) wages; and 7) rikāz (buried treasures of the earth) 
(Section 11). Besides these properties, the institution of zakāt may 
also receive revenue from other forms of Islamic charity (Section 
13). This law presents a new discourse dealing with zakāt in which 
the amount of zakāt is deducted from the tax of the zakāt payer. 
However, this deduction is only possible if the revenue is 
distributed to a zakāt institution managed by the government or a 
private institution (LAZ) that has been authorized by the 
government (Section 14 (3)). This law does not specify the person 
entitled to receive the revenue, but does mention that, ‘the 
revenue is distributed to the recipients in accordance with Islamic 
rules’ (Section 16). Those who do not pay the zakāt are not 
penalized; rather, it is the ʿāmil who can be punished for not 
managing zakāt revenue in a proper way. The penalty for such a 
breach is a maximum of three months in jail or a fine of a 
maximum of three million rupiah (Section 21).  
The contents of law 38/1999 regulate a number of new rules 
on zakāt. This change is in line with the innovative rules advocated 
by Indonesian Muslim scholars. It is important to note that this law 
reveals that the intention of the government is to monopolize and 
control the institution of zakāt. Nevertheless, this law shows that 
the obligation of paying zakāt is not in the form of an imperative. 
Paying zakāt is still voluntary. It only elucidates that there is a 
penalty for those ʿāmil who does not manage the revenue properly.    
This law has affected the growth of institutions concerning zakāt 
matters, within both government institutions and in the wider 
Muslim society. In 2001, the president passed the Presidential 
Decision No.8 of 2001 on the establishment of the national zakāt 
board, namely BAZNAS (Badan Amil Zakat Nasional). The Minister for 
Religious Affairs passed the Ministerial Decision No. 581/1999 on 
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the implementation of the zakāt law. Subsequently, the Director of 
the Bureau of Muslim and Pilgrimage Affairs of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs has issued the decision No. D.291/2000, which is a 
manual on zakāt. In 2001, the Ministry of Religious Affairs also set 
up the Directorate Zakāt and Waqf. In addition, a number of local 
governments have been attempting to establish institutions of 
zakāt, such as BAZDA (Badan Amil Zakat Daerah).  
In connection with the issue of zakāt and other forms of 
charity, the president passed the government regulation 
No.60/2010 concerning zakāt and other forms of obligated religious 
donations that may be deducted from an individual’s gross income. 
However, this regulation does not refer to law 38/1999, but solely 
to law 7/1983 concerning income tax. Section 1 elucidates that any 
zakāt that has been paid by a Muslim or an institution belonging to 
Muslims, or other obligated charity practiced by non-Muslims, may 
be deducted from the gross income. Income tax cannot be counted 
as zakāt as the zakāt law suggests. This deduction is only possible if 
the revenue is paid to institutions organized by the government or 
LAZ, which has authorization from the government. If this is not 
the case, the revenue cannot be deducted from the gross income 
(Section 2).  
5.4.2.2 Law 23/2011 
Members of the DRPD prepared a draft amendment to law 38/1999, 
which had been put forward by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 
They argued that the rules on zakāt regulated under law 38/1999 
were no longer in accordance with the current situation regarding 
matters of zakāt. Departing from public debate and discussion 
concerning a number of rules regulated by zakāt law, the DPRD and 
the government agreed to put the amendment to law 38/1999 on 
the national legislation program (Program legislasi nasional, 
Prolegnas) in 2010. The DPRD and the president finally approved the 
amendment, which became law 23/2011 on zakāt management.  
This law consists of eleven chapters and 47 sections. It 
provides comprehensive rules on zakāt matters and authorizes the 
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government to play a more central role compared to the previous 
law. This law elucidates more detailed regulations concerning the 
principles of zakāt: Sharia, trusteeship, utility, justice, law and 
order, integration and accountability (Section 2). This law also 
extends the kinds of property to which zakāt is obligated. It now 
includes: 1) gold, silver and other precious metal; 2) money and 
other forms of valuable documents; 3) income from business; 4) 
income from crops, gardening and forestry; 5) livestock; 6) mining; 
7) industry; 8) wages and services; 9) rikāz (Section 4).  
Further, this law allows for the institutions of zakāt to be 
organized by both the government and society. The government 
may establish a non-structural national zakāt board, namely 
BAZNAS (Badan Amil Zakāt Nasional) for the national, provincial, 
regional, and sub-regional levels (Sections 5-15). Muslim society is 
allowed to establish a zakāt institution, namely LAZ (Lembaga Amil 
Zakat), albeit under some restrictions, including that LAZ must 
belong to a Muslim organization that has been established for 
educational, daʿwa and social purposes (Sections 17 and 18). This 
law also obligates the government to provide financial support to 
BAZNAS, although it may retain a certain amount from the 
collected revenue (Section 30).  
An important new aspect of law 23/2011 concerns the 
potential to penalize the LAZ, ʿāmil and zakāt payer (muzakkī) who 
do not follow the necessary procedures. The license of LAZ may be 
revoked if this institution does not regularly report to the 
authorized institutions concerning its collected and distributed 
revenues (Section 36). Any ʿāmil who does not distribute the 
revenue to recipients may be punished with a maximum of five 
years in jail or pay a fine to the maximum of 500 million rupiah 
(Section 40). A zakāt payer (muzakkī) who intentionally does not 
pay zakāt may be punished with a maximum of five years in jail or a 
fine of a maximum of 500 million rupiah (Section 39). In addition, 
any ʿāmil or LAZ without a license from the government that 
collects and distributes zakāt revenue and other forms of Islamic 
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charity may be punished with a maximum of one year in jail or pay 
a fine of a maximum of 50 million rupiah.  
This section reveals the most current developments 
regarding the institution of zakāt as a state concern. This changing 
attitude of the government has developed over a relatively long 
period. A number of interconnected factors may account for this 
shift. As Hooker suggests, the government must demonstrate its 
Islamic credentials because the majority of the population is 
Muslim. Hooker also acknowledges that the involvement of the 
government in this issue has financial implications. However, he 
says, ‘whether or not they make any impact on the state budget is 
irrelevant; symbolic importance is everything’ (Hooker 2008:31). 
Other factors also play a role in this situation. The new rules on 
zakāt produced by Indonesian Muslim scholars have created the 
possibility for government involvement in this issue. Included in 
these rules is the fact that zakāt is apparently no longer a purely 
religious obligation; it has now also become an economic issue. The 
accumulation of zakāt and other forms of Islamic charities revenue 
is a latent financial source for the government. In addition, the 
growing number of zakāt institutions managed by Muslim activists 
have, to some extent, influenced the interest of the government in 
this subject. Among these institutions are: BAMUIS BNI, BAZIS DKI, 
BAZMA, BMM, Dompet Duafa (DD), Dompet Peduli Ummat Daarut 
Tauhid (DPU-DT), Pos Keadilan Peduli Ummat  (PKPU), Yaysan Baitul 
Maal BRI (YBM BRI). These institutions have gained a respectable 
public reputation. This reputation has had both economic and 
political implications for Muslims and for the government.  Lastly, 
this shift also shows that the power of the state over society is 
growing significantly. 
5.5. Provincial, regional/municipal laws on zakāt 
This section presents the local laws concerning zakāt. The 
provincial authorities have had little involvement in this matter, 
but it is considered to be a concern of regional government.  
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5.5.1 Provincial law 
Members of the provincial parliament and the governor have 
shown no support for zakāt being the concern of the provincial 
government. This raises the question, why are matters of zakāt not 
on the agenda of the provincial authorities?   
A short explanation is that these authorities have simply 
shown no political interest in this subject. There is considerable 
evidence to support this claim. In 2007, the governor of West 
Sumatra stated that the government should not interfere with the 
practices of zakāt in society (Padang Ekspres, 29/09/07). In March 
2009, the governor also showed his reluctance to get involved with 
zakāt matters. He called on ulama to come to a consensus 
concerning a number of disputed rules on zakāt before the 
government would get involved in this subject. He went on to 
admit that it was not easy to gain this consensus among the ulama. 
The implication is that the provincial government would not get 
involved in this issue. In addition, in 2010 the newly elected 
governor excluded zakāt matters from the provincial government’s 
remit. One explanation for this is that the governor belongs to the 
PKS political party, which maintains a charity institution, PKPU. He 
is also a member of the Muhammadiyah Organization that relies 
heavily on the Muslim charitable tradition for its finance.  
 
5.5.2 Regional/Municipal law 
This subsection presents six regional laws on the rules of zakāt. 
These regional laws originate from the region of Pesisir Selatan, 
the region of Solok, the Municipality of Bukittinggi, the Region of 
Agam, the Municipality of Padanpanjang and the Municipality of 
Padang. These six have been chosen because the first three passed 
the earliest regional laws on this subject, while the last three are 
the latest laws to be passed on zakāt, approved during the first 
decade of the decentralization era. This selection seeks to show 
210 
 
   
 
 
whether there are any differences in the content of the regional 
laws.  
The titles of these regional laws vary from region to region. 
The regional law of Solok is called Pengelolaan zakāt, infaq dan 
ṣadaqah (Zakāt, Infāq, and Ṣadāqa Management), whereas the laws 
from the other five regions are copied from the national law 
entitled Pengelolaan Zakāt (Zakāt Management). This last name 
implies that the regulations are mainly concentrated on zakāt 
matters and that other forms of Islamic charity are less important. 
The former is concerned with all forms of Islamic charity.  While 
the structures of these regional laws are varied, their scopes deal 
with similar topics: consideration; legal bases; general terms; 
principles and objectives; the structure of zakāt institutions; zakāt 
payers (muzakkī), properties on which zakāt is due and the people 
entitled to receive the revenue (mustaḥiqq); ways of collecting and 
distributing the revenue; controlling institutions of zakāt; and the 
penalties. These contents are the same as those of law 38/1999. 
Nevertheless, the differences occur in the detail of both 
regulations.    
Regional authorities have similar intentions in terms of 
codifying zakāt. The intention is to implement zakāt as an 
important Islamic teaching and it is meant as a financial source 
that may be used by the local government. This implies that local 
governments are interested in the advantages to be had from zakāt 
revenue and other forms of Islamic charity. The next part of the 
regulations deals with the legal basis. Five out of the six regional 
laws mention a number of state laws that justify codifying zakāt 
rules in regional law. In contrast, the regional law of Pesisir Selatan 
refers to the Quran, as follows:  
 
[this regulation is based on] what has been stated in the Quran in 
the verse of al-Tawba:103 on the obligation of an institution to 
collect zakāt from the zakāt payers (muzakkī) and also in the verse 
of al-Baqara: 267, which deals with the kinds of properties on 
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which zakāt is obligated if its value has reached a maximum 
amount (niiāb) (regional law 31/2003).  
 
This phrase shows that this regulation is not in accordance with 
the Indonesian legislation system norm under which it is only 
justified to mention the national law for legal reference as is 
regulated under law 24/2004. 
These six regional laws vary in terms of whether paying 
zakāt is obligatory only for Muslims. The regional laws of Solok, 
Bukittinggi and Padang do not deal with this issue at all. 
Meanwhile, the regional law of Agam and the municipal law of 
Padang Panjang acknowledge that paying zakāt is an obligation for 
all Muslims. For example, the regional law of Agam states, ‘every 
Indonesian Muslim or an institution that is owned by a Muslim has 
an obligation to pay zakāt from their properties that have fulfilled 
the zakāt requirements’. The mention of Indonesian Muslims in 
this clause is odd, because the regional law is only for Muslims who 
live in the region. This section is obviously copied from law 
38/1999. The regional law of the Municipality of Padangpanjang 
modifies the section with, ‘every Muslim who lives in the 
Municipality of Padangpanjang or an institution that belongs to 
Muslims has an obligation to pay zakāt from their properties which 
have fulfilled the zakāt requirements’. This clause shows that it is 
not an imperative, but merely a statement that considers zakāt to 
be an obligation for all Muslims. The regional law of Pesisir Selatan 
takes a different position and clearly obligates Muslims to pay 
zakāt and also suggests that they should also pay other forms of 
Islamic charity. This imperative statement is located in Section 
two: ‘(1) every zakāt payer (muzakkī) who lives in the Region of 
Pesisir Selatan is required to pay zakāt; (2) Besides paying zakāt 
they are also encouraged to pay infāq (charitable gift), ṣadāqa 
(almsgiving), waqf (endowment), waṣīya (will), warisan (inheritance) 
and kifarat (expiatory gifts)’. Thus, these three different positions 
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of the regional laws may indicate those regions where Islamic 
teachings have intensified.  
Another issue to examine here deals with the role of the 
Indonesian Constitution and the philosophy of the state, Pancasila, 
as well as Islam or Islamic teachings in the text of the regional 
laws.  These factors are not present in the regional laws of Agam 
and the Municipality of Bukittingi. Meanwhile, the regional law of 
Solok clearly mentions that, ‘the legal principles of the 
management of zakāt are iman (belief) and taqwa (devotion to God), 
and openness, rules of law which are in accordance with the 
Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945’. This section of the 
legislation is a repetition of clause 4 in law 38/1999.  The regional 
law of the Municipality of Padangpanjang explicitly includes Sharia 
as its legal principle alongside Pancasila and the 1945 constitution. 
As can be seen in Section 4, ‘the legal principle of zakāt 
management is Sharia that is based on iman (belief) and taqwa 
(devotion to God), openness and the rule of law which are in line 
with Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945’. The regional law of 
Pesisir Selatan explicitly posits Islamic teachings as its legal base 
without referring to Indonesian legal principles. Section 4 
mentions, ‘the legal principle of zakāt management is Islamic 
teachings that are based on iman (belief), devotion to Allah, 
openness and rules of law which are in line with valid regulations’. 
By mentioning Islamic teachings and devotion to Allah, this 
regional law puts greater emphasis on Islamic teachings rather 
than Indonesian legal principles. Consequently, this is often used 
as an argument for opponents who say that the regional law goes 
against Pancasila and the 1945 constitution. 
The objectives of the regional law are similar to those of 
law 38/1999. They are: 
 
 1. Regional law is to provide some services for Muslims who 
practice zakāt in accordance with Islamic teachings. 
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2. Regional law is to improve the function and role of Islamic 
institutions in order to achieve social welfare and justice. 
3. Regional law is to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and 
accountability of zakāt practices.  
 
These objectives suggest that the presence of the regional law on 
zakāt may provide a way to utilize zakāt revenue. In order to 
achieve the above objectives, these laws provide for institutions of 
zakāt managed by local government, namely BAZDA (Badan Amil 
Zakat), and those managed by Muslim organizations or individuals, 
namely LAZ (Lembaga Amil Zakāt). However, these laws do not 
specify how these institutions are attached to the government 
structure.  
The structure of the BAZDA varies from region to region. In 
Agam, for example, the government has established BAZDA in line 
with the local government structures, ranging from regional 
(kabupaten), sub-regional (kecamatan), to village level (nagari). In 
other regions, this institution is established only at the regional 
and sub-regional level. This structure implies that the purpose of 
zakāt institutions is primarily collecting zakāt revenue from 
Muslims who work for government institutions.  
The kinds of property on which zakāt is due is another 
important aspect of the regional laws. This issue emerges in 
different clauses of the regional law, but they are all in line with 
Section 11 of law 38/1999.73 This classification still remains in 
general terms and only the regional law of the Municipality of 
Padang attempts to elaborate on it. In addition, the issue of 
whether zakāt may be deducted from income tax also emerged, 
though it lacked further detail.  
                                                        
73 They consist of: 1) gold, silver, money; 2) production from trading and 
companies; 3) agricultural production; 4) mines; 5) livestock; 6) production of 
goods and services; and 7) treasures. 
214 
 
   
 
 
The issue of who is entitled to receive zakāt is another important 
aspect of the regional law. None of the above mentioned regional 
laws defines the recipients in detail. For example, the regional laws 
of Pesisir Selatan and the Municipality of Padangpanjang define it 
with the phrase ‘recipients who are regulated under the Islamic 
teachings’. Only the regional law of the Municipality of Padang 
adds to this, stating: ‘Muslims who are not able to pay medical 
costs are defined as poor and indigent’. This implies that the 
groups of recipients still conform to what is laid out in the Quran 
in the chapter of al-Tawba/the Repentance: 60. This is also the case 
with law 38/1999. The last issue with regards to regional law deals 
with punishment. All the regional laws examined only prescribe 
punishment for an ʿāmil who wrongly administrates zakāt revenue. 
The punishment is jail for a maximum of three months or a fine to 
a maximum of 3 million rupiah. Muslims who do not want to pay 
zakāt are excluded from these laws.  
Most of the regional laws show that there is no single 
section indicating a shift of zakāt from a voluntarily to an 
obligatory practice, with the exception of the regional law of 
Pesisir Selatan. Few elements of the current understanding of zakāt 
matters have been adopted into these regional laws. Most of the 
rules prescribed are written in general terms and are mentioned in 
various sources of Islamic legal texts. The texts also show that 
most of the regulations in these regional laws are copied from law 
38/1999. In addition, there is little difference between the regional 
laws passed in the early period of decentralization compared to 
those passed recently. This evidence suggests that the local 
authorities were motivated to pass regional law on this subject in 
response to a popular demand to adopt elements of Sharia, to 
provide a legal basis for their interest in establishing alternative 
financial sources, zakāt revenue; and perhaps also by the need to 
gain the political interest of the rulers. However, most members of 
the local parliament belonged to Islamic political parties and most 
were reluctant to support the regional law on zakāt. This 
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reluctance is caused by a fact that they also belonged to social 
organizations that rely financially on Muslim charity revenue.    
 
5.6 The practices in the Municipality of Padang  
This section provides details of the actual practices and the 
involvement of the mayor of the Municipality of Padang in 
managing BAZDA. It seeks to discover how the mayor maintained 
BAZDA within the framework of his authority as the local ruler, 
including organizing the board of BAZDA, and how money flows 
from zakāt payers (muzakkī) to BAZDA through ʿamil of zakāt, as well 
as how it subsequently flows from BAZDA to the recipients. I will 
argue here that the people involved in managing BAZDA and the 
people to whom the zakāt revenue is flowing are often linked to the 
mayor as a person and as a local ruler.   
DRPD appointed Fauzi Bahar as the mayor in 2004 and he 
regained the position through the public elections held in October 
2008. He was born in the sub-region (Kecamatan) of Koto Tangah, in 
the Padang regency on 6 August 1962. During his childhood, he 
received religious teaching from his parents and via his 
involvement in mosque activities. He enrolled for tertiary 
education (undergraduate level) at the sport’s department of the 
State University of Padang (IKIP) in Padang in 1986 and he gained a 
degree on the magister management at the University of Indonesia 
in 2002. After finishing his undergraduate studies, he worked in 
the navy and in 2004 he become a politician. His success as the 
mayor obviously contributed to his win in the direct election in 
October 2008. Most Muslims believed that he had a good public 
reputation, not least because he had been involved in setting up 
programs to promote Sharia as a concern of the municipality.  
When the mayor turned his attention to managing BAZDA 
in 2006, he justified his plan with Islamic teachings. He repeatedly 
argued that Islamic teaching regulated that his position as the 
mayor meant he was an ulil amr (ruler) obligated to implement 
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Sharia. He further claimed that he had the religious authority to 
collect zakāt revenue from zakāt payers (muzakkī) who live in the 
region. However, he admitted that this authority was confined to 
muzakkī who are working in the institutions that are under his 
authority, i.e. civil servants. To support this argument, the mayor 
often quoted the verse of al-Tawba/the Repentance (9):103, khudh 
min amwālihim ṣadāqatan tuṭahhiruhum wa tuzakkīhim bihā wa ṣalli 
ʿalayhim. (Of their goods, take alms, so that thou mightiest purify 
and sanctify them; and pray on their behalf). He further argued 
that this verse clearly commands any leader to take zakāt from 
muzakkī. In addition, he often quoted legal opinions among Muslim 
scholars that zakāt is only legitimate if it is distributed through 
ʿāmil; otherwise, it will be qualified as other forms of charity. He 
repeatedly maintained the policy with religious arguments; for 
instance, those muzakkī who refused to pay zakāt would experience 
a misfortune or disaster and this attitude was characterized as 
zalīm. He further argued that nobody would become poor after 
paying zakāt. On the contrary, the muzakkī would receive a blessing 
from God (Singgalang, 18/02/2007; 27/03/2007, Haluan, 
03/02/2007). 
Besides these religious notions, the mayor repeatedly 
mentioned a hypothetical calculation of a potential source of zakāt 
revenue. According to him, if 40 per cent, that is one hundred 
Muslim families in the municipality, pay 25,000 rupiah of zakāt per 
month, derived from 2.5 per cent of their monthly income, there 
would be an annual revenue of at least 30 million rupiah collected. 
This collected revenue would be more than sufficient to fund the 
government programs for eliminating poverty (Singgalang, 
27/03/2007). His campaigns were not only aimed at convincing the 
civil servants under his authority to pay zakāt, but he also 




   
 
 
5.6.1 Establishment of BAZDA 
This section briefly examines the ways the mayor appointed 
people to BAZDA between 2006 and 2011. On 11 April 2006, the 
mayor passed decision No.43 of 2006 for the establishment of 
BAZDA (which had previously been called BAZ). On 9 May 2011, the 
mayor passed decision No. 80 of 2011 for the establishment of 
BAZDA for the period 2011 to 2014.  
Section 6 of Law 38/1999 regulates the procedure for the 
establishment of BAZDA. Its structure consists of consultative, 
advisory and executive boards. According to this section, the head 
of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in the municipality proposes 
candidates for the boards and subsequently it is the mayor who 
makes the final decisions. The mayor did not apply this procedure 
in 2006, but he did follow these rules in 2011. In 2006, the mayor 
appointed four people – to protect their anonymity we will call 
them Aman, Amin, Amir and Hamid – to carry out the selection of 
candidates for the boards. After these people had completed their 
assignment, the mayor passed decision No.43 of 2006 on the 
establishment of BAZDA. Sixty people were appointed to the 
boards of BAZDA, which comprise consultative, advisory and 
executive boards and sections for collecting, distributing, 
empowering, developing and publishing muzakkī and mustaḥiqq. 
Aman, Amin, Amir and Hamid were appointed to the executive 
board that was tasked with running BAZDA. Aman was appointed 
as the Chair, Amin and Amir were the Vice-Chairs, and Hamid 
became Secretary of the board. However, the day to day activities 
revealed Amin to be the central figure at BAZDA.  
In 2011, the mayor applied the procedure regulated under 
the law 38/1999 for appointing the boards for BAZDA. He 
encouraged the head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in the 
Municipality to get involved in organizing the new boards for the 
period 2011-2014. On 16 February 2011, a meeting was held to 
discuss these new appointments. The participants at the meeting, 
including the head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and MUI, as 
218 
 
   
 
 
well as the representatives of Muslim organizations, agreed to 
reappoint the same executive boards, i.e. Aman, Amin and Amir, to 
exactly the same positions, for the simple reason that these people 
had succeeded in managing BAZDA since 2006. On 9 May 2011, the 
mayor passed decision No.80 of 2011 to create the new boards of 
BAZDA for 2011-2012. Consequently, 58 people were appointed to 
the boards of BAZDA. The mayor reappointed Aman, Amin and 
Amir to the executive boards together with five other board 
members. Aman is the Chair, Amin and Amir hold the position of 
Vice-Chair; however, it is Amin who remains the key figure in 
managing BAZDA day to day, despite only being the Vice-Chair. 
This information raises questions about Amin’s role since 2006. The 
answer would appear to be that he has gained his position simply 
because he belongs to the mayor’s network.74  
Initially, the mayor provided BAZDA with an office situated 
in the building of the Nurul Iman mosque. After few months it 
moved to a larger office in the Bagindo Azizchan Building, situated 
in Bagindo Azizchan Street. A year later, the mayor facilitated 
BAZDA with yet another new office, this time situated at Jalan 
Ujung Gurun No. 7B in Padang. Soon after, the city was hit by an 
earthquake on 30 September 2009, and BAZDA was forced to move 
its office back to the Nurul Iman mosque.  
                                                        
74 I arrive at this conclusion after applying social network analysis to uncover 
the relationship between Aman, Amin, Amir and the mayor. Amin has more 
common connections with the mayor and both of them are members of the 
same political party, namely PAN and Muhammadiyah. Amin was the head of 
DPRD of Padang 1999-2004 and has positions in other social organizations that 
directly link to the mayor. Amir is rather isolated in the network of the mayor, 
because he only has links with Aman as they are both teaching at the IAIN and 
both of them held the position of Dean when BAZDA established in 2006. 
Although, Aman does not have any overlap in terms of contacts with the mayor, 
he is a well-known ulama, professor and on the board of the Tarbiyah Islamiyah 
organization. Aman’s social reputation may be used to justify why the mayor 
trusts him to be the chair of the executive board of BAZDA, although it is not 
Aman who runs the day-to-day activities of BAZDA.   
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The mayor established branches of BAZDA at the kecamatan (sub-
regional) and kelurahan (village) levels. However, they have 
different names: BAZ (Badan Amil Zakāt) for the kecamatan level, and 
UPZ (Unit Pengumpul Zakāt), which literally means a unit for zakāt 
collection, at the kelurahan level. There are a total of twelve BAZ 
and 104 UPZ offices. The executive boards initially designed the 
annual programs for these agencies. This included the procedures 
for collecting and distributing zakāt revenues, improving the 
services system, publicizing the programs of BAZDA, assisting 
BAZDA in collecting zakāt revenue, improving the linkage with 
other zakāt agencies, and improving the accountability of BAZDA.  
On 11 January 2007, the executive boards passed decision 
No.2 of 2007 concerning a standard operational procedure for 
BAZDA. There are a number of principles applied by BAZDA, BAZ 
and LAZ. Firstly, the boards of BAZDA will not get involved in any 
debate concerning zakāt matters that are disputed by the ulama 
(khilāfiya). Secondly, the collection and distribution of zakāt and 
other forms of Islamic charity will take place within the area 
where the agency is located. Thirdly, the recipients are determined 
under the following procedure: UPZ proposes names of recipients 
to BAZ, then BAZ proposes them to BAZDA. The executive boards 
of BAZDA, BAZ and UPZ hold a meeting to determine the 
recipients. BAZDA then passes this decision to the mayor for 
approval. Then the mayor will pass the municipal decision 
concerning the recipients of zakāt revenue. Fourthly, BAZDA 
expects muzakkī to be any Muslim who owns property that has 
fulfilled nisāb. The kinds of property covered include income from 
farming, livestock, gold, silver, money, professional income, 
business, mining and investment. The types of property outlined 
remain in general terms and mostly refer to law 38/1999 with the 
addition of income earned by professionals, a particular concern 
for BAZDA. However, BAZDA has no any authority to force any 
muzakkī to pay their zakāt to BAZDA. Subsequently, the mayor 
approaches muzakkī who are civil servants working at various 
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institutions of the municipality to pay their zakāt to BAZDA. It is 
clear that the mayor has an influence over the civil servants. How 
the mayor uses his political power in relation to matters of zakāt 
will be further examined in the context of collecting and 
distributing zakāt revenue from civil servants.  
 
5.6.2 Collecting zakāt 
The two most important issues concerning the collection of zakāt 
revenue are determining who the zakāt payers are and on what 
kind of wealth zakāt is levied. The answer to these questions is 
simply that the zakāt payers and the kinds of property covered 
relate to those areas over which the mayor has authority. It is clear 
to Muslim civil servants, for example, that their monthly income is 
a target. Consequently, the method for collecting zakāt relates to 
the power mechanism employed by the mayor. Thus, the 
treasurers of municipal institutions directly deduct 2.5 per cent 
from the monthly income of civil servants. Subsequently, the same 
treasurers deposit the collected revenue in the bank account of 
BAZDA.75 Besides this method of collection, since March 2007, Bank 
Nagari has provided a transfer facility system at its ATMs for those 
who want to transfer their zakāt directly from their account into 
BAZDA’s.  
Before applying this mechanism, the mayor claimed that he 
consulted with the Ulama Council of the municipality, his staff 
experts, and a number of Muslim scholars about whether the 
salary of civil servants was liable for zakāt. According to MUI, any 
civil servant who has a gross monthly income equal to 83 grams of 
gold is obligated to pay 2.5 per cent of this income in zakāt. This 
means that a civil servant who earns more than 1 million rupiah 
                                                        
75BAZDA has accounts with several banks: Bank Nagari, Bank BNI branch of 
Padang, Bank Syariah Mandiri, BRI, Muamalah Bank, BCA, BTPN, BII, Bukopin, 
Danamon, Permata, BTN, Mega Bank, LIPPO Bank and Mandiri Bank.  
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per month is obliged to pay zakāt. Meanwhile, civil servants who 
earn less than one million gross per month are obligated to pay 
ṣadāqa or infaq.  
However, a number of civil servants resisted the mayor’s 
policy, which on paper was voluntary but in practice was 
obligatory. This resistance was channeled to the head of MUI West 
Sumatra, which has a different opinion from MUI in the 
municipality concerning how to calculate the zakāt due on the 
income of civil servants. On 19 December 2006, the head of MUI in 
West Sumatra, who is also the Director of the Zakāt Empowering of 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs, talked to the media about this 
matter. His statement appeared in the Daily Singgalang over the 
following two days. He characterized a regional government, 
without directly mentioning the name of the region, which was 
deducting 2.5 per cent of the income from those civil servants 
earning less than 2 million rupiah per month as ẓālim (unjust). He 
argued that zakāt was only obligatory for those civil servants 
whose monthly income fulfilled nisāb. As long as the income does 
not fulfill this basic requirement, a civil servant has no obligation 
to pay zakāt. (Singgalang, 20/12/2006).   
The head of BAZDA’s executive board reacted immediately 
to the statement. On 20 December 2006, he called other executive 
board members to a meeting at the office of BAZDA in order to 
respond to the head of MUI’s statements. They reached an 
agreement that they would hold a press conference. Their reaction 
appeared in two local daily newspapers, the daily Singgalang and 
Padang Ekspres. The daily Padang Ekspres printed it under the 
headline Kewajiban zakāt jangan diperdebatkan (No need to debate on 
the obligation of zakāt). Meanwhile, the daily Singgalang printed the 
story under the more straightforward headline, Soal pungutan zakāt, 
Salmadanis: Nasrun [Haroen] ‘kencingi dapur’ (With regards to the 
collection of zakāt, Salmadanis: Nasrun ‘Peeing in his own 
kitchen’). According to the head of BAZDA, as the Director of Zakāt 
Empowering of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the head of MUI in 
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West Sumatra should not be accusing the regional government of 
being ẓālim, but rather be supporting the attempt by the regional 
government to manage BAZDA. The head of BAZDA further 
characterized the head of MUI by using a Minangkabau language 
expression for those who demonstrate inappropriate attitudes as 
someone peeing in his own kitchen’.  
The head of BAZDA went on to argue that if zakāt was based 
on the take home pay of civil servants, there would be few who 
actually had the obligation to pay zakāt. Consequently, the attempt 
to manage BAZDA is rife with difficulties (Singgalang, 21/12/2006). 
In addition, another board member of BAZDA added that the way 
zakāt was calculated by BAZDA in Padang was different from the 
opinion of the head of MUI. He further acknowledged that there 
were different opinions among ulama concerning the way to 
calculate zakāt (Padang Ekspres, 21/12/2006). However, the head of 
MUI gave no response to the reaction by the executive boards of 
BAZDA Padang. This brought the public debate to an end.76  
The mayor decided to continue to collect zakāt from civil 
servants and he actively took part in serial campaigns promoting 
his policy for managing BAZDA. Although, the collection of zakāt 
revenue was in theory voluntary, in actual practice it had become 
obligatory. These current developments reveal that the mayor has 
acknowledged his decision to obligate civil servants to pay zakāt 
from their monthly salaries. Indeed, he often publicly threatened 
to punish those who disobeyed this obligation (Singgalang, 
26/02/09). 
The amount of zakāt revenue collected has gradually been 
increasing since 2006 up to 2011. In 2006, the collected revenue 
                                                        
76According to the vice-chair of the board of BAZDA, the mayor prevented the 
executive boards of BAZDA from becoming involved further in the debate about 
these matters, because it would result in a negative impact on the efforts to 
manage zakāt. The mayor argued that the different views on the matter could 
not be reconciled and that he would continue his policy on zakāt collection 
(Correspondence via email with the vice executive board, 10/6/210).  
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was less than 1 billion rupiah and it increased to more than 1.5 
billion rupiah in 2007. A significant amount of revenue was 
collected in 2008 when the revenue doubled compared to that in 
2006. In the next three years, the annual revenue increased 
significantly. In 2009, it reached more than 10 billion rupiah and 
subsequently increased to almost 12 billion rupiah in 2010. In 2011, 
the collected revenue amounted to almost 15 billion rupiah, which 
meant that it had gained more than a billion rupiah per month and 
exceeded the annual collected revenue in 2006 when the 
government began managing BAZDA (Annual Report 2006-2011). 
The details of annual collected revenue are presented in appendix 8.  
 
5.6.3 Distribution of the collected revenue 
The issues concerning the distribution of zakāt revenue include the 
people entitled to receive zakāt revenue, how to select them, how 
and when to distribute the revenue to them. According to the 
decision of BAZDA No. 02 of 2007 dated 11 January 2007, the 
recipients of zakāt revenue cover the usual eight categories.  
BAZDA puts the recipients into six of its programs. First, is 
Padang religious. This is a daʿwa program that includes special 
activities during Ramadan. Second is Padang sehat (health). This 
program funds the costs of medical treatment for the poor or the 
needy. Third is Padang sejahtera (prosperous). This is designed to 
fund small-scale businesses run by the poor or the needy. In 
conducting this program, BAZDA has cooperation with other 
small-scale financial institutions that employ a Sharia system, 
including BMT Rangkiang Basamo (starting from 2009), Bank 
Muamalah (2011), and BTN (2011). Fourth is Padang Makmur 
(welfare). This funds the renovation of houses belonging to the 
poor and needy as well as public facilities. Five is Padang Peduli 
(care). This fund provides aid in the wake of any catastrophes and 
helps homeless people. Six is Padang cerdas (smart). This program 




   
 
 
The distribution of annually collected revenue varies from year to 
year.  Table 5.1 shows the distribution of the collected revenue in 
2009, 2010 and 2011. The last three years shows that the highest 
share of the revenue went to providing financial support for 
students. This amount reached 58.99% (Rp.4,669,269,000.00) in 
2009, 32.06% (Rp.4,808,250,00.00) in 2010 and 32.92% 
(Rp.4,778,231,000.00) in 2011. The lowest share of the revenue went 
to the Padang welfare program, which received 2.91% 
(Rp.292,177,000.00) in 2009, decreasing to 1.1% (Rp.165,000,000.00) 
in 2010 and increasing again to 3.45% (196.113,000.00) in 2011. The 
share of revenue that went to the Padang prosperous program 
increased by less than 1% (Rp.1,500,000.00) in 2009 and 
significantly increased in the next two years: 26,70% 
(Rp.4,004,000,000.00) in 2010 and 25,79% (Rp.3.742,892,500.00) in 
2011.  
 






Percentage of the distribution  
of the zakāt revenue 
2009 2010 2011 
01 Padang Smart 58.99 % 32.06 % 32.92 % 
02 Padang Health   9.64 % 24.96 % 16.37 % 
03 Padang 
Prosperous 
  0.02 % 26.70 % 25.79 % 
04 Padang Welfare   3.69 %   1.10 %   1.35 % 
05 Padang Care*   8.70 %   2.66 %   3.45 % 
06 Padang 
Religious* 
  7.35 %   7.76 % 
 
Source: Calculated  from annual report 2009, 2010, and 2011  





   
 
 
This distribution reveals that BAZDA focuses its support on the 
programs of the municipal government, i.e., those of the mayor, in 
three main sectors: education, healthcare and providing financial 
resources to the poor and the needy to run their small-scale 
businesses. This evidence also reveals that most of the collected 
revenue is distributed to the recipients in the form of charity, 
rather than in the form of finance to improve the economic life of 
the recipients. This situation also means that the boards of BAZDA 
as well as the mayor have not yet conformed to the new rules of 
zakāt, which treat the revenue as an economic factor. However, 
their attitude to this new paradigm has been shifting since 2010 
when they spent more than 4 billion on funding small-scale 
businesses belonging to the poor and needy. In other words, the 
repeated intention of the mayor to diminish poverty in the city 
finally got started in 2010. In addition, it is undeniable that the 
mayor has gained political advantage from actively managing 
BAZDA and maintaining political power as the local ruler. The 
involvement of the government in managing BAZDA has also 
benefited the poor and the needy that now have an alternative 




This section briefly presents forms of resistance to the 
involvement of the local government in managing BAZDA, and to 
the coercion used to get civil servants to pay zakāt from their 
monthly wages, and to the way BAZDA selects the recipients. Any 
resistance is rooted in a conflict of values as well as a conflict of 
interests among the parties involved, and every struggle is also a 
struggle over value (Scott 1985:1). Thus, resistance to government 
involvement in zakāt matters is caused by the different values and 
interests embraced by the different parties in this matter. 
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A number of bureaucrats, members of parliament, civil servants, 
Muslim organizations and individuals have shown their reluctance 
to support the involvement of the local government in zakāt 
matters. The governor of West Sumatra publicly expressed his 
resistance during a meeting on 28 October 2007. The meeting 
aimed at evaluating the management and effectiveness of disaster 
relief and emergency aid was hosted by the governor. Since the 
tsunami in Aceh on 26 December 2004, several catastrophes have 
touched the area including earthquakes and floods that caused 
serious damage in West Sumatra. In a meeting, the mayor of the 
Municipality of Padang suggested to the governor that he should 
take a political decision to collect zakāt fiṭr from the members of 
the Pesantren Ramaḍan in order to provide financial support for 
sufferers of natural disaster. According to the mayor, zakāt fiṭr 
revenue could reach approximately 1.3 billion rupiah. This amount 
of revenue was sufficient to support the victims. The governor 
refused to accept the suggestion. He argued that the decision about 
whether or not to pay zakāt fiṭr rests solely with the participants of 
the Pesantren Ramaḍan as the zakāt payers, as well as their parents. 
He further argued that the government did not have the authority 
to decide how the zakāt must be paid. He stated that if the 
government decided to collect the zakāt fiṭr, the government would 
receive protests from the parents as well as the students. The 
mayor gave no reaction to the response of the governor (Padang 
Ekspres, 29/09/07).  
The disagreement concerning the collection of zakāt from 
the civil servants was also publicly expressed during a speech by 
the governor at the opening ceremony of a meeting of all BAZDA in 
West Sumatra on 6 March 2009. According to the governor, the 
core of the problem behind the refusal to collect zakāt derived 
from the disagreement among ulama on how zakāt should be 
calculated for civil servants. For example, he asked, should civil 
servants who have a debt still be obligated to pay zakāt? Thus, he 
challenged the ulama to reach a consensus (ijma) on the matter in 
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order to implement some fixed rules. Nevertheless, the governor 
seemed to realize that such a consensus was no easy gain.  
Members of the local parliaments, who were mostly 
members of PKS, PAN or other Islamic parties, also showed their 
resistance to this matter. This came in the form of a reluctance to 
approve the draft regional law concerning zakāt matters. PAN and 
PKS members of parliament in the municipality of Padangpanjang 
were reluctant to approve the draft proposed by mayor on July 
2007 (Padang Ekspres, 30/07/2007). PKS members were also 
reluctant to give their consent to the draft regional law proposed 
by the head of Pasaman region (Padang Ekspres, 17/02/2007). A 
similar situation also occurred in Solok when the members of the 
parliament were examining the draft of the regional law on zakāt 
matters in 2003. The explanation is simple and lies in the different 
interests of the members of parliament. For example, members of 
PAN were mostly members of Muhammadiyah whose activities are 
supported by zakāt and other forms of Muslim charity. PKS also has 
a charity organization, PKPU, although officially this political party 
is not affiliated to it. In practice, however, the cooperation 
between PKS and PKPU continues.  
Resistance also emerged among teachers in a number of 
state schools in the municipality of Padang. However, this 
resistance was not directly addressed to the mayor; but rather 
channeled through the bureaucracy of the municipality. They 
mainly argued that their monthly salary should not be subject to 
zakāt. In response, the mayor reaffirmed his commitment to 
deducting zakāt from the salary of civil servants. He threatened the 
civil servants who disagreed with the policy of an administrative 
punishment including a transfer to other schools that do not have 
good reputations. Further, the mayor instructed the principals of 
the schools to take any decision to force the civil servants to pay 
the zakāt to BAZDA. The head of the Bureau of Junior and Senior 
High Schools at the Ministry of Education of the municipality 
acknowledged that there were a number of teachers who were still 
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unwilling to pay zakāt to BAZDA. This does not mean that they did 
not pay zakāt, but they preferred to pay it directly to recipients. In 
a bid to handle such resistance, the principals were given wider 
authority and could take any decision necessary to force the 
teachers to paying their zakāt to BAZDA (Singgalang. 16/02/09). The 
refusal of these civil servants was rooted in their beliefs about 
whether or not their salary fulfilled the minimum income 
requirement. According to them, their salary did not fulfill the haul 
(Correspondence, with a teacher, 30/08/09).   
Since August 2006, the executive boards of BAZDA have 
been busy responding to a series of protests from the poor and 
needy who argue that they should be recipients of zakāt revenue. 
They protested that they had fulfilled the requirements defined by 
BAZDA (singgalang 14/08/2006). For instance, Harimiati, a needy 
mother of three children, challenged the boards of BAZDA by 
asking why she did not qualify as a beneficiary of the revenue. She 
argued that she had fulfilled the requirements for a recipient. Her 
case was published in the Daily Singgalang (Singgalang, 22/10/06). 
Harimiati succeeded in gaining the right to be a recipient and she 
finally received zakāt revenue to support the school fees of her 
children.   
By contrast to the case of Herimiati, there are a number of 
different types of resistance conducted by the poor or needy who 
are excluded from the recipients of zakāt revenue. This form of 
resistance is known as daily resistance and is a common weapon 
for relatively powerless people. Their resistance is conducted in 
several forms, including foot dragging, dissimilation, desertion, 
false compliance and feigned ignorance. According to Scott, this 
resistance has the following characteristics: it requires little or no 
coordination or planning, it exploits an implicit understanding and 
informal networks, they more often represent a form of individual 
self-help and they typically avoid any direct, symbolic 
confrontation with authority. This type of resistance is commonly 
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found among the poor families in villages, schools teachers, 
students, and among low-ranking civil servants.   
However, the reason why these groups are excluded from 
those receiving zakāt revenue is because they do not have a good 
reputation. The poor or needy or any person who is entitled to 
receive zakāt revenue should have a good reputation or a good 
name (Bailey 1972:2). Scott suggests the ways of maintaining a 
good name include devoting time and labor to village projects, 
cooking at feasts, and taking care of the village prayer house 
(mosque, surau) and assembly hall (balai). It also requires 
swallowing a lot of pride and feigning a respect for social betters 
that one does not always feel. However, a good reputation pays 
dividends in terms of employment, zakāt gifts, help when ill and 
public shows of respect and consideration (Scott 1985:24-25).  
 
5.8 Conclusions 
Until the last two decades, the ideas and practices of zakāt were 
absent from the historical dimension of Islamic societies, despite 
the fact that they permeate the experience of Muslim past and 
present. The current concern for zakāt matters entwines religious 
matters, economic factors and the political history of Islamic 
society. This development has gradually resulted in a shifting 
attitude among Muslims, including scholars, intellectuals, and 
ulama, as well as government or ruling figures.  
Currently, the issue of zakāt is experiencing a transition 
from the implementation of piousness towards an economic 
phenomenon. The shift towards economic aspects may ultimately 
lead to zakāt becoming a political concern. This shifting situation is 
revealed in the attitude of the government toward this subject 
since the 1960s, into the present day when the government passed 
law 38/1999 and 23/2011 on zakāt management, the codification of 
the rules of zakāt in regional laws and the actual practices of the 
local government in managing BAZDA. The contents of the 
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national and regional laws show that they embrace both old and 
new rules on zakāt. It is undeniable that the local ruler, the mayor, 
has gained a political advantage from his involvement in the 
management of BAZDA. This involvement has increased his 
political power over his political rivals and provided him with a 
financial source for financing government programs. The flow of 
money shows that it mainly flows within the government 
structures or institutions.  
Support for the government’s involvement relies on 
whether the local government is able to show its credibility and 
accountability in managing BAZDA. Furthermore, it requires the 
application of the principles of transparency, not only in managing 
the collection and distribution of revenues, but also to 
demonstrate the improvements in the social-economic lives of 
beneficiaries. The resistance to the involvement of the government 
in managing zakāt institutions results from a desire by some zakāt 
payers to pay the revenue directly to the recipients, or because 
zakāt payers belong to a zakāt institution managed by political 
parties or social organizations. 
The institution of zakāt is now in a phase of transition, from 
being a purely religious matter to becoming a social-political 
institution managed by the government. The future development 
of zakāt is worthy of further study, particularly in connection with 
the new zakāt law 23/2011, which shows the strengthening role of 
government in this area. By contrast, the awareness of Muslims of 















The preceding chapters have presented a decade of the 
developments of Sharia legislation that have occurred in the 
Minangkabau society in West Sumatra since the government of 
Indonesia implemented a policy of decentralization and local 
autonomy in 2000. The ten year period covered by this study aims 
to understand what Sharia legislation has meant in terms of the 
developments of Sharia in the Indonesian legal system in general 
and for the Minangkabau society in particular.  
The Minangkabau society in West Sumatra is widely known 
in Indonesia to be an Islamized society, although the Minangkabau 
people also adhere to adat norms. This society went through 
several stages of conflict and reconciliation with respect to its 
religious identities. Before the 19th century, ulama belonging 
primarily to the sufi orders Islamized the society and there was no 
significant evidence to suggest that these attempts resulted in 
conflict. This process of Islamization contrasted with what 
happened at the beginning of the 19th century. In 1803, a number of 
ulama began to force people to obey particular aspects of Islamic 
teachings. These efforts were resisted by adat groups. 
Consequently, this process of Islamization became a source of 
fierce conflict between the two groups. Ultimately, this clash led to 
what is commonly called the Padri war, a civil war. After the clash 
ended in 1837, those ulama belonging to the sufi orders and who 
had received religious education at the education centers in Mecca 
and Egypt continued in their attempts to Islamize the society. The 
historical evidence shows that the Islamization of the 
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Minangkabau society was successful insofar as the majority of 
people came to practice Islamic teachings and acknowledge Sharia, 
although these practices were, on the whole, limited to rituals 
matters. 
The evidence also shows that there was a 
‘Minangkabauization’ of Islam as people continued to obey adat 
norms, albeit for the most part in respect of interpersonal 
relationships. The success of these two processes has resulted in 
the distinctive character of Islam in Minangkabau society in West 
Sumatra. 
We may now conclude that Minangkabau society rests on at 
least three prominent distinguishing features. The first of these is 
the fulfillment of the five pillars of Islamic rituals: reciting the 
confessions of faith, performing prayer five times a day, fasting in 
the month of Ramadan, the giving of zakāt and pilgrimage to Mecca 
for those who are able to undertake it. People have maintained this 
important feature by establishing and managing various 
institutions of Sharia, including mosques, Islamic educational and 
charitable institutions where Sharia is taught, told, produced, 
transformed and practiced. These institutions were managed 
locally by the people in the villages where they were established. 
The second prominent feature is a strong sense of Islamic identity. 
For the vast majority of Minangkabau people, Islam was the only 
conceivable religious element of identity. In public, this identity is 
widely expressed by, for example, Minangkabau people having the 
ability to recite the Quran, performing rituals and wearing clothes 
in accordance with Islamic dress codes. In short, people are 
required to show that they are pious Muslims. If they fail to do so, 
they will be judged a non-Minangkabau person. The third 
characteristic is that people also accept an array of adat norms, 
primarily in terms of interpersonal matters. In this respect, people 
continue to obey the family structure according to adat norms. For 
example, it is rare to find a Minangkabau family who will share the 
property of a deceased relative according to Sharia rules of 
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inheritance, despite the property being privately-owned. Instead, 
heirs receive their share according to adat rules, which state that 
property will be inherited by female heirs. These features illustrate 
the overlapping identities77 of the Minangkabau people, i.e. they 
are adherents of Islam as well as of adat rules. Besides these two 
overlapping identities, the people are also expected to obey the 
rules and regulations set by the state – rules and regulations that 
aim to maintain the state’s power in accordance with its own 
interests. Indeed, as this study shows, the state has passed several 
laws and regulations; however, not all of these are in line with the 
rules of Sharia and adat.  
In 2000, the authority of provincial and regional/municipal 
governments was extended when the central government 
implemented a policy of decentralization and local autonomy. This 
was the first time that the provincial and regional/municipal 
governments had the power to maintain local governance since 
independence in 1945. Local authorities as well as members of 
parliament welcomed this new authority enthusiastically by 
advocating the idea to issue local laws or regulations. Furthermore, 
they viewed this shift as a moment to introduce Sharia legislation 
at the provincial and regional/municipal level. Indeed, this 
political shift was seen as a moment to introduce Sharia legislation 
at the provincial and regional/municipal level.   
This Sharia legislation dealt with four main themes: 
unlawful acts, an Islamic dress code, Quranic recitation and the 
involvement of the government in managing zakāt institutions. At 
the heart of the Sharia legislation lies the idea that the 
Minangkabau people have to be regulated by rules that are in 
accordance with both Sharia and adat norms. It should also be 
noted that there is no convincing evidence to indicate that these 
                                                        
77 Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann name ‘overlapping identities’ with 
‘ambivalent identities’ (Von Benda-Beckmann 2007:417-442). 
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efforts were in any way connected with attempts to establish an 
Islamic state.  
There are three classifications of substantive laws that were 
legislated for under Sharia: 1) those substantive Sharia by-laws 
that are regulated under national laws and regulations, but are 
lacking implementation. Rules regarding the prohibition of 
gambling, abuse of alcohol and other psychotropic substances are 
included in this first category; 2) substantive Sharia by-laws 
excluded from national laws and regulations (this includes the 
prohibition of unlawful sexual intercourse and the obligation for 
students to be able to recite the Quran); and 3) legislation where 
the central government began to accommodate a religious 
reaching into regulation which was accomplished by regional and 
provincial law. The national regulations regarding an Islamic dress 
code fall into this category. In other words, the aims of the Sharia 
legislation in each of these three categories are varied. The 
objective of the first category was to bring these issues under the 
authority of regional implementing institutions; the second 
category aimed to add new substantive laws; and the third 
category aimed to accomplish the shift that had been begun by the 
central government.  
All that said, the justification for Sharia legislation was 
debatable, not least because – with the exception of the province of 
Aceh – there lacked an explicit rule that gave power to the 
provincial and regional/municipal authorities to legislate Sharia 
law. Proponents of Sharia legislation justified it by arguing that 
laws 22/1999 and 32/2004 gave the authority to provincial and 
regional/municipal governments to issue a law in accordance with 
local culture. They further argued that Sharia has been adopted 
into the culture of the Minangkabau people. According to this 
view, Sharia legislation is justified. In contrast, opponents said that 
Sharia legislation was unjustified. They argued that there was no 
state rule that explicitly regulated for Sharia legislation. 
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I would suggest that Sharia legislation is only justified as long as it 
is substantive law that does not relate to public law. I argue that 
laws 22/1999 and 32/2004 clearly state that judicial matters are 
included in the authority of the central government, not the 
provincial and regional/municipal authorities. This means that 
judicial institutions, i.e. state courts and the police are the law 
enforcement institutions that should implement the laws and rules 
issued by the central government. Theoretically, a law requires a 
legal organ to enforce it. The legal organs here are the police and 
the state courts. These two institutions are outside the jurisdiction 
of the provincial and regional/municipal governments. 
Meanwhile, the provincial and regional/municipal governments 
possess a different law enforcement institution – the civil service 
police unit, Satpol PP. This legal position is different from the 
research findings of Muntoha (2010:246). He suggests that the 
provincial and regional/municipal authorities possess the 
authority to legislate Sharia as long as its substantive law has been 
accepted by the local culture. This position on Sharia is also 
referred to in a legal theory proposed during the colonial era by C. 
Snouck Hurgronje. He too suggested that the government would 
acknowledge Sharia if it had been adopted into local culture.  
The effect of the debate regarding whether or not Sharia 
legislation is justified has manifested itself in the legal processes 
and implementation of each of the abovementioned categories of 
laws. There were different authorities concerned with these four 
types of Sharia legislation: All authorities at the provincial and 
regional/municipal level supported the issuance of laws that 
obligate Muslim students and civil servants to wear clothes 
according to an Islamic dress code, and those that oblige students 
to have the ability to recite the Quran. All members of the 
provincial and regional/municipal parliament who are from 
Islamic political parties supported the issue of a law related to 
maintaining public morality and aimed at preventing and 
eliminating unlawful acts. However, they were reluctant to 
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support a law regarding the involvement of the government in 
managing zakāt institutions. Heads of a region or mayors 
supported laws that give the authority to the government to 
manage zakāt institutions. This finding shows that we cannot 
generalize and say that all proponents of Sharia legislation were 
from Islamist groups. However, my study does confirm another of 
Bush’s conclusion –that Sharia legislation is closely related to local 
politics; specifically, the introduction of Sharia legislation is 
dependent on the fulfillment of political interests.  
The laws regarding an Islamic dress code and Quranic 
recitation received a degree of support from the authorities, 
including politicians who were members of the provincial and 
regional/municipal parliament as well as from society at large. As a 
result, the process of legislation and implementation of the law 
was successful.  
The involvement of the government in managing zakāt 
institutions raises two issues: one legal and one practical. The first 
concerns the issue that the national law 39/1999 on the 
management of zakāt (this law was amended by law 23/2011) gives 
the government the possibility to manage institutions of zakāt. 
However, central government opted to delay issuing the 
government regulation on the implementation of the law. 
Consequently, this law cannot legally come into force and Hooker 
(2008) and Salim (2007) characterize the zakāt law as symbolic. 
However, local governments required a legal basis for their 
involvement in managing zakāt institutions. To solve this problem, 
they legislated on zakāt rules with the aim to justify their 
involvement in this subject. One version of events regarding the 
involvement of the mayor of Padang in this matter reveals that the 
collected revenues of zakāt were used as a source to fund the 
mayor’s programs. In order to have open access to this institution, 
the mayor selected people from his network to manage the day to 
day activities of the institution. Consequently, people saw this 
institution transform from a religious institution into a political 
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tool of the local ruler. Beuhler (2008:282) has warned that the 
involvement of the government in zakāt institutions may become a 
source of political corruption. 
The law on public morality is the most problematic: 
theoretically and practically. As Hooker (2008:292) has suggested, a 
number of practical problems dealt with the overlapping 
jurisdiction of the civil service police unit (Satpol PP) and the 
national police force and in a theoretical matter; that is to say, 
whether values or morality based on religion can be enforced by 
law. Drafters of the provincial law 11/2001 initially appeared to be 
aware that regulating unlawful acts requires judicial institutions, 
the police and state court, for implementation. The draft revealed 
that there was an attempt to include these judicial institutions 
under the remit of the provincial law. The provincial law 11/2001 
shows that this effort failed and it was only Satpol PP who had the 
authority to enforce the provincial law.  
This study reveals that the attempts to regulate values and 
morality based on religion apparently did not succeed. This failure 
can be seen in two examples: the first is that a draft provincial law 
was ultimately cancelled by members of the Padang municipal 
parliament because they failed to reach an agreement and approve 
the draft. The second was that members of parliament approved a 
revised draft of such laws, but these were never legally valid. This 
was the case with the provincial law 11/2001, the municipal laws of 
Bukittinggi and Padangpanjang, and of other regions. Although the 
prohibition of immoral acts failed to be regulated or implemented 
under a law, it did not mean that the law enforcement institution – 
Satpol PP – did nothing regarding this prohibition. Indeed, 
prohibition was justified under the heading of ‘public order’ 
offences. Consequently, the category of unlawful acts varied from 
region to region and from year to year. This situation created an 
overlapping jurisdiction between Satpol PP and the police and 
varied definitions of what constitutes an unlawful act. In addition, 
238 
 
   
 
 
unqualified staff at Satpol PP and a corruption culture among 
government officers did little to ameliorate the situation.  
This study, then, suggests the effects of a decade of 
implementation of Sharia by-laws. The legislation regarding the 
obligation for Muslims students and civil servants to wear Islamic 
dress, and the obligation that students have the ability to recite the 
Quran has clearly strengthened the religious identity of the 
Minangkabau people. The Sharia legislation has resulted in a shift 
in terms of the dress code in government institutions, from a 
preference for students and civil servants to adopt Muslim dress to 
an obligation. According to Hamdani (1997:128), this shift has 
failed to encourage a personal awareness of religious and cultural 
identity, because it has lost its profound inner meaning for those 
who wear it. Furthermore, he characterizes this imposition as a 
tool of oppression, particularly for non-Muslim students.  
Different to Hamdani’s findings, this study revealed that 
non-Muslim students also see this rule as an opportunity to 
publicly express their own different religious identity, i.e. being a 
non-Muslim. It also revealed that Muslim women have now grown 
accustomed to wearing clothes according to a Muslim dress code. 
For example, Islamic dress can be observed in public places, 
including markets and tourist destinations, where seven or eight 
out of ten women were wearing clothes according to a Muslim 
dress code. However, it is also the case that the majority of Muslim 
women did not wear Islamic dress if they were only leaving their 
home for a short visit in their neighborhood, even though they 
might meet non-family members. This evidence suggests that the 
practice of wearing Islamic dress does not fully conform to the 
dress code regulated in Sharia, i.e. that Muslims must cover their 
ʿawra if they are not with family members.  
The most significant achievement of the Sharia legislation 
is an obligation for students to have the ability to recite the Quran. 
This is in spite of a government report that shows that two out of 
ten students still lacked this ability. However, people tend to see 
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the introduction of a new subject, the recitation of the Quran, into 
primary schools, as well as adding other supplementary activities 
related to this subject to the curriculum was an attempt by the 
government to guarantee the continuity and sustainability of the 
identity of Minangkabau people: that is to say, being a pious 
Muslim.  
The involvement of government in managing zakāt 
institutions and maintaining public immorality resulted in a 
different effect. The mayor of Padang gained political advantage as 
a result of increasing amounts of zakāt revenue, which he could use 
as an alternative financial source to fund government programs. At 
the same time he also received resistance from zakāt payers who 
were working as civil servants. However, he was able to counter 
this resistance with his authority and also because this specific 
form of individual resistance lacked the impact to change the 
policy (Scott 1985; 1986). The mayor claimed that government 
involvement as the zakāt collector (ʿāmil) was religiously justified. 
In contrast, opponents argued that this involvement was an 
interference in religious practices and that the decision to pay 
zakāt or not was no longer and individual decision but that of the 
mayor’s. This new practice was in contradiction with the rules of 
zakāt. This case shows that new norms on zakāt rules are being 
formed.  
On a different matter, the attempt to legislate Sharia 
regarding unlawful acts and public morality failed. The categories 
of unlawful acts were not legislated for in terms of the norms that 
were regulated under Islamic public law (fiqh al-jināya), but they 
were legislated for as values. This situation illustrates that Islamic 
public law still rests in the margins of the Indonesian legal system. 
This marginality might well be linked to how this subject was 
formed and taught at Islamic higher education institutions and in 
various forms of Islamic da’wa. Most Islamic education institutions, 
primarily the higher education institutions such as STAIN, IAIN 
and UIN, regarded Sharia as a theory of the ideal Muslim society, 
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one which only had practical significance in matters relating to 
ritual devotion, family relations, and endowment. Sharia is not 
being taught as a functioning law. However, this approach was 
adopted under the consideration that the initial intention of 
establishing Islamic higher education was primarily to train 
students to work for government institutions, including the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, Islamic courts, Islamic schools, and to 
work as an ulama. The development of state Islamic higher 
education institutions in recent decades shows that the paradigm 
of the study of Sharia has begun to entwine two approaches. This 
trend is illustrated in terms of Islamic higher education 
institutions offering new subjects, departments and faculties. 
Islamic higher education is being challenged to train students to be 
competent and to be able to work in a wide variety of occupations 
and not just gain employment in traditional institutions.  
In addition, the position of ulama was also located in the 
periphery in the process of Sharia legislation. The legislation has 
now become the ‘business’ of politicians and bureaucrats, rather 
than of ulama. This situation is particularly clear when one 
understands that the power of the state significantly increased in 
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Appendix 2.  Executive review procedure for provincial and regional 
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Appendix 5. The draft provincial law on the prohibition and 
prevention of public immorality. 
 
DRAFT  OF  
PROVINCIAL LAW OF THE PROVINCE OF WEST SUMATRA  
 
NUMBER: YEAR 2001 
 
ON 
PROHIBITION AND PREVENTION PUBLIC IMMORALITY 
 
WITH THE MERCY OF THE ONE AND ONLY GOD 
MAYOR OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PADANG 
 
Considering : 1. Province of West Sumatra is a province that has a 
distinctive tradition based on ‘adat is based on 
Sharia, Sharia is based on the Quran, Sharia 
commands, adat implements’. 
           2.Several forms of public immoralities including 
prostitution, unlawful sexual intercourse, 
homosexuality, pornographic acts, abuse of 
alcoholic substances and other public immoralities 
have been disturbing security and social order and 
damaging social principles. These public 
immoralities are in contradiction with the norms 
ruled by state law, religion and adat. 
          3. In order to maintain social stability and community 
in general, as well as to protect the new generations 
from the negative impact of public immoralities in 
particular, preventive measures are necessary. 
         4. Taking into consideration the above factors, it is 
necessary to outline these rules in provincial law. 
 Justified by 1.   National law 1/1946 on Penal Code. 
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         2. National law 61/1958 on the Establishment of the 
provinces of West Sumatra, Jambi and Riau. The 
government regulation 29/1979. 
        3.  National law 8/1981 on the Criminal law procedure. 
        4.  National law 23/1997 on Health. 
        5.  National law 5/1997 on Psychotropic substances. 
        6.  National law 22/1997 on Narcotics. 
        7.  National law 24/1997 on Broadcasting. 
        8.  National law 22/1999 on Local autonomy. 
        9.  National law 39/1999 on Human rights. 
      10. Government regulation 6/1988 on Coordination 
among local government institutions in the regions. 
      11. Government regulation 25/2005 on the authority of 
the central government and provincial government 
as the frame for autonomy. 
     12. Decision of DPRD of the province of West Sumatra 
18/SB/1999 on the rules of conduct of DRPD.  
 
DECIDED TO: 
Agreed with PROVINCIAL LAW OF THE PROVINCE OF WEST 
SUMATRA ON PREVENTING AND ELIMINATING 






Definitions used in this provincial law are as below: 
a. Region means the province of West Sumatra; 
b. Local government means the government of West Sumatra; 
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c. Governor means the governor of West Sumatra; 
d. Public immorality means any conduct that may disharmonize 
the foundations of social and contravene state laws, religion and 
adat including a number of offences of prostitution/gigolo, 
unlawful sexual intercourse, abortion, homosexuality, 
pornographic conduct, gambling, abuse of alcohol, narcotics and 
other forms of public immorality. 
e. Prostitution means sexual intercourse between a man and a 
woman who are not married and with a view to financial gain.  
f. Unlawful sexual intercourse means sexual intercourse that is 
committed by a couple who have no marriage relationship, 
whether it is committed for reason of pleasure or not. 
g. Abortion means the expulsion of a fetus from the womb, without 
medical reason, before it is able to survive independently. 
h. Homosexuality means sexual intercourse that is committed by 
members of the same sex. 
i. Pornographic act means any conduct that may provoke sexual 
desire.  
j. Gambling means any conduct or games that result in financial 
gain and depend solely on luck and where money or property 
are used as a stake. 
k. Abuse of narcotics means the abuse of alcohol and includes 
consuming, distributing, storing narcotics and other 
psychotropic substances that are prohibited by law. 
l. Alcoholic drink is drink containing alcohol.  
m. Pornography means a pornographic picture, writing or 
behavior that may provoke sexual desire. 
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n. Transvestite means somebody who dresses as a member of the 
opposite sex. 
o. Obligation means tasks that have to be conducted by people. 
p. Prohibition means something that is prohibited conduct.  
 
CHAPTER II 
SCOPE AND PURPOSES 
 
Section 2 
(1) The scope of public immorality in this provincial law includes 
any conducts relating to public immoralities that is mentioned 
in Section 1, subsection d, and carried out conducted in West 
Sumatra. 
(2) Any activity and/or conduct relating to public immorality that 
is mentioned in the subsection of this section is an offence.  
 
Section 3 
The purposes of this provincial law are: 
a.   to guarantee the stability of society. 
b. to prevent moral disorder of society in general, and the younger 
generation in particular; 
c.  to restore and maintain the philosophy of the people of West 
Sumatra, ‘adat is based on Sharia, Sharia is based on the Quran, 
Sharia commands adat applies’ and apply it to daily life. 
 
CHAPTER III 





The owner of a hotel/motel/home stay 
 
Section 4 
Any owner of hotel/motel/home stay is obligated to: 
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a.  report the identity of guests who are staying at the 
hotel/motel/home stay to the local authority in the 
neighborhood.; 
b. provide a visitors room or a lobby; 
c. enforce the rule that guests of the hotel/motel/home stay only 
receives guests in the visitors room; 
d. rule that hotel/motel/home stay are not allowed to receive 
guests between  10pm and 6am; 
e. provide rules about guest conduct in accordance with this 
provincial law; 
f. prevent any public immorality offences; 
g. report to the authorized or law enforcement institution any 
suspected public immorality offence; 
h. provide transportation for staff returning homes after 10pm. 
 
Paragraph 2 
The owners of public entertainment and tourist establishments 
  
Section 5 
Any owner of a public entertainment or and tourist establishment 
has an obligation to: 
a. guarantee that no public immorality offences occur in their 
venues; 
b. announce to the public that public immorality is prohibited in 
their venues; 
c. provide rules of conduct in accordance with this provincial law; 
d. prevent any public immorality offences; 
e. report to law enforcement institutions any suspected public 
immorality offences; 
















Any principal of an educational institution has an obligation to: 
a. maintain public morality in his institution; 
b. announce that public immoralities are an offence; 
c. announce that the educational institution supports the 
provincial law; 
d. cooperate with parents of the students and the legal 
enforcement institution if a suspected public immorality has 
occurred; 
e. prevent any public immorality offences; 
f. report suspected public immorality offences to the law 
enforcement institutions;  
g. provide transportation for staff returning homes after 10pm. 
Paragraph 4 
State and private institutions 
 
Section 7 
Any officer of a state, private, civil or military institution has an 
obligation to: 
a. maintain public morality; 
b. announce that public immoralities are an offence; 
c. provide rules of conduct in accordance with this provincial law; 
d. prevent any public immorality offences; 
e. report any suspected public immorality offence to authorized or 
the law enforcement institution; 















Any owner of a business or company has an obligation to: 
a. maintain public morality; 
b. announce that public immoralities are an offence; 
c. provide rules of conduct in accordance with this provincial law; 
d. not run any business related to public immorality offences; 
e. prevent any public immorality offence; 
f. report any suspected public immorality offence to authorized or 
law enforcement institutions; 






Any owner of printed or electronic media has an obligation to: 
a. maintain public morality; 
b. announce that public immoralities are an offence; 
c. provide rules of conduct in accordance with this provincial law;  
d. not publish any form of public immorality; 
e. prevent any public immorality offence; 
f. report any suspected public immorality offence to authorized or 
legal enforcement institutions; 

















(5) Any person who commits public immorality (maksiat) shall be 
guilty of an offence; 
(6) Any person  whose conduct stimulates or triggers another 
person to commit immoralities shall be guilty of an offence; 
(7) Any female who leaves her house between 10pm and 04am 
without being accompanied by family members (muḥrim), 
and/or she is not on duty or obligated by laws and/or she is not 
doing any work justified by other legal norms, shall be guilty of 
an offence; 
(8) Any owner of hotel/motel/inn/guest house who allows any 
guest to visit outside of visiting times or not in a visiting room 
(guest room/lobby) or allows anyone to commit immoralities, 
or provides massage services, or allows men and women who 
are not married to each other to stay in the same room shall be 
guilty of an offence. 
(9) Any person working in the above establishments regulated in 
sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, who allows any person to commit 
public immorality shall be guilty of an offence.  
 
CHAPTER IV 
SUPERVISION AND CONTROL 
 
Section 11 
(1) The governor or other authorized institution regulated 
under the state law and regulations is obliged to implement 
provincial law. 
(2) Supervision of the implementation of this provincial law is 
conducted by the government, law enforcement 
institutions, parents, adat leaders, ulama, scholars, 
educators and the public. 
(3) The provincial government shall be restricted in 
controlling activities in relation to public immorality 
offence that occur in border areas.  
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(4) The government shall establish an institution that controls 
public morality in the villages. Members of this institution 
should be representative of the local ulama, adat leaders, 
youth, NGO activists, and the village government. The 
establishment of this institution is managed by the 






(1) Provincial, regional and municipal government and other 
related institutions have the responsibility to control, 
prevent and prohibit any person from committing any 
public immorality. 
(2) Provincial, regional and municipality government and 
other related institutions have an obligation to censor any 
news or broadcast content that relates to public immorality 
offences. 
(3) Provincial, regional and municipality government and 
other related institutions shall publicize the penalties for 
committing offences regulated in this provincial law via 
various printed or electronic media including stickers, 
billboards, and advertisements. 
 
Section 13 
(1) This provincial law aims to reemphasize the public 
immorality offences that have been regulated under the 
national public law. 
(2) Regional and municipal government may determine other 




PENALTY AND INVESTIGATION 
 
Section 14 
(1) Any person who commits public immorality that has been 
regulated under the national public law is punished 
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according to the national public law and, in addition to this 
penalty, the name of the offender and the offence will be 
published in three local media. The costs publishing are the 
responsibility of the offender.  
(2) Any person who commits public immorality that has not 
been regulated under the national public law will be 
imprisoned for a maximum six months or fined with a 
maximum 5 million rupiah. In addition, the name of the 
offender and the offence will be published in three local 
media. The costs of publishing are the responsibility of the 
offender.  
(3) Any person who commits offences under sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, and 9 will be imprisoned with a maximum six months or 
fined to a maximum 5 million rupiah and an administrative 
penalty.  
(4) Any business owner, principal or other government officer 
who commits a public immorality offence will be 
imprisoned for a maximum of one year or fined with a 
maximum 10 million rupiah, plus an administrative 
penalty. In addition their business license will be 
confiscated.  
(5) Any person who protects a place of public immorality or an 
offender will be imprisoned with a maximum of one year or 
fined with a maximum 10 million rupiah. 
(6) Any government officers, civil or military, who commit a 
public immorality offence will be imprisoned with a 
maximum of one year or fined with a maximum 10 million 
rupiah, plus an administrative penalty. 
(7) Any offender who has been imprisoned or fined must 
subsequently participate in a mental rehabilitation 
program for six months.   
(8) All verdicts must be executed within fifteen days. 
(9) The public immoralities regulated in this provincial law are 
offences. 
(10) Other public immoralities excluded in subsections 1, 
2, 3, and 4 of this section may be punished if they affect and 









(1) Besides the public investigator the civil servant investigator 
at government institutions may investigate the offences 
ruled in section 14. 
(2) The investigator has the authority to: 
a. Receive public reports concerning suspected offences; 
b. Take immediate and necessary action in response to the 
report; 
c. Remove the offender from his or her  activities and 
examine the offender’s identity; 
d. Confiscate property or documents belonging to the 
offender; 
e. Take fingerprints of the offender;  
f. Call any person who is a witness or suspect in the 
investigation; 
g. Present any expert who has authority related to the 
case; 
h. Withdraw the case if the required evidence is not met 
or if the case is not an offence; 
i. Take any legal action according to the law. 
(3) The investigator mentioned in subsection (1) of this section 
must write a report consisting of: 
a. Investigation of the offender; 
b. Searching for  evidence of the offence; 
c. Confiscation of evidences; 
d. Administrative investigation; 
e. Examination of witnesses; 
f. Investigation of the location of the offence. 
(4) The investigator mentioned in subsection (1) of this section 
coordinates with the police concerning with the offence 
and subsequently pass the case to the public prosecutor in 
accordance with national law No.8/1981 on the Criminal 
procedure code. 
(5) An investigation, as ruled under subsection 1, 2 ,3, and 4 of 
this section, must be conducted within three months, 
unless the suspect is not under arrest. 
(6) An investigation is legally invalid if it is not conducted 











(1) Implementation of this provincial law is the responsibility 
of the governor of the province of West Sumatra and the 
Civil Service Police Unit is the law enforcement institution.   
(2) Any revenue from fines regulated under section 14 of this 
law belongs to the provincial or regional/municipal budget.  
(3)  Any consequences of this law are under the concern of the 
provincial, regional/municipality government. 
(4) Further elucidation of this provincial law is regulated under 
the governor’s decree. 
 
Section 17 
(1) This provincial law comes into effect at the time of 
promulgation.  
(2) In order gain public acknowledgment, this provincial law 
shall be noted in the provincial documents of West 
Sumatra. 
    
      Issued in        : Padang 
      Date         : 
 
    






   
 
 
Appendix 6. The provincial law of West Sumatra No.11/2001 on the 
prevention and elimination of public immorality 
 
PROVINCIAL LAW OF WEST SUMATRA 
NO.11 OF 2001 
ON 
PREVENTION AND ELIMINATION OF PUBLIC IMMORALITY 
 
WITH THE MERCY OF GOD 
GOVERNOR OF WEST SUMATRA PROVINCE 
Considering: a. West Sumatra Province is a region whose society 
has the social philosophy, adat is based on Sharia 
and Sharia is on the Quran. The norms of this 
philosophy must be implemented in society;  
   b. This philosophy must be implemented through 
attempts to prevent and eliminate public 
immorality;  
c. Social immorality disturbs and destabilizes society. 
There is evidence that such immorality disturbs 
religious norms, adat and other regulations; 
d. In order to obey the social norms, local regulations 
on the prevention and elimination of social 
immorality are required. 
 
Justified by:   1. National Law No.1/1946, on the Criminal Law 
(announced on 26 February 1946); 
2.    National law No.61/1958, on Establishment of 
Swatantra West Sumatra, Jambi and Riau provinces 
and Government regulation No.29 of 1979; 
3. National law No.8/1981, on Criminal Procedure 




   
 
 
4. National law No.23/1992, on Health (State paper, 
1992 No. 100, Additional of State Paper No.3495); 
5. National Law No.5/1997, on Psychotropic 
substances (State paper, 1997 No. 10, Additional of 
State Paper No.3671); 
6. National law No.22/1997 on Drugs (State paper, 
1997, no. 67, additional of State Paper No. 3698);  
7. National law No.24/1997 on Broadcasting; 
8. National law No.22/1999 on Local government 
(State paper, 1999 No. 60, additional of State Paper 
No. 3839); 
9. National law No.40/1999 on Press (State Paper, 
1999 no.166, additional of State Paper No.3887); 
10. National law No.6/1988, on Coordination of local 
governments activities (State Paper, 1988, No. 10, 
Additional State paper No. 3373); 
11. Government law No.25/2000, on Government 
authority and Provincial authority as an 
autonomous region (State paper, 2000, No. 54, 
Additional State paper, No. 3952); 
12. Presidential decision No.44/1999, on Techniques 
for arranging regulations, drafts of government 
regulations, and draft of Presidential decree; 
13. Provincial law of West Sumatra Province No.9 of 
2000, on General principles of authorities in nagari. 
 
Under the Agreement of 
THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT 











In Agreement with   PROVINCIAL LAW OF THE PROVINCE OF WEST 







The following terms are used in this provincial law:  
a. Region means the province of West Sumatra; 
b. Local government means the government of West Sumatra; 
c. Governor means the governor of West Sumatra; 
d. Public immorality means conducts that may disharmonize the 
foundations of society and contravene religious and adat norms, 
whether or not they have been regulated in national or local 
regulations; 
e. Unlawful sexual intercourse means sexual intercourse that is 
committed by a couple who are not married, whether or not it is 
committed for pleasure, or under duress, or for the promise of 
benefits to one of the two. Homosexuality and lesbianism are 
categorized as unlawful sexual intercourse;  
f. Gambling means all actions aimed at financial benefits and 
depending solely on luck, or all types of games that use money 
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or property as a stake, including buying a ticket that aims to gain 
or win a prize; 
g. Alcohol means any type of drink that contains alcohol or any 
type of drink that causes inebriation and can damage physical 
metabolism including the brain. 
h. Drugs and other psychotropic substances mean any kind of 
drugs or substance, whether or not synthetic or semi-synthetic 
or derived from plants, which can cause a decrease of human 
consciousness, feeling of confusion, or for reducing a pain as 
mentioned in the appendices of law no.5/1997 on Psychotropic 
substance and law No.22/1997 on Drugs.  
i. Publishing and producing material that can stimulate people’s 
desire to commit public immorality means any acts of publishing 
and producing pornographic stories, pictures, posters and other 




SCOPES AND OBJECTIVES 
 
Section 2 
(1) The scopes of preventing and eliminating of public immorality 
in this local regulation means all actions and/or activities 
related to public immorality; 
(2) Actions and/or activities such as those mentioned above means 
any kind of unlawful sexual intercourse, or an action that is 
intended to commit unlawful sexual intercourse, gambling, 
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drinking alcohol, drugs and the publishing or producing of 
pornographic materials. 
(3) If the above acts and/or activities have been regulated under 
higher ranking laws and regulations, they remain regulated by 
those laws and regulations. 
 
Section 3 
The objectives of preventing and elimination public immorality 
are: 
a. To implement the principles and philosophy of Adat is based on 
Sharia, Sharia is based on the Quran; 
b. To protect society from the disturbing effect of public 
immorality; 
c. To support law enforcement of regulations that concern public 
immorality; 
d. To improve social participation in preventing and eliminating 
public immoralities.  
 
Section 4 
Detailed rules on the prevention and elimination of public 




PREVENTION AND ELIMINATION OF PUBLIC IMMORALITIES 
262 
 





Unlawful sexual intercourse 
 
Section 5 
(1) Every person who commits unlawful sexual intercourse shall be 
guilty of an offence; 
(2) Every person who facilitates an unlawful sexual intercourse and 
also acts that trigger sexual desire as a result of a physical 
movement and/or not covering parts of the body that religion 
and adat state should be covered shall be guilty of an offence; 
(3) Every person who produces any kind of writings, pictures, and 




Every person, including military or civil servants, who are involved 
in protecting or facilitating any kind of unlawful sexual 












Every person who allows his property to be uses for facilitating 




(1) Every person who commits gambling or is involved in a 
gambling business shall be guilty of an offence; 
(2) Every person who allows his own business facilities or house to 
be used as a place of gambling shall be guilty of an offence. 
  
Section 9 
(1) Every person, including military or civil servants, who support 
gambling activities shall be guilty of an offence; 
(2) Every person who permits or licenses gambling activities shall 
be guilty of an offence.  
  
Section 10 
Any person who lives on the earnings from gambling or 








Abuse of alcohol, narcotic and psychotropic substances 
 
Section 11 
(1) Every person has an obligation to prevent the distribution and 
spread   of alcohol, narcotics and psychotropic substances.  
(2) Every person has an obligation to prevent other people from 
abusing alcohol, narcotics and psychotropic substances. 
 
Section 12  
(1) Every person who blends, produces, stores, sells, distributes and 
presents alcohol, narcotics or psychotropic substances shall be 
guilty of an offence; 
(2) Use of alcohol, narcotics and psychotropic substance is meant 
solely for medical reasons and must be justified and prescribed 
by a professional physician.  
 
Section 13 
(1) Every person who blends, produces, stores, distributes and sells 
alcohol, narcotics and psychotropic substances without an 
official from the authorized institution shall be guilty of an 
offence.  
(2) Every person who plants any kind of plantations that can be 
used as ingredients for any type of narcotics, narcotics and 
psychotropic substances shall be guilty of an offence; 
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(3) Every person who licenses other people involves in the abuse of 




Every person, including military or civil servants involved in the 
abuse of alcohol, narcotics and psychotropic substances shall be 
guilty an offence. 
 
Part Four 
Publishing and producing pictures that trigger public immorality 
 
Section 15 
Every person who in charge of  the state or private institutions, or 
any person who has business and is involved in publishing, 
producing, and distributing mass media including printing and 
electronically producing or  storing, pictures, posters that 
contravene religious or adat values and trigger public immorality 













(1) The public has the right and responsibility to participate in 
preventing public immorality in order to maintain a social 
order; 
(2) Public participation is proved by reporting suspected public 
immorality to the authorized institution; 
(3) Every person who catches a suspected offender of public 
immoralities should report it to an authorized institution; 
(4) Every person who in charge of an authorized institution has an 
obligation to guarantee the security and protection of a witness 
that is mentioned in section 16, points 1 and 2. 
(5) Every person has the right to complain about, object to or 
express their dissatisfaction with the credibility of the 
authorized institution in protecting a witness. 
(6) A comprehensive regulation on the issue of participation in 
preventing public immorality will be further regulated in 
regional or municipal law. 
 
Section 17 
Every person has an obligation to participate in preventing and 
eliminating public immoralities, as follows: 
a. to warn people not to commit public immoralities; 
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b. to prevent the abusing of places for public immoralities; 
c. to report suspected offences of public immorality to the 
government officers in the neighborhood. 
 
Section 18 
(1) The authorized institutions, mentioned in section 17 (c) above, 
should immediately follow up such as report and pass it to the 
police department or to other law enforcement institutions. 
(2) The authorized officers who receive the report of the case 
should follow up the case. 
(3) Any authorized officers who delays or postpones the follow up 
of a case shall be guilty of an offence. 
(4) Any person who facilitates public immorality shall be guilty of 
an offence.  
 
Section   19 
The authorized institution may provide a reward to any person or 










CONTROLLING AND MAINTAINING 
Section 20 
Local government has the obligation to control and observe all 




The obligations that mentioned in section 20 are focused on: 
a. the prevention and elimination of public immoralities; 
b. protecting the society from the effects of public immoralities; 







(1) Any person who commits offence regulated in chapter three 
will be charged under the related laws. 
(2) Authorized officers who do not follow up reported may be 












The procedure for the implementation of this provincial law will 
be further regulated under a Governor’s decree.  
 
Section 24 
This provincial law is legally valid at the time of the issuance. 
 
In order to implement this provincial law, it must be recorded in 
the Provincial Government Paper of West Sumatra Province. 
 
      Issued in   : Padang 
      Date           : 14 November 2001    
                                      GOVERNOR OF WEST SUMATRA     
  
      ZAINAL BAKAR 
Promulgated in: Padang 
Date                  : 14 November 2001 
Secretariat of the province West Sumatra, 
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Drs. H. Ali Amran 




   
 
 
Appendix 7. The draft of the municipal law of Padang on the 
control, prohibition and prevention of public immorality 
 
THE DRAFT   
MUNICIPAL LAW OF PADANG 
NUMBER: YEAR 2001 
ON 
CONTROL, PROHIBITION AND PREVENTION OF PUBLIC 
IMMORALITY 
WITH THE MERCY OF THE ONE AND ONLY GOD 
MAYOR OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PADANG 
Considering: a. Public immoralities that have been occurring in 
society are causing social disharmony, disturbed 
social order and are not in accordance with 
religious rules, traditions or good conduct. These 
public immoralities have not yet been covered by 
the national pubic law and regulations. 
Consequently, these immoralities cannot be tackled 
by the Municipal authorities. 
          b. In order to maintain public morality in a Municipal 
of Padang, a municipal law aimed at controlling, 
prohibiting and preventing all forms of public 
immorality is required.  
          c. In relation to this, and as specified above under 
letters ‘a’ and ‘b’, the issuance of a Municipal law on 
this subject is required. 
 
Legal basis:1. National law No.9/1956 on the establishment of 
autonomous regions in the province of Middle 
Sumatra (State paper No.20/1956) 
2. National law No.73/1958 on the implementation of 
national law No.1/1946 on penal code (State paper 
No.12/1958, State paper 1660). 
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3.  National law No.8/1981 on criminal procedure code 
(State paper 76, State paper 3209). 
4. National law No.22/1999 on regional autonomy 
(State paper No.60/1999, State paper 3039). 
5. Government regulation No.6/1988 on coordination 
among local government institutions in the regions 
(State paper No.10/1988). 
6. Presidential decree No.44/1999 on techniques for the 
preparation of draft government regulations, and 
presidential decree.  
7.  Ministerial decree of the Ministry of Judiciary 
04.PW-07-03/1984 on the authority of civil servants 
investigators.  
8. Ministerial decree of the Ministry of Home affairs 
No.4/1997 on civil servants investigation. 
9.  Municipal law of Padang No.7/2000 on the 
Municipality grand plan. 
10. Decision of the Mayor of Padang No.11/1996 on 
civil service police unit in following up the decision 
of the Ministry of Home Affairs No.33/1990. 
  
Under consideration: 
Suggestions and recommendations addressed by 
various elements of society including academics, 
village elders, learned religious scholars, religious 
figures, intellectuals, women’s organizations, NGOs, 
legal aid experts, businessmen, government officers 
and law enforcement officers. 
 




   
 
 
In agreement with:    MUNICIPAL LAW ON CONTROL, PROHIBITION 
AND 






Within these Regional Regulations, the intended meaning of: 
1.  Region means the Municipality of Padang 
2.  Regional government means the Government of Padang 
3.  Head of the Region means Mayor of Padang 
4.  DPRD means the Municipal Parliament of Padang.  
5. Public officer means civil servant tasked to enforce rules of 
conducts in accordance with the laws and regulations. 
6. Public order means a dynamic situation that allows the 
government and society to undertake activities safely, orderly 
and peacefully.  
7.  Public immorality means any conduct that occurs in society that 
disturbs the peace in society and that is in accordance with 
religious teachings, traditions and other rules of conduct, but 
these public immoralities have not yet been ruled as offence 
under the national public law.  
8. Prostitute means a woman who is paid to provide sexual 
intercourse and aimed to earn a living from this conducts, which 
is in contradiction with the state laws, religious teachings, adat 
and the living law in the society. 
9.  Lelaki hidung belang means the local colloquial term used for a 
man who enjoys sexual intercourse with a prostitute.  
10. Middleman means any person who directly or indirectly works 
to facilitate the opposite sex to commit public immorality, 
whether or not he receives payment for the service.  
11. The month of the Ramadan means the holy month when 
Muslims are obligated to fast during the hours of daylight.  
12.  Kedai kaki lima means the local colloquial term used to identify 
a kiosk where food, drink and other products are sold.  
13. Warung nasi means the local colloquial term used for a 
restaurant or canteen where food and drink is serviced.  
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14. Alcoholic beverage means any drink containing with 5 per cent 
of or more of alcohol.  
15. Games, such as video games and Play Stations or other similar 
products mean games that required payment.  
16. Billiards means a game that uses small balls of ivory and a long 
stick on a square table covered with felt. 
17. A billiard house means a place where billiards is played.  
18. A music café means a drinking place or other similar type of 
place where the customers are entertained by music.  
19. Guest house means a type of temporary shared 
accommodation.  
20.  Hotel means a building or commercial establishment where 
people pay for lodging, and where other public services, such 






Public immorality offences in this Municipal law are classified as 
follows: 
1. Any person who commits an offence directly or indirectly: 
     a. Public immorality ruled in Chapter I, Section 1, subsection 7;  
     b. Any conduct that disturbs public order or contravenes either 
traditional or religious rules of conduct; 
     c. Drink and sell alcoholic beverages in public places; 
     d. Sell food and drink including opening restaurants and food 
centers, during the day during the month of Ramadan, except 
in places permitted by the local authorities;  
     e. Producing, distributing, displaying and selling any indecent 
material that is in contradiction with public morality  
2.  Abuse of public places, business places or transportation in 
relation to public immorality offences. These places include: 
       a. Hotel, motel, guest house, public building, student dormitory 
or similar venues. 
       b. Restaurant, music café, and other drinking venues.  
       c. Billiard house, beauty salon, VCD and Play Station rental 
venues, massage houses and other places.  
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      d. Tourist destination, parks, public places and other 
entertainment venues. 
      e. Taxi and other types of transport.  
3.  Any person who becomes a middleman involved in public 
immoralities, as ruled in Section 2, subsections 1 and 2 above.  
 
CHAPTER III 






Based on this Municipal law, Mayor as the Head of the Region has 
the authority to establish a law enforcement institution that has 
the authority to enforce the law in respect of: 
1. Offences of public immorality, both preventative and repressive 
measures. 
2. Places or locations where it is permitted to open rice stalls 
during the month of Ramadan and taking into account the 
interests of religious tolerance. 
3. Activities taking places, in billiard houses, music cafes, VCD and 
Play Station rental venues, massage houses and other places 
during the month of Ramadan. 
4. The stipulation in Section 2, subsection 1 (d) and (e) during the 
month of Ramadan. 
5. The stipulation in Section 2, subsection 2 to establish the rules of 





Every  person who: 
1. commits a public immorality offence regulated under chapter 1, 
section 1, subsection 7 of this Municipal law, or makes any 
transactions, negotiations or acts as a middleman in connection 
with public immorality offences, or provides facilities for the 
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committing of public immorality offences, shall be guilty of an 
offence; 
2. abuses alcoholic beverages in public or public places shall be 
guilty of an offence; 
3. owns, carries, prepares, distributes, controls, receives, stores or 
trades alcoholic substances without permission shall be guilty of 
an offence; 
4. carries out public immorality offences ruled in section 2, 
subsection 1 of this municipality law shall be guilty of an offence; 
5. conducts public immorality ruled in section 2, subsection 2 of 
this municipal law shall be guilty of an offence; 
6. conducts public immorality ruled in section 2, subsection 3 of 
this municipal law shall be guilty of an offence; 
7. Persuades, invites or forces another person to conduct public 






Every person who violates the stipulations of chapter four shall 






1. Every person who commits an offence under section 2 and 4 
shall be imprisoned for a maximum 5 months or fined with a 
maximum 5 million rupiah. 
2.  Criminal offences stated in section 6 are classified offences. 
 
CHAPTER V 
STIPULATION FOR INVESTIGATION 
 
Section 7 
1.  Investigators of public immorality offences are: 
     a. National Police officer 
b. Civil Servant Investigator of the municipal government. 
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c. Other law enforcement institutions that have the authority 
to carry out an investigation. 
2.  An investigator has the authority to: 
           a. Receive public reports concerning suspected offences; 
b. Take immediate and necessaries action in response to the 
report; 
c. Remove  the offender from his or her activities and 
examine the offender’s identity; 
d. Confiscate property or documents belonging to the 
offender; 
e. Take fingerprints and photographs of the offender;  
f. Call any person who is a witness or a suspect for the 
purpose investigation; 
g. Present an expert who has the authority related to the case; 
h. Withdraw the case if the required evidence is not met or if 
the case is not an offence; 
i. Take any legal action according to the law. 
3. An investigator mentioned in subsection 1 of this section 
must write a report consisting of: 
   a. Detail of the investigation of the offender; 
b. Detail of the searching for evidence of the offence; 
c. The confiscation of any evidences; 
d. Detail of the administrative investigation; 
e. Detail of the examination of the witnesses; 
f. Detail of the investigation at the location of the offence. 
g. Detail of contact with the family or relatives of the 
offender. 
4. Investigation outcome as stipulated in section 7, subsection 3 
is submitted to the public prosecutor via the investigator of 






1. The mayor of the municipality of Padang has the authority to 
extend public immorality offences that are excluded in this 




   
 
 
2. This municipality law is entitled Control, Prohibition and 
Prevention of public Immorality.  
 
Section 9 
This municipal law takes effect from the date of promulgation 
and in order for it to be legally acknowledged it shall be 
recording in the Regional Paper of the municipality Padang. 
 
    Issued in     : PADANG 
    Date        : 




   
 
 








2006 2007 2008 
01 January   107,528,712.00 159,314,211.00 
02 February  95,540,124.00 166,943,788.00 
03 March  105,580,180.00 183,186,101.00 
04 April  111,044,749.00 211,707,820.00 
05 May  122,912,367.00 193,183,439.00 
06 June  166,879,730.00 209,183,459.00 
07 July  208,591,176.00 196,829,256.00 
08 August  163,086,124.00 163,590,750.00 
09 September  140,211,761.00 246,170,987.00 
10 October  132,791,779.00 192,929,101.00 
11 November  171,135,856.00 170,923,875.00 
12 December  142,183,065.00 206,289,615.00 







2009 2010 2011 
01 January  220,232,939.00 822,997,621.00 1,088,877,751.00 
02 February 429,957,662.00 1,070,604,851.00 907,639,256.00 
03 March 783,640,249.00 951,747,962.84 1,007,722,049.00 
04 April 817,152,204.00 820,156,763.00 1,046,828,391.00 
05 May 843,419,981.00 898,480,119.00 1,038,706,903.00 
06 June 1,571,745,536.00 1,118,258,577.00 1,084,601,669.00 
07 July 965,529,585.00 1,432,255,861.00 2,015,288,177.00 
08 August 863,913,714.00 875,815,239.00 2,463,494,476.00 
09 September 941,254,182.00 1,000,834,511.00 875,295,803.00 
10 October 830,073,149.00 839,667,550.00 1,079,786,743.00 
11 November 817,307,946.00 903,837,253.00 1,016,444,623.00 
12 December 901,875,336.00 1,045,030,771.00 2,035,591,342.00 
Total amount 885,070,143.00 10,033,089,718.00 11,779,686,718.84 
 












ABS-SBK. An abbreviation for the maxim, adat basandi syarak, syarak 
basandi kitabullah, (Adat based on Sharia, Sharia based on the 
Quran). This maxim is widely used to justify the harmony 
between Islam, Sharia, and Minangkabau adat. It also implies 
that Minangkabau adat is subordinate to Islam and that adat is 
valid as long as its rules are in accordance with Sharia. This 
maxim is transformed from an old maxim:  adat basandi Syarak, 
Syarak basandi adat, (adat based on Sharia, Sharia based on 
adat). This maxim indicates that Sharia was subordinate in adat 
rules in which Sharia is only applied as long as its rules are in 
line with adat rules. However, there is considerable dispute 
among the Minangkabau people as to which maxim should 
take precedence. 
adat. The meaning of adat covers local custom, traditional law, 
morality, political systems, legal systems. In the Minangkabau 
world view, adat and Islam are considered the two pillars of 
society. 
ʿāmil zakāt. Zakāt collector that might be an individual or 
institution. According to Sharia an ʿāmil is entitled to receive 
zakāt revenue.  
ʿawra,ʿ awrāt (plural). Part of the body needed to be covered when 
one is together with non-family members, except in 
emergency situations.  
BAM. An abbreviation for Budaya Alam Minangkabau. It is a new 
subject op study created under local autonomy, taught at the 
schools in West Sumatra as in attempt to maintain 
Minangkabau society. It contents covers the foundation of 
Minangkabau society according to adat.  
Bank Muamalat. The first private bank to apply a system of non-
interest, established in May 1992. 
BAZ. An abbreviation for Badan Amil Zakāt, the institution of zakāt 
managed by the local government. This name was commonly 
used before the central government passed law 38/1999.  
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BAZDA. An abbreviation for Badan Amil Zakāt Daerah, the institution 
of zakāt under local government that is commonly used after 
the central government passed law 38/1999.  
BAZIS. An abbreviation for Badan Amil Zakat, Infag dan Ṣadāqa, the 
institution established by local government that voluntarily 
collected zakāt, and other forms of Islamic charities.  
BAZNAS. An abbreviation for Badan Amil Zakat Nasional, the 
institution of zakāt established by the central government. 
According to law 38/1999 this institution is set up at a national 
level, while according to law No.23/1999 BAZNAS it is also used 
in regions/municipalities.   
BPUPK. An abbreviation for Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan 
Kemerdekaan, (Dokuritu Zyunbi Tyoosakai) the Investigating 
committee for the preparation of independence. This 
committee was established on 29 April 1945 to prepare for 
Indonesian independence, declared on 17 August 1945. In 
several literatures the name of BPUPK is added to a word 
Indonesian which is clearly incorrect because this committee 
was set up by the rikugun (Japanese Army), which had 
authority in the regions of Java and Madura. A similar 
committee, namely, Cuo Sangi In, was set up for Sumatra in May 
1945. There was no such committee in the eastern part of the 
archipelago. 
Bupati. The head of the region that was selected the general 
election for the first time in 2005. Previously, this position had 
been selected by members of regional parliament. 
BTA. An abbreviation for Baca Tulis al-Quran.  This is a new subject, 
created under the local autonomy, taught at primary schools 
in West Sumatra as part of implementation of the provincial as 
well as regional/municipal law on the obligation to have the 
ability to recite the Quran. 
cando. A Minangkabau adat term dealing with immorality offences. 
constitutional review. One of the tasks of Mahkamah Konstitusi 
(Constitutional Court) relating to examining whether a law or 
regulation is in contravention of the 1945 constitution.  
darek. A region where Minangkabau tradition initially existed.   
decentralization. The policy of the central government to transfer or 
delegate its authority in order to plan, to make decisions, to 
implement and to manage public functions and development 
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programs at the local government.  The scope of the authority 
of local government is regulated by laws and regulations.  
Didikan subuh. An activity held in mosques early on Sunday 
morning for students of primary school. It was introduced by 
the local government in order to enrich the religious 
knowledge and rituals of the students.  
diya. Financial compensation paid by a perpetrator or his/her 
family to the victim or to his/her family in cases of homicide 
or grievous harm.   
DPR. An abbreviation for Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat the People’s 
Representative Council for central government. Its members 
are selected through a general election. According to the 1945 
constitution this institution has legislative, budgeting and 
oversight functions. 
DPRD. An abbreviation for Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, it is the 
people’s Representative Council for the provinces and regions 
or municipalities. The members of this institution are also 
selected through a general election.  
fāqih. fuqahāʾ (plural). Muslim legal scholars. 
fatwa.  A legal opinion given by a muftī and based on a request.  
fiqh. Islamic jurisprudence that is commonly produced by a fāqih. In 
the Sunni tradition there are four mainstream schools of fiqh 
that are associated with the names of the founders: Shīfiʿīya, 
Ḥanafīya, Mālikīya and Hanbalīya.  
executive review. One of the tasks of central government is to review 
the provincial, regional or municipal laws or other local 
regulations in terms of whether it contravenes with higher 
ranking laws and regulations. This exercise is conducted by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and, as the representative of central 
government the governor may also carry out this review to the 
regional/municipal law or regulations. 
Golkar. An abbreviation for Golongan Karya, a nationalist political 
party.   
ḥadd, ḥudud (plural). A mandatory fixed punishment for the fixed 
offences that are regulated in the Quran or ḥadith. 
ḥarām. A category of normative standards of conduct relating to 
conduct that is classified as prohibited. 
ḥawl. A period of possessing property on which zakāt must be paid 
by the owner. A standard period is one year. 
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ḥijāb. This term is used to identify Muslim dress. It literally means 
to cover, specifically to cover ʿawra. See also ʿawra and jilbāb. 
IAIN. An abbreviation for Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State institute 
for Islamic studies. An Islamic higher education institution 
managed under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. See also UIN 
and STAIN. 
ʾibāḥa. A category of normative standard of conduct relating to 
conduct that is classified as neutral. 
ICMI. Abbreviation for Ikatan cendikiawan Muslim 
Indonesian/Indonesian Association of Muslims Intellectuals. It 
was established in December 1992 and B.J.Habibie was pointed 
as its first chair.  
infāq. A voluntary religious donation. 
Immoral. Suppressed practices, condemned as immoral though they 
involve nothing that would ordinary be thought of as harm to 
other persons. 
jilbāb. The kind of material used to cover ʿawra. Alternative names 
include the ḥijāb. See also hijāb and ʿawra. 
judicial review. One of the tasks of the Supreme Court involving 
determining whether a law contravenes national laws. 
karāha. A category of normative standard of conduct relating to 
conduct is classified as being disapproved of. While it implies 
that the conduct has a negative element, it is not prohibited.  
Kaum Muda. A group of ʿulama in Minangkabau at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. Advocating modernization, including 
the introduction of a new interpretation of Sharia and the 
establishment of schools that adopted the Western model of 
education.  
Kaum Tua. A rival of Kaum Muda. This group was primarily 
associated with traditional values and institutions, including 
with the tarīqa such as Naqshbandiyya and Satariyya.  
khalwa. Close proximity between unmarried persons of the 
opposite sex. 
khimar. A kind of ḥijāb that is commonly used as a headscarf. 
KHI. An abbreviation for Kompilasi Hukum Islam, the compilation of 
Islamic Law. It has been the normative standards for judges in 
the Islamic court since 1991.  
KUHP. An abbreviation for Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana, the 
Indonesian penal codes. The majority of the Indonesian penal 
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codes are adopted from the Wetboek van strafrecht voor 
Nederlands Indie (WvSN) applied on 15 October 1925 based on 
the Koninklijk staadblaad No.732. 
KUHAP. An abbreviation for Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Acara 
Pidana,  the Indonesian penal codes procedures. These 
procedures are regulated under law No.8/1981.  
LAZ. An abbreviation for Lembaga Amil Zakāt, Institution of zakāt 
managed by Muslim communities. This institution must be 
under the license of the government and law No.23/2011 
elucidates more restrictive regulations for this institution.   
LKAAM. An abbreviation for Lembaga Kerapaan Adat Alam 
Minangkabau, an umbrella for adat organizations. This 
institution was initially established by the New Order 
government in 1968.   
local autonomy. Autonomy belonging to the provincial and 
regional/ municipal authorities in order to run the local 
government. Their authority is determined by national laws 
and regulations.    
local law. Translated from peraturan daerah, meaning a provincial 
law passed by provincial parliament and the governor, or a 
regional/municipal law passed by the parliament and bupati or 
the mayor. Law No.10/2004 uses this term to covers provincial, 
regional/municipal and village law. However, this definition 
was revised by law No.12/2011 and now only refers to 
provincial and regional/municipal law.  
MA. An abbreviation for Mahkamah Agung, the Supreme Court. 
Mahkamah syarʿiyah. This is the current name for the Islamic court 
for the first and appeal level in Aceh. This name has shifted 
since this province has been granted special autonomy to 
apply Sharia and is now commonly called qanun. See also 
qanun.   
maksiat. A category of conduct relating to acts that are not in 
accordance with public morality. 
MDA. An abbreviation for Madrasah Diniyah Awaliyah, a centre for 
Qurʿanic recitation managed by the Muslim community. 
MK. An abbreviation for Mahkamah Konstitusi, the Constitutional 
Court.  
MORA. An abbreviation for the Ministry of Religious Affairs, a 
translation from Kementerian Agama, a state institution that has 
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authority in relation to religious affairs in Indonesia; 
established on 3 January 1946.   
MPR. An abbreviation for Majelis Permusyawaran Rakyat, the People’s 
Consultative Assembly. 
MTQ. An abbreviation for Musabaqah Tilawatil Quran, a nationwide 
competition for reciting Quran begun in 1968. 
mufti. A jurist consult, one who issues a legal opinion.  In the 
contemporary Muslim world, the jurist consult may be an 
individual or group of mufti. 
muḥrim. Family member. A Muslim is permitted to uncover his/her 
ʿawra in the presence of muḥrim.  
MUI. An abbreviation for Majelis Ulama Indonesia, the Indonesian 
ʿulama council; set up at the national, province and regional 
levels, established on 26 July 1975.  
mukallaf.  A Muslim to whom religious teachings are applied; a 
subject of law. 
mustaḥiq. Person or group entitled to receive zakāt; the recipients 
of zakāt.  
muzakki. Muslim person or institution possessing wealth on which 
zakāt is levied. 
nadab. A category of normative standard of conduct relating to 
conduct  classified as recommended. While the term implies 
conduct that has a positive element, it is not an obligation.  
nagari. The lowest form of government structure, originally based 
on Minangkabau tradition. 
niqāb. A type of cloth covering for the face of Muslim women. 
niṣāb. The rate or amount of property on which zakāt is levied. 
NU. An abbreviation for Nahdlatul Ulama; the largest Muslim 
organization in Indonesia.  
PAN. An abbreviation for Partai Amanat Nasional. The national 
mandate party that is historically linked with Muhammadiyah.  
Pancasila. The philosophy that forms the foundations of the 
Indonesian state. 
PBB. An abbreviation for Partai Bulan Bintang, the crescent and star 
party that is widely known as an Islamic party.  
PDI-P. An abbreviation for Partai Demokrasi Indonesian Perjuangan, 
the Indonesian democratic party that is commonly known as 
the nationalist party; led by Megawati Sukarno Putri, the 
daughter of Sukarno. 
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Pendidikan agama. A subject relating to religious teachings and 
taught in schools.  
Perda. An abbreviation for Peraturan daerah. See also  local law. 
Pesantren Ramaḍan.  An activity for primary to senior high school 
students, held in a mosque in their neighborhood during the 
fasting month. It was introduced by the local government with 
a view to enriching the religious knowledge and rituals 
activities of the students.  
PHRI. An abbreviation for Perhimpunan Hotel dan Restoran Indonesia, 
the Indonesian association of hotels and restaurants.  
PK. An abbreviation for Partai Keadilan, the justice party. An Islamic 
party, established on 22 July 1998. On 20 April 2002  this party 
changed its name to PKS.  
PKS. An abbreviation for Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, the justice and 
welfare party. 
pondok baremoh. A small temporary building located in tourist 
destinations where couples of the opposite sex spend their 
leisure time. 
PP. An abbreviation for Peraturan Pemerintah, the government 
regulation that endows the president with the authority to 
make a law come into effect. Without PP, a law remains 
window dressing.  
PPP. An abbreviation for Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, the unity 
and development party. It has been an Islamic party since the 
1970s.  
Provincial law. A law passed the provincial parliament and the 
governor and incorporated in the hierarchy of the Indonesian 
legal system.  
PTIQ. An abbreviation for Pendidikan Tinggi Ilmu al-Quran, higher 
education for the Quranic arts.  
qadhaf. Unfounded accusations of unlawful sexual intercourse. 
qanun. The provincial and regional laws passed under the authority 
of Aceh province. Aceh has been granted special privileges to 
implement Sharia.  
qiṣāṣ. A provision concerning offences against the person, including 
homicide and wounding. 




   
 
 
regional law. A law passed together with the regional/municipal 
parliament by and Bupati/ mayor. According to law 
No.12/2011, it is the lowest rank of legislation in the hierarchy 
of the Indonesian legal system.   
repressive non-judicial. The non-judicial authority belonging to 
Satpol PP whose tasks are confined to implementing provincial 
or regional/ municipal law.  
ridda.  Apostasy, an offence according to Sharia.  
rikāz. A type of zakāt property that is defined as buried treasures of 
the earth.  
ṣadāqa. Voluntarily alms as well as zakāt. 
Satpol PP. Civil service police unit that now has the authority to 
uphold and implement provincial, regional/municipal law and 
other regulations passed by the local authorities.  
SMA. An abbreviation for Sekolah Menengah Atas, senior high school. 
STAIN. An abbreviation for Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri, higher 
education for Islamic studies managed by the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs.   
surau. Adat as well as Islamic institution utilized as place for rituals, 
a centre for Islamic teachings and other social functions. 
Currently it tends to function solely as a place for ritual. 
taʿzīr. Discretionary punishment of sinful of forbidden behavior or 
an act endangering public order or state security. 
TPA. An abbreviation for Taman Pendidikan al-Quran, the centre for 
Quranic education mostly located in a mosque and managed by 
the Muslim community.  
TPSA. An abbreviation for Taman Pendidikan Seni al-Quran, the centre 
for the Quranic arts education.   
UIN. An abbreviation for Universitas Islam Negeri, the Islamic higher 
education that transformed form IAIN or STAIN, established in 
the 2000s. 
UPZ. An abbreviation for Unit Pengumpul Zakāt, the zakāt collector 
unit. 
wajib. A category of normative standard of conduct relating to 
conduct  classified as obligatory.  
waqf. Religious endowment. 
waṣiya. A vow to transfer an amount of property to an appointed 
receiver. The amount is a maximum of one-third of the total 
property of the owner.   
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wirid remaja. A weekly activity for junior and senior high schools 
students held in a mosque in their neighborhood. This activity 
comes under the supervision of school teachers living in the 
neighborhood. 
zakāt al-māl. Literally meaning zakāt on property, it refers to kinds 
of property for which zakāt is obligatory.  
zakāt al-fiṭr. Zakāt that is levied on individual Muslims and that 
should be paid during Ramadan.  
Zina. (Arabic: zināʾ) Sexual intercourse that occurs outside of a valid 
marriage, the semblance (shubha) of marriage, or lawful 
ownership (milk yamīn). 
289 
 






1. Books and articles  
 
ʿAbd al-Bāqī, Muḥammad Fuʾād. al-Muʿjam al-mufahras al-fāḍ al-
Qurʾān al-karīm. 3rd ed. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr, 1992.  
Abdillah, Masykuri, et al. Formalisasi syariat Islam di Indonesia: Sebuah 
pergulatan yang tak pernah tuntas. Jakarta: Renaisan and DPP 
Forum Mahasiswa Syariah Indonesia, 2005. 
Abdullah, Taufik. “Adat and Islam: An examination of conflict in  
 Minangkabau” Indonesia, no. 2 (October 1966):1-24.  
———. School and politics: The kaum muda movement in West Sumatra 
(1927-1933), New York: Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia 
Program Cornell University, 1971. 
———. “Zakāt collection and distribution in Indonesia”. In The 
Islamic voluntary sector in Southeast Asia, edited by Mohamed 
Ariff, 50-84. Singapore: ISEAS, 1991. 
Abdulmutalib, Muhammad Ali bin. Burhān al-ḥaq. Padang: Zul 
Jawmar, 1918.  
Abidin, Hamid, ed. Reinterpretasi pendayagunaan ZIS menuju 
efektivitas pemanfaatan zakat infak sedekah.  Jakarta: Ford 
Foundation and Pirac, 2004. 
Abou El Fadl, Khaled. Speaking in God’s name: Islamic law, authority 
and women. Oxford: Oneworld, 2001.  
———. The great theft: Wrestling Islam from the extremists. New York: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 2005. 
Abubakar, Al Yasa. Syari’at Islam di Provinsi Nangroe Aceh Darussalam: 
Paradigma, kebijakan dan kegiatan. Banda Aceh: Dinas Syari’at 
Islam Provinsi NAD, 2006 
Abubakar, Al Yasa and Marah Halim.  Hukum Pidana Islam Provinsi 
Nangroe Aceh Darussalam. Banda Aceh: Dinas Syariat Islam 
Provinsi NAD, 2006. 
290 
 
   
 
 
Abubakar, Al Yasa and Sulaiman M. Hasan. Perbuatan pidana dan 
hukumannya dalam qanun Provinsi NAD. Banda Aceh: Dinas 
Syariat Islam Provinsi Anggroe Aceh Darusalam, 2006. 
Abu-Lughod, Lila. Veiled sentiments. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1986. 
Abū Zahra, Muḥammad. al-Jarīma wa-al-ʿuqūba fī al-fiqh al-islāmī. 
Cairo: Dār al-fikr al-ʿarabro n.d. 
Agenda kementerian agama 1951-1952. Djakarta: Kementerian Agama, 
n.d. 
Agius Dionisius, Albertus. “Fashions and styles: Maltese women’s 
headdress”. In Languages of dress in the Middle East, edited by 
Nancy Lindisfarne-Taper and Bruce Ingham, 107-126. Great 
Britain: Curzon, 1997. 
Ahmed, Laila. Women and gender in Islam: Historical roots and a modern 
debate. New Haven CT and London: Yale University Press, 1992.   
Ajroud, Cristine. “Global context and the veil: Muslim integration 
in the United States and France.” Sociology of Religion 68, no. 3 
(2007):321-325. 
Alatas, Alwi and Fifrida Desliyanti. Revolusi jilbab: Kasus pelarangan 
jilbab di SMA Negeri Se-Jabotabek 1982-1991. Jakarta Timur: al-
L’tishom Cahaya Umat, 2001.  
Ali-Fauzi, Ihsan, Saiful Mujani. Gerakan kebebasan sipil: Studi dan 
advokasi kritis atas perda Syariah. Jakarta: Freedom Institute and 
Nalar, 2009. 
Ali, Mohammad Daud.  Sistem ekonomi Islam zakat dan wakaf. Jakarta: 
UI Press, 1988. 
Ali Muhammad, Rusjdi. Revitalisasi Syari’at Islam di Aceh: Problem, 
solusi dan implementasi menuju pelaksanaan Hukum Islam di 
Nanggroe Aceh Darusssalam. Jakarta: Arraniry Press and Logos, 
2002. 
Amal, Ihlasul. Regional and central government in Indonesian politics: 
West Sumtara and South Sulawesi 1949-1979. Yogyakarta: Gadjah 
Mada University Press, 1992. 
291 
 
   
 
 
Amanat, Abbas and Frank Griffel, eds. Shariʿa: Islamic law in the 
contemporary context. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007.  
Amīn, Qāsim. Taḥrīr al-marʾa. Egypt: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1911.  
Amin, Ma’ruf, et al. Himpunan fatwa majelis ulama Indonesia sejak 
1975. Edited by Hijrah Saputra, Andriansyah and Adhika 
Prasetya K.  Jakarta: Erlangga, 2011.    
Amin Suma, Muhammad. Himpunan undang-undang perdata Islam & 
peraturan pelaksanaan lainnya di negara hukum Indonesia. Jakarta: 
Raja Grafindo Persada, 2004. 
Amrullah, H.A.M.K. Agama dan perempoean. Ford de Kock: TYP Druk 
Geb. “LIE”, 1929. 
al-Anbānī, Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Din. Ḥijāb al-marʾa al-muslima fī al-
kitāb wa-al-sunna. 3rd ed. Beirut: al-Maktab al-isleiru 1989. 
Aniq, Ahmad Fathan. “Zakat discourse in Indonesia: A study of 
teachers’ resistance to zakat regional regulation in East 
Lombok”. Master’s Thesis, Leiden University, 2008. 
An-Naʿim, Abdullahi Ahmed. Toward an Islamic reformation: Civil 
liberties, human rights and international law. Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1990. 
———.“Shariʿa in the secular state: A paradox of separation and 
conflation.” In The law applied: Contextualizing the Islamic shariʿa: 
A volume in honor of Frank E. Vogel, edited by Peri Bearman, 
Wolfhart Heinrichs and Bernard G. Weiss, 321-341. London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2008. 
———. Islam and the secular state: Negotiating the future of shariʿa. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.  
Anscombe, G.E.M. Intention. 2nd ed. Cambridge and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1963. 
Anshari, Endang Saifuddin. Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945 dan sejarah 
konsensus nasional antara nasionalis Islami dan nasionalis “sekular” 
tentang dasar negara republic Indonesia 1945-1959. Bandung: 
Pustaka – Perpustakaan Salman ITB, 1981. 
al-Shāṭibī, Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhim ibn Mūsā. al-Muwāfaqāt fī ʾuṣūl al-
sharīʿa. 4 vols. Cairo: al-Maktaba al-tawfīqīya, 2003. 
292 
 
   
 
 
Aqsha, Darul, et al. Islam in Indonesia: A survey of events and 
developments from 1988 to March 1993.  Seri INIS XXVI. Jakarta:  
INIS, 1995. 
Ariff, Mohamed, ed. The Islamic voluntary sector in Southeast Asia. 
Singapore: ISEAS, 1991. 
Asad, Talal. The idea of an anthropology of Islam. Washington: Center 
for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1986.  
———. Formation of the secular: Christianity, Islam and modernity. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. 
Ash-Shiddieqy, T.M. Hasbi. Syari’at Islam menjawab tantangan jaman. 
Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1966. 
———. Pedoman zakāt. 2nd ed. Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1967. 
———. “Zakat: Sebagai salah satu unsur pembina masjarakat 
sedjahtera”. Lecture presented at the 9th Anniversary of the 
IAIN Sunan Kalidjaga, at Purwokerto, 19 may 1969. 
Asnan, Gusti. Pemerintahan daerah Sumatera Barat dari VOC hingga 
reformasi. Yogyakarta: Citra Pustaka, 2006.  
Asnani.  Zakāt produktif dalam perspektif hukum Islam. Yogjakarta: 
Pustaka Pelajar and  STAIN Bengkulu, 2008. 
al-Asnar, ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. al-Marʾa al-muslima wa-al-
ḥijāb. Talfun: Maktāb dār al-imām al-zahbi,  1413H. 
Aspinal,  Edward and Greg Fealy, eds. Local power and politics in 
Indonesia: Decentralization and democratization. Singapore: ISEAS, 
2003. 
Asshiddiqie, Jimly. Hukum acara pengujian undang-undang. Jakarta: 
Sekretarian Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan Mahkamah Konstitusi 
RI, 2005. 
———. Perihal undang-undang di Indonesia. Jakarta: Sekretarian 
Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan Mahkamah Konstitusi RI, 2006. 
Austin, Jon. The province of jurisprudence determined. Edited by 
Wilfrid E. Rumbe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995. 
ʿAwda, ʿAbd al-Qādir. al-Tashrīʿ al-jināʾī al-islāmiy muqāranan bi-al-
qānūn al-waḍʿ ī. Cairo: Dār al-Turāth, n.d.  
293 
 
   
 
 
Awwas, Ifan Suryahardi, ed. Risalah kongres mujahidin I dan 
penegakan Syari’ah Islam. Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001.  
Azra, Azyumardi. “The surau and the early reform movements in 
Minangkabau”. Mizan 3, no. 2 (1990):64-81.  
———. “H.M. Rasjidi, MBA: Pembentukan kementerian agama 
dalam revolusi”. In Menteri-menteri agama RI: Biografi sosial-
politik, edited by Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, 3-33. 
Jakarta: INIS and PPIM, 1998.  
———. Surau: Pendidikan Islam tradisional dalam transisisi dan 
modernisasi. Jakarta: Logos, 2003.  
———. “The Indonesian marriage law of 1974: An 
institutionalization of the Shariʿa for social changes”. In Shariʿa 
and politics in modern Indonesia, edited by Arskal Salim and 
Azyumardi Azra, 76-95. Singapore: ISEAS, 2003. 
———. “Syariat Islam dalam bingkai nation state”. In Islam, negara & 
civil society, edited by Komaruddin Hidayat and Ahmad Gaus 
AF, 29-52. Jakarta: Paramadina, 2005. 
———. Indonesia, Islam and democracy: Dynamics in a global context. 
Jakarta: The Asia Foundation, Solstice and ICIP, 2006. 
———. “Islamic legal education in modern Indonesia”. In Islamic law 
in contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and institutions, edited by  R. 
Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammack, 257-270. Cambridge 
and Massachusetts: Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard 
Law School, 2007.  
Azra, Azyumardi and Saiful Umam. Menteri-menteri agama RI: 
Biografi sosial-politik. Jakarta: INIS and PPIM, 1998.  
Bagdja, Muara.“Wanita and non-wanita dalam industri mode”. In 
Menjurus arus: Seperempat abad Femina, mendorong kemjuan 
wanita Indonesia 1972-1997, edited by Dewi Anggraeni et al, 121-
135. Jakarta: PT. Gaya favorit Press, 1997. 
Bahar, Saafroedin, et al., eds. Risalah sidang badan penyelidik usaha-
usaha persiapan kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI), panitia persiapan 
kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI), 28 Mei 1945-22 Agustus 1945. Jakarta: 
Sekretariat Negara RI., 1995. 
294 
 
   
 
 
Bahnasī, Aḥmad Fatḥiy. al-Siyāsa al-jināʾīya fī al-sharīʿa al-islāmīya. 
Egypt: Maktabat dār al-ʿarabīya, 1965 
Bailey, F.G., ed. Gifts and poison: The politics of reputation. New York: 
Schocken Books, 1972. 
Baktiari, Bahman. “Iran: Shariʿa politics and the transformation of 
Islamic Law”. In Shariʿa politics: Islamic law and society in the 
modern world, edited by Robert W. Hefner, 121-145. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011.  
Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee. “The rise of local 
governments: An overview”. In Decentralization and local 
governance in developing countries: A comparative perspective, 
edited by Pranab Bardhan and Dili Mookherjee, 1-52. London 
and Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006. 
Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee. “The rise of local 
government: An overview”. In Decentralization and local 
governance in developing countries: A comparative perspective, 
edited by Pranab Bardhan and Dili Mookherjee, 1-52. London 
and Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006. 
Barfield, T. “Afghanistan: The local and the global in the practice of 
Shariʿa”. In Shariʿa politics: Islamic law and society in the modern 
world, edited by Robert W. Hefner, 179-206. Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011.  
Barnes, Ruth and Joanne B. Eicher, eds. Dress and gender: Making and 
meaning. New York and Oxford: Berg, 1992. 
Bazis. Rekomendasi dan pedoman pelaksanaan zakāt (hasil penelitian 
dan seminar zakāt DKI. Jakarta: Badan Amil Zakāt, Infaq dan 
Shadaqa, 1978. 
———. Pedoman pengelolalan zakāt dan infak/sedekah. Jakarta: Pemda 
DKI, 1992. 
Bearman, Peri, Rudolph Peter and Frank E. Vogel, eds. The Islamic 
school of law: Evolution, devolution, and progress. Cambridge and 




   
 
 
Bearman, Peri, Wolfhart Heinrichs and Bernard G. Weiss, eds. The 
law applied: Contextualizing the Islamic shariʿa: A volume in honor of 
Frank E. Vogel. London: I.B. Tauris, 2008. 
von Benda-Beckmann, Frans.  Property in social continuity: Continuity 
and change in the maintenance of property relationship through time 
in Minangkabau, West Sumatra. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1979. 
von Benda-Beckmann, C.E. The broken stairways to consensus: Village 
justice and state courts in Minangkabau. Dordrecht: ICG Printing 
BV, 1984. 
von Benda-Beckmann, Franz and Keebet. “Changing one is 
changing all: Dynamics in the adat-Islam-state triangle”. 
Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, no. 53/54 (2006):239-
270. 
———. “Ambivalent identities: Decentralization and Minangkabau 
political communities”. In Renegotiating boundaries: Local politics 
in Post-Suharto Indonesia, edited by Henk Schulte Nordholt and 
Gerry van Klinken, 417-422. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007.    
Benda, Harry. J.  The crescent and the rising sun. The Hague and 
Bandung: W. van Hoeve ltd., 1968. 
Bertrand, Jacques. “Indonesia’s quasi-federalist approach: 
Accommoda-tion amid strong integrationist tendencies”. ICON 
2, no. 4 (2007):576-605. 
Berger, Maurits and Nadia Sonneveld. “Sharia and national law in 
Egypt”. In Sharia incorporated: A comparative overview of the legal 
systems of twelve muslim countries in past and present, edited by 
Jan Michiel Otto, 51-88.  Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010. 
Bimbingan menasik haji, Jakarta: Departemen Agama, 2009. 
Blackwood, Evelyn. “Representing women: The politics of 
Minangkabau adat writings”. In Women and gender relations, 
edited by Susan Mann, 13-38. Michigan: the Association for 
Asian Studies, Inc., 2004. 
———. “Mothers to daughters: Social change and matrilineal 
kinship in a Minangkabau village”. In Globalization and change in 
296 
 
   
 
 
fifteen cultures: Born in one world, living in another, edited by 
George Spindler and Janica E. Stockart, 117-143. USA: Thomson 
Higher Education, 2007. 
———. Falling into the lesbi world: Desire and difference in Indonesia. 
Hawai: University of Hawaii Press, 2010.  
Bloembergen, Marieke. De geschiedenis van de politie in Nederlands-
Indië: Uit zorg en angst. Amsterdam and Leiden: Boom and KITLV 
Uitgeverij, 2009.  
Boland, B.J. The struggle of Islam in modern Indonesia. Leiden: KITLV, 
1971. 
Bonner, Michael. “Poverty and charity in the rise of Islam”. In 
Poverty and charity in Middle Eastern contexts, edited by Michael 
Bonner, Mine Ener and Amy Singer, 13-30. Albany, New York: 
State University of New York Press, 2003.  
Bonner, Michael, Mine Ener and Amy Singer, eds. Poverty and 
charity in Middle Eastern contexts. Albany, New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2003. 
Bowen, John R. Religious in practice: An approach to the anthropology of 
religions. Boston, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: 
Allyn and Bacon, 1998. 
———. “Shariʿa, state, and social norms in France and Indonesia”. 
ISIM Lectures. Leiden: ISIM, (2001):1-24. 
———. Islam, law and equality in Indonesia: An anthropology of public 
reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.  
———. Why the French don’t like headscarves. Princeton: Princeton 
Univer-  sity Press, 2007. 
BPS. West Sumatra in figure 2010. Padang: Statistic Sumatra Barat 
Province, 2010.  
Brem, Eva. “Diversity in the classroom: The headscarf controversy 
in European schools”.  Peace and Change 31, no. 1 (2006):117-
131.  
Brenner, Susan. “Reconstructing self and society: Javanese Muslim 




   
 
 
Brewer, John D. Ethnography. Buckingham-Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, 2005.  
Brodjonegoro, Bambang Permadi Soemantri. “Decentralisasi 
sebagai kebijakan fundamental untuk mendorong 
pertumbuhan ekonomi nasional dan mengurangi kesenjangan 
antardaerah di Indonesia”. Paper presented at the 
inauguration of professorship in Economic sciences at the 
Economic Faculty, the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, March 
18th,  2006.   
Brown, Nathan J.  “Egypt: Cacophony and consensus in the twenty-
first century”. In Shariʿa politics: Islamic law and society in the 
modern world, edited by Rovert W. Hefner, 94-120.  Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011.  
van Bruinessen, Martin. Kitab kuning, pesantren dan tarekat: Tradisi-
tradisi Islam di Indonesia. Bandung: Mizan, 1995.  
Buehler, Michael. “The rise of Shariʿa by-laws in Indonesian 
districts: An indication for changing pattern of power 
accumulation and political power”. Southeast Asia Research 16, 
no. 2 (2008):255-285. 
Burhanuddin, Jajad. “Islamic knowledge, authority and political 
power: the ‘ulama in colonial Indonesia”. PhD diss., Leiden 
University, 2007.  
Burhanudin, Nandar. Penegakan Syariat Islam menurut Partai 
Keadilan. Jakarta: al-Jannah, 2004. 
Burn, P. The Leiden legacy: Concepts of law in Indonesia. Leiden: KITLV, 
2004. 
Bush, Robin. “Regional Sharia regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or 
Symptom?” In Expressing Islam: Religious life and politics in 
Indonesia, edited by Greg Fealy and Sally White, 160-174. 
Singapore: ISEAS, 2008.  
Buskens, Léon.  “An Islamic triangle: Changing relationship 




   
 
 
 ———. “Recent debates on family law reform in Morocco: Islamic 
law as politics in an emerging public sphere”. Islamic Law and 
Society 10, no. 1 (2003):70-131. 
———. “Shariʿa and national law in Morocco”. In Sharia incorporated: 
A comparative overview of the legal systems of twelve Muslim 
countries in past and present, edited by Jan Michiel Otto, 89-138.  
Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010. 
Calder, N. “Sharīʿa”. In Encyclopeadia of Islam, new ed., vol. IX, edited 
by C.E Bosworth et al., 321-326. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997.  
Campbell, Tim. “Exploring conditions for local economic 
development in decentralized systems of government”. In The 
local alternative: Decentralization and economic development, edited 
by Rafael de la Cruz, et al.,7-37. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011.  
Chaironi, Bambang, “Formalisasi Syariat Islam di Kota Padang: 
Study kasus terhadap dinamika sosial politik dalam 
pembahasan ranperda pekat”. Skripsi S.1, Syaria Faculty, IAIN 
Padang, 2004.  
Chatty, Dawn. “The burqa face cover: An aspect of dress in 
Southeastern Arabia”. In Languages of dress in the Middle East, 
edited by Nancy Lindisfarne-Taper and Bruce Ingham, 126-148.  
Great Britain: Curzon, 1997. 
Chelhod, J. “Ḥidjāb”. In Encyclopeadia of Islam, new ed. vol. III, edited 
by B. Lewis, V.L. Menege, C.H.Pillet and J. Schacht, 359-261. 
Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986. 
The Chicago manual of style. 16th ed. Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2010.  
Clark. B., Lombardi. State law as Islamic law in modern  gypt: The 
incorporation of the sharīʿa into  gyptian constitutional law. Leiden: 
Brill, 2006. 
Cammack, Mark E. “Indonesia’s 1989 religious judicature act: 
Islamization of Indonesia or indonesianization of Islam?” 
Indonesia 63, 1997: 143-168. 
299 
 
   
 
 
———. “The Indonesian Islamic judiciary”. In Islamic law in 
contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and institutions, edited by R. 
Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammack, 146-169. Cambridge 
and Massachusetts: Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard 
Law School, 2005.  
Corrigan, Peter. The dressed society: Clothing, the body and some 
meanings of the world. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, and 
Singapore: Sage Publications, 2008. 
Coulson,  Noel.  A history of Islamic law. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1964. 
———. Conflicts and tensions in Islamic jurisprudence. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1969. 
Crisis Group. “Islamic law and criminal justice in Aceh”. Asia Report, 
no. 117, 31 July 2006. 
Crang, Mike and Ian Cook. Doing ethnographies. London: Sage 
Publications, 2007.   
Crouch, Melissa. “Religious regulations in Indonesia: Failing 
vulnerable groups”. Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 
43, no. 2 (2009):53-103.  
Dajoh, Eric M.F., Suwiryo Ismail. Polisi pamong praja: Hari ini & esok. 
Jakarta: Kantor Ketentraman and Ketertiban Pemerintah DKI 
Jakarta, 1997. 
Ad-Darsh, Syed Mutawalli. Muslim women’s dress: Hijab or niqab. 
Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1997. 
Denny, Frederick M. “Exegesis and recitation: Their development 
as classical forms of Qurʾānic piety”. In Transitions and 
transformations in the history of religions: Essays in honor of Joseph 
M. Kitagawa, edited by Frank E. Reynolds and Theodore M. 
Ludwig, 91-123. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980.  
———. “Tadjwīd”. In Encyclopeadia of Islam, vol. X, edited by P.J. 
Bearman, et al, 72-75. Leiden: Brill, 2000.  




   
 
 
———. Pedoman pembinaan Bazis: Hasil pertemuan nasional I Bazis se 
Indonesia tanggal 3-4 Maret 1992. Jakarta: Depag RI, 1992. 
———. 50 tahun Departemen Agama: Perjuangan dan pengabdian. 
Jakarta: Departeman Agama RI, 1996. 
———. Peraturan perundang-undangan pengelolaan zakāt. Jakarta: 
Depag RI, 2002. 
———. Kedudukan, tugas, fungsi, kewenangan, susunan organisasi dan 
tata kerja Departemen Agama, Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal, Biro 
Organisasi, 2003.  
———. Paradigma baru wakaf di Indonesia Jakarta: Direktorat 
Pengembangan Zakat dan Wakaf, 2004. 
———. Peraturan perundangan perwakafan, Jakarta: Direktorat 
Jenderal Bimbingan Masyarakat Islam, 2006. 
———.  Membangun peradaban zakat. Jakarta: Depag RI, 2009a. 
———.  Membangun peradaban zakat. Jakarta: Direktorat 
Pemberdayaan Zakat, 2009b. 
Departemen Penerangan. Sambutan Presiden Soeharto pada 
peringatan maulud nabi besar Muhamad S.A.W di Istana Negara 
Djakarta, pada tanggal 29 Mei 1969. Seri Amanat 18. Djakarta: PN. 
Pertjetakan Negara R.I, 1969a. 
———. Sambutan Presiden Soeharto pada peringatan isra’ dan mi’radj 
Nabi Muhammad S.A.W, pada tanggal 9 October 1969 di Istana 
Negara. Seri Amanat 24. Djakarta: P.N. Pertjetakan Regara R.I, 
1969b. 
Djatnika, Rachmat. Tanah wakaf. Surabaya: al-Ikhlas, 1983.  
Do’a dan zikir ibadah haji. Jakarta: Departemen Agama, 2009. 
Dobbin, Christine. “Tuanku Imam Bondjol (1772-1864)”. Indonesia, 
no. 13 (1972):5-35. 
———. “Islamic revivalism in Minangkabau at the turn of the 
nineteenth century”. Modern Asian Studies  8,  no. 3 (1974):319-
345. 
———. “Economic change in Minangkabau as a factor in the rise of 
the padri-movement. 1784-1830”. Indonesia 23, (1977):1-38.  
301 
 
   
 
 
———. Islamic revivalism in a changing peasant economy: Central 
Sumatra 1784-1847. London: Curzon Press, 1983. 
van Dijk, Kees. Rebellion under the banner of Islam: The darul Islam in 
Indonesia.  The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.  
———. “Indonesische hadji’s op reis”. In Islamitische pelgrimstochten, 
edited by Willy Jansen and Huup de Jonge, 37-56. Muderberg: 
Coutinho, 1991. 
———. “Sarongs, jubahs and trousers: Appearances as a means of 
distinction and discrimination”. In Outward appearances: 
Dressing state and society in Indonesia, edited by Henk Schulte 
Nodholt, 39-83. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997.  
van Eijk, Esther. “Sharia and national law in Saudi Arabia”. In 
Sharia incorporated: A comparative overview of the legal systems of 
twelve muslim countries in past and present, edited by Jan Michiel 
Otto,  139-180. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010. 
Djuanda, Gustian et al. Pelaporan zakāt pengurangan pajak 
penghasilan. Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2006. 
Duri, A.A. “ʿĀmil”. In Encyclopeadia of Islam, new ed. edited by H.A.R 
Gibb et al., 435-436. Leiden: E.J Brill and London: Luzac & Co, 
1960. 
Eckardt, Sebastian and Anwar Shah. “Local government 
organization and finance: Indonesia”. In Local governance in 
developing countries, edited by Anwar Shah, 233-274. 
Washington: The World Bank, 2006.   
The editor. “Secular Europe: Headscarf and identity”. Material 
Religion 6, issue 1 (2010):111. 
Effedi, Djohan, et al., eds. Agama dalam pembangunan nasional: 
Himpunan sambutan Presiden Soeharto. Jakarta: Pustaka Biru, 
1981. 
Eicher, Joanne B. and Ellen Roach-Higgins Marry. “Definition and 
classification of dress”. In Dress and gender: Making and meaning, 
edited Ruth Barnes and Joanne B. Eicher, 8-28. New York and 
Oxford: Berg, 1992. 
302 
 
   
 
 
Eikelman, Dale E. “The art of memory: Islamic education and its 
social reproduction”. Comparative studies in society and history 
20, no. 4 (1978):485-516. 
Eisenberger, Johan. Indie en de bedevaart naar Mekka. Leiden: M. 
Dubbeldeman, 1928.  
Elmir, Tatty. Berani mencoba, berani berbeda! Dokumentasi 28 tahun di 
pentas dakwah busana muslimah, Anne Rufaidah, the hidden forest. 
Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2009.  
Esten, Mursal. Minangkabau: Tradisi dan perubahan. Padang: Angkasa 
Raya, 1993.  
Faisal, Ahmad. “Rekonstruksi Syariat Islam: Kajian tentang 
pandangan ulama terhadap gagasan penegakan Syariat Islam 
oleh KPPSI di Sulawesi Selatan”. PhD diss., UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 
Yogjakarta, 2004.  
Fakhraie, L. Fatemeh. “Effect of socioeconomic status on hijab style 
preferences in urban Iranian women”. Master’s Thesis, Oregon 
State University, 2008. 
Faisal, Ahmad. “Rekonstruksi Syariat Islam: Kajian tentang 
pandangan ulama terhadap gagasan penegakan Syariat Islam 
oleh KPPSI di Sulawesi Selatan”. PhD diss., Universitas Islam 
Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, 2004.  
Fadlullah, Cholid. Mengenal hukum ZIS (zakāt dan infak/sedekah) dan 
pengalamannya di DKI Jakarta. Jakarta: Bazis Jakarta, 1993. 
Fauzia, Amelia. “BAZIS DKI Jakarta: Peluang dan tantangan badan 
amil zakat pemerintah daerah”. In Revitalisasi filantropi Islam: 
Studi kasus lembaga zakat dan wakaf di Indonesia, edited by 
Chaider S. Bamualim and Irfan Abubakar, 31-60. Jakarta: 
Center for Languages and Culture and the Ford Foundation, 
2005. 
———. “Faith and the state: A history of Islamic philanthropy in 
Indonesia”. PhD diss., University of Melbourne, 2008.  
Fealy, Greg and Virginia Hooker. Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A 
contemporary sourcebook. Singapore, ISEAS, 2006. 
303 
 
   
 
 
Feener, R. Michael. Muslim legal thought in modern 
Indonesia.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.  
Feener, R. Michael and Mark E. Cammack. Islamic law in 
contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and institutions. Cambridge and 
Massachusetts: Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law 
School, 2005.  
Feillard, André. NU vis-à-vis negara: Pencarian isi, bentuk dan makna. 
Translated by Lesmana. Jogjakarta: LKiS, 1999. 
Foucault, Michel. “The subject and power”. Critical inquiry 8, no. 2 
(1982: Summer):777-795. 
Gade, Anna M. “Taste, talent and the problem of internalization: A 
Qurʾānic study in religious musicality from Southeast Asia”. 
History of religion 41, no. 4 (2002):328-368. 
———. Perfection makes practice: Learning, emotion and the recited 
Qur’an in Indonesia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004.  
Geertz, Clifford. The interpretation of cultures.  New York: Basics 
Books, 1973.   
Gerber, Haim. Islamic law and culture. Leiden: Brill, 1999. 
al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid.  al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-ʾuṣūl. Egypt: al-
Maṭbaʿa al-mayrīya, 1366.  
———. Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn, vol. 3. Cairo: Dn,9iḥyāʾ9iḥyā: Dn,9io: Dn,9i-
mayrīy 
Ghazali, Aidit bin. “Zakāt administration in Malaysia”. In The Islamic 
voluntary sector in Southeast Asia, edited by Mohamed Ariff, 118-
137. Singapore: ISEAS, 1991.  
Göle, Nilüfer. The Forbidden modern: Civilization and veiling. Michigan: 
The University of Michigan Press, 2007.     
El-Guindi, Fatwa. Veil: Modesty, privacy and resistance. Oxford: Berg, 
1999. 
———.  “Gendered resistance, feminist veiling, Islamic feminism”. 
The Ahfad Journal, no. 22 (2005): 53-78. 
Hadler, Jeffrey. “Home, fatherhood, succession: Three generations 




   
 
 
———. Muslims and matriarchs: Cultural resilience in Indonesia through 
jihad and colonialism. Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2008.  
Hafidhuddin, Didin.  Zakāt dalam perekonomian modern. Jakarta: 
Gema Insani Press, 2002. 
Halim, Abdul. Hukum perwakafan di Indonesia. Ciputat: Ciputat Press, 
2005. 
———. Politik hukum Islam di Indonesia: Kajian posisi hukum Islam 
dalam politik hukum pemerintahan orde baru dan era reformasi. 
Jakarta: Badan Litbang 7 diklat Departement Agama RI, 2008. 
Halim, Wahidin. Memahami Al-Quran, menjelajah Islam: Mengenang 
sejarah MTQ. Jakarta: Pendulum, 2003.  
Halim, Wahyuddin. “Syari’ah implementation in South Sulawesi: 
An analysis of the KPPSI movement”. In Quo vadis Islamic studies 
in Indonesia? (Current trends and future challenges), edited by 
Kamaruddin Amin et al., eds. 125-152. Jakarta: Direktorat 
Pendidikan Tinggi Islam Departemen Agama and Program 
Pascasarjana UIN Alaudiddin Makasar, 2006. 
Hallaq, Wael B.  An introduction to Islamic law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009.  
———. Sharīʿa: Theory, practice and transformations. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
———. The origins and evolution of Islamic law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
Hamdani, Deny. “The quest for Indonesian Islam: Contestation and 
consensus concerning veiling”. PhD diss., the Australian 
National University, 2007. 
Hamka. Ayahku: Riwayat hidup DR. H. Abdul Karim Amrullah dan 
perjuangan kaum agama di Sumatra. 4th ed. Jakarta: UMMINDA, 
1982.  
———. Islam dan adat Minangkabau. Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1984.  
Harding, Andrew. “Sharia and national law in Malaysia”. In Sharia 
incorporated: A comparative overview of the legal systems of twelve 
305 
 
   
 
 
muslim countries in past and present, edited by Jan Michiel Otto, 
491-528.  Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010. 
Hart, H.L.A. Law, liberty and morality. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1963.   
———. The concept of law. 2nd ed. edited by Penelope A. Bulloch and 
Joseph Raz. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.  
Hatta, Mohammad. Demokrasi kita. Jakarta: Pandji Masjarakat, 1960. 
———. Memoir. Jakarta: Tintamas, 1979. 
———. Sekitar proklamasi. Jakarta: Tintamas, 1982. 
Hazairin.  Tujuh serangkai tentang hukum. Jakarta: Tintamas, 1974. 
———. Hukum baru di Indonesia. Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, n.d. 
The health profile 2010. 2011 ed. Padang: The Health Centre of the 
Municipality of Padang, 2011. 
Hefner, Robert W., ed. Shariʿa politics: Islamic law and society in the 
modern world. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 2011.  
Hefner, Robert W.  “Islamizing capitalism: On the founding of 
Indonesia’ first Islamic bank”. In Shariʿa and politics in modern 
Indonesia, edited by Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra, 148-167. 
Singapore: ISEAS, 2003. 
———. “Indonesia: Shariʿa politics and democratic transititon”. In 
Shariʿa politics: Islamic law and society in the modern world, edited 
by Robert W. Hefner, 280-317. Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2011.  
Helmanita, Karlina. “Mengelola filontropi Islam dengan 
manajemen modern: Pengalaman dompet dhu’afa”. In 
Revitalisasi filantropi Islam: Studi kasus lembaga zakat dan wakaf di 
Indonesia, edited by Chaider S. Bamualim and Irfan Abubakar, 
87-123.  Jakarta: Center for Languages and Culture and the 
Ford Foundation, 2005. 
Herrera, Linda and Annelies Moors. “Banning face veiling: The 
boundaries of liberal education”. ISIM Newsletter 13 (December 
2003): 16-17. 
Hikmah ibadah haji, Jakarta: Departemen Agama, 2009. 
306 
 
   
 
 
Hofman, Bert and Kai Kaiser. “Decentralization, democratic 
transition, and local governance in Indonesia”. In 
Decentralization and local governance in developing countries: A 
comparative perspective, edited by Pranab Bardhan and Dili 
Mookherjee, 81-124. London and Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
2006. 
The Holy Qurʾan. Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. Britain: 
Wordsworth, 2000.  
Holt, Claire, Benedict R. O’G. Anderson and J. Siegel ed. Culture and 
politics in Indonesia. Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1972. 
Hooker, M.B. “State and Shariʿah in Indonesia 1945-1995”. In 
Indonesia, law and society, edited by Timothy Lindsey, 107-118. 
NSW: The Federation Press, 1999.  
———. Indonesian Islam: Social change through contemporary fatāwā. 
Honolulu: Allen and Unwin, 2002. 
———. Indonesian Syariah: Defining a national school of Islamic law. 
Singapore: ISEAS, 2008.  
Hooker, M.B. and Timothy Lindsey. “Public faces of Sharīʿah in 
contemporary Indonesia: Towards a national madhhab?” Studia 
Islamica X, no. 1, (2003):23-64.  
Hooker, M.B and Virginia Hooker.“Sharia”. In Voices of Islam in 
Southeast Asia: A contemporary sourcebook, edited by Greg Fealy 
and Virginia Hooker, 137-206. Singapore, ISEAS, 2006. 
Hooker, Virginia and Yasrul Huda. “Starting Early”. Inside Indonesia 
90. http://insideindonesia.org/content/view/605/47. 
Horris, Herbert. On guilt and innocence. Berkeley, Los Angeles and 
London: University of California Press, 1976. 
Hosen, Nadirsyah. “Religion and the Indonesian constitution: A 
recent debate”. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 36, no. 3 (2005): 
419-440.   




   
 
 
Hunter, Floyd. Community power structure: A study of decision makers. 
New York: Anchor Books, 1963. 
Huda, Ni’matul. Problematika pembatalan peraturan daerah. 
Jogjakarta: PH UII Press, 2010.  
Huda, Yasrul.”Islamic law versus Adat: Debates about inheritance 
law and the rise of capitalism in Minangkabau”. Master’s 
thesis, Leiden University, 2003. 
———. “Perda-perda Syariah di Sumatera Barat.” Paper presented 
at the seminar of the Sharia Faculty, IAIN Imam Bonjol, 
Padang, 31 August-1 September 2006. 
———.  “Syariat Islam di era otonomi daerah”. Paper presented at 
the International Seminar and Regional Dialog, Bukittinggi, 20 
January 2007.  
———.“Faktor-faktor yang melatarbelakangi dan implikasi 
pembuatan perda yang bernuansa agama di daerah”. Paper 
presented at the Public discussion of the by Indonesian Law 
Aids and Imparsial (the Indonesian Human Rights Monitor), 
Padang, 20 May 2007. 
———. “Syariat Islam di Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dan 
implikasinya terhadap daerah lain di Indonesia.” Paper 
presented at the International Conference, “Islamic Sharia and 
Global Challenge: Searching the framework of implementing 
the Sharia in Aceh”. IAIN Banda Aceh, 19-21 July 2007. 
———. “The influence of graduates from the Middle East on Islam 
in West Sumatra 2000-2006”. Paper presented at the 2nd 
Graduate Forum, NUS, Singapore, 25-27 July 2008.  
Huri, Irdam. Filantropi kaum perantau: Studi kasus kedemawanan sosial 
organisasi perantau Sulit Air Sepakat (SAS), Kabupaten Solok, 
Sumatera Barat. Jakarta: FISIP UI, Ford Foundation, and PIRAC, 
2006. 
al-Ḥuṣrī, Muḥammad Khalīl. Aḥkām qirāʾat al-qurʾān al-karīm. 4th ed. 
Egypt: al-Maktaba al-makkīya and Dār al-bashāʾir, 1999.  
Ibn ʿArabī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allah. Aḥkām al-qurʾān, 
vol. III and IV. Egypt: Isa al-halābi, 1958. 
308 
 
   
 
 
Ibn Kathīr, Abū al-Wafā. TafsKa ibn kathīr. vol. III. Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 
1986.  
Ibn Rushd, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad. Bidad.t al-mujtahid wa-nihāyat 
al-muqtaṣid. 3rd ed. 2 vols. Cairo: al-Nāshir maktabat al-khāʾjī, 
1994.  
Ichwan, Moch Nur. “Official reform of Islam: State Islam and the 
ministry of religious affairs in contemporary Indonesia 1966-
2004”. PhD diss., University of Tilburg, 2006. 
Ingham, Bruce. “Men’s dress in the Arabian Pinansula: Historical 
and present perspectives”. In Languages of dress in the Middle 
East, edited by Nancy Lindisfarne-Taper and Bruce Ingham, 40-
54. Great Britain: Curzon, 1997. 
Jabbar, Hamid and Edy Utama. Gebu Minang: Dari tradisi ke inovasi, 
1990-2000. Jakarta: Lembaga and Yayasan Gebu Minang, 2000. 
Jansen, M. Angela. “Fashionably traditional: The development of 
Moroccan urban dress in the last five decades”. PhD diss., 
Leiden University, 2010.  
al-Jazss., ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. Kital al-fiqh ʿalā al-madhāhib al-arbaʿa. vols. 
1 and 5, Cairo: Dār al-fikr,1990.  
Jeffrey, Arthur.  Foreign vocabulary of the Quran. Leiden: Brill, 2007. 
Jones, Caria. “Fashion and faith in urban Indonesia”.  Fashion Theory 
11, Issue 2/3 (2007):211-232.  
Junus, Mahmud. Sedjarah pendidikan Islam di Indonesia, Djakarta: n.p, 
1960.  
Junus, Umar. “The payment of zakāt al-fitrah in a Minangkabau 
community.”  BKI 122 (1966):447-454.  
Juynboll, G.H.A. “The qurrāʾ in early Islamic history”. Journal of the 
economic and social history of the orient 16, (1973):113-129. 
———. “The position of Qurʾān recitation in early Islam”. Journal of 
semitic studies 19, (1974):240-251. 
Ka’bah, Rifyal. Penegakan Syariat Islam di Indonesia, Jakarta: Khairul 
Bayan, 2004. 
Kahin, Audrey R. “Some preliminary observation on West Sumatra 
during the revolution”. Indonesia 18, (October 1974):77-117. 
309 
 
   
 
 
———. “Repression and regroupment: Religious and nationalist 
organizations in West Sumatra in the 1930s”. Indonesia 38, 
(October 1984):39-54. 
Kahle, Paul E. “The Arabic readers of the Koran”. Journal of near 
eastern studies 8, no. 2 (1949):65-71. 
Kahn, J. “Tradition, matriliny and change among the 
Minangkabau of Indonesia”. BKI 132, no. 1, (1976):64-95. 
Kaiser, Kai, et al. “Decentralization, governance and public services 
in Indonesia”. In Decentralization in Asia and Latin America: 
Toward a comparative interdisciplinary perspective, edited by Paul 
Smoke et al., 164-207. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, 
USA: Edward Elgar, 2006.   
Kamali, Mohammad Hasyim. “Shariʿah and civil law: Towards a 
methodology of harmonization”. Islamic Law and Society 14. no. 
3 (2007):391-420.  
Kamil, Sukron, and Chaider S. Bamualim, eds. Syariah Islam dan 
HAM: Dampak perda Syariah terhadap kebebasan sipil, hak-hak 
perempuan, dan non-muslim. Jakarta: CSRC and Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, 2007.  
Kaptein, Nico. J.G. “South Asian debate and Middle Eastern 
inspiration: European dress in Minangkabau in the beginning 
of the 20th century”. In Southeast Asia and the Middle East: Islam, 
movement, and the longue duree, edited by Eric Taqliacozzo, 176-
195.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008. 
Kato, Tsuyoshi. “Change and continuity in the Minangkabau 
matrilineal system”. Indonesia  25 (April 1978):1-16. 
———. “Rantau Pariaman: The world of Minangkabau coastal 
merchants in the nineteenth century”. Journal of Asian Studies 
xxxix, no. 4 (August 1980):729-752. 
———. Matriliny and migration: Evolving Minangkabau traditions in 
Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982.  




   
 
 
Klitgaard, Robert, Ronald Maclean-Abaroa and H. Lindsey Parris. 
Corrupt cities: A practical guide to cure and prevention. California 
and Washington: CS. Press and World Bank Institute, 2000.  
Koçak, Mustafa. “Islam and national law in Turkey”. In Sharia 
incorporated: A comparative overview of the legal systems of twelve 
muslim countries in past and present, edited by Jan Michiel Otto, 
231-271.  Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010. 
Köndgen, Olaf. “Shariʿa and national law in the Sudan”. In  Sharia 
incorporated: A comparative overview of the legal systems of twelve 
muslim countries in past and present, edited by Jan Michiel Otto, 
181-231. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010. 
Konperensi kementerian, departemen, djwatan agama seluruh Indonesia 
di Jogjakartaa 14-18 Aril 1950. Djakarta: Kementerian Agama, 
1950. 
Konperensi Kementerian Agama ke-III di Sukabumi 28 Des. 52 – 3 Djan. 53. 
Djakarta: Kementerian Agama Bagian Penerbitan, 1953.   
van Koningsveld, Sjoerd. “Between communalism and secularism: 
Modern sunnite discussions on male head-gear and  coiffure”. 
In Pluralism and identity, edited by Jan Platvoet and Karel van 
der Toorn, 327-245.  Leiden, New York and Cologne: E.J. Brill, 
1995.  
Kuran, Timur. “Islamic redistribution through zakāt: Historical 
record and modern realities”. In Poverty and charity in Middle 
Eastern contexts, edited by Michael Bonner, Mine Ener and Amy 
Singer, 275-293. Albany, New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2003.  
Kurniawati.  Muslim philanthropy: Potential and reality of zakāt in 
Indonesia. Jakarta: Ford Foundation and PIRAC, 2005. 
Kusuma, R.M.A.B. Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945: Memuat 
salinan dokumen otentik badan oentoek menyelidiki oesaha2 
persiapan kemerdekaan. Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Fakultas 
Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2004. 
Lazreg, Marnia. Questioning the veil: Open letters to muslim women. 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009. 
311 
 
   
 
 
Lau, Martin, “Sharia and national law in Pakistan”. In Sharia 
incorporated: A comparative overview of the legal systems of twelve 
Muslim countries in past and present, edited by Jan Michiel Otto, 
373-423.  Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010. 
Lev, Daniel S. Legal evolution and political authority in Indonesia: 
Selected essays. The Hague, London, and Boston: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000.  
———. “Colonial law and the genesis of the Indonesian state”. 
Indonesia 40 (October 1985):57-74. 
———. “Judicial unification in post-colonial Indonesia”. Indonesia 16 
(October 1973):1-38.  
———. Islamic courts in Indonesia: A study in the political bases of legal 
institutions. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press, 1972.  
———. “Judicial institutions and legal culture in Indonesia”. In 
Culture and politics in Indonesia, edited by Claire Holt, Benedict 
R. O’G Anderson and J. Siegel, 246-318. Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1972. 
———. The transition to guided democracy: Indonesian politics: 1957-1959. 
Ithaca-New York: Southeast Asia Program, Department of 
Asian Studies Cornell University, 1966. 
Lindisfarne-Taper, Nancy and Bruce Ingham, eds. Languages of dress 
in the Middle East.  Great Britain: Curzon, 1997. 
———. “Approach to the study of dress in the Middle East”. In 
Languages of dress in the Middle East, edited by Nancy 
Lindisfarne-Taper and Bruce Ingham, 1-39. Great Britain: 
Curzon, 1997.  
Lindsey, Timothy eds. Indonesia: Law and society. NSW: The 
Federation Press, 1999.  
Lombardi, Clark B. Islamic law as state law in modern Egypt: The 
incorporation of the Shariʿa into  gyptian constitutional law. Leiden 
and Boston: Brill, 2006. 
Lubeck, Paul M. “Nigeria: Mapping a Shariʿa restorationist 
movement”. In Shariʿa politics: Islamic law and society in the 
312 
 
   
 
 
modern world, edited by Robert W. Hefner, 244-279. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011.  
Lurie, Alison. Language of clothes. New York: Random House, 1981.  
Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. Islam dan masalah kenegaraan. Jakarta: LP3ES, 
1985. 
Madani, Mohammed Ismail Memon. Hijab: The Islamic 
commandments of hijab. Karachi: Darul Ishaat, 2000.  
Mahfud M.D, Moh. Politik hukum di Indonesia. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1998. 
———. “Perjuangan dan politik hukum Islam di Indonesia”. In 
Antologi pemikiran hukum Islam di Indonesia: Antara idealitas dan 
realitas, edited by Syamsul Anwar et al., 55-77. Yogyakarta: 
Fakultas Syariah, 2008.  
 ———. Membangun politik hukum, menegakkan konstitusi. Jakarta: 
Rajawali Press, 2010. 
Majda, T. “Libas”. In Encyclopeadia of Islam, 2nd ed. vol. V, edited by 
P.J. Bearman, et al., 732-753. Leiden: Brill, 1986. 
Mann, Michael. The sources of social power: The rise of classes and 
nation-state, 1760-1914. vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993. 
Martyn, Elizabeth. The women’s movement in post-colonial Indonesia: 
Gender and nation in a new democracy. London and New York: 
Routledge Curzon, 2005. 
Masudi, Masdar F. Agama keadilan: Risalah zakat (pajak) dalam Islam. 
Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1991. 
Mattson, Ingrid. “Status-based definitions of need in early Islamic 
zakāt and maintenance laws”. In Poverty and charity in Middle 
Eastern contexts, edited by Michael Bonner et al., 31-51. New 
York: New York University Press, 2003. 
Mernisi, Fatima. Beyond the veil: Male-female dynamics in modern 
muslim society. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1987. 
———. Women and Islam: An historical and theological enquiry. 




   
 
 
Messick, Brinkley. The calligraphic state: Textual domination and the 
history of muslim society. Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford: 
California University Press, 1992.    
———. “Shariʿa ethnography”.  In The law applied: Contextualizing the 
islamic shariʿa: A volume in honor of Frank  . Vogel, edited by Peri 
Bearman, Wolfhart Heinrichs and Bernard G Weiss, 172-294.  
London: I.B. Tauris, 2008. 
Milo, Ronald D. Immorality. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1984. 
Mir-hosseini, Ziba. “Sharia and national law in Iran”. In Sharia 
incorporated: A comparative overview of the legal systems of twelve 
muslim countries in past and present, edited by Jan Michiel Otto, 
319-372 Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010. 
Modeong, Supardan. Teknik perundang-undangan di Indonesia. 
Jakarta: Perca, 2004. 
Moors, Annelies. Muslim cultural politics: What’s islam got to do with it? 
Amsterdam: Vossiuspers UvA, 2004. 
———. “Fashionable Muslim: Notion of self, religion and society in 
Saná”. Fashion Theory 11, vol. 2/3 (2007):319-346.  
———. “The Dutch and the face-veil: The politics of discomfort”. 
Social Anthropology 17, no. 4 (2009):393-408. 
Muchtar,  Kamal. “K.H. Mohammad Dachlan: Departeman agama di 
masa awal Orde Baru”. In Menteri-menteri agama RI: Biografi 
sosial-politik, edited by Azyumardi Azra and Siaful Umam, 245-
267. Jakarta: INIS and PPIM, 1998.  
Mujiburrahman. Feeling threatened: Muslim-Christian relations in 
Indonesia’s new order. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2006. 
Muljadi, Arief. Landasan dan prinsip hukum otonomi daerah dalam 
negara kesatuan RI. Jakarta: Prestasi Pustaka Publisher, 2006. 
Muntoha. Otonomi daerah dan perekembangan peraturan daerah 
bernuansa Syari’ah. Yogjakarta: Safiria Insania Press, 2010.  
Murchison, Julian M. Ethnography essentials: Designing, conducting and 
presenting your research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010.   
314 
 
   
 
 
Mustakim. “Pelaksanaan Perda Kota Padang no. 6 tahun 2003 
tentang pandai baca tulis Al-Quran bagi peserta didik SD & MI: 
Study kasus penerpaan Perda di Kelurahan Gunung Sarik, 
Kecamatan Kuranji, Padang”. Master’s thesis, Andalas 
University, 2008.  
Mutahhari, Murtaza. On the Islamic hijab. Iran: Islamic Propagation 
Organization, 1987. 
Nanji, Azim. “Almsgiving”. In Encyclopeadia of the Qurʾān, edited by 
Jane Dammen McAuliffe, 64-70. Leiden: Brill, 2006. 
Nashir, Haedar. Gerakan Islam Syariat: Reproduksi salafiyah ideologis di 
Indonesia. Jakarta: PSAP, 2007. 
Naskah Tuanku Imam Bonjol, transliterated by Sjafnir Aboe Naim. 
Padang: PPIM, 2004.  
Nasution, Adnan Buyung. “The aspiration for constitutional 
government in Indonesia: A socio-legal study of the 
Indonesian konstituante 1956-1959”. PhD diss., Utrecht 
University, 1992.  
Ng’ndwe, Max. “Theory and practice of decentralization and 
legitimacy”. In Decentralization and legitimacy, edited by Arne 
Musch, 53-61. Leiden: Aladin Association for law and 
administration in developing and transitional countries, 2003. 
Nielson, Jǿrgen S. and Lisbet Christoffersen. Shariʿa as discourse: 
Legal traditions and the encounter with Europe. England and USA: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010.  
al-Nīsābūrī, Abī al-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad al-Waḥidi. Asbad al-nuzūl. 
3rd ed. Beirut: Dār al-Dhakhāʾir, 2004.  
Noer, Deliar. Administration of Islam in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, 1978.  
Noorhaidi. “Laskar jihad: Islam, militancy and the quest for 
identity in post-new order Indonesia”. PhD diss., Utrecht 
University, 2005.  




   
 
 
Nurdin, Ismail. Budaya organisasi polisi pamong praja. Bandung: 
UNPAD Press, 2010. 
Nurlaelawati, Euis. Modernization, tradition and identity: The kompilasi 
hukum Islam and legal practice in the Indonesian religious courts. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010.  
Nusyirwan, et al. Pendidikan Al-Qur’an untuk sekolah dasar/MI kelas 1-
6.  Padang: Penerbit Jasa Surya, 2009.   
Oluwu, Dele. “Democratic decentralization and multilevel 
governance in developing countries”. In Decentralization and 
legitimacy, edited by Arne Musch, 7-26. Leiden: Aladin 
Association for law and administration in developing and 
transitional countries, 2003.  
Osten, Philip and Albert Dekker. “Sharia and national law in 
Nigeria”. In Sharia incorporated: A comparative overview of the 
legal systems of twelve muslim countries in past and present, edited 
by Jan Michiel Otto, 553-612.  Leiden: Leiden University Press, 
2010.  
Otto, Jan Michiel. Sharia and national law in muslim countries: Tensions 
and opportunities for Dutch and EU foreign policy. Leiden: Leiden 
University Press, 2008.  
———. ”Sharia and national law in Indonesia”. In Sharia 
incorporated: A comparative overview of the legal systems of twelve 
muslim countries in past and present, edited by Jan Michiel Otto, 
433-490.  Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010.  
———, ed. Sharia incorporated: A comparative overview of the legal 
systems of twelve muslim countries in past and present.  Leiden: 
Leiden University Press, 2010. 
Panduan perjalanan haji. Jakarta: Departemen Agama, 2009. 
Paret, R. “Ḳirāʾa”. In Encylopedia of Islam, vol. V, edited by Boswarth, 
L.E, et al. 127-129. Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1986.  
Parker, Lyn. “Uniform jilbab: The Islamic headscarf is now 
compulsory in many high schools”. Inside Indonesia, no. 83, 
July-September 2005. Available at www.insideindonesia.org. 
316 
 
   
 
 
———. “Religion, class and schooled sexuality among Minangkabau 
teenage girl”. BKI 165, no. 1 (2009):62-94.  
Pembinaan polisi pamong praja. Jakarta: Departmeen Dalam Negeri, 
n.d. 
Permono, Hadi. Sumber-sumber penggalangan zakāt. Jakarta: Pustaka 
Firdaus, 1993. 
———. Pemerintah Republik Indonesia sebagai pengelola zakat. Jakarta: 
Pustaka Firdaus, 1992. 
Peters, R.S. The concept of motivation. 2nd ed. London: Rougledge and 
Kegen Paul, 1960.  
Peters, Rudolph. “From jurists’ law to statute law or what happens 
when the sharīʿa is codified?” In Mediterranean politics 7 
(2002):82-95. 
———. Crime and punishment in Islamic law: Theory and practice from 
the sixteenth to the twenty-first century. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
Pistorius, A.W.P. Verkerk. Studien over de inlandsche huishouding in de 
padangsche bovenlanden. Zalt-Bommel: Joh. Noman en Zoon, 
1871. 
Platvoet, Jan and Karel van der Toorn, eds. Pluralism and identity: 
Studies in ritual behavior. Leiden, New York and Cologne: E.J. 
Brill, 1995.  
PPIM.  “Islam and good governance”. 11th ed. July 2006, Jakarta: 
PPIM 
Pratikno. “Desentralisasi, pilihan yang tidak pernah final”. In 
Kompleksitas persoalan otonomi daerah di Indonesia, edited by 
Abdul Gaffar Karim, 33-56. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar and 
UGM, 2003.  
Profil. Profil 7 badan amil zakāt daerah provinsi & kabupaten potensial di 
Indonesia. Jakarta: IMZ, 2006. 
Profil.  Profile kesehatan Kota Padang 2010. Dinas Kesehatan Kota 
Padang: Padang, 2011. 
Purwakananta J.M. and Noor Aflah eds. Southeast Asia zakat 
movement. Jakarta: FOZ, DD, and Pemkot Padang, 2008. 
317 
 
   
 
 
Qodir, Zuly. Islam Syariah vis-à-vis negara: Ideology gerakan politik di 
Indonesia. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2007.  
al-Qurṭūbī, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Anshārī. al-Jāmiʿ al-aḥkām al-
qurʾān. vol. XII. N.p: Dār ʿulūm al-qurʾān, 1998.  
Rachman, Erlita. “Lomba perancang mode 1979-1996”. In Menjurus 
arus: Seperempat abad Femina: Mendorong kemajuan wanita 
Indonesia 1972-1997, edited by Dewi Anggraeni et al., 122-134. 
Jakarta: PT Gaya Favorit Press, 1997. 
Radjab, Muhamad. Semasa kecil di kampung 1913-1928: Autobiografi 
seorang anak Minangkabau. Jakarta: Balai Pusta, 1974.   
Rahardjo, M. Dawam. “Fungsionalisasi zakat dalam pencapaian 
kesejahteraan sosial”. In Islam dan kemiskinan, 39-49. Bandung: 
Penerbit Pustaka, 1988.  
———. “Manajemen zakāt”. In Pedoman pembinaan Bazis: Hasil 
pertemuan nasional I Bazis se Indonesia tanggal 3-4 Maret 1992, 5-35. 
Jakarta: Depag RI, 1992. 
Rahman, Fazlur. Islam. 2nd ed. Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1979. 
Ramly, Andi Muawiyah. ed. Demi ayat Tuhan: Upaya KPPSI 
menegakkan Syariat Islam. Jakarta: Open Society Institute (OPSI), 
2006. 
Rais, M. Amien. Cakrawala Islam: Antara cita dan fakta. Bandung: 
Mizan, 1987. 
Rasmussen, Anne K. Women, the recited Qurʾan and Islamic music in 
Indonesia. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press, 2010. 
Razki, Sita Dewi, Mity J. Juni and Rebecca Dahlan. Pakaian tradisional 
Kotogadang. Kotogadang: Yayasan Amai Setia, 2005. 
Riyanto, Edi, et al. Federasi atau disintegrasi. Jakarta: Madani Press, 
2000. 
Rizvi, Sayid Saeed Akhtar. Hijab (dress of modesty in Islam). Tanzania: 
Daar-es-Salam, 1992.  
318 
 
   
 
 
Romli, Mohmad Guntur. “Siswi-siswi kristen pun terpaksa 
berjilbab: Kewajiban busana muslim di Kota Padang”. Journal 
Perempuan 60 (2008):81-92. Jakarta: Jurusan Filasafat UI. 
Rosen, Lawrence. Bargaining for reality: The construction of social 
relations in a muslim community. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984. 
———. The anthropology of justice: Law as culture in Islamic society. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
———. The justice of Islam: Comparative perspectives on Islamic law and 
society. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.  
———.  Culture of Islam: Changing aspects of contemporary muslim life. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. 
———. Law as culture: An invitation. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006. 
Rosen, Lawrence and Robert West. A reader for research methods. 
New York: Random House, 1973. 
Sabra, Adam. Poverty and charity in medieval Islam: Mamluk Egypt, 
1250-1517. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Salim, Arskal. Partai Islam dan relasi agama-negara. Jakarta: PJPPR, 
1999. 
———. “Zakāt administration in politics of Indonesian new order”. 
In Shariʿa and politic in modern Indonesia, edited by Arskal Salim 
and Azyumardi Azra, 181-192. Singapore: ISEAS, 2005. 
———. “Muslim politics in Indonesia’s democratization: The 
religious majority and the rights of minorities in the post-new 
order era”. In Indonesia: Democracy and the promise of good 
governance, edited by Ross H. Mcleod and Andrew MacIntyre, 
115-137. Singapore: ISEAS, 2007.  
———. The shift in zakāt practice in Indonesia: From piety to an Islamic 
socio-political-economic system. Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2008a. 
———. Challenging the secular state: The islamization of law in modern 
Indonesia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008b.  
Salim, Arskal and Azyumardi Azra, eds.  Shariʿa and politics in 
modern Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS, 2003. 
319 
 
   
 
 
Sanit, Arbi. “Partai, masyarakat, dan DPRD: Kasus Padang, Agam 
dan Padangpariaman”. In Partai & parlemen lokal era transisi 
demokrasi di Indonesia, edited by Syamsuddin Haris, 249-311. 
Jakarta: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 2007. 
Scarce, Jennifer. Women’s costume of the Near and Middle  ast. 
London: Unwin  Flymen, 1987. 
Schacht, Joseph. An Introduction to Islamic law. Oxford: Clerendon 
Press, 1964. 
Schulz, Dorothea. “Sharia and national law in Mali”. In Sharia 
incorporated: A comparative overview of the legal systems of twelve 
muslim countries in past and present, edited by Jan Michiel Otto,  
529-552. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010.  
Scott, James. Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. 
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985.    
———. Resistance without protest: Peasant position to the zakāt in 
Malaysia and to the tithe in France.  Memorial Lecture, Asian 
Studies Association of Australia, 1986. 
Scott, Joan Wallach. The politics of the veil. Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2007. 
Shah, Anwar and Sana Shah. “The new vision of local governance 
and the evolving roles of local governments”. In Local 
governance in developing countries, edited by Anwar Shah, 1-46. 
Washington D.C: the World Bank, 2006.  
Shahid, W, and P.S van Koningsveld. “Muslim dress in Europe: 
Debates on the headscarf”. Journal of Islamic Studies 16, no. 1 
(2005):35-61. 
Shihab, M. Quraish. Jilbab: Pakain wanita muslimah. Jakarta: Lentera 
Hati and Pusat Studi Al-Quran, 2005.  
Shirazik, Faegheh. The veil unveiled: The hijab in modern culture. 
Florida: University Press of Florida, 2001. 
Siddiqui, Mona. “Veil”. In Encyclopeadia of the Qurʾān, vol. 5, edited 




   
 
 
Silalahi, Fransiska, “Kami kesel banget pake jilbab”. Interviewed by 
Journal Perempuan, 60, 116-119.  
Simorangkir, J.C.T. and B. Mang Reng Say. Tentang dan sekitar 
undang-undang dasar 1945. Jakarta: Penerbit Djembatan, 1975.  
Singer, Amy. Charity in Islamic societies. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008.  
Starrett, Gregory. Putting Islam to work: Education, politics and 
religious transformation in Egypt. Berkeley, Los Angeles and 
London: University of California Press, 1998. 
Stillman, Yedida Kalfon. Palestinian custom and jewelry. Santa Fe:  
University of New Mexico Press, 1979.    
———. “Libās”.  In Encyclopeadia of Islam, new ed. vol. V, edited by 
P.J. Bearman, et al., 732-747. Leiden: E.J.  Brill, 1986.  
———. Arab dress: From the dawn of Islam to modern times, A short 
history. 2nd ed. Edited by Norman A. Stillman. Leiden and 
Boston: Brill, 2003.  
Stowasser, Barbara Freyer. Women in the Qurʾan, traditions and 
interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.  
Syarifuddin, Amir. Pelaksanaan hukum kewarisan Islam dalam 
lingkungan adat Minangkabau. Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1981. 
Sudewo, Eri. “Perubahan paradigma dan reinterpretasi 
pendayagunaan zakāt”. In Reinterpretasi pendayagunaan ZIS 
menuju efektivitas pemanfaatan zakāt infak sedekah,  edited by 
Hamid Abidin, 143-161. Jakarta: Ford Foundation and Pirac, 
2004. 
al-Suyūṭī, ʿAbd Raḥmān ibn Abī Bakr. al-Iṭqān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾān. 
Cairo: Maktabat al-maṣhad al-ḥusayn, 1967. 
Tantawi, Ali. “The transformation of muslim dress in Indonesia: 
Identity, politics and trends”. Master’s thesis. Leiden 
University, 2009. 
Thaha, Idris, ed. Berderma untuk semua: Wacana dan praktik filontropi 




   
 
 
Tibi, Bassam. Islam between culture and politics. Hampshire: Palgrave, 
2001.  
Thomas, N.M. “On the headscarves and heterogeneity: Reflection 
on the France foulard affair”. Dialectical  Anthropology 29 
(2005):373-386. 
Vredenbregt. J. “The haddj: Some of its features and functions in 
Indonesia”. In BKI 118, no. 1 (1962):91-154.  
Vikør, Knut S. Between God and the sultan: A history of Islamic law. 
London: Hurst and company, 2005.    
Vogel. Frank E. Islamic law and legal systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia. 
Leiden: Brill, 2003.  
———. “Saudi Arabia: Public, civil, and individual shariʿa in law and 
politics”. In Shariʿa politics: Islamic law and society in the modern 
world, edited by Robert W. Hefner, 55-93. Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011.  
Voll, John Obert. Islam: Continuity and change in the modern world. 
New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994.  
Wassef, Nadia. “On selective consumerism: Egyptian women on 
ethnographic representation”. Feminist Review 69 (2001):111-
123.  
Wasti, Tahir. The application of Islamic criminal law in Pakistan: Sharia 
in practice. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009.  
Weimann, Gunnar Jochen. Islamic criminal law in Northern Nigeria: 
Politics, religion, judicial practice. PhD diss., Amsterdam 
University Press, 2010.  
Weir, {A. Zysow}, T.M. “Ṣadaḳa”. In Encyclopeadia of Islam, new ed. 
vol. VII. Edited by C.E. Bosworth, et al., 708-716. Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1995. 
Wehr, Hans. A dictionary of modern written Arabic. 4th ed. Edited by J. 
Milton Cowan. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1979. 
Weiss, Bernard G. The spirit of Islamic law. Athens and London: The 
University of Georgia Press, 1998.  
Wensinck, A.J. A handbook of early muhammadan tradition. Leiden: 
Brill, 1927.  
322 
 
   
 
 
 ———. Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane. vol. III. 
Leiden: Brill, 1955.  
West Sumatra in figure 2010. Padang: Statistic of West Sumatra 
Province, 2010.    
Wibisono, Jusuf. Islam dan sosialisme. Jakarta, 1950. 
Wiktorowicz, Quintan, eds. Islamic activism: A social movement theory 
approach. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 2004. 
Winter, Bronwyn. “Secularism aboard the titanic: Feminists and 
the debates over the hijab in France”. Feminist Studies 2 
(2006):279-298.     
Wiwowo B., et al. eds. Zakāt dan pajak, Jakarta: Bina Rena Pariwara, 
1991.  
Wrong, Dennis H. Power: Its forms, bases and uses. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 1979. 
Yamani, Mai. “Changing the habits of a lifetime: The adaptation of 
Hejazi dress to the new social order”. In Languages of dress in 
the Middle East, edited by Nancy Lindisfarne-Taper and Bruce 
Ingham,  55-66. Great Britain: Curzon, 1997. 
Yamin, H. Muhammad. Naskah persiapan undang-undang dasar 1945. 
vol. 1. Jakarta: Yayasan Prapanca, 1959. 
Yassari, Nadjma and Mohammad Hamid Saboory. “Sharia and 
national law in Afhanistan”. In Sharia incorporated: A 
comparative overview of the legal systems of twelve muslim countries 
in past and present, edited by Jan Michiel Otto, 273-318. Leiden: 
Leiden University Press, 2010.  
Yavuz, M. Hakan. “Turkey: Islam without shariʿa?” In Shariʿa politics: 
Islamic law and society in the modern world, edited by Robert W. 
Hefner, 146-178. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 2011.  
Yusuf, Slamet Effendy and Umar Basalim. Reformasi konstitusi 
Indonesia: Perubahan pertama UUD 1945. Jakarta: Pustaka 
Indonesia Satu, 2000.  
323 
 
   
 
 
Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. The ulama in contemporary Islam: 
Custodian of change. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2002. 
———. “Pakistan: Shariʿa and the state”. In Shariʿa politics: Islamic law 
and society in the modern world, edited by Robert W. Hefner, 207-
243. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
2011.  
Zarkasyi, Muchtar. “Permasalahan yang dihadapi pemerintah 
dalam penelolaan zakāt selama ini di Indonesia”. Paper is 
presented in the National submit of BAZNAS-BAZDA in Jakarta, 
30 January 2010. 
Zein, Kurniawan, and Sarifuddin.  Syariat Islam yes, Syariat Islam no. 
Dilema piagam Jakarta dalam amandemen 1945. Jakarta: 
Paramadina, 2001. 
Zimmerman, Michael J. The immorality of punishment. Toronto: 
Broadview Press, 2011. 
Zubaida, Sami. Law and power in the Islamic world. London and New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 2003. 
Zweigenhaft, Richard L and G. William Domhoff. Diversity in the 
power elite: How it happened, why it matters. Lanham: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006.  
al-Zuhaylī, Muṣṭafā Wahba. Fiqh al-islāmī wa-ʿadillatuh. Damascus: 
Dār al-fikr, 1997. 
Zysow, A. “Zakāt”. In Encyclopeadia of Islam, new ed.  vol. XI, edited 
by P.J. Bearman, et al. 406-422. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2002.  
 
 
2. Laws and regulations 
 
2.1 Constitution  
The Constitution of 1945  
The Constitution 1945 - the first amendment of 1999 
The Constitution 1945 - the second amendment of 2000 
The Constitution 1945 - the third amendment of 2001 
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The Constitution 1945 - the fourth amendment of 2002 
 
2.2 Decisions of MPR 
Decision XV/MPR/1998 on the implementation of local autonomy.  
Decision III/MPR/2000 on the source and hierarchy of laws and 
regulations. 
Decision IV/MPR/2000 on recommendations for the 
implementation of local autonomy. 
Decision IX/MPR/2000 on the establishment commission to 
prepare the amendment of the 1945 Constitution.   
 
2.3 Law 
Law   1/1946 on penal code 
Law 13/1961 on police  
Law 19/1964 on judicial authority 
Law 18/1965 on principles of local government 
Law 14/1970 on principles of judicial authority 
Law   1/1974 on marriage 
Law   5/1974 on principles of local government  
Law   7/1974 on gambling. 
Law   8/1981 on criminal procedure code 
Law 14/1985 on the supreme court 
Law   7/1989 on the islamic court 
Law 10/1989 on the banking system 
Law   7/1992 on the banking system 
Law 11/1999 on regional autonomy 
Law 17/1999 on organizing the journey of the ḥajj 
Law 22/1999 on local government 
Law 23/1999 on the Bank of Indonesia 
Law 25/1999 on fiscal balance between central and local 
government 
Law 35/1999 on the amendment of law 14/1970 (on principles of 
judicial authority) 
Law 44/1999 on the implementation of special autonomy for Aceh 
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Law 38/1999 on the management of zakāt. 
Law 18/2001 on special autonomy for the province of Aceh as the 
province of Nangroe Aceh Darussalam.  
Law 20/2003 on the national education system. 
Law 22/2003 on the bank of Indonesia 
Law   3/2004 on the amendment of law 23/1999 (on the Bank of 
Indonesia) 
Law   4/2004 on judicial authority 
Law   5/2004 on the amendment of law 14/1985 (on the Supreme 
Court) 
Law 10/2004 on procedures in the preparation of laws and 
regulations 
Law 32/2004 on local government. 
Law 33/2004 on fiscal balance between the central and local 
governments 
Law 41/2004 on waqf. 
Law  8/2005 on the acknowledgment of the government regulation 
in lieu of law on law 32/2004 (on local government as law) 
Law   3/2006 on the amendment of law 7/1989 (on Islamic court) 
Law 11/2006 on the government of Aceh. 
Law 13/2008 on organizing the journey of the ḥajj 
Law 19/2008 on Surat Berharga Syariah Negara  
Law 21/2008 on the Islamic banking system. 
Law 36/2008 on the fourth amendment of law 7/1983 (on income 
tax) 
Law 44/2008 on pornography.  
Law  3/2009 on the second amendment of law 14/1985 (on the 
Supreme Court)  
Law 34/2009 on the acknowledgment of the government 
regulation in lieu of law on law 13/2008 (on organizing the 
journey of ḥajj as law) 
Law 48/2009 on judicial authority 
Law 50/2009 on the second amendment on law 7/1989 (on the 
Islamic court)  
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Law 12/2011 on the procedure in the preparation of laws and 
regulations 
Law 23/2011 on the management of zakāt 
 
2.4 Government Regulations 
PP 28/1977 on waqf 
PP 9/1975 on the implementation of marriage law 
PP 1/1981 on the implementation law 7/1974 (on gambling) 
PP 27/1983 on the implementation of criminal procedure codes  
PP 6/1998 on the civil service police unit 
PP 25/2000 on the authority of the central and provincial 
governments as autonomous governments  
PP 32/2004 on the civil service police unit 
PP 38/2007 on the distribution of authority among central, 
provincial and regional/municipal governments 
PP 41/2007 on the organization of local government  
PP 5/2007 on religious education  
PP 18/2009 tentang Bantuan atau sumbangan termasuk zakāt atau 
sumbangan yang sifatnya wajib yang dikecualikan dari objek 
pajak penghasilan   (aids or charity including zakāt or 
obligatory aids) 
PP 60/2010 tentang zakat atau sumbangan keagamaan yang 
sifatnya wajib yang dapat dikurangkan dari penghasilan bruto 
(zakāt and other forms of religious obligatory charity that may 
deduct the gross income) 
PP 6/2010 on the civil service police unit 
 
2.5 Presidential decrees 
President decree 1/PNPS/1965 on hatred, heresy and blasphemy 
offences 
President decree 188/1998 on the procedure in the preparation of 
drafts of law 
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President decree 44/1999 on techniques in the preparation of 
regulations, drafts of law, government regulations,  and 
presidential decisions 
President decree 11/2003 
President decree 55/2007 
 
2.6 President instruction 
President instruction 1/1991 on the compilation of Islamic law 
 
2.7. Supreme Court and Constitutional Court  
Supreme Court Decision 1/2004 on judicial Review rights 
 
2.7 Ministerial decision 
Joint ministerial decision 8 and 9/2006 on places of worship 
 
2.8 Qanun 
Qanun   3/2000 on the establishment of MPU, 
Qanun   5/2000 on the implement sharīʿa in Aceh,  
Qanun   7/2000 on customary law and sharīʿa,  
Qanun 43/2001 on the administration of MPU and the establishment of  
    the plenary council  
Qanun 10/2002 on the establishment of sharīʿa courts.  
Qanun 11/2002 on shar implementation of sharīʿa in the fields of theology 
     (aqīda), ritual (ibāda) and public expression of sharīʿa (syi’ar).  
Qanun 32/2002 on the religious educational system based on the Qurʾān 
     and Ḥadīth. 
Qanun 11/2003 on the prohibition of drinking alcohol and similar  
 beverages  
Qanun 13/2002 on the prohibition of gambling  
Qanun 14/2003 on the prohibition of khalwat   
Qanun   7/2004 on zakāt.  
Qanun 11/2004 on the tasks and duties of the sharīʿa police 
 
2.9 Provincial law 
Provincial law of West Sumatra 11/2001 - on prevention and 
elimination of public immorality 
Provincial law of West Sumatra 3/2007 - on Quranic education 
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Provincial law of West Sumatra 2/2009 - on the implementation of 
education 
 
2.10 Municipal laws 
Municipal law of Bukittinggi 9/2000 - on public order and 
elimination of public immorality 
Municipal law of Bukittinggi 20/2003 - on the amendment of the 
municipal law of Bukittinggi 9/2000 (on public order and 
elimination of public immorality) 
Municipal law of Bukittinggi 29/2004 - on the management of 
zakāt. 
Municipal law of  Padangpanjang 3/2004 - on prevention and 
elimination public immorality 
Municipal law of Padangpanjang 7/2008 - on the management of  
zakāt.  
Municipal law of Padang 6/2003 - on the obligation for elementary 
school students to be able to recite the Quran  
Municipal law of Padang 14/2004 - on the civil service police unit 
Municipal law of Padang 11/2005 - on public order and peace 
Municipal law of Padang 2/2010 - on the management of zakāt 
Municipal law of Payakumbuh 4/2007 - on prevention and 
elimination of public immorality  
Municipal law of Sawahlunto 19/2006 - on prevention and 
elimination public immorality 
 
2.10 Kabupaten/municipal law 
Regional law of Bulukumba 03/2002 - on the prohibition of abusing 
alcoholic beverages 
Regional law of Sambas 3/2004 - on the prohibition of prostitution 
and pornography  
Regional law of Sambas 4/2004 - on the prohibition of gambling 
Regional law of Agam  5/2005 - on the obligation to be able to 
recite the Quran 
Regional law of Agam 6/2006 - on Muslim dress code. 
329 
 
   
 
 
Regional law of Agam 14/2007 - on the management of zakāt 
Regional law of Limapuluh  Kota 6/2003 - on the obligation for 
students and bridegrooms to be able to recite the Quran 
Regional law of Limapuluh Kota 5/2005 - on Muslim dress code 
Regional Law of Padangpariaman 02/2004 - on prevention and 
elimination of public immorality 
Regional law of Pasaman 22/2003 - on Muslim dress code 
Regional law of Pesisir Selatan 31/ 2003 - on the management of 
zakāt 
Regional law of Pesisir Selatan 8/2004 - on the obligation for 
students and bridegrooms to be able to recite the Quran and 
perform prayers 
Regional law of Pesisir Selatan 4/2006 - on prevention and 
elimination of public immorality 
Regional law of Sawahlunto/Sijunjung 1/2003 - on the obligation 
for students, civil servants and bridegrooms to be able to recite 
the Quran 
Regional law of Sawahlunto/Sijunjung 2/2003 - on Muslim dress 
code for student and civil servant 
Regional law of Solok 6/ 2002 - on Muslim dress code 
Regional law of Solok 13/2003 - on zakāt, infāq and sadāqa 
Regional law of Solok 10/2004 - on the obligation for students of 
elementary, junior and senior high schools, and bridegrooms 
to be able to recite the Quran  
Regional law of Solok Selatan 6/2005 - on Muslim dress code 
 
2.11 Decision of Governor, head of region/mayor 
Decision of the head of region of Limapuluh Kota 26/2003 - on the 










Dit werk beschrijft hoe Sharia-wetgeving, in Indonesië gewoonlijk 
Perda Sharia (Sharia-verordeningen) genoemd, is geïntroduceerd 
op provinciaal, regionaal en gemeentelijk bestuursniveau in West 
Sumatra, Indonesië. Dit proces is begonnen vanaf het 
decentralisatiebeleid dat de Indonesische overheid in 2000 inzette. 
Hoewel de wet op lokale autonomie voorschrijft dat religieuze 
zaken niet onder het gezag van de lokale overheid vallen, wordt 
Sharia-wetgeving door de lokale autoriteiten gelegitimeerd met 
het argument dat Sharia, in aanvulling op Minankabau 
gewoonterecht (adat), een identity marker van het volk is geworden 
(zoals het lokale gezegde luidt: ‘adat is gebaseerd op de Sharia, 
Sharia is gebaseerd op de koran’ [adat basandi Syara’, Syara’ basandi 
Kitabullah/ABSSBK]). De Sharia-verordeningen die in dit boek 
behandeld worden, vallen in vier categoriën: publieke moraliteit, 
moslimse kledingvoorschriften, de verplichting om in staat te zijn 
de koran te reciteren en islamitische liefdadigheidsinstellingen. 
Deze dissertatie onderzoekt de volgende stadia van verwezelijking 
van Sharia verordeningen: het wetsvoorstel, het maatschappelijk 
en parlementaire debat erover en tenslotte de tekst en 
implementatie ervan. Een conclusie is dat de legitimatie voor 
Sharia-wetgeving op lokaal niveau discutabel is, niet in de laatste 
plaats omdat er geen expliciete regel is die de lokale autoriteiten 
het gezag geven om Sharia-wetgeving in te voeren.  
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